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The pattern of American institution building through private funding began in metropolises of all 
sizes soon after the nation’s founding. But by 1840, Manhattan’s geographical location and great 
natural harbor had made it America’s preeminent commercial and communications center and 
the undisputed capital of finance. Thus, as the largest and richest city in the United States, 
unsurprisingly, some of the most ambitious cultural institutions would rise there, and would lead 
the way in the creation of a distinctly American model of high culture. 
This dissertation describes New York City’s cultural transformation between 1840 and 
1940, and focuses on three of its enduring monuments, the New York Public Library, the 
Metropolitan Museum of Art, and the Metropolitan Opera. It seeks to demonstrate how trustees 
and financial supporters drove the foundational ideas, day-to-day operations, and self-
conceptions of the organizations, even as their institutional agendas enhanced and galvanized the 
inherently boosterish spirit of the Empire City. Many board members were animated by the dual 
impulses of charity and obligation, and by their own lofty edifying ambitions for their 
philanthropies, their metropolis, and their country. Others also combined their cultural interests 
with more vain desires for social status.  
Although cohesive, often overlapping social groups founded and led most elite 
institutions, important moments of change in leadership in the twentieth century often were 
precipitated by the breakdown of a social order once restricted to Protestant white males. By the 
1920s and 1930s, the old culture of exclusion—of Jews, of women, of ethnic minorities in 
general—was no longer an accepted assumption, nor was it necessarily good business. In 
general, institutions that embraced the notion of diversity and adapted to forces of historical 
change tended to thrive. Those that held fast to the paradigms of the past did not.  
Typically, when we consider the history and development of such major institutions, the 
focus often has been on the personalities and plans of the paid directors and curatorial programs. 
This study, however, redirects some of the attention towards those who created the institutions 
and hired and fired the leaders. While a common view is that membership on a board was 
coveted for social status, many persons who led these efforts had little abiding interest in 
Manhattan’s social scene. Rather, they demanded more of their boards and expected their fellow-
trustees to participate in more ways than financially. As the twentieth century beckoned, rising 
diversity in the population mirrored the emerging multiplicity in thought and culture; boards of 
trustees were hardly exempt from this progression.  
This dissertation also examines the subtle interplay of the multi-valenced definition of 
“public” along with the contrasting notion of “private.” In the early 1800s, a public institution 
was not typically government funded, and more often functioned independent of the state, 
supported by private individuals. “Public,” instead, meant for the people. Long before the 
income tax and charitable deductions for donations, there was a full range of voluntary 
organizations supported by private contributions in the United States. This dissertation argues 
that in a privatist spirit, New York elites seized a leadership role, both individually and 
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It is only fitting that a dissertation with the word “funders” in the title should begin by 
acknowledging those who helped finance this project. I am indebted to Columbia University’s 
Department of History for taking a chance on this unconventional student and extending me a 
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these same old friends, as well as my husband, Jeffrey Paley, my children, and my parents shared 
my pain, and my triumphs, with me. It was also their sacrifice, as they lost me temporarily to the 
challenges of the academy, and I thank them for their unconditional love, and for enduring and 
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“The founders of the older museums were strong-minded, opinionated, dictatorial men with a 
curiously one-sided sense of public obligation. All the larger American cities had them—mostly 
new millionaires determined to show that they could be Duveen more per square inch of canvas 
and cubic inch of marble or bronze than any competitor. They bargained better than they knew, 
and we can now sift out and rearrange the loot. We owe them much, however, and those who 
now inherit what they collected and hoarded should never forget it.” 
 







In the eighteenth century, when the French Revolutionary government transformed the Louvre 
Palace into the first truly modern art museum, it was professing an already commonly held 
belief: public art museums were evidence of political virtue and a government that did right by 
its people.1 Indeed, in Europe, culture has always been a public entitlement and a government 
responsibility, like health care or education. In the United States, by contrast, this historically 
was never the case, and most museums and cultural institutions have been born of the private 
sector and funded primarily by wealthy individuals and private foundations. In the mid-
nineteenth century, American civic leaders recognized that culture could enrich and ennoble the 
nation’s cities as it had in Europe’s great capitals. Challenging Europe’s cultural leadership in a 
purely American way, through the efforts of private citizens rather than though the direction and 
funding of government, would represent a great accomplishment for those who had engineered 
it, and provide a source of pride for the nation as a whole.  
Unlike Europeans, Americans looked to their resources, not to birth in a privileged class, 
as the means by which to measure merit. But even in a country in which rank was conferred by 
the size of one’s fortune, and the idea of aristocracy was disdained in theory if not always in fact, 
money alone could not buy social status or insure lasting political influence or power.2 How 
could such members of the haute bourgeoisie parlay their financial accomplishments into a 
means of gaining influence?3 Leadership in the cultural arena conferred a status of a more 
substantial and enduring variety.  
The pattern of American institution building through private funding began in 
metropolises of all sizes soon after the nation’s founding.4 But by 1840, Manhattan’s 




and communications center and the undisputed capital of finance. Thus, as the largest and richest 
city in the United States, unsurprisingly, some of the most ambitious cultural institutions would 
rise there, and would lead the way in the creation of a distinctly American model of high culture. 
This dissertation describes New York City’s cultural transformation between 1840 and 
1940, and focuses on three of its enduring monuments, the New York Public Library, the 
Metropolitan Museum of Art, and the Metropolitan Opera. It seeks to demonstrate how trustees 
and financial supporters drove the foundational ideas, day-to-day operations, and self-
conceptions of the organizations, even as their institutional agendas enhanced and galvanized the 
inherently boosterish spirit of the Empire City.5 Many board members were animated by the dual 
impulses of charity and obligation, and by their own lofty edifying ambitions for their 
philanthropies, their metropolis, and their country.6 Others also combined their cultural interests 
with more vain desires for social status.7  
In the early nineteenth century, as historians have observed, the young republic 
encouraged a utilitarian attitude towards the arts that paid little heed to aesthetics, bespeaking the 
practicality of a democratic society.8 The mingling of the “vernacular” popular culture of the 
masses with the “high” culture of the European tradition was common; in New York, for 
example, P. T. Barnum’s “museum” was essentially a cabinet of curiosities that included Indian 
arrows and two-headed pigs, along with casts of Greek sculpture and paintings by Gilbert Stuart 
and Thomas Sully.9 The human landscape was equally diverse, and the classes mingled 
comfortably, albeit sometimes tenuously, in public places, including cultural venues. In fact, the 
notion of the museum in Europe arose partly from the impetus to rationalize the disorder of not 
only varied collections, but also a broad citizenry.10 As the nineteenth century progressed in the 




Politics, earlier a means of ascent, was by the 1870s dominated in New York City by political 
“bosses,” who drew their support from “unwashed” immigrants. The pursuit of this manner of 
collectivized power became socially problematical.11 Thus, by participating in the founding 
moments of cultural institutions, some affluent New Yorkers were able to set themselves apart 
while publicly asserting and assuring their city’s future in the cultural domain.12 
At the outset of this research was a larger question. In a capitalist economy, it was 
perhaps inevitable that the wealthiest metropolis in the United States should become its cultural 
capital. But apart from donations, how did trustee leadership explain institutional prosperity? The 
nineteenth-century founders of the library, the museum, and the opera built cultural models for 
the city and ultimately the nation because of their ability to adapt to shifting economic and social 
circumstances. While the American bourgeoisie in the Reconstruction era fell short of the 
ambition to create a national art institution on the order of the Louvre or London’s National 
Gallery of Art because of elite factionalism and provincial social divisions, New Yorkers 
persisted in their efforts in a different way.13 The comparatively fluid nature of the city’s social 
class divisions, from top to bottom—with the currency of mobility being money—provided the 
basis for eventual institutional growth and success, and the steady supply of wealthy newcomers 
guaranteed it. Social openness, together with rapid growth, replenished philanthropic leadership 
with fresh funds and ideas.  
The prevailing lore about Gotham represents the city as one predicated on Dutch 
tolerance for any citizen dedicated to making a guilder. Even so, the tendency towards 
“openness” and possibility is more broadly American—as exemplified by the metaphor of the 
frontier, or the Horatio Alger myth. The growing urban centers of the nineteenth century, 




immigrants. Certain cities, however, were not welcoming of difference at the top rungs of the 
social ladder. In this sense, Gilded Age Manhattan, a place of “sunshine and shadow,” but also a 
place where social acceptance was less dependent on family lineage than on family wealth, 
exemplified perhaps the most “democratic” manifestation of class movement, making it a 
compelling place to realize the “American dream”—at least for white men.  
Although cohesive, often overlapping social groups founded and led most elite 
institutions, important moments of change in leadership in the twentieth century often were 
precipitated by the breakdown of a social order once restricted to Protestant white males.14 By 
the 1920s and 1930s, the old culture of exclusion—of Jews, of women, of ethnic minorities in 
general—was no longer an accepted assumption, nor was it necessarily good business. Jewish 
New Yorkers like George Blumenthal, a Lazard Frères partner who became the Metropolitan 
Museum’s board president in 1934, or Otto Kahn, a Kuhn Loeb partner who helped shape the 
Metropolitan Opera, played vital roles in the organizations they served, as did Eleanor Belmont, 
the first woman elected to the opera’s board in 1933.15 Yet all three would have been prohibited 
from leadership roles in the nineteenth century. In general, institutions that embraced the notion 
of diversity and adapted to forces of historical change tended to thrive. Those that held fast to the 
paradigms of the past, such as the New-York Historical Society, did not. An institution’s relative 
success or failure can be measured many ways: by the legacy of programs; by public attendance 
numbers; by an expansion in purpose or collections; by new funds or donations; by the opinions 
of the press or public intellectuals; or by the positive adaptation of these models in other cities. 
Or simply by the endurance of an organization’s reputation. The New York Public Library, the 
Metropolitan Museum of Art, and the Metropolitan Opera more than survived; they became 




institutions, influenced as much by the city’s uniquely diverse social culture as by its dominant 
financial one. 
*** 
In 1944, as the trustees of the Metropolitan Museum pondered the institution’s seventy-
fifth anniversary, board president William Church Osborn was uneasy about commissioning 
another book describing the museum’s founding. “I am glad to have this matter taken seriously 
in hand,” he wrote to a fellow-trustee, “as certainly the results of the first history were 
lamentable.”16 His colleague concurred. “The trouble with all institutional histories is that they 
are not read,” he replied.17 
The trouble, actually, lies in the fact that official institutional biographies are often more 
mythic than historical, and read more as triumphal narratives of visionary heroes than stories of 
individual men and women identifying and addressing a gap in the circumstances of a historical 
moment. Moreover, there are few “smoking guns” in the institutional archives. Prejudices, 
personal associations, and Machiavellian motivations are all but erased. What remains are the 
corporate documents and official minutes that sketch out the subjects of meetings but not the 
arguments, as well as the letters and notes sometimes so trivial as to warrant the thought of how 
they ever escaped the trash can. These records do not provide much evidence of the drama of the 
rumored back-story. In reality, all institutions rise up around an age and place populated with 
living and breathing people, and are contextualized by events that affect expectations, 
aspirations, and conclusions. The characters participate in a more nuanced negotiation of power 
and leadership than the official record or institutional biographies betray. 
So what is the purpose of retelling the stale founding tales of institutional ascendency and 




institutions within larger cycles of change. Typically, when we consider the history and 
development of such major institutions, the focus often has been on the personalities and plans of 
the paid directors and curatorial programs. This study, however, redirects some of the attention 
towards those who created the institutions and hired and fired the leaders. While a common view 
is that membership on a board was coveted for social status, many persons who led their efforts 
had little abiding interest in Manhattan’s social scene. Rather, they demanded more of their 
boards and expected their fellow-trustees to participate in more ways than financially. As the 
twentieth century beckoned, rising diversity in the population mirrored the emerging multiplicity 
in thought and culture; boards of trustees were hardly exempt from this progression.18 Yet while 
the legitimacy of the argument for the value of leadership diversity in the cultural realm has 
become patently obvious in current decades, even with the significant presence in the 1920s and 
1930s of the Kahns, the Blumenthals, and the Belmonts, the benefit of having outsiders on 
boards was less apparent in their own time.19  
This dissertation examines a more subtle interplay, by turns simple and perplexing. At its 
core is the multi-valenced definition of “public.”20 In the nineteenth century, Americans in 
general and New Yorkers in particular had a unique notion of what constituted a public 
organization, and indeed, who “the public” was. In the early 1800s, a public institution was not 
typically government funded, and more often functioned independent of the state, supported by 
private individuals. “Public,” instead, meant for the people, which had an unerringly democratic 
ring to it. But who were the people? In the case of the early subscription libraries, they were 
those who could afford to pay the membership fee. “Public” in that construction did not 




private individuals dedicated to the public good and avoided government intervention 
completely.21  
In contrast was the notion of “private.” To Alexis de Tocqueville, in the 1820s and 1830s 
the spirit of voluntarism in America was astonishing. Long before the income tax and charitable 
deductions for donations, there was a full range of voluntary organizations in the young country 
supported by private contributions. Yet Sam Bass Warner has argued that privatism—the 
financial dependence on individual enterprise and not community action—was the cause of both 
urban success and failure. If the first purpose of the American citizen was the private search for 
wealth, the city consequently became “a community of private money makers.” This was 
detrimental to Philadelphia, which as a “private city” produced no powerful group that 
understood or appraised it as “a public environment of a democratic society.”22 This dissertation 
argues that in contrast, New York elites seized a leadership role, both individually and 
collectively, and became cultural arbiters. There is no overstating that a different sort of 
privatism, combined with New York’s wealth and prosperity, allowed philanthropists the 
discretion to have a disproportionate impact on the city’s cultural infrastructure.	  
Unlike Warner, Peter Dobkin Hall has countered that the voluntarist impulse actually was 
democratic.23 By the 1870s, this notion of egalitarianism attained its most complete expression 
through private action encouraged but not mandated by government support.24 The Metropolitan 
Museum of Art and the American Museum of Natural History, to name but two of the large, 
early institutions, were founded and funded by persons with superior abilities rather than 
inherited privilege.25 But while oversized ambitions were perfectly reasonable and in fact 
predictable for nineteenth-century trustees and city boosters to have, the oversized encyclopedic 




Thus began a negotiated interplay of authority and accommodation, in which a cultural 
institution’s leaders evaded public control even as they pursued public resources.26 In the case of 
the Metropolitan Museum, for example, with shared private and public responsibilities, who, 
then, was the institution’s rightful owner—the trustees or the city? Furthermore, what precisely 
was the institution’s function, and under whose authority was it established? Was it ultimately a 
place to display a donor’s sophistication and largesse, or a place to advertise American cultural 
refinement? The civilizing affects of art and culture were high on the trustee agenda in an 
apprehensive era of rapid human and physical expansion and the accompanying fears of disorder. 
High culture had a social and even political role to play in this context, with the ability to elevate 
thoughts and aesthetically gentrify both the middle and lower classes.27 
While there was no definitive answer to these questions, the one idea that satisfied all 
parties was the somewhat loose assertion that the museum was founded for the education of the 
public. Privately, however, the trustees and staff acknowledged their trepidation that the “great 
unwashed” also might violate the sanctity of the museum and perhaps even the works on 
display.28 
The trustees of the Metropolitan Opera House, founded in 1880, avoided this issue by 
funding the venture privately. Fundamentally, the auditorium was established as a private 
clubhouse for the rich. Although there were enough seats for the paying public—who functioned 
as the audience for both the cultural display onstage and the social display in the boxes—the 
public in fact was irrelevant to the opera house’s founders. Adding to the bifurcated nature of the 
endeavor was another Metropolitan Opera leadership entity governed by a separate board of 
trustees that administered the performing company. Its mission to bring world-class opera to the 




Another more local bifurcation was the issue of non-profit versus profit-making 
endeavors, which mirrored the more visible tensions between high and low culture and the thin 
delineation between them. Early not-for-profit cultural institutions were the domain of 
philanthropists who were committed to dual local and national agendas of uplift for their fellow-
citizens. New York’s surfeit of moneyed plutocrats and would-be philanthropists in the Gilded 
Age assured firm financial footing for their projects. With money came the assumption that 
trustees could put their own tastes and values on display without taking into consideration what 
the public wanted, but rather only what the public should want. Having claimed high culture as 
their own, in part to reinforce their class status, elites sought to institutionalize it for everyone 
else.29 Prior to the professionalization of museums and libraries, curatorial alternatives were few, 
and collections and program building usually fell to board members. 
While the early character of cultural institutions was marked by this intuitive approach, 
the museum trustees were certain that there was no mistaking their venture for one of P. T. 
Barnum’s productions. Barnum gave the people what he thought they wanted, and did not much 
care about either taste or uplift. His focus was on entertainment and profit.30 Yet his museum was 
also a private effort intended for the public, but with one major distinction: it was a commercial 
venture. 
Barnum unapologetically embraced the tensions of high and low culture when he 
sponsored the Swedish diva Jenny Lind’s American concert tour to sold-out audiences in 1850-
52. As Lawrence W. Levine has described, opera and theater (Shakespeare in particular) in the 
nineteenth century began as neither a “high” nor “low” art form but rather was entertainment 
appreciated across classes experiencing it together in close spaces.31 In time, culture itself 




museums and entertainments, and the low, following Barnum’s popular, profit-generating 
standards. In the 1870s, with both high and low culture accessible to the middle class, American 
taste was somewhere in between.32 
The New York Public Library, the Metropolitan Museum, and the Metropolitan Opera, to 
varying degrees, therefore constantly faced the dialectic of private and public influence. 
Underpinning this tension was a contest of authority between the trustees and the public their 
institutions served. At the Library, this was manifest in the debate over the primacy of reference 
over circulation systems. The public reference library was the domain of gentlemen-collectors, 
and was the template that Astor and Lenox favored for the nineteenth-century libraries that bore 
their names. Rare books and scholarly treasures were in closed stacks; visitors could page and 
read them only in the library during the restricted hours of opening. This model did not cater to 
the larger public. Circulation libraries, conversely, loaned out both classic and popular works for 
home use and served that portion of the public—the so-called “other half”—that could not afford 
to buy books. The trustees of the New York Public Library, aided by Andrew Haswell Green’s 
audacious schemes of consolidation and Andrew Carnegie’s bold $5.2 million donation, 
managed to break the paradigm of “either/or” and deliver a library that served both the reference 
and circulation needs of the colossal city. However, the fact that the dual tasks of funding the 
buildings and operations were shared in an intricate division of responsibilities between the 
private and public-municipal factions of the enterprise added yet another layer to the complex 
system. Dependent on the city government for resources, institutions also maintained political 
independence through the equal financial footing, not to mention entire programmatic 




In the case of the museum, in an often-told decisive moment in the institution’s history, 
in the late 1880s one faction of the trustees held out against public opinion and the majority of 
citizens in forbidding the museum to open on Sundays. The story affords another reading not to 
retell the tale of the elites versus the masses, but to offer another example of the way trustees 
responded to changing times and contexts, and the divided orientations among private 
individuals directing a public enterprise. Ironically, many men on the board opposed to the 
Sunday opening were leaders in organizations devoted to addressing the health, education, and 
welfare of the urban underclass, precisely the group that stood to benefit from the museum’s 
larger education agenda. And yet the unyielding faction remained blind to the demands of the 
city. The so-called “masses” saw the museum as theirs, too, and the incident scrutinized and 
tested the limits of private authority. Ultimately, the museum opened on Sunday, and public 
perception, and attendance records, changed for the better, while more progressive trustees like 
Robert de Forest and William Sloane Coffin rose to leadership.34 
For the opera, the divisions between the entity that controlled the opera house and the one 
that managed the performing troupe quietly festered for years. But the real estate board had 
always had an indifferent and almost dismissive attitude towards the public. The situation 
escalated in the 1930s, when, via the radio, the opera returned to its nineteenth-century iteration 
as entertainment for a broad cross-section of the public. This called into question not only the 
character of the art form but the nature and management of the Metropolitan Opera itself. The 
venture, in fact, had been as much about the physical theater as it was about operatic 
performance. As the locus for the self-defining social interactions that took place among the 
nineteenth-century founders in the boxes, the opera house building was more important for the 




auditorium was required to be large and attractive not so much to accommodate the opera-going 
public, but in order to rival the houses of Europe as a backdrop for a self-styled American 
aristocracy. As it was, opera endured in popularity across the classes into the twentieth century, 
and interest exploded when the Metropolitan began broadcasting performances over the radio. 
The audience quickly expanded into the millions, and the elegant old venue on Broadway and 
Thirty-ninth Street was supplanted by the new virtual “theater” of living rooms across the United 
States. Even so, the public might have remained insignificant to the Metropolitan Opera Real 
Estate trustees were it not for the near-bankruptcy of the endeavor during the Depression. Radio 
listeners pooled their small change to answer the call to save the opera season in 1933, and the 
old guard was forced to accept and embrace the very people who once had been inconsequential 
to its program of conspicuous display. The public again came to the Metropolitan’s aid in 1935 
when it joined Mrs. Belmont’s “democratically” oriented Opera Guild, the proceeds of which 
helped sustain the company’s program. Finally, in 1940, through public appeals, the 
Metropolitan Opera Association bought the opera house from the beleaguered and broke 
aristocrats of the Metropolitan Opera Real Estate Company. “Cathedrals are built with pennies of 
the faithful,” Eleanor Belmont wrote.35  
While these incidents are but three of many examples of the underlying private-public 
dichotomy in the three institutions, they underscore a larger argument. In the face of changing 
times, adhering to an antiquated protocol or expectation of the past would fail an institution 
programmatically as much as obeying a social culture of exclusion on the board would fail an 
institution financially. Indeed, these stories were characteristic of the diverse intersection of 
ideas, people, and events in the early twentieth century that distinguished the multiplicity of 




which began in the 1870s and 1880s during the founding eras of these institutions, became a 
national impulse in the Progressive era that ushered in the twentieth century.37 When trustees 
recognized the larger cultural change and contingency, they made their institutions stronger.  
The dissertation is divided into three parts. The first, “In Pursuit of an American 
Culture,” situates the early trustees in their institutions’ founding periods from the 1840s through 
the early 1880s. In the context of a rapidly expanding metropolis, elite New Yorkers were moved 
to fund and conceptualize cultural projects that might compete with those of the capitals of 
Europe. In the absence of an American template, they adapted European institutional models and 
benefited from the authority accorded them in terms of social stature in life as well as in death.  
Part Two, “Into the Twentieth Century,” focuses on the period from the 1880s through 
the 1910s and structural building for the institutions—both physical and programmatic—within a 
local context of consolidation and a national environment of progressivism and growing social 
variety. The trustees in this period, most of them continuing from the founding time, were 
building on the conceptual framework they had established. The elegant, monumental 
architecture for their institutions, in turn, communicated the extravagance of their ambitions. At 
the Public Library, the combined entities of Astor, Lenox and Tilden, along with a windfall from 
Andrew Carnegie, established the venture as one in keeping physically, intellectually, and 
spiritually with the growing population of Greater New York. In 1880, the Metropolitan Museum 
moved into the initial building of a permanent complex in Central Park, broadcasting visually 
and physically its grand institutional aspirations to rise to the status of the Louvre and the British 
Museum. During J. P. Morgan’s tenure as president, the inclination for progressive-era efficiency 
and professionalism drove a corporate-styled program of “Morganization” while moneyed 




Metropolitan Opera, Otto H. Kahn emerged with both initiative and capital to professionalize 
and galvanize the performing group into a company rivaling the troupes of Europe. 
Part Three, “The Spirit of the New Humanism,” covers the first four decades of the 
twentieth century, and casts the institutions within the changing circumstances prefiguring the 
Depression and WWII, and the modernist values, both from within and outside the boardroom, 
that affected the directions of the institutions. These years were dominated by large personalities 
addressing multiple purposes and a changing financial, political, and social landscape. At the 
library, the diversity of programs was matched only by the range of users. At the museum, the 
tenures of board presidents de Forest and Coffin, marked by a progressive and modern spirit, 
contrasted with the conservatism of George Blumenthal, who succeeded them in the 1930s. The 
opera, too, entered the modern era with a plan to move from the nineteenth-century auditorium—
ultimately scuttled by an ambivalent old guard that did not anticipate impending financial 
catastrophe, and who almost sacrificed the entire endeavor in the process. 
After WWII, with European cities in ruins, New York City legitimately became the 
cultural capital of the world, a status to which its leaders had aspired and indeed claimed for 
almost a century. Émigrés in the arts and letters came to the city to work and share ideas that 
influenced the work of local talents. American culture in a creative sense had come to be 
designated by not only the manufacture and appreciation of high art, but associated with the 





In Pursuit of American Culture 
 
 
On August 4, 1838, a small, untitled article in the Christian Register and Boston Observer 
announced an unprecedented act in United States history: John Jacob Astor, the wealthiest 
American of the day, “with an enlightened and liberal spirit,” was donating $350,000 and a 
parcel of land to the City of New York for the creation of a public library.1 A handful of libraries 
had long existed in the city: the Society Library, founded in 1754; the New-York Historical 
Society, founded in 1804; and other similar “social” libraries in New York that were supported 
by the contributions of members. But none were entirely “public” in the way Northeastern 
libraries were becoming by the 1830s. Astor’s munificence would help make up for Gotham’s 
deficiency in this area.2 But in reality, in terms of culture, the city was backward in all respects. 
 In 1838, New York was already the commercial center of the United States, but the 
country’s intellectual centers were Boston and Philadelphia. Even Baltimore, Charleston, and 
New Orleans were contenders in the perpetual contest for the title of the most cultivated 
metropolis. The British traveler Frances Trollope, however, thought New York to be “a lovely 
and a noble city,” and “as much superior to every other in the Union (Philadelphia not excepted) 
as London to Liverpool or Paris to Rouen.”3 Yet compared to London, Paris, or Vienna, all 
American cities, including New York, remained unsophisticated backwaters that could only 
glorify aspects of what was most original aesthetically about the New World: the utilitarian, the 
practical, the “democratic,” and the downright banal. Americans simply had no “usable past.”4 
 Journals in Boston and Philadelphia immediately issued notices claiming that the Astor 
announcement was a hoax. “What would New Yorkers do with books?” the Journal of Belles 




 The rumors were unfounded. Astor’s library proceeded as planned and opened in 1854 on 
Lafayette Place, the “cultural center of the city,” and boasted a collection of books organized by 
the scholar Joseph Green Cogswell; an elegant Italianate building that quickly became a tourist 
attraction; and an endowment that furthered its expressed purpose to endure as the first free 
public reference library in the United States.6 And it was in New York: self-consciously and 
extravagantly positioning itself as always as the first of American cities in all things. 
 Astor’s project was emblematic of the ambitions of both the mid-nineteenth century city 
and its rich citizens with philanthropic desires. By the 1890s, 45 percent of all wealthy 
Americans were living in New York City and its environs, so that even if a prevailing impulse 
among all urban leaders was to help pull the country out of its cultural illiteracy by building great 
institutions, it was inevitable that the largest efforts would rise in Gotham.7 These founders and 
funders were inflamed with a sense of social responsibility—sometimes religiously, sometimes 
personally motivated—to elevate fellow-New Yorkers of all classes. And as the nation’s 
financial elite, they had the arrogance to believe that they also had the taste and aesthetic 
judgment to determine the programs and directions of their new institutions. In light of the 
absence of a defined professional cultural class of trained curators or directors, this attitude was 
to a certain extent justified. Moreover, funding the endeavors gave the early trustees, for better or 
for worse, this prerogative.  
 With a grand urban public space, Central Park, as its anchor, the city by the 1870s had 
two major libraries and many smaller ones; two growing museums devoted to fine art and to 
natural history; a philharmonic society; and a famous opera house, the Academy of Music. All of 
these began with private funds and initiative, although trustees’ public spiritedness would be 




social landscape. Many of the men instigated the movement to break the city’s corrupt political 
Tweed ring, although machine politics ultimately would prevail and thus provide a reason for 
cultural arbiters to distance themselves from politicians and municipal authority—even if it 
meant rejecting public funds. But by and large, their private wealth and status enabled trustees to 
function independently anyway—not only of the city government, but sometimes of the 
institutions themselves, as in the case of a new entity that challenged the Academy of Music’s 
primacy. By the 1880s, the Metropolitan Opera House had emerged with a distinguished new 
program that elevated the American operatic standard even as it also elevated the social ranking 
of the individuals who founded it.  
 Part One considers the library, museum, and opera projects in New York in their 






By the 1850s, Americans were becoming exposed to European humanism and scholarship in an 
exchange as steady as clipper ship departures and arrivals. But the impulse was still to develop a 
uniquely American intellectual perspective. New England in particular had seized upon this 
growing rational sensibility, which blossomed in a transcendentalist charge that every man, in 
Ralph Waldo Emerson’s words, was far from “cheap and vile,” but rather was “a fagot of 
thunderbolts.”1 Ultimately, the works of Henry David Thoreau, Nathaniel Hawthorne, Herman 
Melville, Walt Whitman, and Emerson represented the long-sought beginnings of an American 
literary culture.2 Meanwhile, scholars and thinkers studied and wrote in private libraries filled 
with books and documents from abroad.3 Poised from within this atmosphere were the men who, 
crediting the small social libraries that had contributed to their commercial successes, sought 
ways to fund libraries as public necessities for Americans. 
Even though the free public library as Americans came to know it originated in Boston in 
the 1850s, a precursor was the tax-supported school district library for adults, which the New 
York State legislature had passed into law in 1835.4 These libraries’ purpose was to provide free 
reading for the population at large.5 But the notion of what defined “public” and under what 
parameters a library for the people’s use might be organized was fraught with ambiguities. If the 
old social library had been considered public because it was open to anyone willing to pay for 
the right to use it, the “free public library” emerged with funding from private philanthropists 
with public spirits, and created with the intention for the institution to be open for all. But the 
term “public” also implied that the venture had a municipal or state-controlled function, and with 




organizational authority and control. So, too, did many of the cultural institutions that came into 
being later in the nineteenth century. 
In the end, the political bureaucrat was no match for the passionate philanthropist in the 
realm of cultural leadership. And where board composition was concerned, private funders were 
wary of politicians who were possibly partisan, and generally unsophisticated. The spirit of all 
cultural endeavors, it was hoped, was nobler than that. But the reality of institution building was 
expensive and potentially beyond the resources of even the richest philanthropists. In New York, 
this tenuous relationship of private and public interests would play out in its cultural program in 
distinctive ways well into the twentieth century. 
*** 
In 1854, the year the Astor Library opened, so did the Academy of Music.6 Located at the 
corner of Fourteenth Street and Irving Place, the opera house was the most elegant and largest 
auditorium in the United States with a capacity of approximately three thousand, and was the 
first large cultural institution built in New York City. It had excellent acoustics, but with too 
many bad seats with little or no view, it soon was deemed a “decided failure.”7  
The Academy’s opening night diva, Giulia Grisi, was hardly an icon like the “Swedish 
Nightingale” Jenny Lind, who would later visit New York in triumph in 1856. Wrapped in 
ermine, the “queen” who had seen “the adoring capitals of Europe fall prostrate at her feet” could 
not move her American audience, which was either “exhausted or insensible.”8 The call for 
“three cheers” for James Henry Hackett, the opening season’s opera manager, also was greeted 
with silence.9 It is not clear whether the audience’s indifference signified displeasure or a general 





While there was no disputing New York’s wealth and commercial influence after the 
Civil War, building an appropriate cultural infrastructure for the city as significant as its physical 
one was proving to be more complex. Prominent New Yorkers shared a fervent desire for 
Gotham to be transformed from a provincial American city into a formidable world metropolis, 
not only in terms of wealth, but also in terms of civilization. The success of the Academy of 
Music was yet another agent of this civic agenda. In a republican nation just contemplating the 
margins of its unique culture, and negotiating who, if anyone, was responsible for it, such 
institution building would be arduous. For now, rich New Yorkers were taking up the cause, if 
not for the city or the country, then for themselves. 
At the time of the Academy’s construction, the mysterious air of exclusivity about the 
building and its fundamental purpose caused much speculation and pessimism. It was not known 
how was the theater being funded, and what its management was going to be.10 Indeed, what 
motivated a group of wealthy men to fund, build, and oversee an auditorium dedicated to Italian 
opera? James Phalen, a local real estate millionaire, presided over approximately eighty 
stockholders who paid $1,000 a share to guarantee them ownership of the parterre boxes, and 
give them a controlling interest in the theater.11 The exclusiveness of the Academy plan was not 
objectionable, however, so long as it remained a private enterprise, independent of the public: “If 
they are quite sure of support on the plan of making the house exclusive, or apportioning its best 
and most eligible privileges to themselves, whether to make their own circle conspicuous as 
friends of Art, or from the less selfish motive of giving to the opera a fashionable rather than a 
popular tone, by all means let the scheme go on, without opposition, as a private and select one,” 




Did social self-interest or the desire for a fashionable diversion occasion the Academy of 
Music? Private funds were financing an essentially private venture, in an overpowering display 
of cultural hegemony and affluence within the larger social arena of the city. New York’s wealth 
in the 1850s was growing exponentially: “plebeian and parvenue [sic] are growing rich, and the 
‘best families,’ already rich by inheritance, increasing their store,” observed the Daily Times. 
Perhaps there were now enough “ambitiously disposed” New Yorkers to support Grand Opera 
without looking to city’s ever-expanding the masses.13 Or perhaps exclusiveness was itself the 
idea. The “best families” wished to differentiate themselves from the plebeian sort, and 
attendance at the opera, wearing the requisite fashionable accessories, was a simple way to 
accomplish this. How else in a republic could anyone really tell the patrician from the parvenu?  
Consequently, Italian opera in the United States was “every where a luxury,” paid for by 
“those who enjoy it,” Harper’s observed.14 By contrast, European opera houses were either 
subsidized by the government (as in Italy and France) or by royal families (as in Germany, 
England, and Russia). In Europe, such “faddish indulgences” could thus be more easily 
sustained, as could other more educational institutions for the public like libraries or art 
museums. Harper’s predicted that American financiers would not long be able to maintain the 
struggle.15 In London, a nobleman had a box at the opera as a “part of the play” of being an 
aristocrat. Accordingly, the “traveled gentry” brought opera to America hoping for something 
similar.16 
Moreover, without government support in England, the opera might have languished. The 
English allegedly were not “a musical people,” although perhaps a notch above Americans, who 
appeared to know only two tunes: Yankee Doodle and Old Folks at Home. While New Yorkers 




which theater—the old Park, the Bowery, Niblo’s Garden, or Astor Place—were for the most 
part unsuccessful. True, in all large American cities there would always be a large group of 
appreciative operagoers, although these were not of the class that could support an opera house.17 
The ironic truth was that European immigrants and the middle class often had a deeper 
understanding of the operatic art than did the wealthy Americans that aspired to their self-
proclaimed royalty. 
 In spring 1866 the Academy of Music burned to the ground, giving occasion to reflect on 
the theater’s short past and its potential future. In a little over a decade, opera in New York had 
begun to gain international recognition. New York City and the Academy had begun a trend that 
had led to the erection of similar opera houses in other large American cities.18 Cynical critics, 
however, stressed the social culture of the Academy’s audience over the high culture onstage.19 
When the rebuilt auditorium opened, the social status quo of the boxes remained, as did the 
question of whether it was built to showcase opera stars or the opera-going aristocracy. In time 
this divide would prove fatal to the Academy, and would be revisited in the Metropolitan Opera 
House that followed it.20 
*** 
 But clearly there was an idea in the air that considerable American financial resources 
could stimulate an American culture. Some New Yorkers had the hubris, the money, and the 
boosterish urban pride to be consumed with the notion that if such a culture was developing in 
the United States, the best formal institutions to legitimize it should be in New York, which by 
1825, for better or worse, was the nation’s art center.21 The plan for a museum of art was next.  
 On November 23, 1869, William Cullen Bryant, the distinguished journalist, poet, and 




proposal to establish a permanent art museum in New York City, “for the benefit of the people at 
large.”22 Although smaller art galleries and repositories existed in the United States, and the 
Wadsworth Athenaeum was established in 1842 as the first free-standing public art museum, as 
of 1869, there was no large-scale art institution. 
 The provenance of this discussion was a July 4, 1866 dinner in Paris attended by a festive 
Franco-American group. After the meal, according to the Times of London, New Yorker John 
Jay gave a “lively and amusing speech on ‘the American invasion of the Old World.’”23 
Although the account noted that the celebration, held at the elegant Pré Catalan Restaurant in the 
Bois de Boulogne, included one tent for dancing and two for refreshments, and lasted until 
nearly midnight, the report gave no indication that Jay’s witty commentary would initiate what 
would become the American museum movement.24 Americans might have invaded the Old 
World in body, but a provincial spirit still lingered over the cultural life of the post-Civil War 
New World. For Jay, whose namesake and grandfather had been the first chief justice of the 
United States, it “was time for the American people to lay the foundation of a National 
Institution and Gallery of Art.” Some of those at the July 4 celebration in Paris were just the men 
to inaugurate the plan.25 
 Returning to New York in 1866, Jay’s associates took up the subject of a national gallery 
of art at meetings at the Union League. The club, at the vanguard of late nineteenth-century 
institution building and cultural and political stewardship, was founded in 1863 under the 
ideological premise of helping to preserve the Union. But it also organized practical initiatives 
involving the public at large like the United States Sanitary Commission, and assisted in the 
drives to erect the Statue of Liberty in New York Harbor and the Lincoln Monument in Union 




to outfit American soldiers.26 Upon his homecoming, John Jay was elected the club’s president, 
and, with its august art committee, initiated a public forum to reflect on their ambitious plan for 
an art museum.27  
 Elihu Root, who attended the early talks, noted that American taste was in a decidedly 
“dreadful” period in the decades between the presidencies of Jackson and Grant. “The newly 
awakening desire of the American people for art was finding expression in sawed scrollwork and 
basswood towers. The women of America, with all the innate and natural taste of womanhood, 
were pressing autumn leaves and doing crude worsted work as an expression of art,” he recalled 
haughtily.28 
 Nevertheless, in November 1869 Bryant came to address a “sea of upturned faces”—a 
large and varied representation of artists, editors, architects, lawyers, merchants, and others.29  
While there was still no precise scheme for how such a museum might be built, the public 
needed to be apprised of the importance of taking “early and effectual measures” for establishing 
it. The esteemed man of letters noted that while no similar project was planned in any other 
American city, New York clearly was unrivalled in many other ways as a standard bearer for the 
nation.30 “Our City is the third great city of the civilized world,” he said. “Our republic has 
already taken its place among the great Powers of the earth; it is great in extent, great in 
population, great in the activity and enterprise of her people. It is the richest nation in the 
world.”31 And New York was the richest metropolis in the United States. 
 Yet Gotham had “hardly made a step” towards establishing an art museum. In a leitmotif 
that had been repeated in other early cultural institutions in New York, political sponsorship 
under Tweed and Tammany leadership would be foolhardy to depend upon. Nevertheless, Bryant 




possibly could have a monumental museum of fine arts. Even Spain, “a third-rate Power of 
Europe and poor besides,” had a museum of fine arts, “the opulence and extent of which 
absolutely bewilder the visitor.”32  
 But if American money could not buy sophistication, it could buy art. Americans in the 
nineteenth century had “invaded” the Old World only in the sense that nineteenth-century 
nouveaux riches men and women of leisure, many if not all born of the “middling” classes, were 
traveling to Europe on grand tours that included spending sprees on fine art and objets of both 
authentic and questionable quality. As Europeans sniffed that America had no cultural future, 
American city builders had to reckon with the prevailing notion that art could be cast in idealistic 
as well as nationalistic terms, measuring a country’s success as a society by its artistic taste.33 
Nineteenth-century collectors were only beginning to recognize the potency of this view, and 
their role in realizing it. August Belmont and A. T. Stewart had amassed large collections of 
European and American art, and some wealthy Manhattanites even opened their mansions to the 
public on select days for viewing. Bryant, however, wondered where these works might find a 
more permanent and public home.  
New York City was the obvious place for such a museum. If the metropolis, as Bryant 
declared, was now a “great mart of the Western World,” with greatness came responsibilities that 
leaders like the Union League Club members embraced. Those who used the term “empire” to 
contemplate and link America’s destiny with the growth of an international capitalist order, also 
saw New York City as the fulcrum where the nation and the world were joined.34 
But Bryant also recognized the dark side of ascent. He anticipated with agitation that an 
increased population—the “aggregation of human life”—would yield “a concentration of all that 




sunshine of philanthropy and talent came the shadow of squalor and poverty. Bryant was not 
alone in surmising that to counteract the vice and crime lurking in “such mighty and crowded 
populations,” art was crucial to elevating the character of the city as a whole.36 The proposed 
museum would be more than a vessel for containing works of art. It would be an instrument of 
moral uplift and a means by which Americans could display and acquire taste. 
*** 
With the emergence of the Astor Library and the Academy of Music, New York was 
already beginning to build cultural institutions appropriate for a great city. But in 1869, a 
purpose-built art museum was not yet part of the plan. It fell as always to the rich, but also the 
cultural aesthetes and the artists themselves to galvanize support for this latest attempt to place 
the United States on the world stage culturally.37 Yet control over these organizations also 
ascribed trustees with the power of defining New York’s cultural identity—something they were 
very self-consciously encouraging.38 
The Union League meeting featured other supporters in addition to Bryant, and they had 
no shortage of ideas. A young professor of art history from Princeton University, George Fisk 
Comfort, reminded his audience that they “were not developed from a race of indigenous 
barbarians, as was the case with European nations,” thus giving the Americans license to 
contemplate the project from a stance of relative superiority.39 Even though Comfort conceded 
that where artistic education and production were concerned, his country was “lamentably 
deficient,” he was convinced that Americans could “build a museum that would surpass any now 
in existence,” even some of the “most conspicuous” galleries in Europe, which, at least 
architecturally, were failures.40 And he was equally sure that the location of the new repository 




The park, which began construction in 1858, was already a landmark, drawing more than 
seven million visitors a year.42 Comfort wagged a finger at those who could afford to join its 
opulent carriage parade, but who lacked the finesse to demand an art museum there, or 
anywhere, in New York. “Again, a museum of art would promote a very valuable taste for 
improvement to that large class of our population who have several hours to spare every day, 
who ride up through the Park and through the avenues, and then return home.”43 Like the park 
itself, the museum could influence and inspire everyone.  
The assembled mix of artistic, financial, and political authorities heard arguments for the 
museum from every perspective: from the aesthetic, to the patriotic, to the political, to the moral. 
Richard Morris Hunt, the founder and president of the American Institute of Architects, pledged 
the assistance of the city’s architects in erecting the new building. Henry G. Stebbins, the 
president of the Central Park Commission, said that the Park Commissioners would “gladly 
render any aid in their power to promote the enterprise.”44 After other related commendations, 
Henry W. Bellows, a Union League founder, president of the Sanitary Commission, and rector of 
All Soul’s Church, closed the meeting with a final appeal for the proposed museum to “redeem 
our civilization from the gross materialism into which our abundant wealth and lack of culture 
were drifting us.”45 This was no longer a local Union League Club affair, if it ever was.46  
In the days following, the “great art enterprise” was reported with anticipation and 
enthusiasm, although the Tribune was quick to note that the idea of an American art museum or 
of art collecting in general was nothing new.47 In fact, “scores of public-spirited men” had 
discussed the subject for years.48 “It is a singular trait of our impulsive and energetic people,” the 
Tribune sniffed, “to discuss questions without ascertaining what has been discovered and 




has previously been accomplished in the premises.”49 Instead of concentrating resources, efforts 
had been too numerous and varied to gain any traction. Invariably, this was a waste of “time, 
talent, and means.”50 
Yet Bryant and Comfort’s sermonizing about the need for an art museum betrayed a 
public insecurity and self-consciousness about a larger issue. A museum on a grand scale was a 
sign of civility as well as civilization, and those who attended the meeting regarded themselves 
as the bearers of such refinement. As much as the United States was on an upward trajectory in 
innovation and prosperity, the country as a whole was ignorant of an artistic perspective or an 
empowering aesthetic sensibility so natural to European nations. This new art museum was being 
founded on the enormous ambition to be not only a repository, but also a symbol of national 
progress. Museums and the men who built them were summoning the power “to make all classes 
acquainted with the beautiful and curious manifestations of the human mind, and the lovely and 
interesting works of men’s hands.”51  
And yet there were also competing preconceptions about who the museums were for. 
Were they for art students, for the new leisure class, for city builders, or for the underclass? Or, 
in the name of uplift, were art museums for the entire society, and indeed, the entire nation? If 
the purpose was educative, whose values were being promoted, and whose taste was the model? 
“The want of such a museum is not the want of a place of amusement, nor even of a new 
adornment of our city and attraction to strangers. It is the want of an essential means of high 
cultivation,” the Metropolitan Museum officers later explained. New York certainly could not 
boast of any cultural institutions of the stature of those in London or Paris. But the trustees’ 
intent was broader than such parochialism; they were making an appeal for American culture as 




Most Americans associated museums with “chaotic gatherings of curiosities and 
monstrosities, real or artificial, united to dramatic entertainments,” like at P. T. Barnum’s, or 
with the richly decorated palaces in Europe, filled with fine art but arranged around no particular 
curatorial or historical plan. In fact, the mingling of the “vernacular” popular culture of the 
masses with the “high” culture of the European tradition was common: Barnum’s emporium 
displayed fine art along with scientific curiosities.53 The talk, indeed, was of educating and 
refining a nation as much as it was about establishing a museum. 
*** 
 Museums had emerged in eighteenth-century Europe, although merchant princes, 
aristocrats, and scholars during the Age of Discovery for decades had been organizing their 
personal collections—consisting of an ironically Barnumesque range of fine art to natural history 
specimens—into refined “cabinets of curiosities” for their private enjoyment. In time, these 
storehouses were opened to researchers, and eventually, to the educated public. Absent the 
context of royal treasuries or palaces, the American perspective was different: borne of a 
republican ideal, the museum functioned as a mode of enlightenment for the citizenry, an 
edifying and inspirational place that was but one aspect of the larger project of nation building. 
Museums in the United States, like the one Charles Willson Peale founded in 1784 in 
Philadelphia, were, in addition, typically market driven and open to the admission-paying public. 
By the nineteenth century, American city builders in New York and elsewhere, fueled by 
growing industrial power and prosperity and the nationalistic desire to compete with the old 





 Similarly, early library efforts were part of a national movement from cultural immaturity 
to maturity. The Lockean spirit behind American democratic thought—of inalienable rights that 
helped an individual to fulfill his or her abilities and advance the progress of society as a 
whole—fueled public library support in the larger quest for “useful learning.”55 Privately, 
American men of means privately began to collect books and documents, and more publicly 
organized voluntary library associations in which members contributed to a general fund for 
book purchase, owned in common.56 Because of the ad hoc nature of these early libraries, 
eventually an official arrangement evolved similar to the privately controlled public services 
such as education and water supply in Great Britain.57 Yet the founders of American social 
libraries were operating under a broader conviction that their purpose was to encourage the 
public pursuit of knowledge and virtue.  
 Although Americans looked to Europe for culture, there was no perfect model to replicate 
in terms of museums. As Americans bought up old masters and transported them away from the 
Old World, cities like Washington and Boston were beginning to build their own art museums in 
1869.58 But New York, with its hundreds of rich families, had the easiest path to make a museum 
happen, as evidenced by the founding of the American Museum of Natural History earlier that 
year. With its oversupply of millionaires, New York did not anticipate encountering much 
difficulty in raising money or gathering art for a respectable gallery. But Boston, with a little 
over one-fourth of New York City’s population, also had its share of wealthy men and cultivated 
potential donors.59 It had important institutions including the Massachusetts Historical Society 
(the first such American repository), the Athenaeum, the Public Library, the American Social 




Harvard University. The competitive impulse towards museum building was multidimensional: 
one part altruism, one part egotism, one part paternalism, one part local pride.60  
Even so, some observers balked at the stir caused by New York’s museum proposal, 
claiming it to be unoriginal. Indeed, the New-York Historical Society was already a major 
repository. Founded in 1804 as both a museum and a library, it had assembled a fine art 
collection by 1857, when it moved into its new state-of-the-art fireproof headquarters built with 
private funds.61 In 1858, it had received the holdings of the New-York Gallery of the Fine Arts, 
comprised of the collection of Luman Reed, a patron of early nineteenth-century American art. 
The same year, James Lenox presented the Society with the “Lenox Marbles,” a large collection 
of Nineveh sculptures.62 Two years later, through a public subscription, the institution raised 
funds to purchase the Abbott collection of Egyptian artifacts, considered to be the greatest 
representative Egyptian works in America.63 In the 1860s, it purchased 433 of the 435 original 
watercolor paintings for John James Audubon’s Birds of America, and Thomas J. Bryan donated 
381 works of primarily European art.64 Every year, new additions arrived.65 By 1869, however, 
the building had grown inadequate. Consequently, the land for an art museum in Central Park 
was already earmarked for the Historical Society, and in both 1862 and 1868, the New York 
State legislature even had designated specific building sites.66  
The Historical Society, then, was unquestionably the preeminent museum in Manhattan 
at the time of the Civil War. Why start yet another?67  
Unfortunately, the Historical Society members and leaders were pedigreed gentlemen of 
small means. Thus, they were more typical of insular Philadelphia and Boston than of the 
moneyed metropolis on the Hudson. Furthermore, the institution had become too exclusive an 




their hands dirty negotiating with the likes of Boss Tweed, and relied instead on private largesse. 
Significantly, the Historical Society rejected the more practical notion of a merger with the 
Metropolitan Museum because its trustees thought that some of its sponsors were not 
gentlemen.68 Not surprisingly, the venerable old museum failed to raise the money for a new 
building.  
Actually, the dream of a fine art museum in New York preceded even the New-York 
Historical Society.69 But early attempts were hampered by haphazard senses of purpose and 
organizational exclusivity. In 1800, Manhattan’s only museum belonged to the Tammany 
Society, a “fraternity of patriots” who were “solemnly consecrated to the independence, the 
popular liberty, and the federal union of the country.”70 The Society’s first Sagamore, John 
Pintard, conceived of the museum in 1790 and opened it in 1791, devoted to the enormous, 
ambitious, and somewhat ill-defined mission “of collecting and preserving everything relating to 
the history of America, likewise, every American production of nature or art.”71 (A little over a 
decade later, Pintard adapted a version of the same mission when he founded the New-York 
Historical Society.)72  
Another venture was the American Academy of the Fine Arts, founded in 1802 by Robert 
R. Livingston, the American ambassador to France. It secured plaster casts of ancient sculptures 
from the Louvre, and it combined exhibitions with lectures, schools, a library, and “other 
agencies in art education,” modeled along the lines of the Royal Academy in England.73 Its 
leaders and subscribers included famous citizens like Aaron Burr, Robert Fulton, De Witt 
Clinton, David Hosack, and Cadwallader D. Colden, but its exhibitions “were not suited to a 
novelty-seeking public,” nor was its stockholding membership comprised of artists.74  




institutional encouragement of art in New York. In reaction, the National Academy of Design 
and the American Art Union were formed in the 1820s and 1830s.75 Both were influential in the 
developing cause of American artistic literacy and the production and sponsorship of the work of 
living artists in the mid-nineteenth century. But both catered to a cultured elite. 
New York also had significant private art collections. In the 1830s, like other notable art 
patrons, the merchant Luman Reed opened his home at 13 Greenwich Street once a week to 
visitors who wanted to view works by the contemporary artists Asher B. Durand and Thomas 
Cole, among others. The third-floor rooms became a congenial place for artists and literary men 
to meet and exchange ideas. Upon Reed’s death in 1836, his friends purchased his entire 
collection to establish the New York Gallery of the Fine Arts. Its trustees were made up mostly 
of wholesale grocers, even though William Cullen Bryant numbered among them. “Why, these 
people know more about pork and molasses than they do about art!” uttered James Gordon 
Bennett of the New York Herald.76 In any case, the institution was financially unsustainable, and 
its holdings became part of the New-York Historical Society in 1858. 
The following year, Peter Cooper founded the Cooper Union for the Advancement of 
Science and Art, the first organization in the United States dedicated to the free education of the 
working classes. The Cooper Union also maintained a reading room, art galleries, and scientific 
collections. By its fifth year, over 150,000 people visited the art gallery alone.77  
 These and other smaller art galleries qualified as proto-museums founded to promote art 
or artists. But none had the broader ambitions, vision, and wider influence of the new proposal of 
1869. A new standard was underway in New York’s cultural milieu, one that recognized the 
passing of the city from a colonial trading post to an international metropolis. But the movement 




that was becoming emblematic of the city as a whole. In no other city was this unique confluence 





CHAPTER ONE  
“For the Advancement of Useful Knowledge”:  
Private Libraries for the Public Good 
 
 
Sometime in 1837, upon returning home from a European tour of private libraries, Joseph Green 
Cogswell, a Harvard-trained educator and editor of the New York Review, was summoned by 
John Jacob Astor, America’s first multimillionaire. Shrewd in business and frugal with money, 
Astor, a once-penniless immigrant, had built a fur trading and real estate empire, and was being 
criticized for giving very little back to the society that had enriched him. At some point, possibly 
on the advice of his friend and biographer Washington Irving, he became consumed with the idea 
of endowing New York City with a library, and he had determined that Cogswell was the ablest 
man to help him in that pursuit. A public library “for the Advancement of Useful Knowledge” 
might perpetuate the Astor name while serving a more grandiose mission to give the city’s 
people access, through a distinguished collection of books, to the culture of the world.1  
Although Astor had a reputation for being miserly and uncouth, Cogswell liked the “old 
gentleman,” who had ingratiated himself to other intellectuals like Irving, Gerrit Smith, and Fitz-
Greene Halleck as well.2 After their first meeting, Cogswell wrote in his journal that Astor spoke 
well on many subjects and showed great interest in the arts and literature.3 Intrigued, Cogswell 
moved into Astor’s home at Hell Gate and for ten years developed his library’s plans, not only 
determining the terms of the bequest, but also assembling the fine collection itself by attending 
auctions and buying books in the United States and abroad.4  
When the library opened in 1854, the New-York Daily Times acknowledged that the 
building was less ostentatious than anticipated, and that the number of books was exaggerated.5 




no match in rank with the books gathered over centuries that were housed in the public libraries 
of Europe. At the Astor Library, there were two miles of shelves for an initial eighty thousand 
volumes. By comparison, the British Museum had fourteen miles’ worth. More important, the 
American library, like the British one, was intended less for “cursory readers” than for 
professionals and scholars. The books were closely guarded by librarians in closed stacks and not 
to be taken from the building.  
The Astor Library was open without charge to “all persons” over age fourteen (later 
increased to sixteen). Its hours were limited, which, along with the lack of popular literature, 
indicated a less-than-wholehearted desire to accommodate the reading public. By 1892, in fact, 
Life published a cartoon depicting a sign outside the library that read, “Open every other Monday 
from 9:58 am to 10 am.”6  
Was this what was imagined as a “public” library? In the absence of a distinct template, 
American library builders were hard pressed to define a framework. “Public” did not necessarily 
mean free, or for everyone, or funded by the government. It fell to early trustees to determine the 
purpose and parameters of their institutions, and to understand and negotiate the limits of their 
own power. 
Certainly the Astor was more public than the Lenox Library, a collection of rare books 
and manuscripts amassed by the merchant and landowner James Lenox. A religious man of few 
words and fewer friends, although one “of varied information, of much studious reading, of 
extensive correspondence, and of many books,” Lenox made large donations to hospitals, 
churches, a home for aged women, and other services for needy New Yorkers, always quietly 
and unceremoniously.7 In 1845, he engaged the bibliophile Henry Stevens to help in his book-




Stevens had an impressive client roster that included the Library of Congress, the Smithsonian 
Institution, public libraries and institutions, and private clients.9 Eventually, Lenox’s library 
possessed the first Gutenberg Bible to come to the United States, George Washington’s 
manuscript for his “farewell address,” and Christopher Columbus’s letter announcing the 
discovery of a new world. His choices were unique, idiosyncratic, and certainly valuable, but not 
comprehensive enough to form a great library. “Mr. Lenox excelled all men I ever knew for 
seizing ideas and perseveringly running them out to the end,” Stevens wrote. But his mode of 
collecting left many gaps. “The result of all Mr. Lenox’s enormous study and labor, to say 
nothing of his vast expenditure, it must be confessed, is ‘a patchy library’ as he left it,” his agent 
admitted.10 
In 1870 Lenox, a bachelor, donated the land, $300,000 for a building, and his books and 
manuscripts to the citizens of New York City, his veritable heirs.11 But his purpose-built library 
felt more like a private country house (on sparsely populated Fifth Avenue between Seventieth 
and Seventy-first Streets). The books could be seen on exhibition, but not perused, and 
admission was by card, much as private art collectors opened their collections to the general 
public on certain days. The New York Times called the Lenox Library “a select resort for 
bibliomaniacs.”12 As a private individual Lenox had succeeded in building a library; but as a 
public trustee his effort had failed. In time this begged the question of whether free reference 
libraries were compatible with the growing movement for free circulating libraries. The library-
using “public,” in fact, was divided into two very different groups: researchers, and readers for 
pleasure. 
By the 1890s, the Astor and Lenox libraries both had outlived their founding purposes to 




repositories, the founders’ descendants were indifferent about the institutions’ ongoing support. 
Furthermore, the New York City “public” had shifted demographically: over 40 percent of the 
population between 1860 and 1890 was foreign born.13 This certainly was not the reading public 
that frequented research libraries like the Astor or the Lenox; new immigrants were better served 
by the free neighborhood lending libraries established by settlement houses and charitable 
societies beginning in the late 1880s. By then, the university library system for advanced study 
also was supplanting the privately organized research and subscription libraries, and newer 
philanthropists of a more bookish bent, in turn, were supporting expanding institutions of higher 
learning rather than perpetuating the so-called public social libraries. 
In fact, Astor and Lenox’s public library initiatives had been intended for a particular 
portion of the public, namely bourgeois strivers and elite gentlemen scholars, not the immigrant 
masses. Neither benefactor could have anticipated that along with the city’s rise and growth, the 
population would shift such that the goals of a public library would be as much about literacy 
and community as they were about research and scholarship. 
These paradoxes of “public” and “private” were myriad. While forging an urbane 
civilization in keeping with the city’s commercial ascension, New Yorkers had planned to 
compete with European cities on every level. But there was a flip side to the notion of “culture”: 
the lived experience of cultural pluralism. Towards the end of the nineteenth century, trustees 
were examining how best to repurpose their noblesse oblige for a different age. In New York, 
libraries needed to cater to different factions of citizens: the middle and lower classes who 
borrowed popular books from ad hoc circulation libraries, and the elites and scholars who 
consulted rare books at research libraries like the Astor and the Lenox. Furthermore, a public 




were privately funded and administered. The reality of a reading “public” had become an almost 
abstract, multi-valenced notion. 
 
“…access to books is almost as completely cut off in this city  
as it is in the Adirondacks”  
 
In early 1879, while waiting for a Grace Church-sponsored sewing class to begin, six little girls 
listened intently to a sensational story that one of them was reading aloud from a cheap 
magazine. When their teacher arrived, she was horrified, and offered to loan each girl one book a 
week in exchange for never purchasing such a publication again. The girls readily complied. 
When other women learned of the incident, they took up a collection that yielded around five 
hundred books, and obtained a room on Thirteenth Street east of Fourth Avenue for a small 
library, which they opened once a week for two hours.14 
The children were told to bring their friends—the only way the program was promoted—
because those connected with the little library carefully and politely wanted to avoid “everything 
like advertising or forcing the Library into the notice of the public.” They preferred instead to 
test the value of their venture by “the demands and interest of those drawn toward it.”15 Those 
who came therefore did so without solicitation by a librarian or anyone on the library committee. 
Nevertheless, almost immediately, the library’s popularity was so great that the sidewalk was 
blocked during the hours of operation, and on one day in the first few months, all of the shelves 
were left bare but for two volumes. At the end of its first year, the New York Free Circulating 
Library, as it came to be known, possessed around 1,200 volumes (all of which had been given 
out several times each), and served both children and adults living from lower Broadway to 120th 
Street.16 One thousand books was not a terribly significant number, but until then, nobody had 




when the model had long existed in smaller cities in New England, Boston in particular. “Every 
one knows, however, that for the general public, and particularly for the poorer portions of it, 
access to books is almost as completely cut off in this city as it is in the Adirondacks,” the 
Library Journal declared.17 
 Recognizing a pressing demand that might quickly outgrow the library’s unpretentious 
beginnings, the women in charge consulted “men of standing” in the community and determined 
the necessity of establishing a library for the circulation of books among the “very poor.” The 
library subsequently was incorporated in March 1880 and hoped to establish distribution points 
all over the city, but not “to attempt the establishment of any large and expensive building,” 
because the very class which they hoped to reach “instinctively shunned” such places. A single 
library building, moreover, would be “comparatively useless” if inconveniently located.18 
 A different formulation from the research or subscription library was at work here, one 
that benefited from a distinctive female presence and outlook. Of the twenty-one members of the 
Free Circulating Library’s first board of trustees, eleven were women, including its first 
president. In the institution’s twenty-year existence, unlike any New York City library before it, 
both men and women were equally distributed on the board, the executive committee, and the 
working committees. Moreover, the first two chief librarians were female, as, indeed, were a 
majority of those who took up librarianship as a professional calling.19  
In January 1882, the library’s leaders, several of whom were associated with the Union 
League Club, arranged a gathering to call attention to the existence of the Free Library, of which 
few New Yorkers were yet aware, and to propose its expansion. Three hundred and fifty 
prominent citizens, taken from the lists of subscribers to the Metropolitan Museum of Art, the 




were “a large number of ladies,” and Mayor William R. Grace, the anti-Tammany, newly elected 
first Catholic mayor of New York, philanthropist, humanitarian, and founder of W. R. Grace and 
Company, who presided.20 The meeting recalled an auspicious moment a dozen years earlier, 
when city leaders rallied around the need for an art museum at the Union League Club event that 
spawned the Metropolitan Museum. Indeed, the current Free Circulating Library president, 
Henry E. Pellew, suggested that the library meeting itself was about a dozen years overdue. 
The talk again was of a “civilizing influence,” the benefits of which would be shared by 
all persons, “irrespective of class and color, race and religion.” As with its other cultural 
endeavors, New York was shamefully behind other cities in the matter of free libraries, and with 
the persistent fear of vice and disorder, the city, it seemed, might benefit from the stabilizing 
influence of books.21 “Idleness, and vacant, unoccupied minds are materials out of which crime 
is produced,” claimed Dr. John Hall, the pastor of the Fifth Avenue Presbyterian Church, at the 
meeting. “It is hard to get good agents, and hard to gain access to all those you desire to reach. 
The best and highest thing in the world is a book.”22 Thus, libraries filled with carefully chosen 
volumes also were perfect vehicles for social control.  
Hall argued that it was unrealistic to expect working people to buy books. Moreover, 
more sophisticated citizens had a moral duty to expose their less-privileged brethren to “first-
rate” literature, and not “waste their strength on the tenth-rate.” The call, though, was for 
democracy and order: “Let the rich men aid in this work by bridging over the chasm between 
themselves and the less fortunate or wealthy classes, and they will lay broader and deeper the 
foundations of society with a regulated liberty, in which the rich might not only enjoy the fruits 
of their toil, and labors, and intellects, but be safe from violence and crime, and from the stupid 




Joseph H. Choate, the gifted orator, lawyer, and trustee of the Metropolitan Museum, the 
American Museum of Natural History, and the Free Circulating Library, was characteristically 
jovial, but no less trenchant in his remarks. “In this great city, at the end, nearly, of the 
nineteenth century, with a population of almost a million and a quarter, there hasn’t been a single 
instrumentality for bringing home books to the poor—the working classes.”24 How could rich 
New Yorkers live in houses filled with books, with neighbors not even knowing what a bookcase 
was? Then Choate took a swipe at New York’s more established libraries. “Any men with 
nothing to do can go to the Astor or Lenox libraries—I believe you can go to the Lenox library. 
It was never open when I was unemployed and could go there,” he said to laughter and applause. 
A workingman might go to “good old Peter Cooper’s Institute,” but could not get a book 
anywhere on an evening or a Sunday.25   
Choate gave complete credit for the New York Free Circulating Library to the women 
who founded it.26 “Having been ejected by the Board of Trustees for non-attendance at the 
meetings, I can appreciate the energy and propelling power with which its members work, and 
that expulsion was due to the ladies of that directory,” he said. “The men who hover about the 
wings here, and who appear as officers of the institutions, are only ornamental; the real work is 
done by the ladies, and they are determined to make the project a success.”27 There was nothing 
that could save the city or the nation as much as the education of the working classes, Choate 
surmised, and a growing cadre of women involved in charitable work as volunteers and as 
professionals were well aware, first-hand, of the issues of the poor. “This community cannot 
long hold if poverty and misery and crime are to increase on one side as fast as wealth increases 




 Clearly the organizers of the Free Circulating Library recognized the demographic 
change afoot in their city. When Astor established his library, Manhattan’s population was 
approximately 300,000, and Brooklyn’s around 47,000. By 1880, over one million residents 
were living in Manhattan, and almost 600,000 in Brooklyn.29 In 1881 alone, over 440,000 
immigrants had arrived in the port of New York, of which approximately 152,00 had stayed in 
the state and in all probability would choose to remain there permanently.30 With the city’s 
increasing population, government control would become more complex, and the library’s Ways 
and Means Committee anticipated many questions that would need settling. Furthermore, the 
municipal leadership was of as much concern as was the new citizenry. Free, “wholesome” 
reading was ever more important to combat the ignorance that was the “basis of 
misgovernment”—a fear that animated not only the anti-Tammany Union League Club 
members, but elites of all stripes.31  
Many of the Free Circulating Library’s other founding trustees, apart from the women, 
also were parishioners of Grace Church, and included such leading figures in New York politics, 
law, and culture as Levi P. Morton, Hamilton Fish, Abram Hewitt, and Philip Schuyler. They 
had friends in high places—Gentile and Jewish alike—who enthusiastically lent their support. 
The congregation’s rector, Reverend Henry Codman Potter, was a social reformer himself who 
took great pride in the library’s beginnings from within his flock.32 At the Union League 
meeting, he quoted some stunning statistics: now outgrown its original room, the library at the 
end of its second year of existence circulated the equivalent of seventy-thousand volumes, each 
book in the collection borrowed over seventeen times, and all returned in good order.33 “In the 
Old World, the classes are bound together by ties not existing among us,” he said.34 Americans 




help begin the process of uniting rich and poor by donating funds for the new public library, not 
as warranted by the state, but as moved by their souls.  
 This was the real purpose of the meeting. The library needed money for a new building 
and a sufficient endowment—ideally, a fund of $200,000. It hoped to create smaller libraries—
conceivably one free library to every police stationhouse—“with special books suitable to certain 
localities.” The result would be a boon to the community at large, not to mention a way to “place 
our hands upon the throat of crime in this city.”35 And for the time being, the trustees did not 
seek the support or management of the Common Council, lest the library become a “politician’s 
football,” and means of patronage.36 
Donations from five to five thousand dollars came in during the library’s first five years. 
Supporters included prosperous members of the Whitney and Vanderbilt families, Robert and 
Ogden Goelet, the heiress Catherine Lorillard Wolfe, Collis P. Huntington, Abraham Kuhn, 
Jacob H. Schiff, and Andrew Carnegie. J. P. Morgan was the library’s treasurer in the early 
1880s. By and large, however, the sizes of donations to the library did not match the benefactors’ 
great abilities or sizable contributions to other causes.37  
But in spirit the endeavor was greater than its leaders, and in purpose more far-reaching 
than any other library initiative in New York, ever. New York’s masses were hardly the 
constituency that Astor or Lenox had considered when planning their “public” libraries. True to 
the Free Circulating Library’s broader mission, the branch librarians established close 
relationships with the public schools, and regularly sent them boxes of books. By 1897, this 
schools initiative had expanded to such an extent that the board established a special Traveling 
Library Department to take charge of it.38 Indeed, by 1900, the New York Free Circulating 




project—all over the city, serving varied populations and communities from the Lower East Side 
to Harlem. The libraries were open every day but four days a year for seventy-seven hours each 
week for lending.39 These buildings became more than just libraries, but functioned as 
community centers.  
The branch on Second Avenue near St. Mark’s Place, for example, opened in 1884 with a 
gift from Oswald Ottendorfer, the publisher of the influential German-language daily newspaper, 
the New-Yorker Staats-Zeitung. It was located in the midst of Kleindeutschland, or “Little 
Germany,” where 150,000 persons of German descent lived. With half of the original eight 
thousand books in German and the other half in English, the Ottendorfer Library was a 
welcoming place that not only cultivated its patrons’ minds but also helped assimilate them into 
American culture.  
This, indeed, was a library for the public. But in terms of funding, was it a “public 
library”?  
In 1880, the per capita income in the United States was $147, and the family income (for 
a family of five) was $735.40 In New York City, however, there were families whose wealth and 
expendable income were exponentially higher. In April 1880, for example, the fifty-four men 
who came together to officially incorporate New York’s Metropolitan Opera House, each 
contributed at least $10,000, and one man, William Kissam Vanderbilt, invested $30,000. 
 Such sums from private sources did not materialize for the New York Free Circulating 
Library, the very antithesis of the culture of conspicuous consumption that had created the opera 
house. In its first few years of operation after the Union League meeting, the library relied on 
membership fees and donations, but the State Library Fund and appropriations from New York 




grew, the burden of support shifted to the public, as it became clear that the small project had 
progressed from a private charity to a public necessity—as the Free Circulating Library leaders 
had presciently anticipated in 1882 that it might.  
The Free Circulating Library, borne of a benevolent impulse arising from an immediate 
and material need, always maintained its tangible connection to those it served. True, its 
founders had been moved by one part noblesse oblige, one part charity, and one part fear of 
urban anarchy. But the library’s success in addressing larger educational goals also spoke to a 
significant and underserved demand. “The idea that this system of circulating libraries is only for 
the use of the very poor has been superseded by the belief that it is an important adjunct of the 
city’s educational system, and as such entitled to municipal support,” the trustees wrote in 
1900.41  
 
“A Rich Man is Primarily a Trustee of Society” 
Samuel J. Tilden’s nickname for most of his adult life was “Whispering Sammy,” because a 
bronchial ailment left him with hushed speech. A “confirmed hypochondriac,” he was plagued 
with a delicate stomach, and was prone to “dyspepsia” and fits of vomiting. Although his attire 
was expensive and clean, there was something careless about the fit of his clothes and the untidy 
way he wore them; the urbane sugar entrepreneur Henry Havemeyer was even slightly 
embarrassed to dine with him at Delmonico’s. But once Tilden began to speak, his perceived 
oddities evaporated.42 He was riveting. 
 Tilden was a pioneer political reformer who used legal means to punish the guilty and 
rhetorical eloquence to galvanize public opinion.43 As a young lawmaker, he was a supporter of 




during the Civil War era, Tilden remained a Democrat, championing reform, and challenging 
New York’s Tweed Ring, which he took credit for crushing.44 “He wants to bring the hay loft 
and cheese press down to the city and crush out the machine,” Boss Tweed said of Tilden in 
1869. “He wants to get a crowd of canting reformers in the Legislature who will talk about the 
centrifugal force of the Government and cut down the tax levy below a living rate and then when 
he gets everything all fixed to suit him he wants to go to the United States Senate.”45 Tilden, in 
fact, did even better than that. Before becoming governor of New York State and then winning 
the popular vote for the American presidency in 1876 (but losing to Rutherford B. Hayes 
electorally), Tilden was known as the “ablest corporation lawyer in America,” and was famous 
for settling cases out of court.46 Along the way he also amassed over five million dollars through 
shrewd investments. 
In judgment, Tilden was methodical almost to the point of mathematical. He also was 
egotistical, blunt, secretive, and had the habit of declaring, “I told you so.” Irritatingly 
noncommittal, Tilden also often said “Not yet” when asked for a point of view. John Bigelow, 
his close associate, called him “one of the most difficult men to get an opinion out of that I ever 
knew.”47 Apparently, Tilden’s indecision stemmed not so much from evading responsibility as 
from taking the time to weigh all of the factors surrounding an issue. He came to sound 
conclusions as a result, and his business and political associates relied heavily on his counsel.48 
But his negative characteristics sometimes obscured the worthy motives behind his behavior.49  
Games like cards or chess did not interest him, nor did charity balls or popular cultural 
activities like music, theater, opera, or art collecting.50 All of his pleasures, it seemed, were 
intellectual. Following the 1876 election, in the last decade of Tilden’s life, a palsy affected his 




partially paralyzed in one leg, one arm, and one eye.51 Unable to speak audibly or to hold a book 
or turn its pages, he stopped regularly receiving visitors and retreated to books and journals that 
were read to him at breakfast and throughout each day—seven hundred books in all—during his 
last four years. Over the course of his life, he collected works on law, art, history, biography, and 
general literature, caring little for poetry, fiction, metaphysics, or the natural sciences.52 By the 
time Tilden died in 1886 at age seventy-two, he had amassed almost twenty thousand volumes.53  
As a bachelor, Tilden had contemplated the “problem” of his wealth in considering to 
whom he should bequeath his assets, and believed that “a rich man is primarily a trustee of 
society.”54 In the end, in his will, Tilden decided to leave approximately $1,400,000 to his 
relatives, significantly more than the $225,000 he designated to others. The remaining two-thirds 
of his roughly five million-dollar estate was earmarked for the creation of the Tilden Trust, a 
fund to promote educational and scientific endeavors, and to establish and maintain a free library 
and reading room in New York City.  
By the year of Tilden’s death, the New York Free Circulating Library was no longer 
alone in articulating a need to provide books to the larger public. A new state law passed in 1886 
now granted assistance to any charitable library of over ten thousand volumes with at least 
$20,000 in real estate.55 The Aguilar Free Library was one of the more important entities that 
emerged from this program that year. Named for Grace Aguilar, a British writer of Jewish 
history and religion, the circulating library was established by two Jewish organizations, the 
Young Men’s Hebrew Association and the Hebrew Free School.56  
And also in 1886, Adolph L. Sanger, the outgoing president of the New York Board of 
Aldermen and future president of the Board of Education, submitted an ambitious series of 




stand as “a monument of the homage paid by the people to self-culture,” supplementing the 
public education system—along with public schools, colleges, and the new museums of art and 
of science—in an institution worthy of a great city.57 Sanger sought a million-dollar 
appropriation for a large building and the maintenance of a free circulating library with reading 
rooms for the people of the city, on the site of the Croton Reservoir on Fifth Avenue between 
Fortieth and Forty-second Streets. He proposed a board of trustees consisting of twenty-two 
members, among them the mayor, the comptroller, the president of the Board of Aldermen, and 
the president of the Department of Public Parks.58  
Ninety-six leading statesmen, businessmen, and scholars officially incorporated the 
proposed library project.59 Sanger assured the press and others who were convinced that “nothing 
good could come out of the Board of Aldermen,” that politicians would have “nothing to do with 
the library,” and that even while the petitioners clearly did include several politicians, they were 
“men of standing” who would not brook any bureaucratic interference.60 Ironically, though, the 
state’s imprimatur is exactly what the resolution sought. Even though it was one of the subjects 
of the 1886 meeting of the American Library Association, Sanger’s proposal failed to win favor 
or approval. 
 Nevertheless, by establishing his Trust with an endowment of over $3 million for a free 
library, Samuel Tilden was catching the wind of the prevailing free library spirit. While by no 
means original in concept, the Tilden Trust in substance finally extended to New York City the 
enormous private financial backing it needed to fund a library for the public good. Executed with 
Tilden’s characteristic lack of dispatch but attention to detail, his will was ten thousand words 
long, with forty-three sections. Not as well-versed in trusts and estates law, Tilden had turned the 




was made public upon Tilden’s death, it was thought to have such clear provisions that “the 
lawyer who should undertake to put upon any part of it a construction other than it bears on its 
face, would have uphill work,” according to the Times.61 
In fact, the will turned out to be less than unimpeachable. Expressing their “bitter 
disappointment,” the seven heirs engaged attorneys, including the incomparable Joseph Choate, 
their leading counsel, to contest it.62 Choate consistently assumed radical positions in favor of the 
public good as a trustee of the Metropolitan Museum, the American Museum of Natural History, 
and even the Free Circulating Library. But he also was an extraordinarily skilled attorney. While 
he was among the many lawyers who prosecuted the Tweed Ring, he also led a practice that 
dealt with complex areas of the law that would take him into sometimes-unpopular territory. He 
was involved in the will contests of the Vanderbilt, A. T. Stewart, and Vassar families, among 
many others; defended the Standard Oil Company in its future antitrust suit; and took large cases 
in areas ranging from landlord disputes to railroad contracts.63 Of course, Tilden’s debt-ridden 
nephews were motivated more by their creditors than any true familial regret.64 Even so, the 
Tilden suit bounced back and forth between the State Supreme Court and the court of Appeals, 
but in October 1891, the Tilden Trust clause of the will was declared invalid.65 In a compromise 
settlement, the Trust received Tilden’s twenty-thousand-volume library and around two million 
dollars.66 While still considerable, the legacy in its depleted state was not enough to carry out 
Tilden’s bold plan on the scale he had envisioned. 
The will’s executors and trustees were Tilden’s private secretary and lawyer George W. 
Smith, and the politicians John Bigelow and Andrew Haswell Green, Tilden’s close associate for 
over forty years. While Tilden, Bigelow, and Green were kindred spirits in matters of reform and 




fulfill an even larger mission as a public servant. His imagination for civic possibility verged on 
the mythical, and his extravagant vision for New York City, which began with the building of 
Central Park in the 1850s, would come to fruition in the 1890s. What eventually became the New 





Unabated Energy and Resolute Will:  
The Founding of the Metropolitan Museum of Art 
 
 
After the November 1869 public meeting to discuss establishing an art museum, the provisional 
“Committee of Fifty” moved quickly and met frequently at the Century Club as well as in the 
rooms occupied by the art dealer Samuel P. Avery. By January 16, the new museum already 
possessed a constitution and an official name, the “Metropolitan Museum of Art.”1 But the 
election of officers went less smoothly over “some doubt” as to whether a quorum was present.2  
More critically, there also was doubt about whether those assembled had a clear idea of 
what they were meant to do, or where the funds were to come from, unlike those who recently 
had gathered to establish an American Museum of Natural History in New York City. That 
undertaking, comprised of some of the same leaders, also sought to emphasize the city’s cultural 
stature while also appealing to the haute bourgeoisie that aspired to become a metropolitan 
gentry. As the project developed, its power to convey social credibility drew financial sponsors.3 
But even so, of the wealthy men in the art museum “Association,” none seemed sufficiently 
enthusiastic. Up to one million dollars, it was estimated, would be required to launch the venture, 
for which considerably more energy, wealth, and enthusiasm would be needed. Not everyone 
shared the new officers’ optimism. For example, August Belmont, Robert L. Stuart, and James 
Lenox, who had been elected members of the Association, had declined the honor.4  
What was the point? While the press justified the new venture with the dual appeals for 
public edification and city boosterism, the trustees’ incentive would have had to be ever greater. 
Many felt a sense of purpose—a social and moral obligation that coincided with their religious 
devotion. Others had been well exposed to the cultural examples of Europe, and felt a lingering 




new institution would require far more motivation than hollow boosterism to justify 
participation. And thus a core group soldiered on. 
On January 31, 1870, the meeting reconvened at the Century Club, and with the Central 
Park Commission President Henry G. Stebbins in the chair, the Metropolitan Museum’s first 
board of trustees was elected.5 While all social and cultural elites, the board was diverse in terms 
of professional and political representation, indicating the earnest thinking that had animated the 
founding committee. But in fact the implicit purpose was to identify art with wealth, and 
stewardship with social station or training.6 John Taylor Johnston was voted president, and 
General John Adams Dix and William Cullen Bryant vice presidents.7 Daniel Huntington 
declined the nomination for vice president, but became a trustee.8 Placing him in a leadership 
role, however, was representative of the earnest effort to include a diversity of opinion on the 
board, which was comprised of artists, writers, and architects, as well as businessmen, financiers, 
lawyers, and city officials.9 In spite of his value as one of the board’s only working artists, 
Huntington perhaps was better respected as a member of the Century Club and the National 
Academy of Design than as a painter whose specialty was creating staid portraits of 
contemporary plutocrats.  
Those given charge of the museum would need to have the social and political versatility 
to make provisional agreements with the Central Park trustees for the site, as well as the ability 
to “quietly” and gracefully raise money for a building. To the clergyman Henry W. Bellows, who 
constructed the board profile, these trustees would be ideally middle aged, with “unabated 
energy, resolute will, and hot enthusiasm” for the plan, possessed of “art-culture and positive art 
knowledge.” This was a tall order, as men of affairs were, according to Bellows, “seldom 




the responsibility deeply felt by each.” Each member’s share in the “labor and honor” of the 
enterprise would be considerable and “worth striving hard to get and to keep.”11 
For the chair of the board, Bellows wanted a veritable saint—a man of patience and 
resolve “in whose soul the enterprise is a principal thing, and about whom the Trustees can rally 
and fire up with his courage and hope and determination.”12 John Taylor Johnston more than met 
this standard.  
The leaders that emerged indeed were touted as the “fittest men” for the project, and the 
Independent pointed out their relative diversity: 
Mr. Johnston is a very liberal purchaser of pictures, a merchant of good repute, 
and a more than millionaire. Mr. Bryant and General Dix are two good figures for 
vice-presidents; and the trustees are men of means, in whom the commercial 
republic will put its trust. The treasurer (Samuel G. Ward) is an agent in New 
York of Baring Brothers, and of course, is a good man for his office; besides, he 
is a scholarly man, and has published a translation of Schiller’s “Letters on Art.” 
Mr. Sturgis is an architect by profession, and a good writer on the subject of his 
art; he, of course, is a good man for the office.13 
 
The description of Johnston spoke volumes about the prerequisites for board leadership: he was 
an art lover first, an honest businessman second, and a millionaire third.14 Like Luman Reed 
before him, he felt a moral obligation to open the private art gallery in his home to the public.15 
His eclectic collection ranged from such masterpieces as J. M. W. Turner’s The Slave Ship, 
Frederic Church’s Niagara, Thomas Cole’s Voyage of Life series, and Winslow Homer’s 
Prisoners from the Front. In March 1872, diarist George Templeton Strong visited the gallery 
and praised Johnston’s integrity for his investment in fine art rather than on “race horses, four-in-
hands, and great ostentatious parties.”16 Strong concluded that Johnston was “quite an enviable 
person,” although he mused that the collector probably had “his troubles and anxieties and sore 




Until his election as the Metropolitan Museum’s board president, Johnston in fact did not 
have many troubles or anxieties. All but retired from his responsibilities as president of the small 
railroad lines he had founded, he was traveling down the Nile River with his wife and daughter 
when word came of his election to the presidency of the new art museum.18 His daughter recalled 
that he was “very much pleased, sent an immediate acceptance, and made arrangements for 
hastening our return home.”19 However, not a year had passed before Johnston had second 
thoughts and penned his resignation, feeling that it would not be right to remain as “nominally 
the head of our enterprize [sic] of such great public importance while in reality doing nothing.” 
He was grateful for the honor, but felt the museum needed a president that shared his desire to 
help but with greater “power and leisure.” 20 
Huntington and Johnston were not the only trustees to express their ambivalence about 
assuming a leadership role in the endeavor. It was no overstatement that the most important 
qualifications for an effective director were indeed “power and leisure,” social and business 
associations, free time, and expendable income. Yet in spite of thoughts of resigning that 
persisted throughout the 1880s, Johnston would remain the museum’s president for eighteen 
years.21 
But one question remained: why devote the energy to a time-consuming cause that only 
duplicated the efforts of other functioning art institutions like the New-York Historical Society? 
There were several possible agendas at work. Bryant was not the only city booster who wished to 
see a more complete cultural apotheosis in New York on the order of its commercial one, to 
elevate its status among world cities. These newly elected trustees had traveled abroad and were 
aware of their country’s aesthetic deficiencies. Moreover, most of the board had ties to Trinity or 




project. Johnston was a Presbyterian, whose devout father had declined a Papal audience because 
it had been scheduled for a Sunday. The younger Johnston remained true to his faith in his 
business life, and cared deeply about things like railroad safety, the cleanliness of terminals, and 
his employees’ churchgoing habits.22 Johnston’s impetus to open his private art gallery to the 
public thus seems to have been guided by a dutiful spirit rather than vain self-promotion, and the 
same spirit appeared to move most of his colleagues in the museum venture as well.  
But without a building, a collection, or even money, the task was almost absurd. The 
founders had only the “clearly defined idea of a Museum of Art and the united will to create it,” 
recalled William C. Prime, who also later reminisced that there was “no hesitation, no pause, no 
shadow or cloud, not an hour of doubt of discouragement” in their desire to improve a city and a 
nation.23 In fact, while private hesitancy did exist, the leaders never aired it publicly.  
 
Institution Building and a Museum Building 
On April 13, 1870, the New York Legislature voted an act of incorporation in the name of the 
Metropolitan Museum of Art, “for the purpose of establishing and maintaining in the City of 
New-York a museum and library of art, of encouraging and developing the study of the fine arts, 
and the application of the arts to manufactures and practical life, of advancing the general 
knowledge of kindred subjects, and, to that end, of furnishing popular instruction and 
recreation.” As summer approached, there was much anticipation of the form the new museum 
would take. “This city is to have a comprehensive museum and permanent gallery of art upon a 
scale worthy alike of the city and the nation,” the Tribune foresaw. “Its establishment will mark 
an era in art in this country.”24 But like some of the failed efforts before it, the new museum was 




twenty-one Trustees elected by ballot. The ex officio members of the board were the president 
and the treasurer, along with the mayor, the governor, the Department of Public Parks president, 
the Commissioner of Public Works of New York City, the president of the National Academy of 
Design, and the president of the New-York chapter of the American Institute of Architects.25 
 Unlike the new art museums in Boston and Washington, the Metropolitan still did not 
own a single work of art, nor had it secured any space in which to build or house a collection. It 
was even unclear what the collection would consist of. American art authorities and the museum 
founders alike looked to sanctioned European tastes for aesthetic guidance, and the thought 
always drifted to casts of European masterpieces, and not originals, as appropriate objects for 
display and study. But for the new trustees, gathering and even contemplating the appropriate 
range of works remained daunting. There would be paintings and sculpture for sure, but of equal 
importance were the “ornamental arts” like pottery, porcelain, engravings, mosaics, metalworks, 
and textiles, as well as the arts “relative to life and to manufactures,” a uniquely American 
predilection of the time.26 
Up until now, Americans possessed a utilitarian attitude towards the arts that reflected the 
practicality of a democratic society.27 The “trades,” after all, were the orientation of the 
American people, and national taste still was developing. Commerce, manufacturing, and 
invention were fundamental to American civilization, and any plan that omitted them might lose 
the sympathy, or the interest, of the people.28 Consequently, the Metropolitan Museum’s 
founders anticipated a need to show a combination of theory and practice in order to succeed, 
playing to the practical American outlook. The thought was to exhibit architectural models, 




Of course, “statues and other bulky objects” obviously would require a large building, 
and the committee grandly noted that the Louvre, Versailles, and the British Museum together 
attracted perhaps ten million visitors per year.29 That the museum’s leaders even dared to 
imagine their own gallery along these lines was highly audacious, to say the least, as New York 
City’s population in 1870 was just over 940,000.30 For the time being, without a collection or 
funds, the trustees looked first for loans of art to place on exhibit. 
 One way or another, the museum promised to have an extensive collection unlike any 
other in the country.31 The trustees used the Kensington Museum (later the Victoria and Albert 
Museum) in London as a prototype; it housed every conceivable representative of the decorative 
and fine arts.32 New York still had nothing similar, and it was unclear how the grand ambitions 
of the Metropolitan Museum ever could be realized. 
*** 
 The museum’s relatively modest initial fundraising goal was $250,000, the smallest sum 
that the trustees considered safe to commence operations. But one year later, the total collected 
was only a dispiriting $110,000, of which $10,000 was pledged by Johnston and $5,000 by 
William Tilden Blodgett. August Belmont still refused to contribute, and was joined by John 
Jacob Astor III and others who felt strongly that the institution’s survival could only depend 
upon massive state aid.33 By 1872, the museum was still $24,000 short of the goal. The second 
annual report put it plainly: “This state of things is very disappointing, and what makes it more 
surprising and more sad is that in a much shorter period than that during which these appeals 
have been pending here, $210,000 have been raised in Philadelphia from twenty-one persons, and 
$300,000 have been raised in Boston, in each case for a kindred purpose.”34 What an 




founding trustees.35 The trustees had proceeded under the overconfident assumption that others 
would support their venture based on their own stature.  
Perhaps James Jackson Jarves articulated the problem most bluntly: it was difficult to 
support a museum without knowing what would be in it. What would the building look like? In 
the Old World, temples, church buildings, or retrofitted stately homes or palaces functioned as 
art galleries. In the United States in 1870, it fell to the architect to create the template for a 
purpose-built museum. 
The Metropolitan and the American Museum of Natural History trustees together 
proposed that, to that end, both institutions might occupy “Manhattan Square,” nineteen acres of 
land between Seventh-seventh and Eighty-first Streets and between Eighth and Ninth Avenues, 
that the city might make available.36 Joseph Choate, the brilliant lawyer and member of both 
boards, conceived of a plan by which the city would tax itself for $500,000 to fund the buildings, 
an idea supported via a petition signed by several prominent New Yorkers.37 In spring 1871, 
hoping to garner support from the petition signers, and also evidently hoping to capitalize 
personally on the large building project, New York State Senator William M. Tweed backed the 
proposal. As to the question of the building’s ownership, Choate proposed a compromise: the 
city would retain legal possession of the museum building, and the trustees would maintain and 
control of its contents—and thus own the treasures of the museum. This original idea in 
municipal government set the pattern for the future followed by most of the major art museums 
in America, except for Boston’s, which neither solicited nor received public funds.38  
But wider aid was needed and not forthcoming. Wealthy New Yorkers evidently were 
less keen on the monumental project than were the trustees. In apparent desperation, the 




suggestion that ultimately was dismissed.39 With no new private resources, the effort was 
foundering, and it had hardly begun. 
Public aid was necessary. On April 5, 1871, the legislature passed Choate’s proposal 
enabling the Central Park commissioners to authorize construction of a museum building on 
Manhattan Square and to raise $500,000 towards that end, in a public and private partnership.40 
Years later, with only a hint of modesty, Choate recalled, “It was thought impossible that any 
money could come from a democratic city such as ours, governed by Tammany Hall, to support 
such a luxury as this.”41 In fact, Choate’s official language invoking the educational aspects of 
the endeavor also helped seal the deal. 
 In spite of the impression of balance and relative diversity on the Metropolitan board, the 
Times described its leaders as “chiefly members of the Century Club,” under whose charge the 
$500,000 building and its contents were to be placed. Apparently that status accorded them the 
authority to confidently collect objects, and soundly direct the museum’s affairs.42 Even so, the 
museum, now permanently organized, was resting on the gentlemen’s promise of assured success 
and solvency.43  
The viability of the “experiment” was still in question. But the press reported that the 
beginning of active operations was “already at hand,” and the Metropolitan Museum had been 
placed on “a most favorable basis” in relation to the state. It also now appeared to have some art 
to exhibit as well, with loans and the new acquisition of a “most precious collection” of 
European paintings, which heralded “a brilliant beginning.” As it was, every newly donated 
dollar would now yield “immediate and valuable results.”44 But by and large, New Yorkers 
failed to embrace the idea of the museum with the kind of enthusiastic passion expressed at the 




They were not seeking personal fame or gain, nor were they even particularly competitive in the 
cultural race with Boston, Philadelphia, or Washington. But it did appear that they were 
possessed of a moral duty to see the project through. 
The press predicted brilliance for the opening exhibition. “It cannot fail to excite a 
general interest among all classes and to implant in the minds of our intelligent tradespeople, 
who have as yet had no opportunity to study good artistic work, a curiosity which will end in 
genuine appreciation and culture,” according to the Tribune.45 Issuing a word of warning to the 
rich, the newspaper also appealed to their vanity: “We hope our wealthy citizens will have the 
wit to recognize that the highest privilege and pleasure which comes with riches in our day is the 
assistance and patronage of such refining and civilizing institutions as this. We are sure that, 
before many years, it will be a matter of grave regret to any man of property that he failed to take 
part in the creation of the Metropolitan Museum.”46 With an earnest board of trustees, and now a 
charter and land, all the fledgling art institution needed was money. “The man who shall link his 
name with such a permanent foundation will secure himself more permanent honor than that of 
kings,” one journal concluded.47 
In fact, it fell to the “varnish king,” William Tilden Blodgett, to purchase a significant 
collection of old masters when they came up for sale in Europe, thus establishing a foundational 
collection for the new museum. Blodgett’s humble background as a young man from Western 
New York with limited education did not keep him from making a fortune in his uncle’s varnish 
business, which he reorganized to become one of the largest concerns of its kind in the United 
States.48 Even if some of his museum board colleagues may have cast aspersions on his artistic 
judgment, Blodgett was possessed of natural refinement, a genial disposition, and a solemn 




founder of The Nation magazine, a senior vestryman at St. George’s Episcopal Church, and a 
founder of both the American Museum of Natural History and the Metropolitan. His public 
spiritedness included involvement in the Sanitary Commission and the Metropolitan Art Fair, as 
well as his support of living artists.  
An unpretentious participant in all of the early organizing meetings of the museum, 
Blodgett was skittish about playing too strong a leadership role: in anticipation of becoming a 
member of the executive committee, he asked that he not be assigned to chair it.50 Nevertheless, 
his colleagues convinced him otherwise, and he served as the first chairman until stepping down 
to the post of vice president only when his health began to fail a few years later. 
As an art collector, Blodgett pursued his purchases with deep pockets and a little naïveté, 
unlike many of his fellow-trustees. Frederic Edwin Church’s 1859 masterwork, Heart of the 
Andes, was his first significant purchase as a collector. The canvas, almost ten feet wide, caused 
a sensation at the Tenth Street Studio Building, when twelve to thirteen thousand people paid 
twenty-five cents each to see it.51 Blodgett, however, paid $10,000 to own it, setting a precedent 
for high prices for American contemporary art.52 Adding to this “noble beginning,” Blodgett 
amassed a collection valued upon his death in 1875 at $250,000, and which he exhibited to the 
public in a gallery in his home on Ninth Street and Fifth Avenue, one block north of his friend 
Johnston’s similar arrangement. 
Blodgett was said to have “few advantages of early education & no youthful associations 
to direct his attention to pictures.”53 Thus, when he found himself in Europe in the late 1860s and 
early 1870s, he looked to advisors and so-called authorities in the art field. During the start of the 
Franco Prussian War, artworks, including old masters, were being placed on the market for 




suspicious Belgian dealer named Léon Gauchez, by others it was an art dealer and expert from 
the Royal Museum in Belgium, Étienne Le Roy, who negotiated the purchase of three important 
private collections of paintings on Blodgett’s behalf, which he then offered to the Metropolitan 
Museum at cost in the summer of 1870.54 The price was approximately $115,000 for a total of 
174 Dutch and Flemish pictures, a sum that would absorb a sizeable portion of the original 
subscription funds.55 The fact that Blodgett guaranteed to deduct the price of any work whose 
authenticity could not be established attested to his awareness that some of the paintings might 
prove to be fakes.56 
Although Johnston believed that the purchase was “somewhat rash,” he had faith in 
Blodgett’s judgment, and volunteered to assume half the cost.57 He also recognized a perfect 
opportunity for the museum to begin building a collection. At the November quarterly meeting, 
the trustees discussed the arrangement, with the understanding that if the museum did not want 
the paintings, Blodgett and Johnston would divide them for their own collections. In spite of 
some opposition among the trustees and apprehension on Avery’s part that Blodgett had been 
duped, the trustees agreed to purchase the collection in March 1871.58 Decades later, Choate 
would recall a less tentative mood. He claimed that “the collection bought then, on the 
responsibility of one man, acting under the general authority of the Museum, was so good, 
contained so many old masters, that very few of those he bought have been rejected or laid 
aside.”59 
With an ideological rationale, municipal funds for a permanent home, and the nucleus of 
a collection, the Metropolitan Museum was ready to take on a more public persona. In late 1871 
it signed a two-year lease on a brownstone on Fifth Avenue between Fifty-third and Fifty-fourth 




museum opened “bravely,” according to the press. In fact, both the opening and the existence of 
the entire endeavor were nothing short of miraculous. “To secure so many and so good pictures 
at such a price was a splendid bit of financiering, only to be explained by the depression in the 
market for all articles of luxury or art which then prevailed in Europe,” Scribner’s Monthly 
speculated. “The wonder, after all, is less that the pictures could be bought so low, than that they 
could be bought at all.”60 Indeed, the preference for reproduction casts evidently had to do with 
the thought that there were only a finite number of masterpieces in the world, all already 
belonging to individuals or collections in Europe and unlikely to be sold. This made the opening 
all the more triumphant. To realize the dream of establishing the Metropolitan Museum, all its 
leaders needed was a perfect combination of money, contacts, some taste, and much audacity. 
“It is like visiting Europe, to enter the gallery,” rhapsodized the Boston journal, Old and 
New, of the Metropolitan’s opening exhibition, which was uncharacteristically restrained for 
New York. The elegant museum was devoid of the expected pretension or garishness. “Tone and 
tranquility affect the senses of the fevered New-Yorker,” the journal wrote; “it will build up in 
him that chapel of ease where the spirit loves to bow itself before the great altar of art, above 
which burns, with the radiance of altar-lights, the great constellation of the masters of the past.”61 
Reviews granted that with the opening, New York was now the victor in the contest for the first 
American art museum.62 Now, the New York museum was poised to compete with Europe.63 
The Dutch paintings’ secular themes were well suited to Americans’ and New Yorkers’ 
practical and material orientation. The works eschewed religious iconography in favor of “the 
household gods”: busy housewives, “topers and smokers” at leisure in local inns, hawkers selling 
fish, cattle grazing, people dancing at parties and festivals, and the like. The press singled out the 




Return of the Holy Family by Peter Paul Rubens and Frans Hals’s Hille Bobbe Van Harlem.64 
While some paintings were overvarnished “so unskillfully” as to be mirror-like, all of the works 
were considered authentic, since “distinguished experts” guaranteed their provenances, which 
could be traced back to original owners.65 
The excellence of the installation notwithstanding, some critics acknowledged that the 
works indeed were second rate. Yet it was exciting to view even these inferior old masters in the 
United States. For the trustees, however, the newspapers had only praise. “We have reason to 
congratulate ourselves upon the present action of the public-spirited gentlemen who procured 
this collection,” the Tribune wrote.66 
George Templeton Strong, perpetual observer of nineteenth-century New York, visited in 
September, noting critically, “Collection larger and (alleged) Old Masters are more numerous 
than I expected. There seems to be nearly an acre of high art. In very few of these pictures did 
my unskilled eye detect anything to admire; High, Old Low Dutchmen preponderate largely.”67 
He reserved his highest praise, however, for Turner’s The Slave Ship, which Johnston had loaned 
for the opening exhibition. “It is certainly among the most astonishing of pictures. Such lovely 
and wonderful painting of sky and cloud I never beheld,” he wrote. The painting was a work of 
genius and power “manifested without effort—such as one receives from a Beethoven 
symphony.”68 
Likewise, Henry James, in an unattributed review in the Atlantic Monthly, equivocated 
about the quality of the new collection. “It is not indeed to be termed a brilliant collection, for it 
contains no first-rate example of a first-rate genius; but it may claim within its limits a unity and 
continuity which cannot fail to make it a source of profit to students debarred from European 




be instructive to the art student. Moreover, and most important, the Metropolitan Museum now 
had an “enviably solid foundation” for future acquisition and development.70 
By three months after the opening, nearly six thousand visitors had passed through the 
museum’s doors. Artists, students, critics, and amateurs alike favorably judged the new venture 
and expressed “very agreeable surprise” at the quality of its art.71 This only boded well for the 
trustees’ efforts. Blodgett responded from Florence that spring: “This is a reward to me for all 
the patience, hard work, anxiety, etc. etc. we have all felt in launching the Bark,” he wrote, 
adding, “ none of us can stop where we are,” stressing the importance of continuing to contribute 
to the fund while making “curatorial” additions to the collections. “The Public we have met and 
have satisfied, and now we could afford to take a high stand and avoid making many mistakes,” 
he said.72 As ever, though, Blodgett was not conceited about his coup.73 
It was with resentment towards Blodgett, however, that his fellow-trustee Avery wrote to 
Johnston from Paris the following summer about his art buying sojourns through Europe. “The 
M. M. of N. Y. is the great hope of all the operations in antiques (old & new)—the wonderful 
doings of Mr. Blodgett, the wholesale way—we (he) began, the large average price paid, the well 
known liberality (or folly) of the Americans as a class, the published accounts that we had 
35,000,000 of francs to go into the fight of competing with the old fossils of Europe for the 
fossils of all time.”74 By mocking the way in which “several Murillos & Co.” could suddenly 
materialize for his perusal; how “self sacrificing foreigners of all languages” approached him 
“sometimes with a Raphael or so under their arm”; or how a 250-pound “ex countess” pressed 
him with “warm admiration (therm 90) against a freshly varnished ‘Susanna and the Elders’,” 
Avery was contrasting his own professed sophistication with the wealthier Blodgett’s relative 




Mr. Blodgett at the first and only time I was at Gauchet’s [sic],” Avery continued to Johnson, 
adding that when he tried to “haul G[auchez] over the coals” for bidding so vigorously for the 
Metropolitan Museum, Blodgett defended him.75 
 It would stand to reason that as an art dealer, Avery needed to distance himself from his 
less-discerning American brethren. In the mid-nineteenth century, a host of counterfeit “old 
masters” had flooded the American market, making buyers wary. Hence, in the prosperous years 
following the Civil War, American collectors concentrated on acquiring contemporary art that 
could be readily authenticated. Those who bought art outright often considered their support of 
American artists, rather than the quality of the art, as the main criteria for a purchase, particularly 
if the buyer had no experience abroad and thus limited artistic exposure.76 Furthermore, the 
undiscriminating American buyer was having more far-reaching and irritating implications for 
Avery, who, knowing better, was being offered “worthless” things in Europe, or worse, was 
being charged inflated prices for more respectable works.77 
 Even if the presence in Europe of Americans flaunting their new wealth was anathema to 
art dealers like Avery, art buying in the late nineteenth century in fact involved a more nuanced 
and generous negotiation between serious business and spirited philanthropy. The result of this 
compromise endured in the cultural institutions that came to be. However, the fact that the 
Metropolitan’s “old masters” had supposedly uninterrupted pedigrees alone may not have been 
sufficient evidence of their legitimacy. When submitted to the test of time, Avery’s concerns 
about authenticity would indeed prove valid. Nevertheless, in the early years of the 
Metropolitan’s existence, the daring Blodgett purchase gave the museum a start, a raison d’être, 





A General and a Gentleman-Archaeologist 
A year before the auspicious opening in 1872, John Taylor Johnston received a letter from the 
Count Luigi Palma di Cesnola, the amateur archaeologist and American consul in Cyprus known 
as “the General,” who wanted to sell thousands of antiquities. Cesnola technically was not a 
count before renouncing the title upon becoming an American citizen, nor was he exactly a 
general, the other title he assumed after claiming that his commission had been on Abraham 
Lincoln’s desk awaiting his signature on the night of his assassination.78 From Lincoln he did, 
however, obtain the diplomatic commission to Cyprus, where the Cesnola family lived from late 
1865 until 1876. It was there that archaeology became Cesnola’s passion, and where he 
supervised excavations funded with his own savings, and later with a loan from Rollin and 
Feuardent, the leading European dealers in antiquities based in Paris.79 In 1870, after years of 
smaller, local digs, he hit pay dirt at a site near Golgoi, where he unearthed a trove of sculptures 
and other objects. For £20, the consul quickly secured the property from its owner, a farmer, and 
hired more than one hundred diggers to excavate it, despite orders from Turkish authorities 
forbidding him to do so.80 Cesnola claimed the objects as his property, having obtained prior 
official permission from the Turkish governor general for the exploration, which he supervised 
with his own funds.  
A perpetual self-promoter, Cesnola transformed his house in Larnaca into a museum, 
which became a tourist attraction. But his greater desire was to sell the collection to an important 
repository like the Louvre, the Hermitage, or the British Museum. In spite of a command from 
Constantinople preventing the objects’ transportation from the island, through some subterfuge 
Cesnola managed to export over two hundred cases to New York.81 But several thousand coins, 




that caught fire at sea in June 1872. Later, another shipment arrived safely in London with 
Cesnola.82 
When the British Museum proposed to buy only a portion of the collection for £10,000, 
Cesnola refused. “What I desire above all is that my collection should remain all together and be 
known as the Cesnola Collection,” he said. “I have the pride of my race, and that of a Discoverer 
who wants his name perpetuated with the work if possible.”83 
The rejection of the British Museum offer created an opening for the Metropolitan, and, 
acting quickly, Johnston proposed to buy the collection himself for $60,000 in gold, which the 
museum would then reimburse through public subscription. “I do not doubt that you will feel a 
great interest in seeing that a collection so large, so ancient and unique, and so valuable in point 
of history, as mine is, which has cost so much labor, time, and money, is secured for America 
and not scattered,” Cesnola wrote, appealing to the museum’s somewhat deluded self-
importance, while revealing his own. “I did not undertake archaeological diggings for a 
commercial purpose, and though my collection represents today my whole fortune ‘in toto,’ yet I 
am disposed to be very reasonable when a public Institution would like to purchase it.”84 In fact, 
it was said that the collection might have brought $200,000 if broken up and sold at auction in 
Europe, and Cesnola’s protestations about keeping the collection together notwithstanding, he 
did sell some pieces separately to the British Museum.85 
At a meeting at trustee John F. Kensett’s painting studio the spring of the museum 
opening in 1872, Johnston informed the trustees of Cesnola’s intended sale. There was much 
more on the agenda as well, as a movement had been afoot to change the proposed permanent 
location of the museum building from Manhattan Square to Reservoir Square, the space at Fifth 




convenience might have attracted a broad and diverse attendance, although the possibility for 
expansion was more limited there than at the site the park commissioners soon after designated, 
farther north on Fifth Avenue between Seventy-ninth and Eighty-fourth Streets. The museum 
was becoming a reality, and with the approval of Calvert Vaux, the co-designer of Central Park, 
as the architect of the proposed buildings, the trustees were only beginning to envision what kind 
of collections might be housed there.  
That summer, Harper’s New Monthly Magazine published a twenty-page-long, heavily 
illustrated article by Hiram Hitchcock about the Cesnola discoveries. Hitchcock, a hotel 
developer and the president of the Madison Square Garden Company during its formation, was 
Cesnola’s erstwhile New York representative, friend, and champion, who had traveled 
extensively in Egypt, Syria, Cyprus, Greece, and Italy. He had made the official announcement 
in 1871 of Cesnola’s discoveries, and had lectured and published widely on the subject.86 The 
flattering, highly descriptive Harper’s piece issued a challenge for the United States, and by 
extension, the Metropolitan Museum, to enter the pool of possible suitors for the collection’s 
purchase. “It is to be hoped that America, of which the discoverer is a worthy and honored 
citizen, will anticipate the action of London, Berlin, and St. Petersburg,” Hitchcock concluded.87 
Without a trained curatorial staff, the trustees had to do their art vetting themselves, much 
as they did for their personal collections. While the trustees were men of taste but not bonafide 
art experts, their support of the purchase was based on reputation and instinct, and little else. 
Johnston arranged for the American financier Junius Spencer Morgan to inspect the objects in 
London, where Cesnola had rented a house and was exhibiting the best examples in a private 
gallery near the British Museum. Morgan visited twice, the second time bringing along Blodgett, 




museum’s de facto curatorial board.88 Morgan, Blodgett, and at least two other museum 
members, Robert Gordon and Cyrus W. Field, expressed enthusiasm about the purchase, which 
the trustees ultimately approved.89 Ultimately, Johnston paid the $60,000 through the offices of 
J. S. Morgan and Company.90 It was only in May 1874, months after the collection’s first public 
exhibition in New York, that the trustees were able to fulfill the subscription and assume 
ownership of the collection.91 
With this considerable new acquisition, the museum prepared to move to a larger 
temporary space in the old Douglas mansion at 128 West Fourteenth Street. It had taken Cesnola 
and eight professional packers seven weeks to box up only the portion of the collection that was 
in London.92 To prepare the artifacts for exhibition, Cesnola was paid $500 a month to unpack, 
inventory, clean, repair, and arrange his collection, which had sustained considerable damage in 
transit.93 Cesnola had sent two hundred crates to the United States, with one thousand more 
pieces still coming from Cyprus. Upon his arrival in New York in January 1873, he was 
celebrated as a great archaeologist.94   
By then he had already been paid $20,000, with the remainder to follow over two years.95 
The “General” quickly commenced speaking to the press about the collection.96 The “fresh look” 
of the statues or reliefs, and their “perfect condition” was surprising given how long the figures 
had been buried, although nobody thought to question the authenticity of Cesnola’s claims.97 
Some eminent British antiquarians had dated the collection from 1800 to 1200 BC. “Of their 
high antiquity, however, there can be no doubt, and great praise is awarded to the Trustees of the 
Metropolitan Museum of Art for obtaining these antiquarian treasures for the City of New 
York,” the Tribune boasted.98 Furthermore, the British Museum had requested the “privilege” of 




which the Met proudly granted. The Tribune triumphantly noted that the British Museum’s Lang 
Collection of Cyprian antiquities, “upon which the institution prides itself, merely contains 90 
pieces, among which there is only one statuette entire.”99 Now New York’s museum was in at 
least one respect competitive with London’s.100 
New Yorkers anticipated the museum’s opening in the new location on Fourteenth Street, 
and even as the Times looked askance at the Blodgett old masters (“purchased so unwisely”), it 
looked forward to seeing the Cesnola Collection alongside a loan exhibition of art treasures 
belonging to “numerous millionaires of the City.”101 The variety of the loans—apart from 
paintings, the exhibit was to include jade carvings, pottery and faience, rare bookbinding, and 
Japanese pottery—would “present an attraction of which New-York has never seen the equal.” 
These works, gathered from “dusky corners in the houses of the wealthy,” and placed “into the 
glare of day,” might be “completely strange” and even cabinet-of-curiosities-like but nonetheless 
instructive to a majority of visitors. Best of all, they could furnish “mines of ideas” to the 
manufacturer and artisan.102 
But it was the Cesnola Collection that was generating interest—“gratifying evidence that 
the New World is on the right track, after all,” William H. Goodyear of the Independent wrote.103 
Indeed, New York was seeking to accomplish the inconceivable: to compete with the cities of 
Europe, whose culture was centuries in the making. Such an ambition was staggering, but 
unsurprising for the city. To aim for less would have been “unbecoming,” the Times admitted.104 
It had taken three years to raise the $250,000 from private sources, and the Legislature 
was responsible only for the building, and not the institution’s expenses. By contrast, in the 
previous year, the British had allocated more than a million dollars of public money for art 




Appropriations of public money in the name of art were not in accordance with the American 
policy, even if public feeling was to the contrary.105  
Moreover, nineteenth-century American philanthropy was commonly more functional 
than aesthetic, and focused on benevolent causes with religious or moral agendas. It was one 
thing to feed and clothe the poor, quite another to educate the public about art. Furthermore, art 
buying was seen as a rich man’s extravagance, not a public benevolence. Individual donations of 
art or money that went into a larger pool simply did not appeal to the vanity of many a potential 
philanthropist.106 Thus, the Museum had to look forward to years of “slow and painful” growth 
until it conquered the respect of the public and commanded their support.107 Donations of art also 
proved problematic to accept, given the American level of taste; trustees preferred to rely instead 
on their own dealers and advisers to make more studied and sound purchases for the collection. 
After the embarrassment of exhibiting an eight-foot-high statue of a dancing girl by a German 
sculptor at the museum’s opening, Johnston complained to another trustee, “It may be very fine, 
but eight feet of dance is a trial to the feelings. Hereafter we must curb the exuberance of donors 
except in the article of money, of which latter they may give as much as they please.”108 
Even so, in its “modest condition,” the Museum was showing vitality in three short years. 
One vexing change for its trustees and members, however, was the necessity of charging 
admission with the move to Fourteenth Street. The hope was to continue to keep the museum 
open to the public for free on certain days, but the legislature failed to include the museum 
among its city expenditures. “This evidence of the lack of sympathy among our public men with 
the efforts of the members of the Museum to provide gratuitous art instruction for the whole 
public, is chilling, and is not creditable to us as a people,” the Times complained.109 Indeed, the 




One year later, on March 27, 1874, the trustees held a public meeting to discuss ways 
they might successfully procure the popular Cesnola Collection from Johnston, who was still its 
rightful owner. If the aesthetic argument for its purchase was too lofty to incite city leaders to 
action, a competitive spirit with other cities might better goad them. The Tribune reasoned: 
There is intelligence enough among our business men and mother-wit enough; let 
the scholars, the artists, the connoisseurs appeal to these with vigorous arguments 
and show them, as they easily can, that this city cannot afford to lose the Di 
Cesnola collection—cannot afford to let Boston have it, or Philadelphia, or the 
British Museum, one of which must become its owner if the merchants of New-
York do not do their duty in the matter. It seems to us high time in virtue of our 
metropolitan brag, that we should have something in our city to make it a place 
worthy living in for scholars and cultivated people. There is no third-rate town in 
Europe that is not better equipped than New-York in the matter of museums, 
libraries, and galleries of art.110  
 
Because someone unintentionally neglected to bring the list of those who had contributed under 
$1000 to the well-attended meeting, it furthered the impression that the venture was the sole 
province of the rich men whose names were read, and that smaller supporters mattered very 
little. The museum’s trustees were forgetting their republican roots, and unwittingly suggesting a 
class divide. “I have no doubt that they have, as a body, the best intentions in the world,” an art 
student wrote. “But they are rich men, all of them, and all their associations are with rich and 
flourishing people, who live in an atmosphere of ease and comfort, with the moderate culture 
that satisfies our easy society, and not so much wanting in sympathy with the mass of the people, 
those with small means and small opportunities, as completely ignorant of their needs and their 
desires.”111 
The fact that small contributions from small donors could have an impact on the future of 
the museum was a revolutionary concept that eluded the trustees. “The sooner the enterprise is 
put where it belongs—on the shoulders of the general public of educated, cultivated men and 




suggested.112 Perhaps without realizing it, the museum’s trustees also were reluctant to enlarge 
their subscriber pool precisely because it challenged their authority, and the paternalistic spirit of 
their endeavor. 
*** 
Soon after the collections were relocated to the Douglas mansion, an international 
financial crisis hit the American economy, causing a deep financial depression, one of the worst 
in American history. The Panic of 1873 began in September, when the New York Stock 
Exchange closed for ten days. The international depression would last until 1879, and in its 
wake, 89 out of 364 American railroads were forced into bankruptcy; 18,000 businesses failed; 
unemployment reached 14 percent; construction work and real estate values dried up; and 
corporate profits evaporated.113 Clearly, acquisitions would be difficult for the museum through 
this period. 
Nevertheless, in August 1873, just as it was becoming evident that the museum’s 
collection was outgrowing its building, the Metropolitan broke ground for a permanent 
headquarters in Central Park. Cesnola, his immediate task with the museum complete, returned 
to Cyprus, where he expected to engage in more archaeology: this time, he hoped, with the 
Museum covering his expenses.  In September 1874, he announced that he had discovered the 
Treasure of Curium—over 1,500 objects in gold, silver, gems, bronze, alabaster, and terracotta 
which allegedly rivaled the important archaeological work of Heinrich Schliemann in Mycenae 
and Troy in 1873. The discovery, however, was later proven to be a group of unconnected 
objects the General had gathered from different places around the island. His desperation was 




$15,000 for the first Cesnola purchase and had collected only $207,000 from the original 
subscription drive.114  
But the museum persevered. Another appeal was announced in November 1876, when 
the British Museum joined a bidding war for the Curium cache. In the end, the Metropolitan 
Museum raised $40,000 of the $60,000 purchase price in order to win the collection. It also 
agreed to pay for shipping and once again engaged Cesnola to install his combined collections in 
the new museum space. The trustees raised the initial sum almost immediately, and secured the 
remainders two weeks after making the public appeal.115 
The successful purchase was tempered by a bittersweet sale that December. One casualty 
of the financial depression was John Taylor Johnston, who fell to financial ruin, and was forced 
to sell all of his art at auction—323 works in all. By 1876, it had become one of the largest and 
most valuable private collections of paintings in the United States. Under the direction of 
Johnston’s friend and fellow museum trustee Samuel P. Avery, the pictures were to be sold 
without reserve.116 Johnston had been a towering patron of artists and art education, and public 
sympathy was widespread. He had bought “with such intelligence that the entire group has a 
certain unity which more pretentious galleries do not possess,” the Times lamented.117 Thousands 
of people had seen the works in Johnston’s art gallery as well as at the Metropolitan Museum 
that summer, in a benefit for the Academy of Design. Regret was appeased with the knowledge 
that in the collection’s dispersal, American art education as a whole might benefit.118  
The sale was held at Chickering Hall on the 19th, 20th and 22nd of December 1876. On 
the first evening, at 11 pm, Turner’s Slave Ship was brought before the filled auditorium and sold 
for $10,000, about one-third of its believed original price, to a buyer from Boston. That work, 




be scattered to other American cities. “Probably New York retains the largest numerical 






“Music Loving & Enthusiastic, but Not Yet of Sufficient Culture”:  
Opera in New York 
 
 
In 1878, August Belmont, the investment banker and newly elected president of New York’s 
Academy of Music Board of Directors, wrote that Manhattan’s operagoers were “a very music 
loving & enthusiastic audience, but not yet of sufficient culture to do without the additional 
stimulant of some European celebrity or some native phenomenon.”1 In courting “Colonel” 
James H. Mapleson, the famous British opera impresario, to assemble an opera company for the 
twenty-four-year-old Academy, Belmont could not overstate the importance of European “stars” 
to attract the American public.2  
 A self-styled American aristocrat, Belmont was using his position as the leader of 
America’s preeminent opera venue to affirm his social status. But he and others like him were 
aspiring to sophistication not necessarily by appreciating opera, but by imitating the superficial 
construction of a European upper-class tradition of sitting in a box in the opera house. 
Unbeknownst to Belmont, the Academy was soon to be obsolete—not so much because the 
operagoing culture would not endure, but because other plutocrats would seize upon this 
template for social success and improve upon it. 
By now, New York already was reputedly the American operatic capital reputedly on a 
par with Paris, London, Berlin, Vienna, or Milan. But the opera house would need a good 
resident company and a broader audience to maintain this standard, and looked beyond the elite 
boxholders for the theater’s sustenance. When Belmont pleaded the case for good Academy 
publicity to Charles A. Dana of the Sun, he also betrayed a self-conscious desire to extend his 
city’s continuing cultural preeminence, and suggested that an interested public might help 




press was now being called upon to  “appeal, on behalf of the Opera House, or one or more of its 
unhappy managers, to a more popular support.”3 It was one thing to create an exclusive club, but 
it was another to ask for the public to help pay for it.  Belmont’s argument, however, looked 
beyond such glum prophesies of the past and cast his boosterish plea in the context of the city’s 
future, which he assumed would be of interest to any New Yorker. “If New York wants a good 
Italian Opera, if she wishes to rival Paris & London, her citizens must show a liberal patronage 
& good will.”4 Opera stars, and the cult of celebrity that surrounded them, were proven to 
encourage that patronage. The fact that Italian opera implied European pretentions and social 
snobbism also appealed to ambitious aspiring elites.5 And New York’s press, which by 1870 was 
the veritable core of American newspaper publishing, had the power to disseminate both good 
reviews and the offstage stories of the performers and their elite Academy of Music patrons.6  
In spite of rumblings about the theater’s inadequate box capacity, it held more seats than 
London’s Covent Garden or Paris’s Italian Opera House. In contemplating Belmont’s offer in 
1878, Colonel Mapleson would certainly know of the “very handsome profits” that a New York 
season gave opera impresarios and divas.7 “I know that the receipts of our Academy, 
notwithstanding the much abused 200 seats of the stockholders, have averaged much higher 
when we had a good Opera, than the most brilliant seasons of Covent Garden,” Belmont wrote to 
Levi P. Morton, his fellow board member, New York financier and politician, and, in 1878, 
emissary in Europe assigned with the mission of securing Mapleson. “You ought to insist that 
Mapleson pledges himself not only to give us a first class Stock Company, complete in all its 
parts, but that he agrees also to bring over one or two of the great Stars, like Patti, Nilsson, 
Nicolini or Fauré.”8 If New York City itself was just beginning to become a cultural mecca, there 




might win over the impresario and his opera stars. With resolute bravado, Belmont equated his 
city’s financial capital with the social capital of European aristocracy: “Mapleson would make a 
fortune & Patti herself would have a people of Sovereigns at her feet, instead of the Czar alone, 
& the three parties, Gold, Silver & Greenbacks would vie who could offer the largest amount of 
its special panaceas for all financial ailings.”9 The payback indeed could be lucrative. As a 
prodigiously wealthy financier, Belmont knew whereof he spoke, and was also a financial 
advisor and investor to famous performers.10  
“You know that our people will rush & pay liberally for celebrities & for real good 
artists,” he wrote with shallow enthusiasm, “while the second class (using a very mild term) 
leanings of European Operas served up to us for the last four or five years by Maretzeck & 
Strackosh [sic] will not in the future more than it has in the past attract an American audience.”11 
Both Max Maretzeck and Maurice Strakosch were European musicians and impresarios, and it is 
unclear why Belmont thought disapprovingly of their tenures at the Academy.12 
Strakosch had balked publicly at the nature of a business that commodified performers 
over composers.13 To him and Maretzeck, the music was the thing—not the stars, and certainly 
not the social spectacle of operagoing. Indeed, there remained a gulf between managing the 
Academy of Music as a theater and managing the opera company that performed there. It is no 
wonder that Belmont was calling for artistic consistency in addition to gathering the stars that 
New Yorkers craved to see.  
*** 
As with operatic endeavors, August Belmont’s approach to life was pragmatic and 
calculating. Born August Schönberg in 1813 in the Rhineland Palatinate (now western Germany) 




successful nineteenth-century New York City German Jews. Indeed, August Belmont did not 
even associate with them, having converted to the Episcopal faith; marrying Caroline Slidell 
Perry, daughter and niece of American naval heroes; and effectively erasing his past by joining 
New York’s most exclusive and restricted clubs.14  
He went to work at age thirteen as an unpaid apprentice to the Rothschild banking house 
in Frankfurt. After showing great promise but possibly lacking in social skill, he was transferred 
to Naples and then Havana, and finally New York, where he had rushed upon hearing news of 
the Panic of 1837. During the subsequent downturn, every American bank stopped payment in 
gold and silver coinage, causing a five-year depression, financial failures, and record high 
unemployment. Because Baron Nathan Rothschild had famously advised that the best time to 
buy was when there is “blood in the streets,” the young banker, who by then had assumed the 
name Belmont, began buying in a hugely depressed market.15 He repeated this service in 
subsequent panics, stabilizing United States debtor banks with House of Rothschild loans, and in 
the process ingratiating his firm and himself both to bankers and the United States Government 
alike. Thus, in 1837, the newcomer August Belmont launched his career by operating a veritable 
Federal Reserve System.16 He was twenty-one years old.  
New York City was the perfect place for Belmont to reinvent himself: it was 
foundationally mercantile, recognized success in trade as much as family pedigree, and socially 
was the antithesis of such places as Boston, Philadelphia, Charleston, or New Orleans. The 
eighteenth-century politico and New York patroon Lewis Morris was thought to have said, “As 
New England, excepting some Families, was ye scum of ye old, so the greatest part of the 
English in the Province [of New York] is ye scum of ye New.”17 Indeed, the Morrises were the 




Cortlandts, Rhinelanders, Verplancks, Beekmans, Brevoorts , Goelets, and Schermerhorns—all 
had to work for a living.18 It was a perfect place for Belmont to settle as a sophisticated man of 
means. 
The emergence of etiquette books in the 1840s—filled with unintentionally comical 
caveats about proper manners in public—was an indicator of just how gauche Americans could 
be in the nineteenth century.19 Even John Jacob Astor, the wealthiest American of his time, was 
known to have had atrocious personal habits. But Belmont, a keen observer and the ultimate 
social climber, maintained an aristocratic existence. He behaved with elegant European manners; 
owned fine horses and coaches; entertained grandly with fine wines, food, and porcelains; and 
collected tasteful art. And, of course, he supported high culture. Belmont was the only Jew 
admitted into the opera’s magic inner circle.20 
In fact, at the Academy of Music, that circle was closed to anyone but the 
“Knickerbocker aristocracy” that had created it. The Academy’s exclusivism grew to be more 
profound than whether or not the public would be called upon to pay high prices for bad seats in 
someone else’s social club.  It also was about class and “race”—in this case, not-so-veiled anti-
Semitism. It was about taste, manners, and style as markers of social rank. It was about forging 
an upper class by virtue of inclusion and exclusion. It was about a persistent and gnawing 
American insecurity.  
New Yorkers may or may not have been sensitive to their own inexperience with high 
culture. If taste, to Pierre Bourdieu, is “an acquired disposition to ‘differentiate’ and 
‘appreciate’”—to distinguish and recognize an object “without implying knowledge of the 
distinctive features which define it,” then taste did not happen intuitively to the average 




making, the notion of “taste” in the European sense was something that might have eluded even 
the most sophisticated Bostonians, precisely because it was associated with a European past that 
they had repudiated.22 As John Kouwenhoven has explained, the young republic encouraged a 
utilitarian attitude towards the arts that paid little heed to aesthetics, bespeaking the practicality 
of a democratic society.23 Even the Academy of Music was prone to flights of tasteless fancy. A 
panel in front of the conductor was decorated with a painting of a guitar and a banjo entangled in 
the strings of a lyre. “It might be thrown away advantageously,” the Daily Times sniffed.24 
P. T. Barnum, the über-impresario of the nineteenth century, promoted not only his 
museum, but also plays and other popular entertainments. His fare represented “low culture,” 
while the Academy of Music’s operas represented “high culture.”25 Taste was equated with 
status, which, in turn, required money. One cannot fault the nascent New York upper class for its 
attempts to buy taste. At the Academy, however, only a few of the rising many that were 
financially able and willing were permitted to purchase it.  
In the 1870s, New York’s “world of fashion was still content to reassemble every winter 
in the shabby red and gold boxes of the sociable old Academy,” wrote Edith Wharton, in an 
often-quoted passage from The Age of Innocence. “Conservatives cherished it for being small 
and inconvenient, and thus keeping out the ‘new people’ whom New York was beginning to 
dread and yet be drawn to.”26 Whether Belmont’s plan to secure Mapleson for the Academy of 
Music was successful or not would prove to be irrelevant. The dreaded “new people” wanted the 
opportunity to participate in the spectacle of operagoing, and the Academy’s social exclusivity, 
reinforced by the physical reality of its limited number of boxes, were insurmountable 
constraints. Armed with great wealth and even greater social initiative, the so-called newcomers 




Act Two: A New Opera House for New York 
During the years between the Academy’s inception and the beginning of Belmont’s tenure as 
board president, Manhattan’s population had more than doubled to well over one million, and 
New York became one of the largest and richest cities in the world. Once a veritable urban 
village in lower Manhattan, the city steadily expanded northward, filling in blocks of 
development in areas that on the 1811 Commissioner’s Plan were merely represented by grid 
lines laid over uneven terrain. Gotham was the place where Thomas Edison came in 1881 to 
install electric lights and establish the first permanent central power station a year later. Gotham 
was where, in 1883, a bridge of unprecedented scope and scale was erected, linking the cities of 
New York and Brooklyn, the country’s first and third-largest metropolises. Gotham was the 
location of Wall Street and its great stock exchange. Gotham was the place where the robber 
barons and merchant princes built their opulent mansions. An economically polarized city of 
growing ethnic diversity, Gotham also was home to the penniless immigrant and the peripatetic 
street peddler. In 1880, when the United States per capita income in was $147, and the family 
income (for a family of five) was $735, New York City had thousands of families of far more 
prodigious means.27  
 On April 10, 1880, fifty-four men incorporated the Metropolitan Opera House Company 
Limited of New York. The cost, entitling each subscriber to a box at the proposed opera house, 
was a minimum of $10,000.28 Many paid more. William Kissam Vanderbilt signed on for 
$30,000; his father, William Henry Vanderbilt, for $20,000; as did George Henry Warren, 
George Griswold Haven, Robert Goelet Sr., and James A. Roosevelt. The remaining men—
among them Cornelius Vanderbilt II (William K.’s brother and William H.’s son), the brothers 




Rhinelander, Adrian Iselin, Henry Clews, Theodore A. Havemeyer, Joseph W. Drexel, Samuel 
L. M. Barlow, and D. Ogden Mills—all purchased 100 shares for $10,000.29 These and other 
enthusiastic plutocrats with money to spare easily raised the necessary money to build a new 
theater. After establishing the bylaws of the opera house company, thirteen directors were 
elected, and were scheduled to meet each month during the early phases of construction. But a 
quorum was rarely present until 1883, the year the theater opened.30 
 With appreciation of the operatic art form still fickle at best in New York City, what 
precipitated the rise of a new opera house and the marginalization of another? The New York 
Times stated it plainly: “It is . . . safe to assume that every New-York family desires to own an 
opera-box as that every Englishman wishes to get into Parliament. And a box in an unsuccessful 
opera-house is worse than no box at all.31 Thus, by the Times’s estimation, “more than a hundred 
of our best families are therefore irretrievably committed to a social war of extermination,” 
pledging to either the Academy or the Metropolitan, “like our Revolutionary fathers, ‘their 
fortunes and their sacred honor’ or the social prestige which may be taken to be a modern 
substitute for the same.”32 From the outset, the “war” was social rather than artistic or 
philanthropic, and female rather than male. By design, there were not enough boxes at the 
Academy, and it was clear that in order for New York society to remain exclusive, there should 
never be enough. 
 For their part, the Academy leaders showed no willingness to relinquish their boxes to 
any of the new New Yorkers—millionaires who had made fortunes elsewhere in the country—
who aspired to the financial and social distinction of an opera box.33 The supplicants were 
typically female, and the necessity of box ownership had nothing to do with musical 




and that he bought into the new scheme simply for the sake of his family.34 In reality, if all one 
wanted to do was to hear the opera, it was relatively easy to purchase a ticket to the Academy of 
Music. “No actual hardship is attached to a seat in the parquet,” the architecture critic 
Montgomery Schuyler observed. “In fact the music and the spectacle are at least as available 
from that humble station as from the coigne of vantage in the box tier, and the philosopher who 
occasionally goes to the opera . . . can not have failed to remark that the most attentive looking 
and listening is not done from the boxes.” The parquet or orchestra seats were rarely crowded, 
while the boxes were always taken.35 
 Contrary to reports, the Academy leaders actually had been generous to the plutocratic 
newcomers. Although it was rumored that a $30,000 offer (allegedly by William K. Vanderbilt) 
for an Academy box was rejected,36 in fact, George H. Warren, the lawyer, financier, subsequent 
Metropolitan Opera investor, father-in-law to Robert Goelet Jr., and Vanderbilt legal advisor, 
conferred with August Belmont and other Academy stockholders in early April 1880 and learned 
that there were nine available boxes.37 The Academy directors presented him with a proposal that 
would add twenty-six more to the existing thirty in the reconstructed (post-fire) house.38 An offer 
of an astonishing total of thirty-five boxes could hardly be considered inflexible, although 
perhaps the proposal came too late. In conflicting reports, one of the directors of the Academy 
board allegedly was obstinate about the plan, and scuttled it.39 Whatever the case, Warren and 
the men he represented barely contemplated the bid, for by April 7, he was already announcing 
to the press that $600,000 had been subscribed to create a new opera house.40 
Both critics and ordinary observers alike were puzzled. Schuyler mused, “In what other 
cause of charity or of culture would it be possible so to enlist the men of business who have for 




point of view, was the good money of assessment after the bad of hopeless investment? . . . Here 
was not only the certainty of no pecuniary return, but the additional prospect to the stockholders 
of paying their admission into their own building like the undistinguished throng.”41 Such 
phenomenal civic and artistic philanthropy was rare, even in New York. “When we compare this 
alacrity,” continued Schuyler, “with the struggles of the Metropolitan Museum of Art, or with 
the languishing condition of the project for the erection of a cathedral by the richest Protestant 
denomination, it shows that whatever may be the nature of the hold of Italian opera upon the 
‘high-dizened, select populace,’ it is at least very powerful.”42 
 What did this power represent? Perhaps the Metropolitan Opera group realized that to 
own a box at the Academy was not tantamount to joining its inner circle, and that box ownership 
alone no longer conferred sufficient social leverage. The assumption was that Warren and his 
group wanted not only to join, but also to lead, and it was patently clear, particularly in an age of 
untaxed wealth, that they had virtually unlimited financial means to do so if all it took was the 
construction of an opera house. In the end, the Academy’s manager, still Colonel Mapleson, 
dismissed the Metropolitan investors as “a number of rich persons who want some new way of 
spending money.”43 
But something was clearly amiss with this line of reasoning.  The Metropolitan Opera’s 
founding shareholders included many with long-established wealth and social importance, such 
as William Rhinelander, Robert L. Cutting, Samuel L. M. Barlow, Levi P. Morton, and John 
Jacob Astor III, the brother-in-law of the Mrs. Astor, reigning arbiter of society and grand dame 
of the Academy of Music.44 Thus, while the story of the nouveaux challenging the old guard 
made good copy in the newspapers, it was hardly true. In fact, one might recall that Morton, as 




Europe for Mapleson to come to New York as the Academy’s manager in the first place. Now 
Morton, and others like him, had a foot in both camps.45 The Academy was hardly inferior, but it 
was left over from another, more conservative time. Even the old guard could not help but 
recognize that new energy and money might infuse a staid social and cultural activity with a new 
spirit.  
 The Metropolitan Opera House’s construction proceeded with difficulty, and the project 
faced mounting debt that required further financial intervention on the part of stockholders. At 
the March 8, 1882 board meeting, stockholder Egisto Paolo Fabbri suggested that the venture be 
abandoned entirely: “no enterprise of this character can prosper if handicapped with a heavy 
debt, or indeed with any debt at all,” he said.46 His proposal that the property be sold and 
outstanding contracts liquidated was roundly voted down.47 Since the expensive building would 
need to be leased to a worthy opera impresario for little or no cost in order to secure him, Fabbri 
soundly anticipated an issue that would affect the opera house for years to come: “The 
experience of every Impressario [sic] in Europe and in this country almost uniformly shows that 
as a rule such business is unprofitable and hazardous, and I know that the company will find it 
necessary to offer at least its building free of rent to induce a reliable Impressario to undertake 
the arduous task of furnishing us and the public with satisfactory operatic performances.”48 
Nevertheless, the board soldiered on, and new box purchases injected more money into the 
project. 
 Significantly, in May 1883, as the Metropolitan Opera House was nearing completion 
and the final group of stockholders was preparing to draw lots for their boxes, the Mrs. Astor 
herself joined the list.49 Granddaughter-in-law to the paterfamilias John Jacob Astor, Mrs. 




society’s “queen.” On Mondays, her preferred night for opera, it was her habit to arrive late, in 
haughty splendor, to her Academy box and then to leave early. An invitation to the yearly ball at 
her home at 350 Fifth Avenue at Thirty-third Street (and later farther uptown at 840 Fifth 
Avenue) was tantamount to acceptance into New York society. In 1888, Ward McAllister, Mrs. 
Astor’s “court” major domo, estimated to the New-York Daily Tribune that society consisted of 
approximately four hundred individuals.50 Beyond that number, he reasoned, were those not at 
ease in a ballroom—Mrs. Astor’s or anyone else’s. Even during the 1880s McAllister struck 
many observers as dim-witted and out-of-touch. “It is hard to believe in the existence of such a 
Rip Van Winkle of snobbery as the Tribune’s interviewer would make this gentleman appear,” 
wrote Life.51 
When the Vanderbilt clan took the lead in funding the Metropolitan Opera plan, they had 
yet to be invited into Mrs. Astor’s inner circle. It was primarily this fact that prompted the belief 
that the social aspirations of these nouveaux inspired the new opera house. The Vanderbilts, 
however, did not emerge out of nowhere. By 1869, the family wealth, mostly in railroads and 
shipping, already had surpassed the Astors.52  The deaths between 1875 and 1877 of the city’s 
three richest men, William B. Astor Sr., A. T. Stewart, and Cornelius Vanderbilt, occasioned an 
easy comparison of their net worth. Astor, already second-generation rich, had inherited his 
capital from his father, and took few risks with the family’s real estate holdings. The other two 
were self-made men, the Staten Island-born Vanderbilt being not only the “rougher and less 
cultivated” of the group, but also the richest, with a fortune valued at nearly one hundred million 
dollars.53 With little philanthropic spirit, Vanderbilt left the bulk of his estate to his son, William 
Henry Vanderbilt, who died only seven years later, in 1885. Similarly, William B. Astor Sr., also 




contrast to New York’s current nouveaux riches.54 Until their father’s own death in 1875, his 
sons William B. Jr., and John Jacob Astor III also lived austerely and frugally.55 Later their tastes 
and indulgences changed. Likewise, the Commodore’s grandsons and William Henry’s sons, 
Cornelius Vanderbilt II and William Kissam Vanderbilt, bucked the miserly family spirit and 
spent lavishly on themselves and on their favorite extravagances. Notably, even though 
Vanderbilt wealth was not aged nearly as long as the Astors’, it was the third generation of both 
families that was caught up in the social whirl of 1880s New York City. 
 In 1880, the Vanderbilts remained barred not only from the Astors’ social “visiting list” 
but also from the Patriarchs’ Ball.56 By January 1883, however, both Cornelius and William 
Kissam Vanderbilt and their wives were on a list of invitees to tea at Mrs. Ulysses S. Grant’s 
home, along with Mrs. Astor.57 Around the same time, thirty-year-old Alva Vanderbilt, William 
Kissam’s wife, was planning an opulent costume ball of her own as a housewarming for her 
family’s Richard Morris Hunt château at Fifth Avenue and Fifty-second Street. She sent out 
1,200 invitations to New York’s new and old guard, but left off Mrs. Astor, whose daughter had 
eagerly anticipated attending with her friends.58 Consequently, the queen had to capitulate and 
acknowledge the Vanderbilts’ social existence in order to receive an invitation for herself and the 
young Carrie. With or without Mrs. Astor, the party that March was a triumph. “The Vanderbilt 
ball has agitated New-York society more than any social event that has occurred here in many 
years,” stated even the staid Times.59 The Tribune compared it to the most celebrated balls of the 
previous half-century.60 Thus, the social barriers to the Vanderbilts finally fell in 1883. The same 
sort of exuberant and extravagant mix of wealth and generations would be present at the 






For all the financial outlay necessary to construct of the Metropolitan Opera House, little 
attention was paid to creating an innovative or modern theater. Josiah Cleaveland Cady, the 
chosen architect, had never designed an auditorium.61 His initial plan to fit a site of square 
proportions at Vanderbilt Avenue was adapted with little revision for the more rectangular final 
site on the block bounded by Thirty-ninth and Fortieth Streets and Broadway and Seventh 
Avenue.62 In fact, the opera house’s design itself bore an uncanny resemblance to Covent Garden 
in London, the plans of which had been made available to Cady.63 Following a European 
template for a theater struck some observers as absurd, since royal boxes were arranged 
according to the prevailing titled social hierarchy. This concept in theory could hardly be 
translated into anything American, even if the Metropolitan Opera group viewed itself as 
American nobility.  
Even the name of the original corporation, the Metropolitan Opera-house Company, Ltd., 
was ambiguous. The word “opera” was little more than a modifier for the word “house,” and the 
word “company” also could be taken to mean an opera company or a corporate entity that owned 
the house. Whatever the intended meaning, detractors insisted that only the culture of display 
appealed to the founders, “not the attendant responsibilities,” which indeed were myriad.64  The 
public uncertainty of whether the Metropolitan Opera was a theater or a performing company 
would follow the endeavor into the twentieth century. But the early mission was plain: it was a 
real estate investment in opera, and by extension, perhaps also an investment in New York’s 
culture. Nevertheless, the founders of the Metropolitan Opera revisited some of the same issues 
that the leaders of the Academy of Music did before them, but with one crucial difference: in 




company, which controlled the auditorium, and the body which managed the opera troupe that 
performed there.  
The unveiling of the grand new opera house was much anticipated as a harbinger of a 
new era in New York City culture. The implicit social competition between the old and the new 
venues also was a source of fascination. Semi-hyperbolic assessments compared every aspect of 
the Academy and the Metropolitan: from its impresarios, Mapleson and Henry E. Abbey; to its 
soloists; to, perhaps most importantly, its board leadership. Mapleson likened the New York 
“blue blood” Academy leaders to “the Faubourg St. Germain” sophisticates of Paris. The 
Metropolitan Opera founders were merely the rich “monopolists.”65 
No other city in the world, except for Paris, was able to sustain two opera houses, and it 
was improbable that both would survive in New York. The Metropolitan Opera evidently was 
going to be large, opulent, and flashy—a physical manifestation of its financial backers and their 
ambitions. In September 1883, the Metropolitan Opera’s prospectus describing the coming 
season featured on its cover an image of a defiant American eagle—probably intended as a 
challenge to Mapleson, the Times suggested, although as much a self-important herald of a new 
American cultural institution.66 The Academy was expected to fall short in its “primitive 
surroundings” and “archaic interior,” which would not stand the comparison to the dazzling gold, 
crimson, and silk of the new house.67 However, the endless and shameless speculation was more 
about how well the new auditorium would function as the setting for a “brilliant audience”—not 
about how it would function as a glittering temple for opera.68 
Abbey was not above controversy. Less than a week after his arrival in New York, the 
press reported that he anticipated charging stockholders an additional $1,200—the cost for non-




fervently defended and denied this; in fact, the $1,200 assessment as well as a reported $600 one 
were part of another plan by which the directors were bound to protect manager Abbey against 
loss, sharing the financial risk of the coming operatic season.70 
Indeed, the risk was great. The Metropolitan Opera House cost $1.7 million to build, over 
twice its original estimate.71 The boxes, 122 in all, accounted for 732 seats, or one quarter of the 
total capacity, which was 3045, half again as large as the New Opera in Paris. Ironically, this 
amounted to only forty-five seats more than the old Academy. More important, the founders 
were determined that there was to be no Academy-like controversy over the number of boxes.72 
The sightlines—a lingering problem at the Academy as well—was another issue. Pointedly, 
because “persons of inferior status” occupied the balcony and family circle, their complaints of 
poor visibility were ignored.73 
Not surprisingly, the Metropolitan Opera House was built to be the largest opera house in 
the world, as befitted a city that in a few decades would become the largest and richest 
metropolis in human history.74 Even so, the architecture of the building was disappointing. Its 
style was called Romanesque or Italian Renaissance—but Cady’s apparent intention was for the 
building to be timeless and devoid of “transient fashions” or “architectural humors” of the day.75 
The interior was painted pale yellow, anticipated to mellow into ivory by gaslight, but thought by 
the society magazine American Queen to resemble lemon ice cream.76 The ceiling was fitted 
with a huge sheet of metal suspended from the roof with painted decorations that were likened to 
“an immense imitation majolica platter.”77 The stage curtain was sage green instead of the more 
conventional crimson or gold. There was no main grand staircase. The acoustics were not as 
good as the Academy’s, although opinions on the subject were, according to one account, “as 




to enjoy the performance if one was sitting beyond the parquet or the boxes.79 The common 
refrain from Cady and critics alike was that the theater would grow on the beholder in time.  
Yet underlying the public’s condemnation of the auditorium was resentment that the 
Metropolitan Opera’s founders had built a place not for opera, or the public, but for themselves. 
“A more amazing example of wealth working without taste or conviction or public spirit was 
never seen,” wrote the World. “The general impression made upon the observer by the Opera-
house is that the capitalists instructed their architect to build as big a house as possible and not 
bother about its appearance or its convenience.”80 The founders’ civic agenda, if there ever was 
one, was imperceptible.  
Within a week of the opening, Abbey found it necessary to make at least a few changes to 
the new opera house. A gold proscenium curtain replaced the green one, and eleven of the 
second tier boxes were made smaller to make way for a “dress circle” group of chairs for sale at 
a moderate price.81 
*** 
Lost in the hoopla was the fact that on October 22, 1883, the much-anticipated date of the 
simultaneous openings of both the Academy and the Met, two operas in fact were performed: 
Bellini’s La Sonnambula and Gounod’s Faust. Nobody commented on the ironic significance of 
the choices of operas themselves—the stories of a sleepwalker at the Academy and of a pact with 
the devil at the Met. In fact, comparatively little was said about the performances at all; much 
more was said about both audiences, and about the new theater.  
Even though both houses were sold out, Mapleson expressed concern that the other 
(lowbrow) openings on the same night—of the National Horse Show and at Tony Pastor’s 




time patrons filled the boxes, and Mapleson missed “no one of significance.”82 Even the 
insignificant attended the Academy that evening, filling the house to standing-room capacity.83 
When the Met’s conductor lifted his baton twenty minutes late at 8:23, people were still 
“pouring in from every side.” Christine Nilsson, the star that evening, was a seasoned performer 
who had created her role in Faust at the Paris Opera premiere; she was almost unanimously 
thought to be in perfect voice. The scenery and costumes were rich and beautiful, the artists were 
all warmly received, and the production as a whole was a “lyric and dramatic representation.”84 
Yet, in an odd reprise of the Academy’s opening night decades before, the first two acts received 
little or no applause.85 Certainly the five-hour length of the performance had something to do 
with the lethargy.86 Almost as likely was the fact that Abbey played it safe. “In spite of the 
magnificent apparatus which Mr. Abbey and his musical director have at their disposal they did 
not go beyond the conventions in the manner of the production in anything except the stage 
settings,” the Tribune wrote.87 
But that was not the point. As anticipated, the opening at the Metropolitan Opera House 
was a social, not a musical event. “The audience was apparently more interested in surveying the 
house and seeing who was there than in listening to the music,” summed up the Critic.88 The arts 
and letters journal the Independent conceded that the Metropolitan Opera House indeed did 
outshine the Academy. Moreover, it probably surpassed any recent gathering of “the beauty and 
wealth and fashion” of New York City. “Everybody who was anybody” was there, shimmering 
in costly outfits and diamonds and pearls.”89 Not to be outdone, however, at the Academy, the 
Times noted that there was “such an audience as has rarely been seen in the old Fourteenth-street 
opera-house except upon occasions of more than usual interest, and it was liberal with its 




Yet the final judgment about the Met was limited to its physical success as a setting for 
its brilliant audience in terms of complimentary paint colors and architecture.91 But given the 
run-up, the audience also was surprisingly sophisticated. The Tribune wrote: 
Everybody was in full dress and in the glorious good spirits that a consciousness 
of elegant clothes inspires. When the opening notes of the overture sounded 
through the house were was a momentary hush, and then as if everybody had 
made his bow and done his duty by that everybody turned to his neighbor and 
began to chat in the liveliest manner, or turned completely around in his seat to 
get a full view of the house. A more sociable gathering it would be hard to 
imagine. Everybody seemed to know everybody and everybody seemed to have 
something to say. But when the curtain arose the conversation ceased at once and 
from that time forth, except between the sets, the audience was attentive to that 
which was taking place upon the stage, applauded heartily, if not with the greatest 
enthusiasm, and seemed to be satisfied with everything.92 
 
Mapleson might have deemed them the rich unwashed, but the Metropolitan Opera’s 
opening night audience was comprised of a diverse mix of New York’s wealth and privilege as 
well as hundreds from the circles of art, science, letters, and foreign society.93 By any serious 
estimate this crowd had a combination not only of affluence, but of influence—socially, 
culturally, and politically.94 In spite of its faults of exclusivity and superficiality, in the 
Metropolitan Opera House, forces had consolidated into a new and possibly better operatic 
venture. But this striking fact was not yet apparent to observers. 
It was the “jewels, gems, diamonds, bright eyes, and dazzling teeth” of the new wealth 
that were all the focus.95  The newness of the newcomers’ gold luster, according to American 
Queen, would be fleeting, and the group would “never hold long the same society following,” 
even if the music was good.96 Nevertheless, at intermission, those in the audience who had 
brought along the day’s newspapers could verify who was sitting where by consulting the 




The absurdity about splitting hairs about who was aristocratic and who was not in the 
United States, and in New York in particular, was not lost on the humor and satire journal Puck, 
which had a short continuing column written in the voice and argot of one of the nouveaux. Of 
the Met opening, “Fitznoodle” wrote:   
“Well, we went, and on enterwing the building I was stwuck by the wesemblance 
of the operawa house in some wespects to Her Majesty’s Theatah, and in othahs 
to Covent Garden. Some of the Amerwican families who pwofess to be of verwy 
ancient and arwistocwatic wace and aw lineage were not pwesent. I aftahward 
discovahed the weason. It was because some of the wecent millionaires—the 
nouveaux wiches—had contwibuted the gweatah part of the funds necessarwy 
faw the constwuction of the house. I almost wo-ahwed with laughtah when I 
heard this. It was weally too widiculous. As if one millionaire were any maw 
wespectable or belonged to a maw illustwious family than anothah!”98 
 
The peculiar triumph for the Academy that evening was one of survival. Mrs. Astor did 
not attend, and sent her regrets from the country; the press failed to note that she owned boxes in 
both theaters, which perhaps explained her uncharacteristic absence from an unusually 
auspicious opening of the opera season. But August Belmont, his wife, and son were present at 
the Academy, as were several judges and government officials, as well as other 
“Knickerbockers” whose prominence had peaked in the 1870s.99  With the opening over, the 
Academy was still standing— undamaged musically and socially. 
The following day, comparisons between the houses abounded. And as the season 
progressed, reviews for both opera venues appeared, usually side-by-side, and typically without 
overt preference for one company over another. If anything was becoming clear, though, it was 
Mapleson’s over-reliance on his stars, of which there were at first only two. Yet in November, 
the operatic superstar, Adelina Patti, returned to the Academy stage, and new to the company’s 
mix was Lillian Nordica, a great young American soprano. And every “habitual opera-goer in 




Even so, Americans were still somewhat provincial about how they took their opera, and 
were fond of hearing operatic feats like a tenor hitting the high C, the Met’s Roberto Stagno’s 
stock-in-trade. “An American audience will go anywhere, sacrifice anything, to hear this one 
note,” the Critic claimed.101 
By December, the journal Life was bold enough to surmise that “in the Metropolitan 
Opera House, we have really an opera,” and that at the helm, Abbey was “not a bad sort of 
impresario.”102 The exemplary artistry of the performances as a whole was slowly being 
recognized, interpreted by a company dependent on not one or two stars alone, but a troupe of 
excellent soloists, chorus, orchestra, and conductor. Mapleson, on the other hand, had less than a 
handful of great singers. “Is it surprising, then,” asked Life, “that a night at the Metropolitan 
Opera House is more than likely to be one of brilliancy and enthusiasm?”103 
Thus there was hope that the Metropolitan Opera might succeed not only socially, but 
artistically, and become a great venue for all New Yorkers. Even while the productions were 
gaining respect, however, a notice posted in the boxes reminded the denizens of the parterre not 
to talk too much during the performances.104  
As the Met’s the first season was coming to an end, Mapleson was in severe debt, having 
drawn on reserve sums to secure Patti’s contract in order for the Academy to function 
competitively. Sheriffs served notices on him, and Mapleson’s guarantors only half-heartedly 
offered their support. The Met was not faring much better, the season having lost a half million 
dollars.105 
It would have cost the Academy only $100,000 to include more boxes. Instead, between 
$1.7 and $3 million was spent to build the Metropolitan Opera House. The mix among the 




better and stronger undertaking that also helped secure New York City’s place on the world 
cultural map. Their great wealth also enabled the opera house’s investors to continue to sustain 
the money-losing venture somewhat indefinitely, thus guaranteeing its survival.106 
In 1833, Philip Hone, the elite merchant, New York mayor, and diarist, wondered about 
the opera: “Will this splendid and refined amusement be supported by New York? I am 
doubtful.”107 In the half-century that followed, opera indeed could be supported, albeit only in 
one place, and while continuously treading a fine line between success and failure, and its social 
versus aesthetic purposes. When the Metropolitan Opera’s first season was over in late April 
1884, at least a few Academy directors were willing to concede defeat, and led a movement to 
investigate a merger of the two houses. But of two hundred votes, only thirty-eight were in favor 
of amalgamation.108 Perhaps more significantly, at that meeting, August Belmont announced his 
resignation after five years as president of the Academy, citing business interests. His gamble 
with Mapleson had not paid off, and opera in New York was taken over by a richer group with 
greater imaginations and ambitions.  
The city’s cultural framework was changing, and for the opera, so, too, was its 
entrenched social structure. In 1895, Cornelius Vanderbilt transferred some shares of his stock to 
enable Belmont’s son and namesake, August Belmont Jr., to become the owner of Box Four at 
the Metropolitan Opera House. And in 1896, in an example of the enduring new mix which she 
herself helped initiate, the now-divorced Alva Vanderbilt married Belmont’s son, Oliver Hazard 
Perry Belmont. Although the Academy continued to exist as an occasional venue for opera, it 
also showcased vaudeville, balls, and other gatherings. The Metropolitan Opera board, on the 
other hand, reiterated in an 1896 resolution that the House was strictly to be used for opera, and 




The cycle was complete, and the Metropolitan Opera had realized August Belmont’s earlier 
vision for opera in New York by drawing on a new group of supporters with ample resources to 





Into the Twentieth Century 
 
 
By 1898, the year of the consolidation of the five boroughs of Greater New York, cities were 
becoming an American focus, and with massive urban growth came interventionist efforts to 
guide an altered social and cultural landscape.1 The New York Public Library, the Metropolitan 
Museum of Art, and the Metropolitan Opera were continuing to build on the frameworks their 
trustees had established years before. And as the institutional missions expanded, the buildings 
themselves did as well.  
 The New York Public Library seized the wave of consolidation in a larger sense: borne of 
three separate entities and united into a colossal enterprise, by the turn of the century it expanded 
to incorporate the city’s disparate free circulating libraries as well as a branch system funded 
through Andrew Carnegie’s stunning $5.2 million donation. Likewise, the opening of a 
permanent building in Central Park publicized not only the growth but the ambitions and 
ascension of the Metropolitan Museum, measured by the steady flow of important donations in 
art and in cash. And the Metropolitan Opera House, rebuilt by the governing Real Estate 
Company after a fire destroyed the theater in 1892, and gradually refurbished along grander 
specifications, was becoming as famous for its performing troupe. Led by a separate and 
idiosyncratic board of trustees, the company respected the protocol of the past but set in motion 
more professional management and a forward-thinking artistic program. 
 All of this required money. New York had maintained its position as the “Empire City” 
and grand marketplace of commerce, and with these developing cultural programs came a slow 
and necessary acceptance of official city involvement. The library and museum both were built 




purview of the private trustees. Carnegie, who had contemplated his philanthropic activities in 
simultaneously practical, abstract, and emotional terms, predicated his library donation on the 
equal participation and maintenance of the city, thus forcing the trustees into ongoing 
involvement and negotiation with the public servants who served the library users. Similarly, the 
Metropolitan Museum trustees under J. P. Morgan’s presidency recognized the need for 
municipal cooperation. By opening the board to three ex-officio members from the city 
government, the institution was able to parlay the association into support for new wings in the 
1910s. 
 For the library, museum, and opera, the personalities and agendas of the important 
trustees Carnegie, Morgan, and Otto Kahn loomed large. At the museum, Morgan rejected the 
common practice of organizing a benefaction around a donor’s name, as others like Henry 
Gurdon Marquand forced the notion further by distributing their collections without restriction 
before their deaths. This sort of altruism may have appeared quietly self-effacing, but it did not 
escape public notice. In the case of Carnegie’s millions for the library, it also opened him to 
criticism for his motivations in giving away his “tainted money.” 
Indeed, a philanthropist’s adoption of the dual role of cultural and moral arbiter was, to 
say the least, arrogant. In the late 1880s, the museum trustees faced censure over the question of 
opening the building to the public on Sundays; a little over a decade later, the opera would 
encounter some of the same moral concerns (and public condemnation) over performances of 
Richard Strauss’s controversial modern opera Salome.  
Even so, trustee presumptuousness in employing some of the corporate practices that had 
enriched them had some benefit for their chosen cultural institutions. Morgan, for example, was 




constitution, capitalized on the ways and means of public support, and professionalized the staff.2 
Similarly, the library embraced the Dewey Decimal System and new scientific approaches to the 
profession. While this sort of organizational efficiency was a hallmark of the progressive era, so, 
too, was the more disturbing control that many of the trustees—all members of an intricately 
connected philanthropic cohort—had over corporate boards and money trusts as well. 
Indeed, the era’s paradoxes were complex. As American culture was becoming 
increasingly heterogeneous, charitable impulses were ever more ambiguous. As committed 
Protestants, many of the trustees’ activities advocated reform to improve the quality of life for all 
classes, even while possibly moved by a more conservative inclination to intervene and stem the 
tide of further change.3 “There is great confusion,” wrote Walter Lippmann in 1914, “due in 
large measure to the persistency which men follow tradition in a world unsuited to it.”4  
Part Two investigates the ways in which the trustees of the library, museum, and opera 
built on the accomplishments of the past and responded to the future in a rapidly changing and 
growingly modern age, even as their institutions, and they, as directors, were becoming 




CHAPTER FOUR  
World Metropolis: The Consolidation of New York City  
and the Building of a Colossal Library System 
 
 
In December 1868, Andrew Haswell Green presented a report to Central Park’s Board of 
Commissioners that extended in scope far beyond the acreage of the still-unfinished urban park. 
The board, in fact, already had enlarged its authority to cover the city’s urban planning, and 
Green’s communication ostensibly focused on a scheme for improvement to Manhattan’s 
northern end. The Harlem River, which connects the Hudson and East Rivers, was a potential 
boon to development if only bridges or tunnels could be built to span the waterway. Northern 
Manhattan and southern Westchester (the future Bronx) were the subjects of Green’s focus; they 
were still rural, and it was difficult to imagine as grandly as he did that the Harlem River had the 
potential to become a veritable Thames or Seine, with serious roadways connecting densely 
populated areas of an international city.1  
Green looked to the past—to the land in Yonkers granted to Adriaen van der Donck in 
the seventeenth century, and to the city’s rapid development northward following the gridiron 
scheme of 1811—to inform his view of city planning. He scrutinized territorial administration in 
the city as well as the state. He contemplated the “great procession” of European immigrants 
flowing into the city, and pondered new means of communication and transportation. He had an 
unfailing faith in technology, and the optimism that the ambitious infrastructure he imagined 
could and would be built.2  
 And he saw consolidation—in terms of territories and of “squabbling” entities—as the 
wave of the future.3  
“Let this be done,” the Tribune wrote, “and New-York in the course of one or two 




and his plan to achieve it was through the consolidation of the City of New York, Kings, Queens, 
and Richmond Counties, and a part of Westchester County, under one common municipal 
government, to be arranged in departments, under a single executive head.5 This notion of 
annexation certainly was not original to Green, and in varying degrees had existed since the 
1820s, but Green’s tenacity and passion for city building finally saw it through in 1898, thirty 
years after submitting the germ of the idea in his report. 
Over his long career, Green never would shrink from using public resources to enhance 
private ventures, particularly where his consolidation initiative was concerned. He gave 
consideration to the human shape and physical scaffolding of the metropolis, and responded 
imaginatively with a corresponding solution to the city’s cultural complexity. New York’s 
library system would become one grand result of his program. 
In 1845, when he was twenty-five, Green began a lifelong business and personal 
connection with Samuel Tilden. “He is surrounded with political hangers on which in my humble 
opinion is of no especial advantage in a business point of view,” Green wrote in his diary, 
dubious of Tilden’s potentially conflicting political interests.6 Yet the two men ultimately did 
practice law and politics together for decades, and Tilden, although only six years older, became 
Green’s mentor. The young Green’s initial reticence about working with his future partner 
demonstrated the singularity of focus and sober integrity that would characterize his life of 
public service.  
The Consolidation of Greater New York in 1898 was the capstone of Andrew Green’s 
long career, which included a leadership role on the Central Park Board of Commissioners.7 
Green used the Park Commission bureaucracy to further an aesthetic agenda that promoted his 




encompassed both a physical and cultural infrastructure. Imagining a world-class city, he 
supported the proposals for both the American Museum of Natural History and the Metropolitan 
Museum of Art to be built on city land, setting a precedent by which public support could aid 
private initiatives organized for the public good. For Green, the Park was the nucleus of a 
comprehensive program of progress in his quest to make New York the great urban center of the 
country.8 
In the last decades of the nineteenth century, the shape of the city was a perpetual 
question of public debate. One of the more active members of the planning movement was 
Frederic C. Howe, the lawyer, Ohio politician, tax specialist (a devout follower of Henry 
George’s single tax proposal), and polemicist on the urban condition.9 “A new conception of 
municipal purpose has come in,” he wrote. “It is neither conscious nor defined as yet, but in the 
midst of the outward manifestations of municipal activity, an unrecognized broadening of the 
culture and life of the city is going on, of immense significance to the future.” That this 
expansion was proceeding “unrecognized” had much to do with the fact that it had emerged 
quietly through private channels. “But that the private activities of to-day will become the public 
ones of to-morrow is inevitable,” Howe wrote.10 Private initiatives like settlement houses, 
playgrounds, and hospitals, he anticipated, all were “surely and slowly” passing under public 
control. 
Consolidation, in the intellectual as well as the physical sense, was part of the spirit of the 
times, and the library movement was about to be swept into its midst. 
*** 
At the 1886 meeting of the American Library Association, the controversy over taxing 




states had over time come to accept the necessity of public support, the middle states, and New 
York City in particular, still were wrestling with the issue. “Is the municipal government of New 
York City so much worse than that of other large cities—Boston, Chicago, Cincinnati, and 
Milwaukee—that it cannot be trusted with the interests of a public library?” the Association 
president William F. Poole asked incredulously.11  
New York was no different from other large cities in the presence of “disturbing 
elements” like large immigrant populations, socialists, communists, or anarchists; yet the most 
disturbing element of all was “the reluctance of wealthy men to be taxed for such an object.” To 
Poole, the problem of state support could not be solved in New York without rich private citizens 
who would be willing to create a library endowment of $4 or $5 million. “The large legacies and 
gifts which have recently been made for the founding of libraries in this country are among the 
most cheering signs of the times,” he said.12 But he doubted that any such rich philanthropist 
would appear in the Empire City. 
At the conference, Adolph Sanger’s recent proposal for a New York Public Library also 
was a topic of discussion. He had shrewdly selected prominent men to be the bill’s incorporators 
as a signal that no New Yorker of stature could deny the significance of a public library housed 
in a large building “worthy of the city.”13 But almost immediately the Senate Cities Committee 
heard arguments against the bill from among others, Melvil Dewey, the librarian of Columbia 
College and inventor of the library classification system, and three trustees of the Free 
Circulating Library. They favored small, scattered libraries around the city instead of a central 
branch, and argued that New York already had the fine Astor Library for reference. Sanger’s 
suggested site at Forty-second Street seemed too far out of the way for poor people to visit, 




public library needed to serve the public, which in New York consisted of mainly those who 
could not afford to buy books. Building and equipping a library on the Croton Reservoir site 
would cost at least $2 million, and the interest alone on that sum, $100,000, could sustain ten 
branch libraries, “doing ten times as much good.”14 
Meanwhile, even with the lingering fear of municipal corruption, the Free Circulating 
Library trustees eventually did seek public aid. William W. Appleton, the Library Committee 
chair, believed that with public support, “the libraries at present in existence should be 
strengthened & the money given to some non-political board of trustees, who would see that the 
money was expended in a way to do the most good & to develop some comprehensive scheme of 
library work.”15 
When Samuel Tilden died in 1886, the nature of the debate changed. The Tilden bequest 
was going to serve as an example of how great private fortunes might be returned to the public 
good, and in this case, enable New York to match the free public libraries of Boston and 
Chicago.16 In response to Tilden’s relatives’ litigation of the will, Green, Bigelow, and Smith 
quickly incorporated the Tilden Trust in March 1887, specifying its purpose to establish and 
maintain a free library and reading room in the City of New York.17 
Four years later, when the Court of Appeals decided against the Trust and in favor of 
Tilden’s relatives, the New York Times called it “a public calamity” that deprived the city of a 
great public monument.18 But in a surprise compromise, Laura Pelton Hazard, Tilden’s 
grandniece and reluctant participant in the suit, agreed to sell her interest in half of the residuary 
estate for $975,000, guaranteeing that around half of the Trust, minus her payment, would 
survive for Tilden’s intended use. The Times, along with other newspapers, condemned the other 




legal right to the money, the beneficiaries had “not a shadow of a moral or equitable title.”19 The 
Tilden Trust emerged with his book collection and only $2.5 million to accomplish its grand 
purpose. With a yearly income of only approximately $100,000 to build, equip, and run a public 
library, by itself it could never be of the scale of Boston’s or Chicago’s, which operated for 
hundreds of thousands of dollars, and which would soon feature large new central buildings, with 
branch and delivery stations, erected by their municipal authorities.20 
After the verdict was handed down, the Tilden trustees met, more to bury their hopes than 
to consider the disposal of the remaining Trust money. “We have no plans to make public, for 
the simple reason that we have none at all,” one trustee said.21 The lesson was that Tilden and 
community-minded philanthropists like him would be better advised to make their contributions 
during their lifetimes, rather than entrusting descendents or trustees with the task of carrying out 
their intentions.  
As a case in point, a few weeks after the Tilden verdict, William Waldorf Astor refused a 
trusteeship of his great-grandfather’s library. His decision not to continue to take an active part in 
the Astor Library was allegedly to free it from the appearance of being an “appendage of the 
Astor family which controlled it for purposes of self-glorification to the detriment of public 
interest.”22 Because he was living abroad this was understandable, although the implication also 
was that the Astor family was as indifferent to the endeavor as they were in protecting John 
Jacob Astor’s interests. Indeed, one year later, when William Waldorf’s uncle William Astor 
died with an estate estimated at up to $50 million, he left the Astor Library only $50,000.23 For 
the Sun, it was a “mystery of wealth” that the Astor family, with an estimated net worth of over 
$100 million, would not think to endow their library with enough money to sustain it, but would 




public library: it was supported by an exclusive patronage; run perfunctorily and secretly by a 
“close corporation” of trustees; and its use restricted to adults over the age of twenty-one from 8 
am until 4 or 5 pm, depending on the time of year. Essentially, it was closed to the working and 
poor classes. The board was apathetic about improvements in this regard, although one Astor 
trustee speculated hopefully that if the Tilden entity became New York’s long-sought great 
circulating library, the Astor Library might still fulfill the wants of the city for reference works.25 
While awaiting a final judgment on the suit, the Tilden trustees had weighed their 
anticipated options. The Free Circulating Library, of which Bigelow was a trustee, had made 
overtures for a merger, as had the Lenox Library and the Scientific Alliance, the newly formed 
body devoted to scientific research and education.26 After the decision, Green presented the now-
available alternatives. They could establish a library in Tilden’s Gramercy Park home, a plan he 
quickly dismissed as unwise. They could combine forces with the Lenox Library, and either 
together or alone request the city to erect a public library building on the reservoir site, as per 
Sanger’s scheme. They could manage the smaller, undersupported libraries of the city.27 Or they 
could adopt some version of a consolidated plan. 
By now, Green had been championing the consolidation of Greater New York for 
decades, and what was once thought to be “Green’s folly” or “hobby” was beginning to gain 
traction in the state legislature, which had created a commission, headed by Green, to explore the 
possibility further. In March 1892, the on-again off-again Greater New York bill was once again 
on the table. “The time is coming, and is not far distant, when New York City will be the 
financial centre of the world,” the bill’s proposer, General James W. Husted, the powerful former 
speaker of the assembly said, echoing popular boosterism. “New-York City will become the 




Immigrants were more than doing their part in making it the great city of the future. “She needs 
more room,” he said—namely, Brooklyn, Staten Island, and Westchester County.28 
The state of library development in New York City, and the prospects for the Tilden 
fund, remained a hot topic of discussion for many months. The circulating library system 
continued to be the most practical approach to the public’s needs, yet the reference library model 
still prevailed. The two most obvious alternatives for the Tilden bequest were to build a great 
public reference library for scholars, or to support free circulating libraries for the masses. 
Funding both was not possible. 
Historically, the reference library, best exemplified by the Astor or Lenox, had relied on 
private funding. Because circulating libraries already were receiving small state grants, the 
thought was that the city was bound to support a popular library eventually, with or without 
private munificence, making some observers reason that the public reference library was a more 
logical alternative for the Tilden money.29 Even so, the argument made clear that the 
shortcomings of the Astor and Lenox Libraries were so great that the notion of one more 
reference library hardly seemed impertinent or extravagant.  
But Andrew Green had bigger ideas. He and his Tilden trustees by now had accepted the 
fact that the Trust would be unable to establish and build a comprehensive popular library. He 
also could not avoid knowledge of the constant financial woes of the smaller individual 
circulating collections. Moved by his proclivity for consolidation, Green found it both efficient 
and logical that the scattered city libraries might benefit from a movement towards 
amalgamation as well. So, too, might the Tilden Trust. Publicly protesting that he was acting on 
his own to appear politically dispassionate, although evidently proceeding with the support of his 




New York City that passed in the state legislature in May 1892.30 Under the law, any organized 
library in the city and county of New York could join with any other similarly organized 
corporation and reconstitute their interests into a new corporation. Coordinating the interests of 
all of New York’s public libraries—to avoid duplication and to assemble as complete a 
collection of materials as possible—was the obvious solution to the problem of inferior library 
services.  
Almost immediately there was no question that the consolidation had to start by 
combining the Astor and Lenox libraries with Tilden money. The new library would be in the 
full sense of the term a “public library,” differing in scope from the Astor, which was expressly 
intended as “a working library for studious persons,” and from the Lenox, whose precise public 
or archival function was not really clear. With such an arrangement, New York could have 
facilities equaling those of London or Paris.31 Furthermore, the United States was a leader in the 
modern study of library science.32 Even in its potentially reduced state, if the new library were to 
get the benefit of this progress, it might still stand as one of the most valuable libraries of the 
world. The press envisaged the possibility in rhetoric that recalled the past calls for the necessity 
of “useful” learning and knowledge in the public realm. 
The misfortune of the diminished Tilden funds, in fact, had forced the hand of 
consolidation, which was turning out to be an advantage. Had the $5 million remained intact, the 
trustees might have thought to establish some form of a scientific library as originally favored by 
Green, or something more limited like the Astor or Lenox Libraries, which were noble 
memorials to their founders but of little practical use to the masses.33  
Instead, Tilden’s monument would be more abstract: it enabled the establishment of “a 




all of the existing free circulating libraries into the plan. As editorials trumpeted, this was indeed 
a chance for a great library. With a fine central building of architectural distinction, many 
satellite branches, and combined private and public support, the library was predicted to grow 
rapidly.34 
For two years the three separate boards discussed the complicated undertaking both on 
and off the record, often at the home of Lewis Cass Ledyard, J. P. Morgan’s personal attorney. 
By early March 1895, the press reported that an announcement was at hand. New Yorkers owed 
a debt of gratitude to the three groups of trustees whose “disinterestedness” made the anticipated 
achievement possible, and some accounts singled out William Waldorf Astor for his “powerful 
support” in influencing the outcome.35 Somewhat unexpectedly, he and his cousin John Jacob 
Astor IV not only consented to the alliance but also helped initiate the meetings of the joint 
committee. Members of the working group were impressed by the willingness of the Astor 
family to lose the Astor name in the public mind by subsuming it into one great consolidated 
library.36 
While other generations of Astors might have considered it “an hereditary glory” to 
enrich the Astor Library with additional wings and collections, William Waldorf Astor 
interpreted that calling quite differently. True, he had shown more than a passing interest in the 
institution when he presented it with one of its rarest possessions, the Latin translation of one of 
the two letters written by Columbus on shipboard while returning to Spain after the discovery of 
the New World.37 But he also heeded the critics who protested that the Astor Library had become 
closed and irrelevant. Was this his great-grandfather’s intent? In a letter of support, William 
Waldorf Astor recognized the library’s censure by the American press “along comprehensible 




weary of New York society and his aunt’s antics with “the 400,” even wearier of the United 
States as a place “not fit for a gentleman to live in,” and would soon abandon his native land for 
England, where he could live like real aristocracy.39 In the end the Astor Library also was as 
irrelevant to William Waldorf and John Jacob Astor IV as it was to New York, for the Astor 
name was living on in more significant ways to them.40 Nevertheless, the credit they received for 
promoting consolidation was not altogether out of place.  
News of the libraries’ official consolidation in the press allegedly took the trustees by 
surprise. “We did not intend to have the plan made public so soon,” Green told a Tribune 
reporter, “but now that the consolidation scheme has been published we propose to push it 
through as rapidly as possible.”41 Positive public opinion, of course, was critical. The aspiration 
was for New York to have a public library worthy of a great metropolis, and the successful final 
negotiation on February 22, 1895, Washington’s birthday, was heralded as one of the most 
important steps ever taken in the American educational realm.42 The more the boards thought of 
the advantages of a consolidation scheme, the greater the advantages seemed. A joint committee 
consisting of, among others, John L. Cadwalader and Bishop Potter from the Astor Library; John 
S. Kennedy and George L. Rives from the Lenox Library; and Green and Ledyard from the 
Tilden Trust, presented a plan of consolidation for each of the boards’ approval.43 
In spite of each entity’s individual shortcomings, it was not hyperbolical to suggest that 
the consolidation of two of the largest and richest libraries in New York, along with Tilden’s 
money, gave the trustees ample means for establishing one of the finest libraries in the world. 
The Astor Library had over 260,000 rare and well-chosen books particularly in the areas of art, 
mathematics, and law; the Lenox Library over 100,000 volumes, important manuscripts, 




published with movable typography; and the Tilden collection included Audubon’s Birds of 
America as well as the first, second, and third folios of Shakespeare and a first edition of 
Milton’s Paradise Lost, which also were in the Astor and Lenox collections.44 Even more 
important were the considerable assets available from joint endowment funds and real estate. All 
told, the combined assets of the three libraries were estimated at $8 million, and while the 
approximately 450,000 books could not yet match the two million volumes each in the French 
Bibliothèque Nationale or the British Museum, with the additional capital, the new behemoth 
could accomplish great things.45  
Although the committee also considered a more thorough consolidation that included 
some of the free libraries in the city—the New York Free Circulating, the Aguilar, and the 
Mechanics’—that complex topic was deferred until a later time. When the formal agreement was 
executed in May, the terms were simple: to establish and maintain a free public library and 
reading room in New York City, “with such branches as might be deemed advisable,” and to 
“continue and promote the several objects and purposes” of the Astor, Lenox, and Tilden 
entities.46 More pointedly, the reconstituted library could advance the level of New York’s 
library resources to compete with, or even exceed, those of other cities. All that remained was to 
determine the site of the library, which was to be called “The New York Public Library, Astor, 
Lenox and Tilden Foundations.” 
Immediately, the presence of a monumental new depository of knowledge fired New 
Yorkers’ imaginations as a signal of Gotham’s greatness and power. Libraries had come to be a 
bragging point in a city’s claim to be metropolitan, and this library was going to be distinctive in 
its dual objectives of circulation and reference. While researchers and scholars also would 




over Christendom,” one publication crowed), New Yorkers as a whole also would be the greater 
for it.47  
There were two serious options of where to build this great intellectual “lighthouse”: the 
Lenox Library property at Seventieth Street and Fifth Avenue, and the previously proposed 
reservoir site at Bryant Park, on Forty-second Street and Fifth Avenue.48 Wherever it was 
destined to be, accessibility was paramount, as the library was intended for every class of 
readers. With a warning to “make no mistake,” the Mail and Express joined other tabloids and 
even the Tribune in begging the new generation of trustees not to repeat the errors of the past in 
selecting a location for the library—that is, to ignore the progress of New York City’s 
development northward by advocating an unwise location which might in decades be 
inconvenient and far removed from the central district. Following this logic, to some, the ideal 
place was the “Acropolis” rising on Morningside Heights and anchored by Columbia University 
and the Cathedral of St. John the Divine.49 
Although the vote for consolidation had been unanimous, the committee on site selection 
was divided. The Astor trustees, recognizing the impracticality of their own library’s location, 
favored the Bryant Park site; Thomas M. Markoe, the board president, went so far as to suggest a 
public partnership in which the city donated the site along with a building for the use of the free 
library.50 The Lenox trustees, with their large Richard Morris Hunt-designed edifice and 
additional undeveloped lots surrounding it, preferred their own site. It was left to the Tilden 
trustees to place the deciding vote. Green was vehemently against the Forty-second Street site, 
because he felt strongly that if the reservoir were dismantled, the property should become a part 
of Bryant Park. His fellow Tilden trustees, Ledyard and Bigelow, disagreed. “I am too well 




allow his enthusiasm for a consolidated library to exceed his commitment to New York itself.51 
He did admit, however, that the Lenox building was “not the very best place in the city.”52  
The New York Public Library trustees met for the first time on May 27, 1895 at the Astor 
Library.53 In December, they elected John Bigelow as president, and appointed a site 
investigation committee. Its eventual report raised serious doubts about the efficacy of the Lenox 
land, and caused the committee to think more broadly about the new institution and the future 
metropolis it would serve.54 The constant changes in the city’s population and development, and 
the shifts in locations of businesses and residences, taken together with the promising 1895 bill 
for the consolidation of Greater New York, rendered it impossible for even the most experienced 
leaders to make a “trustworthy judgment” concerning the future.55 
 What they anticipated and even assumed was the epic character of their endeavor. The 
New York Public Library ultimately would be like the British, French, or Boston libraries—all of 
which were supported, however, by municipal funds. “It seems but just that public aid should be 
extended to those higher forms of public instruction, designed solely for the benefit of the public, 
which are embodied in the work performed by public libraries,” the committee wrote. New York 
hitherto had done little or nothing for the support of public libraries, except small appropriations 
for free circulating ones. The time had come for the city to do its part in “this great work.” 
Unlike Boston, New York was not obligated to rely on public money for library funding. 
Nevertheless, the committee did recommend that the trustees petition municipal authorities to 
grant a site for the library building, namely, the site of the Croton Reservoir. It was ideal in terms 
of its central location, large area, and accessibility.56 
 But in considering the site, the committee first had to contemplate the purpose of the 




reference library, which, as such, probably would be used by scholars regardless of where it was. 
But a larger plan encompassing public instruction, education, and general circulation would need 
an accessible location. The prevailing expectation was to establish something greater: an 
institution open to the public, as opposed to a closed and exclusive club for bibliophiles. 
“Useful” as a reference library might be, the trustees had to acknowledge the even larger 
measure of usefulness a broader plan would engender. Moreover, they were convinced that the 
public might take a more active interest in the library and its affairs if its principal function was 
to reach and serve the people. If they were proposing merely another reference library, it would 
be, quite simply, a disappointment.57  
 By spring 1897, the library had won all necessary approvals from the state and city to 
build on the reservoir site, and a committee of the most energetic trustees was fast outlining a 
plan of action.58 John S. Billings, the first director of the library, was gathering information on 
library buildings. The Commissioners of Public Parks authorized the erection of the building for 
$1,700,000, after which the trustees sponsored an architectural competition.59 Twelve selected 
finalists would take part in a second competition requiring more detailed drawings.60 
Charged with developing a structure to be contained within a footprint of 482 by 455 feet, 
the committee prepared a document outlining its expectations. In fact, the committee’s wish list 
of interior spaces helped frame their larger discussion of the potential programs and initiatives 
the library might offer. Beyond stacks for over one million volumes, the library would need 
rooms for public documents and children’s literature and reading; a library for the blind; a 
manuscript department; a picture gallery; administrative and processing offices; and mechanical 
areas. One major requirement was for all public and clerical chambers to have as much daylight 




refreshing shift from the past, the trustees were foreseeing wide use for this library, and taking 
into consideration the needs of the public. 
 No fewer than ninety-one architects participated in the competition, and in November 
1897, the trustees announced the winner: the Beaux Arts-trained partnership of Carrère & 
Hastings. The firm, established in 1885, had already completed some notable residential and 
commercial projects, including the redesigned interior of the Metropolitan Opera House, 
although none were on a par with the unique stature of the New York Public Library, nor of their 
future work like the House and Senate office buildings in Washington, DC.62 Skilled as an 
architect and administrator, John M. Carrère had an abiding interest in public affairs and city 
planning, and was a leader in the movement in 1893 to convince the U. S. government to support 
open design competitions for its public buildings. Thomas S. Hastings was the son of the dean of 
Union Theological Seminary and had contacts with wealthy people from both his wife and his 
father. The jury said their “direct and dignified” submission would give New York “a beautiful 
and monumental building.” Both the exterior and interior conveyed a stately grandeur, and 
provided a clear physical representation of the ambitious undertaking.63 
 The winning design demanded an imposing stone in keeping with the substantial and 
“conspicuously placed” new library.64 Marble, the ideal material for the commanding edifice, 
would necessitate an additional appropriation of $500,000. Would the boss of Tammany Hall, 
Richard Croker, and the new administration of Mayor Robert A. Van Wyck be inclined to favor 
a cost increase with no possibility of a kickback?  
With unusual urgency, the Board of Estimate and Apportionment unanimously voted to 
adopt the winning plan, representing the first time that the city ever was accountable for a 




any other library in the world,” Cadwalader stated. From the outset the trustees had considered it 
best to try to anticipate public demands. Most significantly, this included the imperative 
condition that the institution be open every day and evening of the year, including Sundays from 
1 until 9 PM.66 It had been only six years since the trustees of the Metropolitan Museum, with 
great controversy and much recalcitrance, had agreed to a Sunday opening “experiment.” This 
was progress indeed for the leaders of the New York Public Library to categorically include 
Sunday hours as one of its founding promises, particularly in view of the fact that several of its 
trustees were part of the Metropolitan’s board, which was famously divided on the issue. 
Significantly, the final proposed cost of the New York Public Library building, $2.5 
million, was the amount the rival Boston Public Library spent for its own McKim, Mead and 
White “palace for the people,” on Copley Square that opened in 1895. The City of Boston also 
gave the library around $200,000 annually for the building’s maintenance.67 The contrast 
between the Massachusetts capital’s early library support and New York’s initial neglect was 
never far from the thoughts of those at the forefront of New York’s library movement. In further 
developing a plan, Cadwalader argued for a system that included reference, circulation, and a 
“considerable number” of branches and delivery stations to reach all classes of readers. Boston, 
Chicago, Baltimore, and many other American cities already had implemented this system, but 
not New York. Indeed, in 1890, Massachusetts had set up a commission that granted $100,000 in 
books to any town library meeting state law requirements, thus taking the public library out of 
the private sector.68 Many other states were already following this example and adopting its 
scheme, as libraries became civic monuments not merely for conserving scholarly resources, but 




needed a free public library on a scale that acknowledged both their wants and the magnitude of 
their city.70  
*** 
At midnight on December 31, 1897, Greater New York came into being.71 Green’s once-
preposterous “hobby” of consolidation had occasioned the birth of one monumental metropolis, 
second in population to London, created out of five separate areas comprising the first and fourth 
largest cities in the United States along with their adjacent counties and annexed districts.72 
Green’s years of cajoling the legislature to consolidate the boroughs now known as Manhattan, 
the Bronx, Brooklyn, Queens, and Staten Island, had earned the consummate booster the 
sobriquet “Father of Greater New York.”73 And he also had a larger mission: to make the city 
beautiful as well as great. The esoteric cult of beauty was becoming a serious trend in the years 
after the 1893 World’s Columbian Exposition and the advent of the City Beautiful Movement, 
although it was, at best, “an avocation of the few.” Money-grubbing with little regard for design 
but an enduring focus on utility, had always been New York’s controlling disposition.74 Green’s 
next project was to safeguard the city’s potential beauty against the forces of financial 
expedience. 
Carrère and Hastings shared the aesthetic vision of city builders like Green. Carrère 
conceived of beautifying New York City by way of municipally sanctioned public art and 
architecture, much as he had contemplated the relationship between the federal government and 
architects in Washington in 1893. Carrère championed his idea to the Fine Arts Federation in 
1896, and in 1898 the Art Commission of New York City came into being, with a mission to 




officials to incorporate the agency into the new city charter, a task he successfully accomplished 
with the help of his former client, the statesman Elihu Root.76  
 But almost immediately, the grand scale of the bold project was problematic. Around 
1898, the library leaders George Rives and Lewis Cass Ledyard paid a visit to Bird S. Coler, the 
first comptroller of Greater New York, to discuss the city’s financing of the library building. The 
$2.5 million sum, they discovered, would not be enough to finish the structure. Rives and 
Ledyard came away with two possible courses of action: for city authorities to place a definite 
cap on construction, or for the city, or the Library trustees with the approval of the city, to ask 
the Legislature to remove the limit of cost imposed by the original 1897 act authorizing the 
building.77 The public/private partnership was proceeding relatively smoothly.  
 In fact, nothing hampered the realization of either the library’s architectural plan or any 
inspired programmatic ideas. The missing piece completing the ambitious vision was a 
circulating system that might serve the entire city, but this undertaking would be onerous. In late 
1899, the Free Circulating Library approached John Cadwalader to discuss the possibility of a 
consolidation with the Public Library. “They wish to put us in charge of circulation and are quite 
prepared to turn over their corporation to us, and in fact to put it out of existence; except that 
they fear (without having examined the law) that it might in some way affect some of their 
legacies present or prospective,” he wrote to Ledyard. Clearly Cadwalader was approaching the 
next step towards a more complete library consolidation in New York City with apprehension.  
He anticipated, however, who his greatest champion might be. “When the thing is 
brought to a point, probably you had better explain to Green how it stands; but do not let him run 
away with the subject,” he warned Ledyard.78 In fact, Andrew Haswell Green had stated to the 




thought that the project might be too complex for the New York Public Library to handle, at least 
for the moment.79 After the trustees became aware of Cadwalader’s ongoing talks with the Free 
Circulating Library, however, Green badgered Ledyard for progress updates, particularly relative 
to the manner in which they were approaching the mayor, the Tammany-backed Robert Van 
Wyck.80  
He had no need to worry. In July 1900, Coler asked the Public Library to investigate and 
report on the circulating libraries in Manhattan and the Bronx. His objective was to improve the 
system of public payments to the free libraries, with an eye towards consolidation. Interestingly, 
he sought this information not via the smaller libraries themselves, but from the significant New 
York Public Library’s trustees. Already engrossed in the issue, Cadwalader set the machinery in 
motion for the requested report, which fell to John Billings to research and write.81 Billings 
found that fourteen institutions (sustaining twenty-seven branch libraries) were already receiving 
aid from the city.82 Several additional “distribution centres” were needed on both east and west 
sides of town. Almost as important, Billings found the main deficiency in the circulating libraries 
to be a lack of financial accountability. Furthermore, among American cities, New York ranked a 
dismal ninth in per capita spending on libraries.83 
In September, the Library’s executive committee recommended that municipal support 
continue with the free circulating libraries, but that they reorganize under one central authority—
assumed to be the New York Public Library.84 In early February 1901, an official bill was 
introduced in Albany amending the Library Consolidation Act of 1895 in order to permit the 
amalgamation of all of the public libraries in New York City. 
That month, the New York Free Circulating Library voted to put both its name and 




and purpose would remain devoted to the free circulation of books, even under the public 
library’s authority.85 While funding problems may have accelerated this action, as the New York 
Public Library gained in legitimacy, the city was promoting the idea of incorporating circulating 
libraries into its system, and combining forces seemed the obvious thing to do. “The idea that 
this system of circulating libraries is only for the use of the very poor has been superseded by the 
belief that it is an important adjunct of the city’s educational system, and as such entitled to 
municipal support,” the Free Circulating leaders observed.86 
One relatively silent member of the Free Circulating Library’s board was Andrew 
Carnegie, a consistent supporter beginning in the 1880s. In the late nineteenth century, 
Carnegie’s Horatio Algeresque life story had captured the American public’s imagination; as a 
Scottish immigrant to the United States, Carnegie was an example of how hard work, good luck, 
and overwhelming tenacity could produce one of the richest men in history. By 1889, he was 
assessing the meaning of his wealth amid both the excesses of the era’s conspicuous 
consumption and the developing wave of American philanthropy, which had begun during the 
Reconstruction era. Carnegie was playing a large part in this movement, even as he was defining 
his responsibility in patently Social Darwinist terms. 
While some of this public-spiritedness was part of a culture of ostentatious public 
display, there also was a rising sense of what Arthur Schlesinger has termed “richesse oblige,” an 
idea that Carnegie captured in his essays on wealth and the best fields for philanthropy in the 
American Review.87 In “Wealth,” he pondered the duties and responsibilities of the moneyed 
class—once possessed of a healthy surplus of cash—to designate their money for significant 
community uses. In a way that no affluent person had thought to before, Carnegie articulated the 




most common approach; or “hoarded” and then bequeathed for public purposes; or administered 
during the donor’s lifetime. Of the second option, Carnegie balked that many bequests became 
“merely the monuments of the testators’ folly,” and the “amount of real good done by 
posthumous gifts was ridiculously disproportionate to the sums thus left.”88 One thing he knew 
for certain: “I would as soon leave to my son a curse as the Almighty Dollar.”89 
In 1899, the Free Circulating Library trustees had approached Carnegie about donating a 
parcel of land on Twenty-third Street near Sixth Avenue. As he had already begun a program of 
granting considerable sums for libraries throughout the country and the world, the local 
circulating library, now with over one million volumes, felt justified in asking his support to help 
alleviate its overcrowded spaces.90 Carnegie did better than that. 
In March 1901, Carnegie and Billings corresponded about the New York Public Library’s 
thoughts about incorporating branch libraries into its developing system. With the new Free 
Circulating Library merger in process, along with the amendment of the Library Consolidation 
Act, Billings and the trustees had done some further thinking about circulating libraries, and 
estimated adding at least forty branch libraries, twenty-five small distributing centers in public 
schools, and one large traveling library to the great central reference building on Fifth Avenue 
and Forty-second Street. That would give Manhattan and the Bronx about one branch library for 
about 50,000 people. Compared to Boston, New York City was still deficient, but it was a start.91  
Carnegie proposed to fund the establishment of not only forty, but sixty-five branch 
libraries, which, while a “large order,” would only begin to satisfy a need that was being better 
addressed elsewhere in the country. “The system must be extended over the entire city,” 
Carnegie told Billings, who had based his estimate of forty libraries on the needs of Manhattan 




special benefit of the masses of the people,” Carnegie would pay for their construction, calling it 
a “rare privilege” to donate the then-colossal sum of $5.2 million for that purpose. It was a world 
record. In one sweeping gesture, Andrew Carnegie closed the gap in New York’s emergent 
library scheme: the city had covered only operating funds and maintenance, while the Library 
endowment focused solely on research collections, leaving no capital to build up the vital 
circulating libraries.93 “Sixty-five libraries at one stroke probably breaks the record, but this is 
the day of big operations,” Carnegie’s typewritten letter stated, to which he inserted in his own 
handwriting, “and New York is soon to be the biggest of Cities.”94 
Two months later, the New York Public Library’s executive committee met to discuss the 
details of the ambitious Carnegie agreement. But the meeting agenda also included granting the 
final approval for the Forty-second Street structure’s building material. It would be white marble, 
and when the architects were done, 530,000 cubic feet of it would be used for the exterior and 
part of the interior.95 Referencing the pure classical forms of ancient Greece and Rome as 
symbolic of the integrity of the noble library enterprise as a whole, Carrère and Hastings 
intended to produce an original version of American Classical, replete with stone from 
Vermont.96 And in just a few years, the New York Public Library would go from being a laggard 
to being the crown jewel of American public libraries, competitive with the greatest such 
institutions in the world. 
 
“I have only just begun to give away money” 
 
On March 13, 1901, the day after he offered $5.2 million to the New York Public Library for a 
branch system, Andrew Carnegie embarked upon a seven-month trip to Europe. When asked 




the New York press in tow, he replied jovially, “Well, you have got me this time.” After 
reminiscing about the thrill at age seventeen of having an article accepted by the New York 
Tribune (and his consequently warm feelings for Horace Greeley), he answered a pressing 
question. How much had he contributed to libraries thus far? “Well, I cannot tell. You see, I have 
only just begun to give away money,” he said with a smile.97 
 News of Carnegie’s record-setting donation to the New York Public Library would not be 
revealed for another four days. On the record, however, in March 1901 alone Carnegie was 
continuing to distribute tens of thousands of dollars to libraries in smaller communities as far and 
wide as Massachusetts, North Dakota, North Carolina, Utah, and Virginia, and that was news in 
itself.  
On March 14, Carnegie announced a different $5 million donation: $1 million for the 
maintenance of the libraries he already had built in three Pennsylvania towns in the Allegheny 
County of his childhood; and $4 million for an endowment fund for retired and disabled 
employees of his company. Any of these gifts alone was unprecedented; together with his other 
grants, Carnegie’s generosity was astounding.  
 This flurry of activity no doubt was precipitated by his other big news: less than two 
weeks earlier, J. P. Morgan had completed secret negotiations to purchase Carnegie’s share of 
his steel company for $480 million. Carnegie immediately became in Morgan’s words, “the 
richest man in the world,” and also a retired one.98 
At this auspicious moment, he issued only two public statements. The first he addressed 
to “the Good People of Pittsburgh,” to proclaim loyalty to his adopted city, which he now would 
be leaving for New York. The second message, to the management of the Carnegie Company, 




business as an acknowledgment of the keen debt which I owe to the workmen who have 
contributed so greatly to my success,” he wrote.99 
 Actually, Carnegie had had a home in Manhattan as early as 1867, and in 1898 purchased 
a lot at Fifth Avenue and Ninety-first Street, north of the chateaux of “millionaires’ row.” The 
mansion’s sixty-four rooms, large garden, and the latest modern conveniences notwithstanding, 
Carnegie intended for his new residence to be “the most modest, plainest and roomiest house in 
New York.”100 From his private office there, he would carry out the substantial philanthropic 
projects he anticipated realizing in retirement. 
Similarly, J. P. Morgan used his New York residence as the headquarters for his own 
avocation, art and book collecting, and while it was the first electrically lighted private house in 
the city, it also was austere in comparison to the opulent mansions of his peers.101 In 1900, 
Morgan commenced plans for an adjacent private library building designed by Charles Follen 
McKim. At the time, he was keeping his massive art collection in England, along with a portion 
of his books and manuscripts. Morgan’s ambition was to gather the finest and most exemplary 
objects of European culture. “Mr. Morgan’s Library” aspired to be not only a repository of rare 
treasures, but a treasure house in and of itself, with architecture that telegraphed the magnitude 
of its contents, if not its owner.102  
At the beginning of the twentieth century, these two tycoons had a mutual professional 
respect for each other and similar board and philanthropic interests. Yet Carnegie was consumed 
with giving away his vast holdings, while Morgan was still amassing his, both as a financier and 
as a collector. Nevertheless, along with other millionaires including John D. Rockefeller, they 
sought to enrich New York City by adding to its culture. The metropolis’s philanthropic boards, 




accused of greed unmixed with generosity,” the Kansas City Star wrote in an editorial 
reproduced in the New York Times. “New York, where the extremes of luxury and poverty stand 
out with vivid irony, where splendor and squalor touch each other at almost every turn in the vast 
tide of activity which surges through its thoroughfares, is worthy of the Nation and of the people 
who are making it the most magnificent capital on the globe—and the most merciful,” the article 
proclaimed.103 Some observers even credited Carnegie and his musings on wealth for causing 
this new surge of charitable activity. 
 Others, however, were offended by such philanthropists’ presumptuousness. In truth, a 
tycoon’s largesse may have had long-lasting benefits for culture, but it also provided a 
hegemonic advantage for the philanthropist himself.104 The great wave of consolidation that 
rationalized the geographical and physical disorder of Greater New York had less triumphal 
connotations in the corporate realm: the same impulse of efficiency, here combined with greed, 
was the driving force behind the new corporate monopolies and trusts that emerged in the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Critics balked at super-rich industrialists like Carnegie 
preaching a “gospel of wealth” even while exploiting workers for personal gain. The acts of 
charity through which Carnegie, Morgan, and Rockefeller chose to dispose of their riches were at 
best beside the point, and at worst self-aggrandizing vehicles to perpetuate their questionable 
legacies. 
 Chief among Carnegie’s detractors was Washington Gladden, the outspoken leader of the 
Social Gospel movement who turned Carnegie’s argument in “Wealth” on its head. In his 1895 
essay, “Tainted Money,” he questioned the morality of nonprofit institutions accepting “tainted” 
funds earned from extortion or outright crime. That many millionaires’ prosperity had been won 




money?” Gladden asked. “Can any man, can any institution, knowing its origin, touch it without 
being defiled?”105 It was one thing for a rich man like Carnegie to publicly air his thoughts and 
search his soul to justify his wealth, and even give it away. But it was quite another thing, and 
hitherto unthinkable, for a charity to consider rejecting such a gift. Where once nineteenth-
century benefactors of libraries and other charities had lavished the grateful towns of their 
modest beginnings with conspicuous donations, now their paternalism and even the very nature 
of their wealth was coming under scrutiny.106 
Unlike most of his fellow industrialists, Carnegie believed in the rights of labor to 
unionize. But by supporting his associate, Henry Clay Frick, in a violent effort to break the union 
at the steel works in Homestead, PA in 1892, Carnegie exposed himself to criticism from 
Gladden and other Progressive reformers.107 “To separate the money from the history of the 
processes by which it was won is not practicable,” Gladden concluded. “To wish for ill-gotten 
gains is to condone the wrongs by which they were obtained.”108  
Yet Carnegie considered it his moral duty to support cultural institutions. And, as a 
devout Presbyterian, he also considered it a high calling to spread his wealth wisely. True, 
Carnegie believed that “the man was more important than the money,” but he also accepted 
inequality as a byproduct of progress.109 For him, rich men had the advantage of being able to 
offer benefactions “from which the masses of their fellows would derive lasting advantage, and 
thus dignify their own lives.”110 To Carnegie, this was the proper mode of administering wealth, 
and he felt he knew “the best means of benefiting the community”—to place the proverbial 
ladders of success like free libraries, parks, art education, and “public institutions of varying 




The post-Civil War financial boom had affected the country as a whole, for better and for 
worse. The political and social innovations of the Progressive era that followed embraced new 
corporate structures, while recognizing the need to impose order upon the urban condition. This 
reformist sensibility also spawned movements to expose corruption in government and improve 
the health, education, and welfare of Americans. It was in this atmosphere that Carnegie 
commenced his program of international philanthropy, beginning with his first library, which 
opened in 1883 in his birthplace, Dunfermline, Scotland.112 The following year, the opening of 
Toynbee Hall in London inaugurated the international settlement house movement of 
interdependence among volunteer middle-class workers and their low-income neighbors. 
Americans immediately followed suit with the University and the Henry Street settlements on 
New York’s Lower East Side, along with Hull House in Chicago and many other similar efforts. 
Established in areas populated largely by immigrants, most of whom knew little English and 
even less of American culture, settlement houses offered educational and cultural programs, 
kindergartens for children, and a safe haven for community meetings. Circulating libraries like 
the Ottendorfer, the Aguilar, or the St. Agnes, also located in diverse neighborhoods, proffered 
complementary support, functioning as part-book repository, part-community center. As with the 
settlement houses, the staffs of the libraries were women who seized an opportunity to fill unique 
professional roles in work that society deemed acceptable and appropriate for them.   
 Carnegie began building public libraries in the United States in 1889 with a library in 
Braddock, PA, near his adopted hometown. By 1898, he had built fourteen more libraries 
throughout the country.113 Such unbridled patronage, however, resembled the “indiscriminate 
charity” he considered patently unwise. He thus developed a procedure that came to be known as 




as well as its ability to answer a set of questions he and his secretary, James Bertram, had 
developed. Carnegie offered to erect libraries in towns and cities that guaranteed 10 percent of 
the construction cost for annual upkeep, demonstrated the need for the building, provided a site, 
and offered free library service to all. The libraries he proposed building in New York were to be 
no exception.  
Carnegie’s interest in libraries had more complex underpinnings than his critics may have 
realized. While employed as a messenger in Allegheny City, the fifteen-year-old future 
multimillionaire, along with other working boys, looked forward to visiting the four-hundred-
volume library of one Colonel James Anderson each Saturday afternoon. “Every day’s toil and 
even the long hours of night service were lightened by the book which I carried about with me 
and read in the intervals which could be snatched from duty,” Carnegie recalled.114 It was from 
this early experience that Carnegie became convinced that the best way to benefit young boys 
and girls was through public libraries, which he offered to build in communities willing to 
support them as municipal institutions. 
While this story, of course, was fodder for his myth, Carnegie also seemed genuinely 
moved by his personal experience. Responding to the “tainted money” critics, he reevaluated his 
thinking and emerged even more resolute to do good on a colossal scale. He began in 1901 by 
reissuing “Wealth” in a collection of his writings entitled The Gospel of Wealth and Other 
Timely Essays, adding a religious element to his title that implicitly answered Gladden’s rhetoric. 
Carnegie then examined the largely unmethodical way philanthropy was practiced in the United 
States, whereupon, using a corporate model, he invented a unique method to monitor and 






With Carnegie only two days at sea, the New York Public Library got to work raising 
public consciousness as it prepared to announce his gift. Beginning with a meeting between 
George L. Rives, John Bigelow, and John J. Cadwalader with Mayor Robert A. Van Wyck, the 
executive commitee suggested that Brooklyn and Queens, where there were already well-
established library organizations, as well as Richmond, be left to administer their own boroughs’ 
branches.115 While this move was not necessarily in the spirit of a consolidated library 
community, it was both practical and pragmatic. The mayor was “most heartily in favor of the 
plan,” and was prepared to do all in his power to carry out Carnegie’s vision.116 
Billings updated Carnegie while still en route to Europe, sending along a package of 
positive newspaper clippings. Any difficulties with his proposal lay with the City bureaucracy, 
he noted. “Naturally the Municipal authorities desire to retain as much control of the matter of 
sites, architects, appropriations, etc., as possible,” Billings politely warned, “but the Mayor and 
the Comptroller are well satisfied to have these things entrusted to the New York Public Library, 
and the immediate representative of Tammany on the Board of Estimate will not hold out against 
your requirements.”117 Acutely aware of image and opinion control, Billings included the text of 
the cable from the library that would be awaiting Carnegie upon his landing in Southampton, as 
well as a suggestion for Carnegie’s reply, both of which he anticipated distributing as a news 
item. Apparently somewhat distrustful of the public partnership, Billings wished to make it clear 
for the record that the legislation at Albany was giving the City full authority to ensure 
satisfactory provision for the libraries’ maintenance.118 
The New York Public Library, already a massive enterprise, now had the potential to be 




second Street, about forty circulation libraries in Manhattan and the Bronx and twenty-five in the 
other boroughs, small distributing centers in public schools, and a large traveling library 
program. Each branch would include reading rooms large enough for one hundred adults and one 
hundred twenty-five children, outfitted with encyclopedias, dictionaries, and atlases, in addition 
to books for circulation. Building one library would average $100,000, including the site and 
equipment; maintaining the entire system would cost around $500,000 a year, counting 500,000 
volumes in circulation plus at least 40,000 more additions or replacements per year. It would 
take at least five years to realize the project, and Billings reiterated to the mayor (and the public) 
that New York’s library statistics compared terribly to Boston’s and Chicago’s, a fact of which 
he had made Carnegie well aware.119 Even so, Billings surmised to the press, the New York 
Public Library was poised to become “the greatest free public library system in the world.”120 
The mayor, breaking his rule not to give a public interview, was even more hyperbolic 
about Carnegie’s offer. “Mr. Carnegie speaks in his letter of the fact that this is a day of great 
things,” Van Wyck said. “He is the greatest man of his time. He is the greatest human product of 
the nineteenth century.”121 More to the point, Carnegie had hit on something by recognizing that 
“unqualified” and “unmitigated” giving was liable to do as much harm as good. By requiring a 
community to provide a site for a building and to comply with other conditions, Carnegie was 
forcing a joint commitment and insuring the continued usefulness and value of the gift.122 He had 
noted the failings of cultural institutions that had begun with the best of intentions, and clearly 
resolved to do better than Astor, Lenox, and countless other benefactors whose projects had 
failed to thrive by not accounting for the future. 
In spring 1901, Cadwalader and Billings began talks with the mayor about sites and the 




would be more difficult than appropriating an (increasing) amount of money every year to 
support them.124 Comptroller Coler was less concerned, noting that many rich men like former 
mayor Abram S. Hewitt were coming forward to contribute land.125  
 While publicly there still appeared to be some question about accepting Carnegie’s gift, 
in actuality no cultural institution or municipal authority was about to turn away $5.2 million. 
Meanwhile, Carnegie was forcing the decades-old issue of private versus public authority over 
the library system. He supported the New York Public Library and its board, but the enormity of 
the undertaking demanded government involvement. Ultimately, while the Public Library was 
willing to assume the responsibility of the Carnegie libraries for all five boroughs, the City 
assigned it only the branches in Manhattan, the Bronx, and Richmond, and separately contracted 
with the Brooklyn and Queens libraries, which already had established library systems. But the 
site selection and construction were unambiguously under the trustees’ supervision, even if the 
city provided the land. As requested by Carnegie, the City also agreed to appropriate a yearly 
amount for maintenance equal to at least 10 percent of the expense of erecting and equipping the 
Carnegie-funded buildings, also subject to the trustees’ direction. Reminding Carnegie of the 
prevailing distrust of city officials, Billings noted optimistically that private donations of 
property for the libraries also might be forthcoming “partly because some persons may be willing 
to give sites to the Public Library which they would not give to the City.”126 
A year later, only one location planned before the Carnegie grant, the Yorkville branch 
on East Seventy-ninth Street, had yet been selected.127 Securing sites was costly, as the lots often 




Yet in February 1902, when Carnegie attended his first New York Public Library trustees 
meeting, he expressed delight that the first contract for the free library bore his friend Lewis Cass 
Ledyard’s name. “Two Scots working together for [the] good of New York,” Carnegie wrote.129  
Carnegie’s passion for the library also was apparent in the way he contemplated board 
recruits. But he expected them to work. Among his significant suggestions was “that 
Extraordinary Man,” J. Pierpont Morgan. Carnegie feared, however, that Morgan probably 
would be willing to contribute his name but not his time, which was of equal importance. “I 
don’t think it would be the act of a genuine friend of his like myself to put him in this false 
position,” Carnegie wrote privately to Ledyard, Morgan’s lawyer. “Before you go further I 
suggest you see Mr. Morgan & explain that under our rules one who is absent three successive 
meetings ceases to hold office—that it is a body of earnest workers—no figureheads—& then if 
Pierpont undertakes this he will be a tower of strength,” Carnegie surmised. “Pierpont Morgan 
has never been untrue to friends. I like him much too much to see his name used as a dummy 
director,” he asserted.130 Morgan, in fact, did join the board. 
*** 
 As a businessman, Andrew Carnegie was an efficient innovator who originated now-
common practices like cost accounting.131 As a philanthropist he was similarly systematic. 
Influenced by Carnegie’s outlook, the executive committee supported a team of architectural 
advisors that recommended that the branches be uniform in design, materials, and scale, and for 
two to five firms to design the buildings, rather than award them in open competition. This way, 
the structures might be built cheaper and faster.132  
The advisory committee consisted of John Carrère (with Thomas Hastings, the architect 




(of Babb, Cook & Willard, Carnegie’s favored architectural firm), and nobody complained when 
their firms got the final contract to collaborate on the branch buildings.133 The gnawing fear, 
though, was of lack of architectural variety, even in the face of the opportunity to wrest some 
control away from politicians affecting the aesthetics of the city’s landscape.134 
Unexpectedly, Carnegie objected to the scheme, particularly the architects’ percentage 
fees and the choice of only three fashionable firms. But Billings convinced him of the plan’s 
appropriateness in terms of “economy and efficiency.” Furthermore, the designers were well 
aware of the need to acknowledge the views of librarians vis à vis the best arrangement and 
lighting of rooms to serve the convenience of the public, and to ensure economic and efficient 
administration in quite a different sense.135 As for the apprehension about architectural 
monotony, the alternative of bidding out the design of forty buildings might prove unwieldy; at 
any rate, Billings actually embraced the idea of “one distinctive and uniform type,” in part “so 
that the most ignorant child going through the streets of the City will at once know a Carnegie 
Library when he or she sees it.”136 The branches would be taken as a whole to be a collection of 
buildings with a distinctive identity, rather than individual structures spread throughout the 
city.137 
Carnegie actually did not seem intent on broadcasting a self-conscious, public image 
through his New York City library buildings, although of course the mere notion of one 
architectural style reproduced in sixty structures over five boroughs was destined to make a bold 
statement. More important was adhering to the mandate of what would prove to be a twentieth-
century vision guiding the library system as a whole. Carnegie’s branches aspired to be not 





To begin with, Carnegie’s method of philanthropic giving in itself was a thorough 
departure from the nineteenth-century model. Furthermore, instead of a temple of useful 
knowledge erected in a rich benefactor’s name, a Carnegie branch library conveyed fiscal 
responsibility in design, scale, and demeanor.138 Carnegie’s library project also corresponded 
with the modern reforms in library science that Progressive visionaries such as Melvil Dewey 
and John Cotton Dana were promoting. Dewey, the inventor of the library classification system, 
was a pioneer in professionalizing the field and an early advocate of libraries that served the 
entire population, including children. Dana, of the Newark Public Library and the founder of the 
Newark Museum, was a leading proponent of library collections for special groups ranging from 
immigrants to businessmen. He initiated the open shelving method to engage the library 
patrons—“customers,” really—directly with the books themselves. “The storehouse idea must be 
discarded at once,” he wrote. 
What is wanted is a workshop, a place for readers and students, not a safety-
deposit building. . . . The library, if it is to be a modern, effective, working 
institution, cannot forego the demands of its daily tenants for light, room, and air, 
and submit to the limitations set by calls for architectural effects, for imposing 
halls, charming vistas, and opportunities for decoration.139 
 
The palatial designs of the past simply were inappropriate for the times, which demanded a form 
that addressed the function of the library itself. A modern library was for the entire community, 
and emphasized the reader as well as the book.  
Embedded in the question of whether a library should follow the model of closed stacks 
for reference versus accessible stacks for circulation lay a tension between nineteenth and 
twentieth-century ideas. That both could coexist in the New York Public Library system 
represented an enormous paradigm shift. The modern library was active, not passive, and 




use; free access to shelves; rooms for children; space for educational or community gatherings, 
lectures, and exhibits; longer hours of operation; and all within a cheerful, “homelike” 
building.140 Carnegie’s project was in line with this fresh way of thinking. This revisionist notion 
was uniquely American, and Carnegie’s steadfast investment in a branch network helped 
guarantee the perpetuation of the new ideal.141 
By 1910, 41 percent of New York City was made up of foreign-born immigrants, and the 
Public Library trustees and John Shaw Billings were positioning the institution to be an active 
participant in the urban experience.142 Nevertheless, this also made them vulnerable to the 
greater charge that middle-class reformers and wealthy philanthropists were imposing their 
values on the masses. Carnegie’s rigid conditions governing his library gifts were no exception 
to this apparently antidemocratic impulse. Yet Carnegie obviously saw things differently, and 
had extolled the virtues and economic dominance of the American system as he saw it in his 
1886 book Triumphant Democracy.143 To him, the successful growth of American cities was 
happening with the aid of a definite design as opposed to a vague directive to “‘just grow’ like 
Topsy.” Carnegie explained: “In these modern days cities are laid out under definite, far-seeing 
plans.”144 Nevertheless, even as he pondered the urban condition along somewhat Progressive 
lines, Carnegie also approached his gifts for the “deserving poor” guided by the more predictable 
paternalist sentiments of the nineteenth century.  
*** 
On January 1, 1911, the Times described the scene on a recent morning aboard the upper 
deck of a Fifth Avenue bus. As it rattled by Forty-second Street, a bright-eyed old woman craned 
her neck to see the passing sights. “Would you be good enough to tell me what building that is?” 




answered impatiently. “It’s more than twelve years since Carrère and Hastings were selected for 
the architects, but we hope to see it finished before the end of June, 1911.”145 Thousands had 
pondered the same question, and New Yorkers already had grown accustomed to seeing the 
“slow-forming” structure perpetually under construction. As it neared completion, they 
anticipated the opening with a new charge of energy.  
At this point, it was the architectural detail that was getting all of the attention, and, 
although antithetical to the new practical form of the circulating library, it was magnificent. 
Speaking of the arched American oak screen in the great reading room, John Carrère said, “A 
century hence, the classic perfection attained by the artisans who executed this carving, then 
softened by the patina of time, will have rendered this work an antique that will be much 
appreciated.” Answering critics who were dismayed by the fourteen-year building project, the 
architect added, “How could such a result been hastily attained?”146 
Indeed, in June 1899, when workmen began to demolish the old Croton Reservoir to 
prepare the ground for the new library, the city still was mired in the old century. It had only one 
bridge to Brooklyn; it yet lacked the modern conveniences of subways or of train systems 
running under its rivers; and the skyline did not yet feature any buildings of more than a few 
stories. But over a decade had passed, and in that time a mass transit system now was in place, 
three new bridges were spanning the East River, and the monumental palace for Pennsylvania 
Station was built and already in use, all while the new library still had yet to open its doors.147 A 
masterpiece on the order of the New York Public Library, with an exterior boasting 300,000 tons 
of marble, an interior of equally elegant detail, and library services without parallel in the world, 
would all take time. Legal, labor, and contractual difficulties caused delays, and in spite of a 




committee consistently worked with the authorities, although the construction legally was the 
City’s responsibility.148 Moreover, 530,000 cubic feet of pure white marble, the largest use of the 
material in the United States, was extravagant, as the wastage of stone bearing streaks and 
discolorations ran at 60 percent, instead of the anticipated 25 percent.149 Along with the expense 
of custom-designed furniture and fittings, there was not even $4,000 left for the exterior 
plantings by 1911, and none of the trustees was “much interested in the subject,” Rives explained 
to Carèrre.150 The final cost of the building amounted to $9 million, over $2 million more than 
the Library of Congress.151 
The building, however, was Carrère and Hastings’s masterpiece, built “as the ancients 
built,” for eternity.152 Unfortunately, the fifty-three-year-old Carrère died two months before the 
grand opening from injuries he sustained in a taxicab accident.153 Two thousand prominent men 
and women paid their respects as he lay in state in the great hall of the new library, opened for 
the first time for a few hours for the somber occasion. 
When the library opened in May 1911, sixteen years to the day after the library’s 
founding, it was a national event. In his remarks, President William Howard Taft acknowledged 
the one-million plus volumes and the eight million people a year who would use them, but what 
he recognized even more was the vision of a few “master minds” who united several disparate 
agencies into one library worthy of a great imperial city. The building was emblematic of the 
aspirations of New York City itself, with its design and materials even better than the Albany 
state house, which had paper maché ceilings.154  
Moreover, it had the most innovative library facilities ever before attempted under one 
roof, including a reading room for the blind, a room for children with small tables and chairs, and 




without equal in the world.155 It had over 1.2 million volumes and pamphlets—almost four times 
the inventory of the original three foundations.156 More than fifty thousand persons visited the 
library on its first day of business. A female presenting a library card from the Bloomingdale 
Branch on West One-hundredth Street borrowed the first book, a treatise on farm management. 
“The attendant concealed a little surprise that the first book loaned by the great book palace 
related to the raising with profits of the humble potato,” the Times observed.157  
One year later, however, the building remained unfinished, and Cadwalader sought an 
appropriation or bond from the city to complete it.158 And while Andrew Carnegie’s grant for the 
circulating system was generous, it would cost New York City more money that it had ever 
anticipated or would have given otherwise. By 1910, when all of the branches were to have been 
completed, twelve sites still were remaining to be acquired.159  
In 1901, when Carnegie’s library philanthropy project went “wholesale” (in his words), 
New York City was its first precedent-setting recipient, and set a benchmark in scale and impact. 
By 1917, he had donated more than $56 million towards 2,509 public library buildings in the 
English-speaking world.160 And until his death, Carnegie continued to disperse his wealth, in the 
name of the diffusion of useful knowledge, via the Carnegie Corporation of New York; the 
Carnegie Council on Ethics and International Affairs; the Carnegie Endowment for International 
Peace, the Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching; the Carnegie Technical 
Schools (later Carnegie Mellon University); and the Carnegie United Kingdom Trust, promoting 
community service and voluntary organizations in Great Britain and Ireland.161  
The Carnegie Corporation was one of the first modern foundations ever established. In 
1911, the year of its founding, no word yet existed to describe such a “corporation,” whose 




businessmen-turned-philanthropists like Henry Ford and John D. Rockefeller would follow 
Carnegie’s example with their own foundations. But before the concept even existed, Carnegie 






“If we have committed errors, it has been at our own expense”: 
The Metropolitan Museum Builds 
 
On March 30, 1880, the World observed one dignified Metropolitan Museum trustee slapping 
another heartily on the back, saying: “Can you believe it? Can you realize that the thing really 
exists?”1 After years of a nomadic existence, the Metropolitan Museum’s permanent building 
was being inaugurated in Central Park. The structure was hardly finished and far from imposing, 
but the institution now had an air of permanence, and with it, the sense of promise for the future. 
 Moreover, American art itself was beginning to make a greater impression. Displayed 
alongside European work, it was “not so bad after all,” the New York Evening Post noted, 
because “it stands up like a man by the side of its fellows and neither blushes nor faints.”2 Other 
critics concurred.3 William H. Vanderbilt, then in Europe, was so enthused by the popular 
reception of the new museum and its installations that he telegraphed the trustees his support by 
donating any ten pictures in his house. Samuel P. Avery supposedly said in response, “You may 
be sure we took the best he had”—such as that was.4  
 But with a new building and greater collections came greater problems of maintenance 
and control. Without curators or even very many staff members, the day-to-day responsibilities 
fell to the trustees. But their instincts sometimes fell short of their institution’s greater ambitions. 
 Cesnola, who by 1877 had accepted a place on the board of trustees and in 1879 
commenced serving as the museum’s first director, was praised for his professionalism. 
However, as an aesthete whose curatorial judgment was more intuitive than trained, he did have 
an unorthodox and arbitrary cabinet classification method, in which, for example, figures were 




The museum’s opening was heralded as “one of the leading events in the art history of 
New York,” and “one of the most magnificent social pageants the city has ever known.”6 The 
description was not mere hyperbole: it was characteristic of the aspirations of city leaders 
guiding a new era of art for the country. After Joseph Choate spoke on the plans of the museum 
to be a democratic institution to “humanize, to educate and refine a practical and laborious 
people,” President Rutherford B. Hayes formally opened the institution to the public.7 Over three 
thousand fashionable New Yorkers came dressed in colorful attire worthy of Easter Sunday.8 A 
large crowd of less elegant citizens waited outside in the March chill to catch a glimpse of the 
president as a band played music, and the Times reported that carriages filled the drives, 
pedestrians lined the walks, and “Central Park, in this immediate vicinity, never before presented 
such a picture of life and beauty.”9  
 Choate had brokered the arrangement for public support for the building, and his 
“elaborate address” on the history and future plans of the museum did not fail to stir some 
interest. The 48-year-old trustee had a legendary gift not only for the law, but also of oratory, 
rendering him an admired wit, raconteur, and popular after-dinner speaker, not to mention future 
Ambassador to the Court of St. James. Affable and dignified, he nevertheless was prone to 
sarcasm and audacity, with a natural, informal, and unpretentious oratorical style, “sometimes 
with a hand in his trousers pockets, or a thumb and forefinger thrust into the vest pocket.”10 
Choate preferred humor over pedantry, and the tone of his “extensive” talk at the museum 
opening was apparently no exception.11 Puck parodied its content, “quoting”: 
Ladies and Gentlemen: I know nothing about Art—or at least I am willing to say I 
don’t. It’s a horrid fib, but it sounds funny. This is the first subsidy Art ever got 
out of the State of New York; and you can wager your sweet lives, my beloved 
fellow-citizens, there was some tall log-rolling done to get it. When I look around 
me and behold the various and appropriate etcaeteras, I feel very much as most 




collection, which is very large, what there is of it. When the Juke of Argyll was 
over here, he told Cesnola—Cesnola was talking to him kinder easy and 
familiar—a real live Juke—that he’d never seen anything like it in Europe.”12 
 
While a spirit of fun and obvious pride pervaded Choate’s speech, so, too, did a hubris 
that awkwardly revealed what the trustees perceived their role to be in the theoretically public 
museum. “If we have committed errors, it has been at our own expense; if time and labor have 
been wasted, they have been only our own; if money has been misspent, it was our own money 
and that of a few generous friends who zealously shared our errors,” Choate said, concluding, 
“and here to-day we bring before you the net result of all our labors, all our aspirations, and all 
our mistakes.”13 The dramatic words struck some observers as tone deaf to the appeals the 
museum had been making to the public to help fund the venture. Indeed, it was the trustees alone 
who had incurred the museum’s sizable debts while arrogantly presuming that they were 
responsible to nobody but themselves. “We would not seem captious or ungracious, particularly 
at the present time when the taxpayers of New York, who have paid for the Museum building 
and have contributed to its running expenses, are naturally rejoicing at seeing at last something 
tangible for their money,” the Art Amateur wrote, charging that without the loan exhibition, the 
net result of all the trustees’ labors would in fact look somewhat insignificant.14 
 The fanfare of the opening and the building’s presence in Central Park had placed the 
museum and its trustees on an entirely new and more visible level. Its location on the park side 
of Fifth Avenue was a natural draw for visitors; if only a fraction of the tens of thousands of 
visitors to the park trickled into the museum, that would still be a far greater number than the 
visitorship at the Lenox Library, for example, across Fifth Avenue at Seventieth Street.15 By 
May 1880, there was one day in which eighteen thousand visitors went through the museum’s 




three weeks of August, 58,831 people had gone to the museum.17 
 All of a sudden, observers and the press alike began questioning both the museum’s 
management and its decisions. The museum was heavily in debt caused by potentially “unwise” 
expenditures, and new appeals to the public for subscriptions were constant. Against the 
background of failed appeals for funds, it stood to reason that the recent purchase of Avery’s 
collection of porcelain for $35,000 seemed imprudent, especially given that the museum’s 
collections were lacking in so many other more important areas, and that Avery was a trustee. 
With still little-to-no professional staff, the trustees had been relying on their own tastes and 
artistic predilections to guide the organization of the museum’s collections. Now, as the museum 
had passed from the idea stage into reality, the early purchases of Blodgett and even the Cesnola 
collection were suspect. Were old masters of lesser quality worth having? Were archaeological 
objects art? Should fine art be concentrated in one place, like the Metropolitan? Were the 
Metropolitan’s trustees worthy of public trust?18  
 The Times tempered its praise of the “first-class” transformation of the museum with 
criticism for Johnston, W. C. Prime, Huntington, Rutherfurd Stuyvesant, and William Waldorf 
Astor. These distinguished citizens believed that trusteeship was an honor entailing “no labor or 
thought,” the newspaper accused.19 Being the custodian of American taste was a tenuous 
proposition for any museum leader. It was even more so in the context of a young society in 
which the value of art was not yet a basic requirement, as in Europe, where art support was 
recognized as a function of government, and aesthetic sophistication was an honorable quality 
for a person to have. For some Americans, it appeared that money alone was “the great aim and 
prize of life.”20 




could. Johnston spent the better part of the 1880s contemplating his resignation as president of 
the museum. Financial ruin aside, he was in poor health, and negative public opinion about his 
role at the museum could not have helped matters. Cesnola implored him to remember his 
obligation to finish the good work he began, if only to provide support for the trustees in the 
director’s own camp.21 
 In 1881, Johnston weighed the possibility of handing over the presidency to Henry 
Gurdon Marquand, but Cesnola and others managed to dissuade him.22 Two years later, 
resignation was still on Johnston’s mind, and his first vice president, William C. Prime, was as 
impassioned as Cesnola had been about the clear sense that Johnston was the glue that held the 
sometimes-fractious group together: 
I cannot imagine or entertain the horribility [sic] of such an occurrence, and it 
would be a grievous blow to many members of the Board of Trustees. I know that 
I express the universal hope + confident expectation of all that as you have made 
the Institution, you will, for many long years to come, continue to guide it with 
that wonderful skill, discretion, and good calm judgment with which you have 
brought it up.23 
 
Prime also was expressing the belief that animated Choate’s speech: that the trustees’ efforts 
alone had created the institution. Four years later, as the museum continued to expand its plant, 
the entire board of trustees signed a letter making it clear that they were unanimously behind the 
museum’s “parent and chief.”24 Ultimately, the trustees could not compel Johnston to remain 
president in perpetuity, and in 1889, he finally stepped down, succeeded by Marquand. 
 
Moneyed Men and Museum Management 
Samuel P. Avery very well may have been an opportunist on the Metropolitan Museum board, 
with his ready access to and stake in saleable art. The museum’s 1879 purchase of his china 




Avery was a businessman who drove a hard bargain, and his philanthropic spirit, if it existed, 
was tempered by a professional approach. “‘Time is short and life is fleeting’ – I am afraid that 
between delay in coming before the public with the plan to raise the $150,000 and the probable 
failure of it, the Museum will lose the porcelain,” Avery warned his friend Johnston in 1879, 
adding dramatically, “if it is lost, the public will not be lenient towards us, whatever may be the 
excuse.” In a veiled threat, Avery warned Johnston that “besides other contingencies,” he had to 
make his arrangements and count the Museum “out of the question.”25 Avery could not have 
been more wrong in thinking that the public would support the purchase (even at $35,000 instead 
of $150,000), or that the best time to call for a large subscription drive to pay for the porcelains 
might be coordinated with the building opening, for it only drew attention to Avery’s 
advantageous position, and the magnitude of the museum’s debts.26 
 For those leaders less invested in the art world, what was the point of being a trustee? The 
commitment—of time and resources—could be onerous. There were regular and frequent 
meetings of the board, the executive committee, and the various subcommittees. There was a 
growing public sense of trustee accountability, which made the prospect of board membership 
substantially more serious than membership on the roster of a men’s club. Board membership 
also came with a financial responsibility.  
 But being present at the inception of the Metropolitan Museum of Art also held the 
promise of lasting greatness—for the institution and its creators. Most trustees believed in the 
new museum’s potential. While the arguments for the endeavor and others like it often were 
couched in terms of moral and cultural uplift, the opportunity to participate in the formation of a 





 Using their connections, the board members always kept an eye out for a potential donor. 
For example, William E. Dodge, a founding trustee, in an otherwise chatty personal letter to 
Cesnola in 1880, included a postscript about Joseph W. Drexel, the banker who had retired in 
1876 at age forty-six to pursue important charitable causes in New York.27 “I trust you will 
cultivate Mr. Drexel who will be a most valuable + liberal friend of the Museum,” Dodge 
wrote.28 Drexel recently had successfully bid on a fine collection of almost two thousand 
Egyptian coins in Cairo, intending to donate them to the Metropolitan.29 He excitedly wrote to 
Cesnola, “I wish by first mail to hurry them forward but I fear they will not be here before the 
opening of the museum.”30 Two months later, Drexel enthusiastically offered for “any of the 
gentlemen of the Metropolitan Museum of Art” to stop by his home to look over his collections 
“and select what they think fit” for exhibition.31  
Thus, it was no surprise when Drexel joined the Metropolitan Museum trustees in 
February 1881.32 “Any man would be honored by being elected a trustee of your Museum, and I 
am not therefore surprised that many are anxious to be selected,” he wrote. But he humbly 
suggested a better choice, Darius Ogden Mills, who Drexel noted was “far richer and more 
generous” than he was.33 Drexel was no novice philanthropist, however. A member of the Union 
League Club, he had been chairman of the New York Sanitary Commission, a member of the 
Academy of Natural Sciences, treasurer of the New-York Cancer Hospital, and was to become 
president of the New-York Philharmonic Society and a director of the Metropolitan Opera 
House.34 As for Mills, there would be room enough for him on the board as well.35 
 Mills, like Drexel, was a seasoned philanthropist and sophisticated aesthete, so his 
inclination to join the board could hardly be viewed as social opportunism. However, the Central 




money now reflected favorably on a donor’s public profile. It was no coincidence that Cesnola, 
for example, was adamant about attaching his name to his objects. A few years after Drexel’s 
death, when the museum requested that his collection of Egyptian casts might be “scattered,” his 
executors adamantly refused, claiming that “good faith would require that the Collection be kept 
by itself and should not lose its identity.”36 In essence, this was as much about Drexel’s own 
personal legacy as it was about keeping a group of artifacts together.  
 Other trustees spent a portion of the year in Europe or vacationing in Egypt, and being 
part of the new American art museum gave some structure to their travels. They wrote back to 
New York about European museums, collections for sale, and other gossip from the art world. 
Those who remained closer to home also managed to devote their professional time to the 
museum. Huntington, for example, who felt inadequate in meetings with the wealthy 
businessmen he was more comfortable painting, helped hang pictures in the galleries.37 During 
the move from Fourteenth Street to Central Park, without professional art movers, the trustees 
feared breakage so much that they packed everything themselves.38  
 In time, Prime would long for such simpler days. “The main trouble with our board is that 
when the museum was struggling, and fighting its way, many of them were perfectly willing to 
let those who worked & fought take the responsibility,” Prime mused to Cesnola. “They didn’t 
care to differ from the working men. Now that the Museum is rich in popular esteem, they are on 
hand with all sorts of schemes,” he brooded.39  
While the Times was wrong in its harsh assessment of Johnston and Prime, they were not 
far off in their criticism of Rutherfurd Stuyvesant and William Waldorf Astor, who lived mostly 
abroad, and who were valued on the trustee roster more for their names than for their 




even had no idea about what his responsibilities were.40 In spite of his requests to resign, 
Stuyvesant remained on the board until his death. The total of his cash gifts to the museum over 
thirty-nine years amounted to only $14,000, plus a bequest of $20,000.41 Astor was a bit more 
circumspect about his role. He was aware that there was a financial obligation connected to 
trusteeship, and offered to resign when, in spite of his great wealth, he refused to contribute even 
$10,000 in five years. “I am sorry that I can neither secure nor contribute this sum, + feeling that 
in this, as well as on other occasions I have not come up to the required standard, I request you to 
receive my resignation from the Board of Trustees,” he declared.42  
The growingly businesslike quality of the board proceedings grew out of the rising 
complexity of the museum itself. Expressing a prevalent opinion about New York’s cultural 
institutions, the Times predicted in 1880 that the future of the Metropolitan would be great if the 
elite trustees continued to oversee it and keep it out of the “vortex of City politics.”43 But 
negotiating the public and private aspects of institutional leadership would never be easy. Drexel, 
for example, was fully aware of the museum’s responsibility to the public, and the sometimes-
conflicting significance of trustee control. Once a collection is given, he stated ominously, “the 
public becomes the master, not the trustees.”44  
“Few men leave behind them monuments that remind the survivors of anything but greed 
and an absorbing devotion to accumulation for its own sake,” the Times stated bluntly of gilded 
age millionaires.45 The Metropolitan Museum board in this respect was a cut above. Even Prime, 
in spite of his constant complaints, could admit that there were “a really good lot of men in the 






“Tampering with Antiquities” 
On July 21, 1880, the steamship Dessoug lay at anchor at the pier on Twenty-third Street and the 
Hudson River, awaiting word on where its precious cargo, an Egyptian obelisk, ultimately would 
be placed in the city. William H. Vanderbilt paid the expense of bringing it across the Atlantic, 
ostensibly in honor of his father, the Commodore Vanderbilt, who had died in 1877.47 The 
intense interest in Egyptian culture had begun in Europe after Napoleon’s expedition, sparking a 
craze animated by the concurrent movements of Neoclassicism and Romanticism. Tombs that 
had lain untouched for millennia were being opened and excavated throughout the nineteenth 
century. With the installation of the obelisk, New York City’s competition with Paris and 
London, the only other Western cities possessing such an ancient monument in a public space, 
continued. The symbolism of the acquisition was not lost on many observers. “Cleopatra’s 
Needle” had been part of a pair, the other of which was the London obelisk; now New York had 
its own symbol of ancient civilization. The question remained of where to put it. 
 “The obelisk of Luxor, removed to a country which was dimly known to the ancient 
Egyptians, is not a radical anachronism in Paris; and the fellow of our obelisk after many strange 
vicissitudes, set up as a gazing-stock for English cockneys, is at least in the middle of a 
civilization which has yet about it a mediaeval flavor,” the Times wrote. But the stride from 
ancient Egypt to the “raw, lusty, noisy land which we call the United States of America,” was 
vast. “There is almost nothing tangible that is older than the obelisk. There is nothing much 
younger than New-York. The extremes have met.”48 Newspapers found the whole thing 
ridiculous. Indeed, New Yorkers had shown “the effete monarchies of Europe that when we want 
an Egyptian obelisk we can have one as well as they can, and we beat them easily in the 




 On the Dessoug, the atmosphere was worthy of P. T. Barnum. Over one hundred and fifty 
people visited the vessel to see the curiosity, and while the captain entertained his guests, 
Hassan, “the Barbary boy, in his picturesque attire,” ran about the deck and tended to the donkey 
and the Egyptian sheep that were on board.50 As for the monument, the hieroglyphics on the 
stone were hard to decipher, although most people did not much care.51  
 Among the visitors that July day was one “Mr. Feuardent,” an archaeologist that some 
claimed to be one of the best in the world.52 
 Gaston L. Feuardent in fact was also a dealer in antiquities, and with his father had been 
associating for years with members of the Metropolitan Museum trustees, including Cesnola, 
through their firm, Rollin and Feuardent, based in Paris. Only that month, the younger Feuardent 
was one of two men appointed by the French government to be their agents in the United States, 
to facilitate scientific expeditions and exchange anthropological specimens for a museum in 
Paris.53  
 The next month, the Art Amateur published an even larger Feuardent scoop: a serious 
indictment against the director of the Metropolitan Museum of Art of tampering with 
antiquities.54 Feuardent wished to give “as publicly as possible” his opinion on “certain deceptive 
alterations and unintelligent restorations” of some objects in the Cesnola collection which had 
been restored under the General’s supervision. The specific claim was of deliberately false 
restorations, repairs, and finishes made to eight objects.55  
 According to Feuardent, in summer 1879 he had occasion to examine a statuette in the 
Cesnola collection, and was “astonished” by the apparent addition to the figure, carved into the 




apparent deception was to serve future antiquarians, who would be puzzled by it if the matter 
were left alone.56  
 When Cesnola learned of the allegation, he sent Feuardent a letter stating that his charge 
was serious enough to warrant a thorough investigation.57 The ensuing disruption for the 
museum lasted for years. Cesnola opined that in order for any collection to be of value, it had to 
be free from even the slightest question of authenticity. But clearly Cesnola personally also 
sought public exoneration. Thus, the trustees appointed Prime and John Quincy Adams Ward to 
convene with three non-board experts to investigate Feuardent’s accusations.58  
 On January 26, 1881, they submitted their report. The experts sought the advice of 
sculptors, stonecutters, and scholars, and made microscopic, chemical, and other rigorous (and 
destructive) examinations of the works’ surfaces.59 In addition, they used previous documentary 
photographs of the objects. The committee’s conclusion was that all of the charges were without 
foundation, and that Cesnola and his collection were of pristine reputation. 
 Cesnola had responded to the charges with poise and few words—an “indefinite 
grandeur” in Puck’s estimation—but also took ill with acute rheumatism. As the Metropolitan’s 
director and only “professional” staff member, Cesnola was, in Prime’s words, a “jack-of-all-
trades”—the “Director, paymaster, accountant, builder, architect, forwarding and receiving clerk, 
housekeeper, and butler for the museum” who had “done most, and given most & sacrificed 
most” to the museum’s success.60 Cesnola was exhausted. The integrity of the entire Cesnola 
collection, as well as the man himself, were in question. 
As for Feuardent, a Tribune editorial stated it most succinctly: Cesnola, at least on the 
face of it, had no motive for “enriching” his collection by tampering with any particular objects. 




York looking for business, and, while he was well acquainted with many of the Metropolitan 
Museum trustees, he was not able to establish an official connection with the new institution, 
which a few years earlier could not afford to buy large quantities of objects from him and his 
father. “In short, Mr. Feuardent was in the business of selling antiquities, and his eagerness to 
appear before the public in this matter cause a suspicion that his real object was to advertise 
himself and his wares,” the Tribune concluded.61  
While the newspaper excoriated the tabloids’ willingness to “think evil of almost any 
man who has achieved distinction and success”—meaning Cesnola as well as the trustees who 
stood behind him—it also was not above casting the accuser in bigoted class terms, something 
Cesnola did not discourage. “The General” was supposedly an Italian nobleman, who had 
abandoned his citizenship for the distinction of being an American, and fought and “periled his 
life” defending his adopted country. Feuardent, on the other hand, was the enterprising son of a 
“Hebrew dealer in antiquities,” who had pressured the insolvent museum to do business with 
him.62 
But neither Feuardent nor the incriminating news accounts would go away. In March 
1882, the powerful art critic Clarence Cook issued a pamphlet (published by Feuardent) which 
charged that two statues in particular were “a fraudulent patchwork of unrelated parts,” and 
questioned not only Cesnola’s restorations but also the disparate locations of the digs in which he 
found the supposedly cohesive collection.63 Cook sought to demonstrate that the collection of 
Cypriote antiquities was a fraud, as was the narrative of its discovery.64  
This hit closer to home. Despite Cesnola’s often-pompous demeanor, the museum had to 
stand behind its director. With this new accusation, the executive committee ordered that the two 




glass cases and examined in strong light on the floor of the great hall. Indicative of the primitive 
means by which such disputes were then settled, museum members, the public, and reporters, 
artists, scholars—virtually anyone—was invited to “examine” the works for several weeks. 
“Every indignity was heaped upon defenseless stone; visitors washed, chisled, cut, scraped, 
treated with caustic potash and other chemicals, brushed with wire brushes, and examined 
microscopically to their hearts’ content,” the museum’s early biographer, Winifred Howe, wrote. 
After being so vandalized, the statues ultimately were judged to be authentic.65 Several sculptors, 
among them Daniel Chester French and John Rogers, even sent in unsolicited letters 
“exculpating completely” the condemned artworks.66 
But the controversy continued. When Cesnola, still not feeling vindicated, published a 
brief and total denial of the charges, Feuerdent accused him of libel. The trial began on October 
31, 1883, with Allen W. Evarts, Albert Stickney, and Choate defending Cesnola. The trustees 
supported their director and bore the trial’s expense.67 In February 1884, the jury “sustained the 
entire integrity” of Cesnola’s collection and found all of the charges baseless. Cesnola’s 
dignified conduct throughout the “trying ordeal” again had met the trustees’ and the public’s 
approval.68 But the scandal did open the museum and its trustees to unwarranted publicity, which 
in itself demonstrated how significant it had become in the public eye. 
Afterwards, Cesnola looked only to the future, and was particularly pleased by a note of 
support from Professor Charles Eliot Norton, the famed chairman of Harvard’s Art History 
department and the first president of the Archaeological Institute of America. Cesnola took the 
opportunity to remind Johnston that in spite of the museum’s recent exposure, both scholars and 
aesthetes alike now were recognizing its international prominence. “The aims and purposes of 




beleaguered director wrote. Johnston and the trustees for over ten years had “nobly worked and 
toiled,” to lay the solid foundations of a museum, “the greatest institution of the kind in the New 
World, and the pride of this City,” Cesnola concluded.69 
 
“A great deal of money to very little purpose”  
On December 18, 1888, the wind whirled around Cleopatra’s Needle, the relic that by now had 
stood sentinel for eight years outside the Central Park entrance to the Metropolitan. As many as 
eight thousand people strode past the obelisk and into the museum for the opening of the 
museum’s new building, the latest monument to the art of the past and the American civilization 
of the future.70  
The formal opening of the new wing would become one of the defining moments in the 
history of the institution. Among those seated on the platform for the ceremony was John Jay, 
whose idea years before had laid the groundwork for the museum. Johnston was unable to 
participate in the event, and around a month later, his weakening physical condition finally 
convinced the trustees to accept his long-desired resignation. But William C. Prime was as 
appropriate a speaker as any that day, having been the active first vice president of the 
Metropolitan since 1874.  
 Prime used his speech to ponder the subject of art. It was at once “a kind of goddess,” 
while the artistic process had a more functional application, echoing the foundational beliefs of 
many a cultural institution in nineteenth-century America. “Enumerate carpets, upholstery, wall 
papers, furniture, handsome houses, the innumerable beauties of life which employ millions of 




beauty your city would be a wilderness, your steamers and railways would vanish, your wealth 
would be poverty, your population would starve,” Prime said.71 
Indeed, not only artists, but workers toiled to produce goods of aesthetic as well as 
practical value. During the decades of the museum’s founding, the laboring classes had become 
increasingly politicized in New York, galvanized by a successful three-month strike by one 
hundred thousand workers for an eight-hour workday in 1872; the first official observation of 
Labor Day in 1882; and the continued progress of union and labor reformers and reform 
organizations.72 The labor force was now largely Catholic in a still strongly Protestant and 
Anglo-Saxon city. This often led to conflicts over temperance, city government, and the role of 
religion in public education.73 
 The original premise of the Metropolitan Museum—that it enabled all New Yorkers to 
benefit from the edifying presence of a museum of art—was coming into conflict with a 
competing belief, and a blatant reality. Was “uplift” to be of a religious or a cultural variety? 
Could it be both? Given the fact of six-day workweeks and of the mostly wretched immigrant 
existence in New York, was Sunday, the “day of rest,” to be exclusively religious or partially 
secular?74  
 At the opening, Robb, the Parks president, expressed something that had been brewing 
contentiously in the press as well as in the trustees’ meetings since the museum’s inception in the 
1870s: the idea of opening the museum on Sundays. “I believe I am voicing the sentiment of a 
great majority of the people of this city, that the day is not far distant when the museum will be 
kept open on Sundays as well as all other holidays,” he said.75 Mayor Hewitt concurred as he 
officially opened the new wing: “This magnificent addition to the Museum . . .  I now declare to 




everlasting future I trust the time will come when on no day shall they be excluded.”76 The 
suggestion was received with applause by the audience, and was enthusiastically endorsed by the 
press. 
 Prime, however, had never shared these sentiments. He was an impressive nineteenth-
century polymath: a journalist (editor and owner of the New York Journal of Commerce); an art 
historian (and first chairman of Princeton’s Department of Art History); a lawyer; numismatist; 
peripatetic travel author who wrote books about Egypt; and literary executor for Civil War 
General George B. McClellan, whose autobiography he had edited. But in spite of his wide-
ranging erudition, Prime had rather parochial views about blue laws, for which he would stake 
his personal association with the museum that he had helped build and lovingly nurture. 
 In his address, Prime emphasized that “the secret of the success of the Museum was its 
usefulness.” As the museum was not intended for any one class, “but for all,” its influence on 
both education and aesthetic taste was “stimulating an emulation for the highest purposes.”77 The 
trustees shared his exalted notion of the museum’s function: it was not a “mere show place for 
the amusement of the people,” but rather a place for their instruction.78  This corresponded with 
the city administration’s new attention to the institution’s regard to the interests of the people—
in terms of education, to be sure, but also in offering free admission on certain days of the week. 
The city’s investment in the museum thus far had been about $1.1 million, while the investment 
of the museum members was $2.5 million.79 The contest over public versus private authority, 
and the parameters of trustee accountability, was on. 
 Those who sided with Prime had no issue with opening the museum to the greater 
public—just not on Sundays. But spending the day in church and then at home was a bourgeois 




experience—not to mention Jewish religious observation. Time at church represented perhaps 
only two hours out of a Sunday morning, and given the typical worker’s crowded living 
conditions in the tenement or the boarding house, it was unlikely that much of the day could be 
spent “at home,” in any case. Moreover, what was the equivalent probability of a more cultured 
New Yorker refraining from looking at his own collection of artworks on a Sunday, or from 
talking about them with his family or friends?80 The question of opening the museum on Sunday 
was becoming a secular matter regarding the institution’s popular utility and function. “To quite 
nine-tenths of the community it is a secular question, and to them the restriction upon the Sunday 
opening looks like an oppression of the poor by the rich,” the Times concluded in a widely held 
view.81 
 The topic had been smoldering for years after the move to Central Park in 1880, and the 
introduction of public support for the endeavor. To some trustees, like Joseph Choate, the answer 
to the “Sunday question” was obvious. It would immediately double the museum’s usefulness 
and inspire public interest, he wrote to Cesnola in April 1880. “Sound religion and good morals 
require it, and I hope it will be put to the vote at once. Imagine the Louvre closed on Sunday!” he 
added.82  
Other trustees were less certain, and equivocated individually as well as collectively—but 
always privately—as they tried to balance their personal views with their public responsibilities. 
For the time being, the subject would be a matter of trustee prerogative, although this in itself 
created obvious problems of interpretation. “From the very beginning, the museum has been an 
exclusive social toy, not a great instrument of popular education,” the Tribune wrote, “and all its 




the restless demonstrations of opposition, have sprung from the conviction that this radical fault 
existed.”83 
Consequently, tension continued to build throughout the 1880s for Sunday hours. The 
city administration began to voice a strong view; the Metropolitan, after all, was built on public 
property with taxpayer funds. In April 1881, the Department of Public Parks presented the 
Metropolitan Museum’s trustees with a petition signed by over ten thousand New Yorkers, 
including such prominent citizens as August Belmont, Oswald Ottendorfer, and Felix Adler, 
requesting that the Metropolitan and the American Museum of Natural History be opened on 
Sundays. The petition committee asked for a meeting after the Parks Department received a reply 
from the museums.84  
But the Parks board itself was of mixed opinion, and the Metropolitan and Natural 
History Museum trustee Salem H. Wales moved that it was impossible to discuss the matter “on 
such short notice,” thus making an immediate audience “impracticable.”85 While both boards 
prevaricated, the religious dimension was depicted as tangential, and the standpoint on Sunday 
openings, or closings, as the case happened to be, was strictly practical.86 In this manner, the 
subject remained on the table but was not acted upon for several years. 
It appeared that the leadership of both museums had tended towards elitism to the 
detriment of the greater program. The Times impatiently maintained that the trustees of the art 
museum had spent “a great deal of money to very little purpose,” and had shown “a great deal of 
silly irritation” when their judgment was called in question.87 Furthermore, the situation was 
emphasizing a fact that hitherto had been overlooked to some extent: with a city-owned building 
and reliance on public money, the museum, even in light of its private support, could not be 




in the popular press along blunter lines. “The people of this City would certainly resent, with a 
good deal of indignation, the shutting of the Park gates in their faces on the one day when the 
majority of them have a chance to visit the Park,” the Times concluded.88 
Even with constant demands from the public, the Parks Department, and the State Board 
of Estimate, the trustees of the Metropolitan and the Natural History museums held firm.89 All 
protestations to the contrary, personal religious views were influencing the trustees on the 
matter.90 Matching the escalating pressure in the press for Sunday openings was Prime’s rising 
hostility to the Metropolitan’s current board. “How hard it used to be to get a quorum. Now, 
since we have made the Museum a great institution, you find a lot of Trustees who never used to 
attend, always on hand to vote Sunday openings, direct the Exec. Com. to acknowledge all gifts 
by separately prepared letters, & pass other stupid & Impracticable orders.” Prime was beyond 
discouraged.91 
Nevertheless, both factions of the trustees believed they were looking out for the people 
and the institution regarding Sundays, and they took it to be their absolute responsibility to do so. 
Prime, Johnston, Marquand, W. E. Dodge, and even Cesnola himself were of one mind, as the 
upholders of old-fashioned reason, temperance, and the greater cause of uplift. The equally 
reasonable others, like Choate, Rhinelander, Samuel L. M. Barlow, Hoe, and Robert de Forest 
also were thinking of the people. “The great public, composed of working men and women, 
mechanics, laborers, and clerks are now excluded from the benefits from our collections almost 
to the extent that would result from their removal to Albany,” Barlow wrote to Cesnola. “The 
almost universal public voice, the press, men of all classes who have considered this question 




 Choate remained consistently in favor. As a dominant member of both boards, the whip-
smart jurist was unafraid to present his opinion. On moral grounds, museums were more 
wholesome than alternative “corrupt inducements of places of dissipation” also open on 
Sundays. On “prudential” grounds, Choate made his most compelling case: “The people are the 
chief support of the Museums, and we expect to live in the future as in the past by their bounty. 
Nothing can in my opinion be more shortsighted than to ignore them, to defy their wishes, and to 
deny to them the full enjoyment of the museums which they can never have if they are closed all 
day Sunday.” He warned that the trustees’ “stupid obstinacy” might result in the forfeiture of 
annual public grants. In short, the deference with which the trustees held certain wealthy 
Sabbatarians (and potential supporters) was nothing short of “contemptible,” Choate wrote, as 
“the very men on whose account our Trustees muzzled themselves died without leaving the 
Museum a dollar.”93 
Finally, the promotion of the very usefulness of the museums was at stake. Hundreds of 
“professional men and mechanics” could not possibly visit the museums on any other day than 
Sunday. Choate reasoned that the museum was intended for public use, and that the public 
demand for this change was greater than some of the Trustees appreciated.94  
Yet Cesnola and Jesup persisted resisting Sunday openings, and in November-December 
1885 used their authority as trustees and prominent citizens to turn to the newly installed 
Catholic Archibishop of New York, Michael Corrigan, whom Cesnola knew personally. “An 
Ingersollian Society has been organized for the purpose of secularizing the Sunday,” Cesnola 
wrote to Corrigan, intimating that its first step was to force the museums to be open—“then the 
Theatres and Bar rooms will follow; and in a short time the New York Sunday will become like 




men in the secular movement was none other than the current mayor, W. R. Grace, the first Irish 
American Catholic to hold that office. He was “only posing for political effect and popularity,” 
Cesnola presumed, revealing, “I detest his policy, as I have no respect for his personal character 
as you well know.”96 Grace had blocked expenditures for a new wing for the natural history 
museum, in part because of Irish Catholic sentiment that the Sunday closing was “just one more 
bit of Protestant meanness.”97 
Corrigan’s secretary responded that there were two different “aspects” under which the 
Sunday question could be viewed. “Visiting a museum or gallery of art may be combined with 
the faithful performance of the duties of religious worship on the Lord’s Day, and when it does 
not bring with it the neglect of the day’s obligations, does not face, even as a mode of recreation, 
under the prohibition of the Church,” he wrote.98 Officially, the church did not advocate “such 
Sunday-laws as would hinder necessary work, or prohibit such popular enjoyments as are 
consistent with the sacredness of the day.” Accordingly, if Catholics objected to the opening of 
museums on Sunday, it would not be on account of the Church deeming it sinful to visit them. 
 But with an explanation of the second “aspect” for viewing the situation, the Church 
prevaricated, even as it seemingly approved of a Sunday museum opening. While it was true that 
the Catholic clergy permitted “popular enjoyment” on Sunday, neither did it recommend it or 
wish to introduce it where it did not exist, as the Church was decidedly not in favor of 
secularizing the day.99 
 With no action on the matter, the public took to signing ever more petitions, which both 
Johnston and Jesup received from the American Secular Union and the Central Labor Union. 
There were signatures from officers of the city, judges of the court, prominent businessmen, 




our best citizens represent a great part of the citizenship of New York,” declared Samuel P. 
Putnam, the secretary of the Secular Union.100 The resolutions from labor organizations 
represented fifty thousand working New Yorkers.101 
Meanwhile, both boards also received petitions representing the other side. One came 
from certain conservative theologians like the dean of the General Theological Seminary; the 
rectors of the St. James and Calvary Churches; the pastor of the University Place Presbyterian 
Church; along with such prominent citizens as John D. Rockefeller.102 Another came from the 
Presbytery of New York. Such people feared the “Continental Sabbath”: European cities had 
long practiced recreation and leisure in addition to churchgoing on Sundays. Some Americans 
freely interpreted that custom as promoting a day of dissipation or as a capitalistic maneuver to 
garner seven days’ labor from workmen for six days’ pay.103 
 For the museum trustees, the case had become one of their sole authority as institutional 
leaders versus their more abstract moral authority as prominent men of means. Their sort of 
paternalism was staggeringly paradoxical because it overlooked the reality of the laborers’ 
existence in New York. Furthermore, it flew in the face of their other charitable activities. The 
gentle, dignified, and sober Morris K. Jesup, for example, was a leader in important benevolent 
and humanitarian causes.104 As with Johnston and Prime a devout Presbyterian, his philanthropic 
religiosity also was bound up in the notion that Sundays were sacrosanct, and that to violate the 
Sabbath was tantamount to breaking a deeper religious tenet that almost would cast into question 
the entire museum endeavor.105   
 Samuel Putnam persisted in pressuring to meet with the Conference Committee, and his 
tepid reply came finally in February 1886. The committee remained unmoved, in spite of the fact 




“heads of families, officers of the city, judges of the courts, businessmen, and working people,” 
and that the attached resolutions from labor organizations represented fifty thousand of the 
working people of NYC.106  
 By February 1890, the legislature in Albany could tolerate the museums’ recalcitrance no 
longer, and Senator Brown introduced a bill demanding the Sunday opening. Marquand and 
Jesup both argued that the bill was unconstitutional on the grounds that not only did both 
museums have contracts with the city controlling the matter in their favor, but that the museums 
were private corporations, and that public interference with the rights of the trustees to manage 
their own affairs was out of line.107 The issue now was becoming not only one of moral 
authority, but of institutional prerogative, and the anti-Sunday trustees were smugly holding 
firm. 
 The situation highlighted the power and influence some of the trustees had behind-the-
scenes in stubbornly advancing what was evidently a losing cause, by calling upon political 
contacts to guide things their way. On April 13, 1890, Marquand informed Cesnola that Senator 
Brown “has been seen & is inclined to withdraw the bill—he was under the impression that the 
Museums were run by a lot of fanatics—they get this from the prominence some members take 
in religious matters.”108 After the municipal authorities’ determined escalation of the call for 
Sunday openings, a quiet withdrawal seemed strange indeed. Marquand, in fact, was contacting 
his political friends like Lispenard Stewart and John Bigelow, urging their opposition of the 
bill’s passage. Dodge and Marquand even astonishingly thought to enlist the pro-Sunday Choate 
to telegraph Albany to stop the bill. “He has influence at Albany. Altho’ he is anxious for 
Sunday opening he would not want it forced in this dangerous way,” Dodge reasoned.109 




and who became the New York Public Library’s first president, wrote to Marquand on April 15, 
assuring him that the word was that Brown, “the author of the obnoxious bill,” had had a change 
of heart and “had made up his mind not to press the Museum Bill” after seeing “some New 
Yorkers.” 110 On April 21, Cesnola learned exactly why. In strictest confidence, Dodge revealed 
that he had “arranged quietly with Senator Brown thru a special friend to quietly drop the Bill 
and he carried out his idea.”111 The trustees had managed to quell the mounting municipal 
demand for the Sunday opening, going so clearly against the majority public opinion. 
 The hiatus would last only around a year, for the press was taking up the cause with a 
zealousness that proved difficult to ignore. Newspapers exposed the fact that trustees themselves 
and their friends for years had been visiting the museum on Sundays, if provided with a special 
pass. This added an even more elitist, class element to the debate: the museum did, in fact, open 
on the Sabbath, but only for a select few trustees and their friends who were issued “Sunday 
cards.”112 The practice was pronounced a “heartless outrage” and added fuel to the petitions in 
circulation. The Critic hoped that “before long the Museum will be as easy of access to the mass 
of the people on Sunday as those resorts now are, whose influence is as hostile to the sprit of the 
day as that of art is friendly.”113 
 With negative public opinion rising, the trustees’ new argument against the opening was 
now financial. Cesnola told the press in February 1891 that the rumor that the city had made an 
offer of $10,000 a year towards paying the expenses of opening the museum on Sunday was 
untrue. It actually would cost the institution $25,000 a year, he said, money which it “had not to 
expend.” In addition, at least one-third of the members of the museum would resign if the 





As the months counted down for the May trustees meeting, the public and media clamor 
grew in intensity. More petitions in favor of the Sunday opening were circulating. An 
anonymous committee of women sought signatures from many of the clubhouses, cafés, and 
businesses. One of its stops was the Union League Club, site of the Metropolitan Museum’s 
founding. “All members who saw it signed it,” the Times reported, and within a few weeks many 
hundred signatures were on the list.114 There was another one with ninety thousand names 
representing a diverse array of New Yorkers, from Vanderbilts and Havemeyers to many 
members of the clergy, around two hundred physicians and medical students, artists, writers, 
lawyers, businessmen, and over a thousand letter carriers. In addition, a communication from the 
Working People’s Petition Committee, representing fifty thousand laborers, was on the table.115 
Even religious leaders were joining the call. The Reverend R. Heber Newton of the All Souls’ 
Church chided some churchgoers who had “the wealth to change the city, to lift it from its 
degradation, to sweeten, to humanize it, and to Christianize it.”116 Specifically, he was speaking 
of the trustees of the Metropolitan Museum of Art. “[I]n the name of religion they are driving 
men away from religion itself,” he preached. “When the average workingman comes up to the 
doors of a museum on a Sunday morning and finds that the Church has closed those doors 
against him, is he not very apt to sneer and turn away and conclude that the whole thing is a 
gigantic fraud?117  
Meanwhile, the Socialist Central Labor Federation was beginning the fight in New York 
for an eight-hour workday and also passed a resolution demanding that the Metropolitan 
Museum of Art as well as the Museum of Natural History be kept open on Sundays.118 The 
trustees’ alleged concern for worker morality, safeguarded by closing the museum, was not only 




Turning to the museum, what now defined its “popular usefulness”? To a majority of the 
community, that was a secular question, and the restriction on opening was looking like the 
oppression of the poor by the rich. To be a truly popular institution, like for example, the park, 
and not a perk for the aesthetic enjoyment of a small minority, the museum had to be open on a 
day when it was accessible to a majority. “The Trustees are men of sense and men of the world, 
and there is reason to believe that they are waiting only until the popular demand shall be 
unmistakable in order to give it effect,” the Times concluded.120 
Whose museum was it? “The museum building is the property of the people; the Trustees 
of the museum are the tenants and pay no rent,” Charles B. Stover, the secretary of the Museum 
Opening Committee, boldly stated. In 1886, Stover was a cofounder, with Stanton Coit, of the 
Neighborhood Guild (later known as the University Settlement), the first settlement house in the 
United States, and as such had done much thinking about the larger impact of the changing urban 
condition.121 “The works of art displayed in the building are the property of the Trustees, and the 
people pay no admission fee to see them. If the people should attempt to compel the trustees to 
open the museum on Sunday afternoons, the trustees could then take their works of art away and 
leave the building empty,” he suggested peevishly.122 The museum, after all, had been conceived 
for the edification of the city and the development of its culture, and municipal involvement was 
entirely appropriate, not to mention necessary, to defray prohibitive expenses. Nevertheless, the 
inspiration, the energy, the resources, and the commitment to the project had been the trustees’.  
 On May 18, 1891, the Metropolitan’s board of trustees finally met. Vice President Daniel 
Huntington nervously presided over the three-hour meeting, joined by a full complement of the 
board, minus Prime, John S. Kennedy (another strong opponent), and Marquand, who was 




declared, “was won at last.” The Metropolitan Museum would be open on Sundays, from one 
o’clock in the afternoon until a half hour before sunset. Twelve trustees voted for the resolution, 
five against, and one abstained.124 But halfway through the meeting, it was uncertain whether 
this would be the ultimate outcome. 
Public money had financed the building, but not the collections. The growth of the 
institution indeed was phenomenal, and there was nothing comparable, even in the countries 
where government support was available.125 The trustees were hardly unanimous in the idea of 
opening up the museum to further public support or management. The report acknowledged that 
the museum’s educational mission “for the improvement of the people” was the justification for 
the Sunday opening appeal, and yet the matter was a divisive one from a religious point of view, 
which had the power to eclipse the educational agenda altogether. Furthermore, to open on 
Sundays, Bigelow reported, the museum would need a “very considerable addition to its present 
resources”—essentially, “new and extraordinary fountains of revenue.”126 Evidently, these 
“fountains” were expected from private, not public moneys, and the insurmountable nature of 
such a fundraising effort provided the pretext for the recommendation of tabling the discussion 
yet again.127  
At this point in the meeting, the resolution to open on Sunday was voted upon and 
defeated.128 But then reality intervened. 
The trustees suspended their discussion to receive a representative from the New York 
World, the editor and writer George Cary Eggleston, who presented the museum with a check for 
$2,500 to help defray the expenses for the Sunday opening. He was followed by a delegation 




secured for the same purpose. When the trustees reconvened, the Sunday opening resolution 
passed. 
Speaking to the press, Cesnola refused to divulge the names of those voting for or 
against, stating that “he had no time to waste on such trivial matters.”129 Indeed, preparations 
were already underway for the first Sunday opening in two weeks. Huntington, however, was not 
so circumspect, and went on the record, together with William E. Dodge, Bigelow, and Hiram 
Hitchcock, as dissenters “on conscientious grounds.”130  
“That was a funny meeting we had yesterday,” was Salem H. Wales’s understatement to 
Cesnola the following day. “The course of Mr. Choate was not only a surprise to our friends—
but also a source of mortification— He treated the report of the committee very roughly—and 
much annoyed some,” Wales revealed.131 Choate had been the “foremost advocate” for Sunday 
openings for over a decade, so his position should not have come as a surprise to anyone: the 
Times reported that it was “largely, and in fact wholly,” due to his efforts that the master debater 
accomplished the result long sought by so many New Yorkers. Choate noted that the petitioners, 
consistent with years of press reports and contrary to the assertions of trustee naysayers, had 
intimated that the popularity of the movement would be so great that money would “flow into the 
treasury without stint,” thus alleviating the museum of its financial concern. The majority of the 
board was willing to test this theory.132 
Not surprisingly, there were rich supporters who were not strict sabbatarians. The 
subscribers to this fund comprised an elite assemblage of prominent Gentile and Jewish 
businessmen, politicians, intellectuals, and women, including Andrew Carnegie, Abram S. 
Hewitt, Hugh Bache, Richard Watson Gilder, Jacob H. Schiff, August Belmont, and the Schuyler 




$10,000, at the behest of a gentleman who had two years before offered the museum the money 
to defray the extra expense of a Sunday opening. “He made no conditions, and left it optional as 
to when the offer should be tendered, as he did not wish it to embarrass the trustees, as to when 
or how the museum should be so opened,” Avery wrote.133 Intriguingly, Avery made no mention 
of this proposal when it might have been needed to tip the balance. 
Their “victory” won, the financial reality of the new situation now seemed daunting. The 
trustees, in spite of their assertions, had not thought though the financial ramifications of the new 
mandate. Robert Hoe earlier had presented a bold proposal for more public funds, which the 
trustees had roundly rejected without putting forward a viable alternative. Because of the annual 
deficit and the added expense of opening on Sunday, Hoe suggested that the city should pay the 
expenses of keeping the Museum open to the public, while the trustees would continue to 
contribute only to increasing the collections. In exchange for abolishing museum admission fees, 
the city would be responsible for the museum’s total running expenses.134 
Hoe’s view had not gained greater support not only because it was a good argument in 
favor of opening on Sunday, but because it opened the institution to greater political intervention 
and involvement.135 He complained candidly to the new young trustee (and Johnston son-in-law) 
Robert W. de Forest that he thought the board had made a mistake, and that the inattentiveness of 
some members who came to the meetings without taking the time to consider the matters “from 
all sides” resulted in resolutions being passed which were difficult for the executive committee to 
carry out. But he felt certain that sooner or later “(and the sooner the better)” the city would have 
to pay the expenses of keeping the Museum open, and “emphatically advocated” the abolition of 
paying an admission at all, “as they are against us, tending to lead people to think we have an 




Hoe found an ally in de Forest, and while the junior trustee was reluctant to take the lead 
in the matter, he wrote to Marquand expressing his concerns about the business arrangements of 
the Sunday opening, particularly wondering why the notion that the city pay the costs of running 
the museum was dismissed without a proposed alternative.137 Cesnola reassured Hoe that the 
museum affairs were in capable hands, and that there was no need for alarm.138 
On May 31, 1891, when the Metropolitan Museum opened its doors for the first time on a 
Sunday, eleven thousand persons poured into the building, proving that working New Yorkers 
indeed would “avail themselves of the privilege” of visiting it.139 “At the close of the day the 
most strenuous opponent of the Sunday opening movement could not find a word of fault to 
say,” the Times reported.140 Cesnola himself was surprised at the “character” of the crowd. 
“Those who expected to see Essex Street Polish Jews and Thirty-ninth Street and Eleventh 
Avenue hod carriers, in ragged clothing and dilapidated hats, were agreeably disappointed,” the 
Times asserted.141 And of the visitors—well-dressed men, women, and children, many speaking 
French, German, and other foreign languages—the only disappointed ones were those who had 
brought lunch baskets and were turned away. 
Cesnola maintained his distance from the new constituency, who, in his estimation, knew 
museums only “from the specimens to be seen in Dime Museums on the Bowery” and came 
expecting to see “freaks and monstrosities similar to those found there.”142 In time, however, 
these new museumgoers proved to be “respectable, law-abiding, and intelligent.” In the first six 
months of the Sunday experiment from May 31 to November 15, more than 30 percent of the 
total attendance visited on the Christian sabbath.143 
George H. Story, the curator of paintings, drawings, and prints, gave a lively description 




our Sunday visitors, I do not believe that the names of all who come are registered in the Elite 
Directory,” he began. “Yet for all that I trust you will not think that the Rowdie [sic] element 
prevails, every quarter of this city, Brooklyn and Jersey City included yeilds [sic] its quota, and 
the hard fisted mechanic elbows the shopkeeper, clerks, shop girls, Chinese, and pushing Jews 
crowd together. But as a whole they are orderly and respectful to one another, and look with 
intense interest in a bewildered wondering manner at the beautiful objects which will meet their 
eyes at every turn.”144 Story’s arrogance was typical of Cesnola’s and the trustees’ apprehension 
over the manners and morals of their new visitors, and the leaders’ incremental abandonment of 
the museum’s democratic and educational focus.145 
Financial issues persisted and increased, since all employees of the museum, including 
Cesnola and his curators, were expected to work on Sundays to answer questions and keep 
order.146 Nevertheless, the Sunday opening experiment was a success. But Philadelphia and 
Boston had bested New York in this regard, having become convinced much earlier that there 
was no danger in making such means of elevation available on Sunday.147 
 
“There was money in the air” 
Returning in 1906 to the “American scene” of his youth, Henry James was astonished at the 
Metropolitan Museum’s transformation. He remembered when it was nothing more than a 
“stately though scrappy” museum installed “a large eccentric house in West Fourteenth 
Street.”148 A critic of American provincialism, James was uncharacteristically effusive that “the 
Museum, in short, was going to be great,” in part, because “there was money in the air.”149 
 Indeed, as James observed, the money went to “all the most exquisite things.” The 




state and city authorized $1 million for a Fifth Avenue wing, designed by Richard Morris Hunt 
and opened in 1902. The imposing Beaux Arts structure broadcast an opulence that denoted a 
culture of consumption over an earlier one of restraint.150 
It also now was receiving many donations and bequests. Upon his election as a trustee, 
Cornelius Vanderbilt, the Commodore’s namesake and grandson, donated seven hundred Italian 
drawings.151 Catharine Lorillard Wolfe, an heiress thought to be the richest woman in the world, 
gave both a large bequest and an endowment to enlarge it, the first such self-sufficient gift to the 
Metropolitan. Anthony Drexel’s widow donated Egyptian art and a gallery of casts. Perhaps the 
oddest highlight of this “new and grandiose” era at the turn of the century was the large bequest 
of Jacob S. Rogers, an eccentric $10 annual member who unexpectedly gave the museum $8 
million upon his death in 1901.152 
 But it was Marquand who gave most spectacularly. In an era when donations functioned 
as ostentatious public displays in honor of a donor, Marquand thought first of the museum. His 
opposition to Sunday openings had been thoroughly disconnected from his earnest belief in the 
educational mission of the institution. Marquand helped fund the library, the collection of casts, 
the art schools, and the general endowment, and his gifts of decorative arts always met the 
museum’s existing needs.153 
 Yet the department of paintings benefited the greatest from Marquand. In 1888, he placed 
his collection of old masters, recently purchased abroad, on loan at the Met for the opening of its 
new wing. Seeing the great stir they caused, he soon gave them outright to the Museum without 
serious conditions of any kind.154 The paintings, including important works by Vermeer, Van 
Dyke, Rembrandt, Hals, Velazquez, and Turner, had never even entered Marquand’s home, and 




museums of the world.155 Larger than entire collections of old masters in many art museums, the 
Marquand gift of thirty-seven paintings was then the best collection of old masters in the United 
States.156 By comparison, Vanderbilt’s obelisk had neither educational nor real financial value, 
and Wolfe’s bequest came only after her death. Marquand’s benefaction was different: he shared 
the wealth, both financially and aesthetically, during his lifetime, and established an 
extraordinary standard of philanthropic conduct.157 A “new era” for the Metropolitan Museum 
had arrived. The institution now was deemed worthy of the city as well as the park.  
 Marquand had been the obvious choice to succeed Johnston. “A man who serves the 
public in this style acquires for the best reasons a weight in the councils of the Museum which 
the public will not fail to respect,” the Times wrote.158 The Sunday issue had been larger than the 
man himself—a clash of personalities, sensibilities, perceptions, and generations. But it was 
brash indeed when, in 1895, certain trustees saw fit to test Marquand’s very authority. 
 It was over Luigi Palma di Cesnola, the museum’s director for sixteen years, who had 
become increasingly imperious with subordinates, prickly, temperamental, and contemptuous of 
certain trustees. As the founding board aged, younger men with new perspectives and less 
patience for the “General” rose to leadership. In 1895, at a meeting of the committee on casts, 
Robert W. de Forest, the youngest board member and committee chair, reported that John S. 
Kennedy, Samuel Avery, and three others agreed with him about Cesnola’s unsuitability. Soon, 
even Hiram Hitchcock, Cesnola’s one-time champion, and Joseph Choate, his defense attorney, 
conceded that Cesnola not only hindered the museum’s progress, but did not represent it. They 
thought he was a “martinet” who behaved as though he owned the museum, and now controlled 




Marquand was outraged, and regarded de Forest and Kennedy’s action as an effort by 
younger trustees to seize control from their older colleagues.160 At the deciding board meeting 
for the annual election on February 18, 1895, Marquand announced that he would resign unless 
all of the officers, including Cesnola, were reelected. J. P. Morgan, who could not attend, threw 
his support behind Marquand.161 The nine votes cast against Cesnola were not enough to dismiss 
him. Cesnola’s discharge, in the end, was simply beyond the bounds of possibility, out of respect 
for Marquand.162 
In early March, the story leaked out to art circles, presumably on purpose by some 
trustees, possibly even de Forest himself. “The men who have been most active in their 
opposition to Gen. Di Cesnola are eminently qualified to judge of the necessity of his no longer 
remaining with the museum,” the Times reported. While not opposed to him on personal 
grounds, they believed Cesnola’s removal would be in the best interests of the museum.163 The 
objecting trustees were identified as Choate, Huntington, Ward, Kennedy, E. D. Adams, de 
Forest, Avery, Post, and Professor William R. Ware of Columbia, some of whom had been once 
the General’s strongest advocates, but who now wished him to see him retired.164 
Cesnola quickly responded in the Tribune. “The whole trouble originates in a desire on 
the part of recently appointed trustees to control the Museum,” he stated bluntly. He 
conspicuously mentioned Morgan’s support, as well as Vanderbilt’s, who had made a speech 
characterizing the effort as out-and-out usurpation. “You will understand that these remarks by 
Mr. Vanderbilt and Mr. Morgan were not solely in my defence, but a general protest against a 
revolution of the management of the institution, and an assumption of authority by men newly 




But the trouble lay with Cesnola. Artists and archaeologists joined the discussion, and 
now freely called the “obnoxious” director “useless and harmful.” The common opinion was that 
Cesnola lacked interest in “all fine art matters” with the exception of his own collection.166 
Cesnola had even rebuffed Avery by refusing an extremely valuable collection of prints, which 
ultimately went to the New York Public Library.167 In the lean, scrappy early days of the 
museum, Cesnola had worked tirelessly as the only paid administrative and curatorial staff 
member. Yet at the same time, the “General” also was a professional opportunist and a social 
climber, and all protestations of his acquired American citizenship to the contrary, he always had 
been an autocrat of aristocratic pretensions and dubious credentials. 
Robert de Forest issued a statement regretting the leak and stressed that the board had 
nothing but the interests of the museum at heart. Indeed, the young trustee was merely 
challenging the status quo of the past, and thinking about the museum’s image going forward. He 
also was deeply alert to the trustees’ collective power to affect the museum’s general program. 
De Forest may have been one of the youngest trustees on the board, but in his statement to the 
press he deftly pointed out that Choate, who sided with him, could not be considered part of a 
newly elected faction, nor, for that matter, could Huntington, Ward, or Avery—trustees since the 
early 1870s. It also bespoke a self-conscious awareness of the growing influence of the 
institution in high cultural circles. 
Cesnola’s continuing presence fractured the Metropolitan Museum board, and with a 
truce came the resignations of de Forest from the executive committee and Ware from the board. 
While the trustees stood firm with Cesnola during the Feuerdent scandal, and the museum 
emerged stronger from the Sunday opening controversy, this would be the most turbulent 




years, but the founding era of the museum was converging on the new century, and with it came 
new issues. 
Earlier concerns about the museum’s public-private alliance were proving to have been 
unfounded, for there was no serious contentiousness with the city. Moreover, in 1895, speaking 
for the art and natural history museums, Jesup declared authoritatively that “no appointments 
will be made to the Park Department that will not be agreeable to our Museums.”168 The trustees 
used their political influence for higher appropriations: in 1891, the city’s annual grant was 
$25,000; in the early years of the century it grew to $150,000; and by 1909 it was $200,000.169 
The city absorbed the million-dollar costs of the construction of three new wings that were added 
during Cesnola’s time.170 The monumental Fifth Avenue entrance designed by museum trustee 
and architect Richard Morris Hunt opened in 1901, and effectively covered up the museum’s 
modest past—and the original Calvert Vaux and Jacob Wrey Mould building—behind a massive 
limestone façade.171 The trustees and Hunt’s grand scheme planned for gradual expansions that 
ultimately would cover eighteen and a half acres. 
As the new century began, the leaders of the founding era of the institution were dying—
nine of them between 1899 and 1904. John Taylor Johnston, president through the museum’s 
formative decades, died in 1893; his successor Marquand in 1902; and his successor (for only 
two years) Frederick Rhinelander in 1904, the year Cesnola himself succumbed (to acute 
indigestion and heart failure). Cesnola had worked at the museum on Friday, November 18, and 
had looked forward to the quarterly meeting scheduled for the next Monday, at which J. P. 
Morgan, the first vice president and Cesnola’s ardent supporter, was to be elected president, 
succeeding Rhinelander. But Cesnola died suddenly on Sunday, and the meeting, and the 




Looking back on the era of the institution’s founding, Robert de Forest saw the history of 
the Metropolitan as divided into three periods: the “voluntary service” era, which ended in 1879 
with the hiring of Cesnola (and the move to Central Park soon after); the Cesnola years 
(“increasingly marked by the General’s dominating personality,” de Forest saw fit to add); and J. 
Pierpont Morgan’s presidency, beginning in November 1904.172 Morgan had been one of the first 
fifty patrons of the museum in 1871, but it wasn’t until 1888 that he joined the board.173 Ten 
years later he was elected first vice president, and upon Rhinelander’s death that same year, 
President. 
 
Inflamed by a Grand Design 
In the last decade of the nineteenth century, J. P. Morgan’s reputation as a powerful and 
fearsome force in finance and industry was unparalleled. He was equally intimidating physically, 
six feet tall with large shoulders, piercing eyes, and a deformed nose caused by rosacea, a 
chronic skin disease. His presence on any board carried great weight, and the Metropolitan 
Museum considered it a coup to get him. “Our Board decided that it is not in the interest of the 
Museum to have Trustees select persons who are already Trustees of the Museum of Natural 
History,” Cesnola wrote to Morgan hesitatingly in 1888. “If you can see any way to get out of 
the other Museum before next May your election in our Board would be assured. Please think 
this matter over and let me know confidentially what is your desire in the matter,” Cesnola 
suggested, concluding with a flourish, “I know too that your excellent father would be very glad 
to learn that you have taken an active interest in this institution which is progressing at the rate of 




Unlike many titans of business, Morgan disliked publicity.175 And yet his very being 
attracted attention, for he conducted both his professional and personal lives on a grand scale. He 
bought the best prize-winning horses or dogs or paintings or yachts. He was a major supporter of 
the biggest church in the country (the New York Cathedral of St. John the Divine); the largest 
and finest opera house (the Metropolitan); the “best-situated and most beautiful clubhouse” (the 
Metropolitan); and the “first subscription of every important public object.”176 Yet unlike other 
New York millionaires who built ostentatious chateaux on Fifth Avenue, Morgan contentedly 
lived in an unobtrusive Murray Hill brownstone. 
Morgan began collecting rare books, manuscripts, and works of art in the 1890s, around 
the same time his involvement with the Metropolitan Museum deepened. He focused on art and 
artifacts of every kind—from tiny snuff boxes to large, magnificent tapestries. After acquiring 
the best in any field, he would turn elsewhere. For example, when his sister inquired if he would 
be seeing a dealer in Greek antiquities in Naples, he replied, “I have done with Greek antiquities; 
I am at the Egyptian.”177 
 His consistent passion was for quality. “When Pierpont Morgan accepted the presidency 
of the Metropolitan Museum in 1904,” future director Francis Henry Taylor wrote, “it was 
abundantly clear that his imagination was inflamed by a grand design for the artistic enrichment 
of his native country.”178 His ambitions for the museum were equally great. In 1905, he decided 
that it needed to establish an Egyptian Department, replete with a dedicated archeological 
expedition. Driven by the desire to make the Met’s department the best in the United States, 
Morgan recruited Albert M. Lythgoe, the founder of the Egyptian Department at the Museum of 




 New curatorial departments kept up with the steady accumulation of treasures of 
Decorative Arts, Asian Art, and paintings. Armor, which, like ancestral portraits imparted the 
sense of a noble, noncommercial history, became a faddish collectable for Americans, and an 
1896 bequest by John S. Ellis was augmented in 1904 by an exceptionally fine collection that 
Morgan bought from a French aristocrat, the Duc de Dino.180 Morgan had acted with dispatch 
when he enlisted Rutherfurd Stuyvesant to do the museum’s bidding for the objects in Europe, 
and pressured the trustees to contribute their own funds towards the successful purchase.181 
 Indeed, Morgan approached the task of administering the institution with Progressive-era 
efficiency. In his professional life, his reorganization and restructuring of troubled businesses 
came to be known as “Morganization,” a process from which the Metropolitan Museum was not 
immune. Before Cesnola’s death, a committee began revising the museum’s constitution to 
clarify definitions and practices.182 Morgan’s Secretary on the board, Robert de Forest, also was 
a strong organizational force to whom he entrusted responsibility for this initiative. One of de 
Forest’s recommendations employed business methods to capitalize on any available support by 
creating different classes of contributing membership between the ten-dollar annual member and 
the thousand-dollar fellow for life.183 Indeed, the enlarged membership produced increased 
revenues. 
 Similarly, the trustees sought to replace Cesnola with someone of executive ability, 
expert knowledge of art, museum experience, and perhaps the most important thing that Cesnola 
lacked, courtesy, and the gentlemanly qualities needed to represent the museum sympathetically 
to all of the different classes of the community.184 They chose Sir Caspar Purdon Clarke, the 
director of the Victoria and Albert Museum (formerly the South Kensington) in London, the 




the Metropolitan “not merely a museum and art gallery but a great educational institution,” in 
keeping with its original charter.185 Professionalization of the museum’s operations, however, 
eroded the authority of its patrons, and this, perhaps, was part of Morgan’s intent.186 
 Indeed, to Winifred Howe, the museum chronicler, “the keynote” of the Morgan era was 
educational efficiency. It was becoming obvious that a museum did not begin and end with the 
collection and exhibition of works of art alone. It had a responsibility to make art both 
“intelligible and attractive” to the public.187 Under these guidelines Clarke rearranged the 
collections “in a more logical and instructive way,” grouping objects and acquisitions “according 
to a comprehensive scientific plan,” which included assembling a curatorial staff and a more 
ordered exhibition approach. The trustees also saw fit to issue publications, sell photographs, 
offer increased use to art students, build up the library, and most important, cooperate with the 
public and private schools of greater New York.188 In so doing, they self-consciously harkened 
back to the original mission of the museum: to offer the city a collection as well as a place to 
study fine arts with an eye towards the national development of an artistic aesthetic.189  
 Recognizing the need for municipal cooperation, in 1907, under Morgan, the trustees 
designated that the Mayor of New York, the City Comptroller, and the president of the 
Department of Parks be henceforth permanent ex-officio trustees. Mayor McClellan 
subsequently championed Morgan and his museum to the Board of Estimate, and was able to 
increase its annual appropriation.190 Moreover, during Morgan’s presidency, the city’s special 
grants to the museum to build four wings, a carpenter shop, and a powerhouse amounted to over 





 Ironically, Morgan felt his greatest achievements at the museum were of a more personal 
nature. Soon after Morgan’s death, Herbert Satterlee, his son-in-law, began work on a 
comprehensive biography in which he recounted two relatively small incidents. In 1911, Morgan 
had become “tremendously interested” in the museum’s new Egyptian galleries in the Museum, 
visiting them frequently to take his mind off business matters. Having seen the Nile Valley 
excavations, he was interested in how the antiquities might be exhibited. Moreover, knowing the 
Egyptian departments in the great museums abroad, he wanted the one at home in New York to 
be “as good or better than the best of them,” Satterlee wrote. At a preview before the opening in 
November, he gave a tour of the galleries to some friends, and told anecdotes about particular 
objects. Satterlee asserted that the evening, for Morgan, was the high point of his 
administration.192   
Satterlee and others also recalled an elegant gathering in 1909 at the museum, at which 
Morgan and his wife stood in a reception line in the great hall, flanked by members of the board 
and the director Clarke. As an orchestra played in the gallery, the museum’s leaders greeted 
hundreds of members. One of them was an informally dressed spouse of a museum attendant, 
carrying an infant. Morgan “shook hands with her as graciously as he did with the lady in full 
evening dress who preceded her,” de Forest later wrote, and asked him to write down the child’s 
name.193 At the board’s next meeting, Morgan proposed the baby as a member of the Museum 
‘in Perpetuity’ and paid her $5,000 membership fee.194 Carried away by his enthusiasm and 
pride, Morgan also was consciously signifying that “in perpetuity” for the child might mean at 
least until the late twentieth century. The museum had a future, and it was solid. 
In Pierpont Morgan’s eight years as president, the Metropolitan’s acquisitions 




indeed, was in the air: the museum received large bequests from John S. Kennedy, Joseph 
Pulitzer, and Francis L. Leland.196 
In late 1912, Morgan testified before the House Committee on Banking and Currency. 
The Pujo Committee concluded that powerful financial leaders had gained control of the 
manufacturing, transportation, mining, telecommunications, and financial markets of the United 
States. In fact, four allied New York City financial institutions related primarily to Morgan and 
the Rockefeller family held 341 interlocking directorships in 112 major banks, railroads, public 
utilities, and insurance companies. The sum of these resources was $22 billion, or half the gross 
national product of the United States.197 
“A very few men,” the Times wrote, “stand sponsor for our finances, men whose ability, 
whose tastes, whose strength, and whose fortune have led them into ‘big business’ and brought 
them high place there. And we shiver and talk of a possible ‘money trust,’ and the ‘control of 
finance.’”198 Yet these same men also were “captains of philanthropy” and, as such, were 
“interlocking directors” who similarly populated the boards of both the Metropolitan Museum 
and the Charity Organization Society, among others. “They do not always appear together, of 
course, but some of them are almost sure to be found as ‘backers’ of every public-spirited 
concern in the city, and every one who reads the news of philanthropy, art, science, and 
education has long since become almost wearily familiar with their names.”199 Seven New 
Yorkers in particular were “again and again” on such lists: de Forest, Morgan, Otto T. Bannard, 
Jacob H. Schiff, Isaac N. Seligman, R. Fulton Cutting, and Felix M. Warburg. In the 
philanthropic realm, how could such a “trust” be a bad thing? What would New York’s so-called 
public activities do without them? Furthermore, even if high culture could be deemed 




immigrant masses into a respectable middle class.200 “As we name things ‘trusts,’ here we have 
one—it is a trust of public spirit,” the Times conceded.201 Furthermore, the Jewish presence on 
this list was not lost on the newspaper, owned by the American-born, German-Jewish Adoph S. 
Ochs, a serious advocate against anti-Semitism.202  
Morgan might have been a special case, with his wide-ranging and outsized 
accomplishments in finance, combined with his comparably grand feats of fine art and 
manuscript collecting, carried out with a ravenous zeal that bordered on hoarding. But there were 
others like him. Benjamin Altman, for example, was the son of Bavarian Jews who had settled in 
the United States in the 1850s. In 1870, the same year as the Metropolitan Museum’s founding, 
he set up a dry goods shop, and ultimately built it into one of New York’s leading department 
stores. Altman lived out of the public eye and spent his free time amassing an extraordinary art 
collection. Like Morgan, Altman sought quality. Both had fully developed tastes, but Morgan’s 
“feeling for works of art was basically romantic and historical rather than aesthetic” in the larger 
consideration of how an object pertained to culture. Morgan made his decisions with speed. 
Altman, on the other hand, sought out fine aesthetic quality over any historical allusions or 
visceral impressions, consulted experts and reflected sometimes for weeks about a potential 
purchase.203 
In 1909, Altman offered his collection to the museum under the condition that it be kept 
intact in one gallery, and managed by an endowed curator of his selection and funding. Although 
museum policy rejected such restrictive bequests, Morgan convinced the trustees to capitulate in 
this special case. The Altman collection was simply too fine to pass up. The gift remained a 
secret until Altman’s death in October 1913, when Edward Robinson, the museum’s director, 




ever made to the people of the city of New York.”204 According to Metropolitan Museum 
historian Calvin Tomkins, however, Altman’s collection was but an “inland sea” in proportion to 
Morgan’s “ocean.”205  
“Every smallest ornament or richest picture had the hallmark of his individuality,” one of 
Morgan’s friends once said of his grand collection. “However rich the trappings, they took their 
proper place, merely as trappings of the man.”206 Because the United States imposed a 
substantial (20 percent) duty on all imported artworks, the bulk of his art collection was not in 
his Thirty-sixth Street library in New York, but remained in London, in the house he had 
inherited from his father. In 1909, the Payne-Aldrich tariff bill eliminated import duty on art 
more than one hundred years old. That same year, Britain increased death duties, prompting 
Morgan by 1911 to call in all of his loans to foreign museums and move his belongings to New 
York.207 
In March 1911, Robinson wrote to Morgan in Rome about finding space in which to 
house his collection at the Metropolitan. Although the planned Addition H initially did not 
appear to have enough room, Robinson suggested that if he held back on installing “certain 
collections” intended for the second floor, Morgan could have the seven large new galleries, 
among the finest in the museum. “Should the idea of utilizing this space for your collections 
appeal to you, as I earnestly hope it may, the installation could be regarded as a temporary one, if 
you so desire,” Robinson wrote, “and we could look forward to providing still more ample 
quarters in a future extension, with plenty of time to plan for the most effective display of the 
collections, having the objects before us to study and arrange for.”208 
The next day, Robert de Forest wrote to Morgan on the same issue, specifically the idea 




angling for. De Forest cautiously approached the subject about how, where, and when the 
addition would be built, as well as how to finesse the situation with the city administration. 
I cordially endorse Robinson’s suggestions, unless in your judgment the occasion 
of your bringing your collections to the Museum can and should be made a reason 
for the city’s building another extension. I remember your suggestion about 
utilizing that opportunity of having the city build our southwest wing. If we could 
certainly get this wing built as a result of such an inducement, without exciting 
opposition on the ground of park occupancy, I should say by all means do it; but 
after conference with Cadwalader (the only trustee with whom I have ventured to 
speak on this subject), I ought to express his judgment and mine, that any 
proposed extension on that side at this time, before the opposite northwest corner 
had been occupied, would be likely to excite opposition and be too patent a move 
to occupy space.209 
 
De Forest thus suggested that Morgan diplomatically approach the city officials about the reason 
for a northwest wing while not letting the construction interfere with the delivery and temporary 
installment of his collections in Addition H. “It may be that this would be too large an 
expenditure for the city now to commit itself to,” de Forest warned.210 
 Around two weeks later, Morgan’s private secretary wrote to de Forest, quoting Morgan 
in a cable he had just received. “‘Inform Robert W. de Forest – ‘Your letter, also Robinson’s, 
received. Will it make any difference if I wait until I reach London middle of May as important 
consult lawyers there before final decision. My inclination is strongly carry out your 
suggestions.’”211 Robinson wrote optimistically that the cable was “certainly most exciting as 
well as agreeable,” and included details about the McKim, Mead and White adapted plans for 
Addition H.212 A week later, Morgan cheerfully cabled Choate a message which was distributed 
to the trustees, most probably acknowledging their birthday greetings to the board president: 





 One month later, with no word from Morgan, Robinson cabled him in London to ask if 
the museum could expect a decision soon, as delaying the plans was becoming difficult.214 
Morgan’s reply came the following day:  
MY WISHES AND INTENTION UNCHANGED BUT IT IS VERY 
COMPLICATED AND CANNOT BE DECIDED SO SUDDENLY BESIDES 
WHICH I SHOULD FEEL VERY MUCH EMBARRASSED IF MUSEUMS 
PLANS WERE INTERFERED WITH BY MY DECIDING OTHERWISE 
LATER THEREFORE THINK YOU HAD BETTER GO AHEAD AS YOU 





Still optimistic, Robinson cabled back, thanking Morgan for his message and stating that they 
would proceed with the original architectural scheme but that plans could be modified easily 
later.216 
 By November, Morgan was proceeding swiftly with government bureaucracy and 
corresponding with William Loeb Jr., the Collector of the Port of New York, about the 
importation of his art collection, asking if the cases could be opened at the Museum, “a public 
institution upon which many million of dollars have been spent by the city Government.”217 
Three days later a better proposition was on the table: Franklin MacVeagh, Secretary of the 
Treasury, had agreed to send an inspector from New York to London to examine the cases as 
they were packed. “I am greatly interested as a citizen in the coming of your great collection, and 
it will give me sincere satisfaction to render all permissible official assistance to importations by 
which the entire country is to be eminently benefited,” MacVeagh wrote.218  
 Thus, in February 1912, the shipments started to arrive, and Loeb observed Morgan’s 
wish that the importation be kept confidential for security reasons.219 As the cases began to fill a 




indeed arriving in New York, but that the trustees had no knowledge of what Morgan’s further 
intentions were. While it would be a “pleasant dream” for the Museum to house the collections 
permanently, the museum had “no such space now,” he added.220  
 In fact, the city was not taking the hint, and appropriations for a new wing of any sort did 
not seem to be immediately forthcoming. Once again, recalling the Sunday issue, the conflict of 
municipal ownership of the museum building versus its trustee-supervised collections was 
proving complicated. Although editorials abhorred the notion that taxpayer money should be 
spent on buildings in which Morgan could “parade his wealth,” Morgan dismissed his friends’ 
advice to consequently “enrich a museum somewhere else” and allowed his patience to be tested 
with the Metropolitan.221 Was the museum’s installation of the Morgan Collection to be a 
monument to the man or to some of the finest products of human civilization that he had 
collected? Was this gift to the City of New York to come at too great a price for city officials?  
As “vanloads” of Morgan’s artworks continued to arrive, no provisions were being made 
for a space in which to exhibit them. Most of Morgan’s treasures were lying in the basement of 
the Museum in their packing cases, “apparently unwanted by the city administration,” Satterlee 
reported. In late spring Morgan washed his hands of the matter and went off on his yacht, and 
spent a month “entertaining and being entertained.”222  
 Then in late November 1912, Morgan informed Robinson that he had no intention of 
giving his collection to the museum. Whether he was merely putting pressure on Robinson and 
the museum trustees to make a more concerted effort with the city is unclear, but his tone had 
changed. Morgan was intending to sail for Egypt in January after the Congressional committee 
hearings. He apparently wanted to tie up loose ends—or at least to get some action.223  




Friday, November 29, 1912, Mr. Morgan sent for me to come to his Library, and 
told me that he wished it distinctly understood by the City authorities and 
whoever else ought to know of it, that he had no intention of giving or 
bequeathing his collections to the Metropolitan Museum. He said that the value of 
these collections at the present time was about fifty million dollars, and he 
regarded this as much too large an asset to take out of his estate in case it might 
ever be needed. He wished me to confer with Mr. de Forest as soon as possible, 
report to him what I had been told, and decide with him what was the best method 
of making this known to those concerned. He said further that he did not wish the 
City to grant the money asked for this year upon the understanding that it was to 
be devoted to the permanent housing of his collections, and then learn afterward 
that the collections were not to become the property of the Museum.224 
 
Morgan clarified that it was his understanding that the city money was to go towards the general 
purposes of the museum alone, and in any event, the request had been made before he resolved 
to consolidate his collections in the United States. This was the first time Morgan had expressed 
his intentions definitively. 
  According to Satterlee, the Hearst newspapers had opposed the appropriation 
consistently and “no one took the trouble to circulate petitions asking the Board of Estimate and 
Apportionment to set aside the necessary money,” he grumbled.225 In fact the New York 
American at one point had feared the collection would go to Hartford, Morgan’s birthplace.226 
Morgan supposedly was thinking about his collection enriching the future city of New York, 
according to the tabloid as well as his son-in-law.227 In fact, it was Morgan who had changed the 
policy of the museum away from becoming a “mausoleum” for wealthy donors and towards its 
artistic integrity as a public space, with galleries organized by genre as opposed to by collector. 
The museum under Morgan was no longer interested in restricted benefactions, so it was not 
entirely consistent that he would demand separate galleries in the Metropolitan for his own 





There were other things on Morgan’s mind. Two weeks earlier, Pujo was back in 
Washington to reconvene his “money trust” investigation, and was set between November 25 
and December 20 to take testimony from “every prominent American financier”; Morgan of 
course had been asked to appear.229 By November 20, the date had not yet been set for his 
testimony, although the city tabloids for months had been continuously implicating Morgan’s 
complicity in trust dealings of all stripes that yielded huge profits for him and his cohort. The 
hearings sent rumbles through Wall Street, where a “drastic liquidation” occurred on December 5 
amid rumors of an investigation of the stock exchange and anticipated repercussions from 
antitrust initiatives. Morgan was reported to be ill, and the Wall Street “bears” were predicting a 
calamity if his health weakened further.230 
Morgan, a man accustomed to getting his way, at least publicly was growing impatient 
with the museum and with the situation in general. But in truth, the museum trustees and even 
the city were more forthcoming with him in private than the public record recorded. With new 
proposed laws potentially taxing his estate and restricting his business ventures, and with the 
museum and the city not enthusiastic enough for Morgan about his enormous gift, perhaps the 
time had come for him to consider the importance of his legacy to his family rather than to New 
York City. At a second meeting with Morgan in late December, Robinson revealed that he had 
“every assurance” from individual members of the Finance Committee of the Board of Estimate 
of an imminent appropriation for the wing. “I asked if he was willing to tell me what his 
intentions were in case the money were granted,” Robinson wrote. “He replied with some 
vehemence that whether the money were granted or not, nothing whatever was to be done with 
any of his things for an indefinite time, and until I received further instructions from him 




cases for any reason whatever with the exception of his paintings, for a temporary exhibition of 
which he had already given consent.”231 With the matter still unsettled in January 1913, Morgan 
sailed for Egypt and Europe for an extended absence and empowered de Forest to perform his 
duties as president.232 Two months later, while traveling in Rome, Morgan died. 
It turned out that Morgan’s wealth, in fact, was considerably less than that of Frick, 
Harriman, George F. Baker, or Andrew W. Mellon, and not even close to the richest men in the 
world, Andrew Carnegie and John D. Rockefeller, Sr. Morgan, it seemed, had spent almost 
everything he earned on his art collections, valued at approximately $60 million. Although many 
important works and objects from the Morgan collection did wind up at the Metropolitan 






“The Spirit of the Parvenu”: Enter Otto Kahn 
 
 
Otto Hermann Kahn had a voracious appetite for the arts, but his great love was opera. Born in 
1867 in Mannheim, Germany, to a cultured bourgeois family, he inherited a serious knowledge 
of music and literature and a scorn for those with less sophistication. Indeed, the extended family 
was as passionate about culture as about business—a new breed of parvenu that was anything but 
philistine when it came to the arts.1 
Moreover, there was an even more important aspect to cultural patronage: the Kahns 
were Jewish, and the national theater in Mannheim, a European artistic center, did not share the 
bigotry of the banking house. Artistic venues with a need for new money in the face of waning 
aristocratic sponsorship allowed Jews an opportunity to mix with an otherwise segregated elite 
society. New audiences enlivened creative activities and embraced new settings for recitals and 
literary discussions. Staged in affluent private homes, performances became occasions for 
musicians and artists to mix with politicians, intellectuals, writers, and people in society.  
 By contrast, in supposedly more democratic New York, “The Four Hundred would have 
fled in a body from a poet, a painter, a musician, or a clever Frenchman.”2 Artists, like art, were 
for display, not friendship. In Mannheim, Kahn’s aunt, Bertha Hirsch, was hostess of the best 
salon in the city. Celebrities in society and the arts mixed freely in her home, one of few places 
where Jews could easily mingle with Gentiles.3 The assimilated Kahn family considered itself 
nonreligious and German, yet others still identified them as Jewish.4 Sophistication and fluency 
in the arts could transcend this social barrier; success in business alone could not. But the limits 




 German Jews, more so than their Eastern European brethren, were typically cultured, 
educated, and experienced in trade and commerce. Similarly, in England, some of the wealthiest 
of them rose to noble or parliamentary ranks along with other self-made men of the late 
Victorian era. There, financiers could be bestowed with noble status faster and in greater 
numbers than industrialists.5 Otto Kahn entered that world in 1888, when he began working in 
the important London office of Deutsche Bank. 
 Of possibly equal importance to Kahn was the cosmopolitan cohort he encountered at 
another aunt’s Edwardian London home, which made his Aunt Bertha’s Mannheim salon look 
provincial. Elizabeth Eberstadt was married to George Henry Lewis, a noted (Jewish) financial 
and criminal solicitor who was knighted in 1893, elevated to baronet in 1902, and made a 
commander of the Victorian Order in 1905. Friend to the king and known as the lawyer in 
London, he was the only solicitor whose name ever became a household word, and was said to 
know the secrets of every family in the British peerage.6 The Lewises welcomed painters, 
sculptors, musicians, actors, writers, lawyers, and politicians; and an invitation from Lady Lewis 
was entrée into “a social milieu at once fluid and eclectic.”7 According to John Juxon, George 
Lewis’s biographer, Elizabeth Lewis was free from the “society” obsession with rank, while her 
husband’s association with the Prince as well as with financial and political personalities saved 
the couple’s parties from the “bitchery and narcissism” to which creative types were prone.8 But 
these were no mere temperamental artistes: among Kahn’s Aunt Betty’s friends were James 
McNeill Whistler, Edward Burne-Jones, and John Singer Sargent, who painted her portrait.  
W. S. Gilbert and Arthur Sullivan came to the Lewis home, as did Thomas Hardy, Henry James, 




 In 1893, the same year that Kahn became a British subject, he was sent to New York on a 
temporary assignment with Speyer & Co., a great dynastic financial firm that rivaled the 
Rothschilds’. Echoing the financial circumstances that had brought August Belmont to New 
York over a half-century earlier, 1893 marked the beginning of an economic downturn in New 
York that lasted for four years and would keep Kahn from returning to his adopted homeland. 
For an ambitious financier, this was not necessarily bad, for the city presented him with a range 
of financial, romantic, and cultural opportunities.  
 At the time, the Speyer firm was engaged in a familial conflict as James G. Speyer came 
of age and pushed out the non-family partner, William B. Bonn, who had run the New York 
office. Speyer proceeded to alienate other experienced firm partners as well as some of the 
leading bankers of both London and New York, among them J. P. Morgan.10 Kahn was caught in 
the middle—a factotum that was neither mover nor shaker, working for a company whose upper 
management was increasingly unsettled.  
 Love saved the day. In January 1896, Kahn married the daughter of Abraham Wolff, co-
founder and partner of Kuhn, Loeb & Co., a leading Wall Street firm. Despite private hesitation, 
Jacob Schiff, the bank’s senior partner, acquiesced to Wolff’s request that his new son-in-law be 
given a position as partner.11 Because of other even deeper generational and marital alliances in 
the firm, Kahn ultimately always maintained a somewhat junior role, regardless of his abilities. 
Nevertheless, soon after Schiff reorganized the Union Pacific Railroad in 1895, he placed his 
new junior partner on its board of directors. In this capacity, Kahn was flung into a complex and 
highly lucrative venture, and became acquainted with another board appointee,  
E. H. Harriman. Twenty years older than Kahn and a corporate giant, Harriman became a Kuhn, 




becoming the controlling force behind a national railroad empire.12 Kahn’s allegiance to 
Harriman was important in business. It also helped that Kuhn, Loeb and its partners were 
becoming enormously wealthy as major bankers to the railroad industry.13  
 Harriman’s Anglo-Dutch lineage qualified him to be a “Knickerbocker,” although a 
catastrophic fire and 1830s financial uncertainty depleted the family fortune before Harriman 
rebuilt it a half-century later. Although he was a member of the “right” clubs and knew the 
“right” people, Harriman was a bit of an outsider—neither new money nor old—and his 
contentiousness both in business and social affairs did not ingratiate him to local social elites.14 
The conundrum of New York’s social life was that neither money nor birthright alone could buy 
status in a world based on subtle distinctions and manners.  
Harriman recognized a kindred spirit in Kahn, and took him under his wing. At that time, 
the ultimate social ban was directed at persons of Jewish descent during the nineteenth century.15  
A culture of exclusion defined the parameters of a developing class, creating not only class 
cohesion but class distinction. Jews were simply not welcome in the upper reaches of 
mainstream “society.” 
Unfortunately for Kahn, elite New Yorkers, as with Britons, thought of Germans 
primarily as Jews. And unlike the London sophisticates that Kahn encountered at his aunt’s 
eclectic salon, New York’s fashionable society did not include Jews of any sort. Freed of this 
stigma while in England, Kahn was back where he started when he came to New York. This was 
partly because America’s Gentile elites, as self-sufficient capitalists, did not need financial help 
from Jewish bankers, as did the British aristocracy.16 
 Yet on occasion in New York, the Jew and Gentile joined business forces, sometimes in 




particular, ethnic ancestry became irrelevant, and “the best houses of Wall Street took healthy 
pride in their self-regulatory, gentlemanly codes of behavior.”17 The possibility of great profits 
trumped any sort of ethnic parochialism. 
But polite business acquaintances did not mix outside the boardroom, and the 
disconnected sects retreated to their respective clubs and enclaves. And like August Belmont 
before him, Otto Kahn did not want to be part of a separate German Jewish elite, which he felt 
was too German and insular. For whatever reason Kahn felt like an outsider among “Our 
Crowd,” despite the fact that the group included agnostics like himself.18 Unlike Belmont, 
however, Kahn never overlooked the polite hypocrisy that he endured for being Jewish: “A kike 
is a Jewish gentleman who has just left the room,” he reportedly said.19 
 
“A mix of the highest class, thoroughly cultured, and lovers of music…” 
In spite of the relatively fresh social mix that started the Metropolitan Opera House in 1883, the 
theater was founded on a distinctive premise of division, much as the Academy of Music had 
been. The boxholders became stockholders of an entity called the Metropolitan Opera Real 
Estate Company, a new board of thirty-five members formed after a devastating fire gutted the 
building in 1892. That group selected an operating company to perform and determine 
programming in their theater. Evidently, the reigning elite cared more about where they sat than 
what they heard. By 1902, the Met had engaged five principal general managers in just under 
two decades: Henry E. Abbey, Leopold Damrosch, Edmond Stanton, John B. Schoeffel, and 
Maurice Grau.  
In 1903, Heinrich Conried, a Viennese theatrical manager with both creative and 




impresarios of the previous half-century who were more entrepreneurial than artistic, Conried 
was an idealist who had taken over the Irving Place Theatre in 1892, a venue for German drama 
in New York. But receiving neither German nor Jewish financial support, Conried instead 
became a veritable play broker who secured American rights to European productions, which in 
turn funded the money-losing undertaking.21 The theater, however, was “synonymous with all 
that was artistic,” and the German plays were “an intellectual treat,” far from the popular 
lowbrow entertainments that New York audiences frequented.22 Indeed, the Irving Place Theatre 
was considered a semi-educational theatrical laboratory for college students. Conried capitalized 
on this connection, and lectured or had his company perform at Columbia, Harvard, Yale, 
Cornell, Vassar, and the University of Pennsylvania, which conferred upon him an honorary 
degree in 1902.23  
With the Metropolitan Opera, Conried saw a chance to realize his aesthetic ideals without 
risking his own money. He previously had tried to obtain the contract for the Metropolitan Opera 
House in 1886 as a venue for his opera company to perform comic works “in a style surpassing 
anything that has been shown along that line in this country.”24 His ambitions were as grand as 
his proposal—forty musicians, a chorus of sixty, and the best American and European principals, 
and featuring comic opera, a rarity for New York City. The Metropolitan rejected his application. 
Conried tried again in 1902, and began a subscription to raise $150,000 to obtain the Met’s lease 
and management. Among his prime supporters was Henry Morgenthau, the Jewish, Mannheim-
born lawyer, real estate businessman, and American diplomat. Conried already had received 
commitments from Jacob H. Schiff, Ernest Thalman, Daniel Guggenheim, Randolph 
Guggenheimer, and Henry R. Ickelheimer. Morgenthau recognized that all of the men “were of 




Gentile boxholders, he quipped to Conried, “If you could only secure a Mr. Hochheimer and a 
Mr. Niersteiner you would have a complete wine list, but you could never secure the opera house 
through it.”25 The Jewish Conried immediately recognized his naïveté, and asked the diplomat to 
suggest an alternative. 
Morgenthau requested a free hand to carry out a plan, which commenced with a meeting 
with Augustus D. Juilliard and George G. Haven, Metropolitan board members who had the final 
say in the matter of the leaseholder. He then won over younger social leaders to support 
Conried’s application. Chief among them was James Hazen Hyde, the new vice president of the 
Equitable Life Insurance Company. Some of the other associates were Alfred G. Vanderbilt, son 
of Cornelius Vanderbilt II; Harry Payne Whitney, the 31-year-old inheritor of his father William 
C. Whitney’s fortune and husband of Gertrude Vanderbilt; Robert Goelet; Clarence H. Mackay, 
the heir of a silver mining and telegraph fortune; George J. Gould, financier and railroad 
magnate Jay Gould’s son and heir; Eliot Gregory, the artist and writer; and Bainbridge Colby, 
the lawyer and eventual founder of the United States Progressive Party and Secretary of State to 
Woodrow Wilson.26 Vanderbilt and Whitney joined Conried’s board after the first meeting, an 
indication to the press of the desire of young millionaires “to stand as patrons of operatic art in 
New York.”27 More aptly, the addition of a few younger members of the Gentile boxholding 
entity clearly served to buttress the religiously mixed group, which also included Jacob H. Schiff 
and James Speyer by 1905.28  
Despite some misgivings, the board of the Real Estate Company unanimously awarded 
the lease to Conried on the strength of his artistic reputation and financial backing.29 His group 
also was able to pay for a storage facility, taking that responsibility out of the Real Estate 




refurbishment of the stage. Conried managed to merge high culture with crass commercialism in 
an inoffensive and highly effective way that did not give the opera house’s snobbish leaders a 
moment’s pause. While Conried’s distinguished theatrical career had earned him an Order of the 
Crown from the German emperor, an Imperial Franz Josef Order from the Austrian emperor, and 
honors from American and many German universities, in the end, his contract was all about 
money.30 He boasted to the press that he had received so many offers of support from subscribers 
that he easily could have raised $1 million. But “only $150,000 is required by the Metropolitan 
Opera Company,” he said.31 
Before Conried’s trustees met for the first time, Schiff, pleading lack of time, bowed out, 
but not before suggesting that his young business associate, Otto H. Kahn, replace him.32 Finally 
able to show off his sophistication, free of being the junior partner, and with judgment suspended 
on his Jewishness, Kahn energetically presided as chairman of the first meeting of the Conried 
Metropolitan Opera Company on March 5, 1903. He nominated Conried for president, Hyde and 
Morgenthau for vice presidents, and William H. McIntyre for secretary and treasurer. Rounding 
out the five-member executive committee was Kahn himself.33 Within the resulting Metropolitan 
operating company, Kahn was to mix with a new generation of rich, cosmopolitan New Yorkers 
who were willing to challenge the plutocratic and aesthetic disparities at the opera house.”34   
Aside from the chasm between the house and the company, there were occasional 
differences of opinion about particular singers, or repertory, or conductors, in addition to the 
lingering anti-Semitism of the Real Estate Company board. Yet something innovative and radical 
happened with Conried’s new trustees: they were formidable financiers as well as opera 
aficionados. They were, plainly, the real estate company’s equals. Never before had the operatic 




innovation and operatic performance, commencing in November 1903 with the legendary Enrico 
Caruso’s American debut in Rigoletto.35 The original board “wine list” had become a more 
diverse group consisting of young and old, Gentile and Jewish, and new money and old—all 
emblematic of the diversity at the top of Manhattan’s society. This board in time would usher in 
the modern era, sustaining both the Metropolitan Opera Company and its theater, and decades 
later, consolidated both interests.  
Conried was a maverick that comprehended that the culture of the Metropolitan Opera 
House was not merely musical, but social. “I have been so busy,” he said to the Times, “that I 
have not had time all day to eat a square meal. It is all the time shaking hands, and when I walk 
through the Park everybody stops me with congratulations.”36 His commitment, however, was to 
excellence. In the next five years, Conried put in a new ceiling and chandelier and replaced the 
old drop curtain with one divided in the middle for ease of curtain calls.37 Conried also 
modernized the house’s theatrical machinery to include an elaborate switchboard to manipulate 
stage lighting; a safe “fire” machine that made use of steam and electricity; and reinforced the 
stage with trap doors so unique “that nowhere in America could the proper parts be found.”38 His 
proposal to alter the boxes’ lighting was met a little less enthusiastically. According to 
Morgenthau, he unsuccessfully fought the box holders’ demands to be kept illuminated 
throughout the performance; finally they agreed to install red shades over the lights.39 At least in 
this case, social concerns trumped the artistic.  
Conried, like both sets of trustees, had international ambitions for his company. Over 
Richard Wagner’s family’s objections, he produced the opera Parsifal at the Met, in spite of the 
late composer’s hesitation to have it performed anywhere but Bayreuth. “Here’s my chance,” 




and who will never get to Bayreuth.”40 The demand for seats to Parsifal was unusually high, 
even by Met standards. The lavish six-hour opera, not part of the regular subscription series, cost 
twice as much as the Bayreuth production: it featured new costumes, selected by Conried himself 
and executed by Viennese artists; an expanded orchestra; and a new ballet troupe imported from 
Europe. Although the house was packed at each performance, the gross receipts did not cover the 
costs.41 Meanwhile, Morgenthau claimed that he alone “made over a hundred people happy by 
securing seats for them.”42  
The Parsifal premiere was a triumph. December 24, 1903 was not Christmas eve, but 
“Parsifal night” in New York, and the two-block area around the Metropolitan Opera House was 
lined with crowds, carriages, cabs, and reserve policemen from the Tenderloin Station.43 “The 
eyes of the whole musical world were turned upon this performance,” said the Times. “In many 
of its aspects it was one of the most important and significant musical events that Americans 
have been concerned with.”44 It capped Conried’s reputation as a daring opera manager worthy 
of a distinguished company in a great city. Opera in his hands became a transformative 
experience for New Yorkers. In spite of the opera’s entertainment value, it was still high art. 
That same month, Conried announced that the superstar diva, Nellie Melba, soon would 
sing at the Met.45 The directors of the Company were ecstatic, and passed a resolution 
commending Conried’s “splendid executive and artistic ability in the presentation of grand opera 
in New York.”46 The Met’s international reputation was now secure.  
*** 
In 1904, a little over a year after Morgenthau approached James Hazen Hyde with his 
Conried plan, Hyde consolidated control of the opera company board and marginalized his 




were left as the only Jews among the directors of the Met operating company.47 Like Kahn’s 
business mentor Harriman, Hyde was less concerned with Kahn’s ethnicity than with his refined, 
cosmopolitan, aesthetic, and artistic sensibilities, which Hyde shared.  
Hyde’s ascent in business had been swift. When his father died in 1899, the new Harvard 
graduate inherited a significant block of the Equitable Life Assurance Society’s stock. As 
chairman of the Equitable’s executive and finance committees beginning in 1902, Hyde 
controlled a complex investment portfolio.  Otto Kahn had entered his orbit not only through the 
Met, but also through various Wall Street dealings and directorships.48  
 Hyde, however, was known less for his professional or cultural interests than for his 
personal overindulgence.49 Much as the Vanderbilt family’s social ascension began with Alva’s 
1883 ball, a little over two decades later, a similar event given in honor of his debutante niece led 
to James Hazen Hyde’s downfall.50 
 It was an “eighteenth-century costume fête” at Sherry’s on the last day of January 1905. 
Hyde himself was attired in the formal costume of the New-York Coaching Club:  bottle-green 
coat, red waistcoat, black knee breeches, black silk stockings, and pumps. For decorations, the 
École des Beaux Arts-trained architect Whitney Warren converted one of the elegant restaurant’s 
ballroom floors into a garden scene at Versailles, and the other into a large stage, constructed and 
designed, along with scenery and a curtain, expressly for the evening.51 The ball began around 
10:30 pm with a Louis XVI dance. Later, in the theater, a ballet performed by dancers from the 
Metropolitan Opera company was followed by a play written for the occasion. Adjourning again 
to the Versailles room for supper, the guests found grass on the floor, gilded tables electrically lit 




 Indicative of Hyde’s eclectic and daring tendencies, his guests were an intergenerational 
combination of New York high society, social standing, and culture. The Astors, including their 
doyenne, were there, as were the Belmonts, Stuyvesants, Cuttings, Goelets, Havemeyers, Iselins, 
Livingstons, Van Cortlandts, and Vanderbilts, among many others. Most of the board members 
of the Metropolitan Opera Real Estate Company and the Conried company were there. Franklin 
D. Roosevelt was there, celebrating on the day after his twenty-third birthday. And so were Mr. 
and Mrs. Mortimer L. Schiff and Mr. and Mrs. Otto Kahn, in apparently their first important 
New York social event.  
Jewish names were still rare in New York social columns. Until 1905, Kahn appeared in 
the press only in reports of business and railroad deals, or in connection with Jewish benevolent 
organizations, or as a supporter of the horse show in suburban Morristown, New Jersey. But 
Kahn’s Jewishness did not stand in the way of an invitation to Hyde’s party. 
Also among the mix of attendees were those whose social standing was achieved by 
entrée through the larger cultural world. Among them was Frank Crowninshield, the critic and 
founding editor of Vanity Fair; Edith Wharton; Ralph Pulitzer, publisher of the New-York World; 
the architects Charles Follen McKim and Stanford White; the theatrical and literary agent 
Elisabeth Marbury and her companion, the decorator Elsie de Wolfe; and the American diva 
Lillian Nordica. 53  
Ending at seven in the morning after three separate suppers, the ball was deemed one of 
the most “original entertainments” of the winter.54 Hyde was spared public attacks along the 
lines of those after the notorious 1897 Bradley Martin ball because his publicists had cast the 
evening as a “cultural event.”55 But it was more than that. Indeed, it was different from the stale 




Astor invited six hundred members of society. The Times noted that for the first time in years, 
few guests went to the ball directly from the opera; many went to private dinners elsewhere 
beforehand. At Mrs. Astor’s, there was “very little change as to decorations or lists of guests 
from year to year.”56 The formerly arriviste Vanderbilt family now had been attending for over 
twenty years, and many who went to Hyde’s ball later that month were at Mrs. Astor’s as well. 
But there was a marked difference in style and substance to the Hyde party that felt more like a 
changing of the guard than a challenge to unseat it. 
Within days the rumors began that Hyde had spent $200,000 of Equitable’s money to pay 
for the event, resulting in a New York State investigation of the entire insurance industry. It did 
not help that Hyde already was in the throes of a company power struggle with president James 
Waddell Alexander, which came to a head at the Equitable board meeting a little over a week 
after the ball. Alexander attacked Hyde, accused him of “open, aggressive and misguided” 
misuse of his stock control, and berated his penchant for “recreations and enjoyments of a more 
or less public nature, which is exceedingly harmful to the company.”57 Alexander also 
condemned Hyde’s self-indulgent lifestyle, casting aspersions on his ability to be a responsible 
insurance company head.58 
It was open season on Hyde. Even the press in other cities joined the smear campaign. 
The Boston Daily Globe described Hyde as the “New York Exquisite”: meticulously dressed, 
fond of floral arrangements in his home, a passionate supporter of coaching, and a great friend to 
theatrical celebrities and foreigners. In other words, Hyde was an effete, dandified dilettante. 
“With his Henry III beard, his lustrous brown eyes and his carefully curled pompadour, he is 
known everywhere. He speaks in a low, cultivated voice that approaches effeminacy, and his 




More aptly, he was not in the least bit deferential to antiquated social standards, and was 
equipped with the means and spirit to defy convention not only in his choice of friends but also 
in his choice of cultural philanthropic endeavors. 
Nevertheless, after proving that he indeed had paid for both his ball and his indulgences 
out of his own pocket, Hyde resigned from his position in June 1905, and spent a good part of 
the rest of his life in Europe. He maintained his relationship with the Metropolitan Opera as a 
foreign board representative until 1910, and participated in other American cultural ventures, 
while remaining a strong supporter and close friend of Otto Kahn’s. Around two decades later, in 
an introspective moment after visiting Hyde in Paris, Kahn acknowledged the depth and 
importance of their friendship: “I have never forgotten, and never shall forget, your attitude to 
me in olden days, when you had much to give and I little, when you were a power in the land and 
I was at the beginning of my career. It is always a sincere joy to me to see you again, and a 
genuine satisfaction to observe with what wise, true and rare recognition of real values, you have 
tackled the problem of arranging your life.”60 Constitutionally indifferent to social convention, 
Hyde had opened doors for Kahn, and in so doing, ushered in a new era of Metropolitan Opera 
board participation. 
Ultimately, Kahn’s cultural involvements were boundless. He recognized it as his calling 
“to become a militant force in the cause and service of art, to be foremost in helping to create and 
spread that which beautifies and enriches life.”61 Moreover, he seized upon the fact that art had 
the ability to transcend national, ethnic, or even social boundaries, and so, too, might artistic 
patronage. Kahn funded the opera as well as theater, film, dance, and classical and jazz music, 
and his social circle expanded into the nascent “café society” of the modern post-WWI era. 




among these stars and celebrities, but more interesting was what this crowd meant to postwar 
modernity: they constituted a new internationalist elite. By comparison, the emissaries at 
Europe’s financial commissions were ineffectual, predictably plain and dull, lacking the wit, 
fashion, or excitement of the art world.”62 
 
A New Theater 
By 1906 Kahn was an important member of Conried’s Metropolitan Opera board, and, along 
with some of the same affluent New Yorkers he had encountered at the opera, he turned his focus 
to a new project, the New Theatre, modeled on the Comédie Française, the French state theater 
in Paris. The scheme evolved much as the Met’s plan had: for an idea originated by Conried, the 
financial outlay was steep ($50,000 per investor to the original capitalization) and the founding 
motivation was controversial. But finally, with this project, Kahn was an acknowledged leader 
among its organizers.  
The New Theatre’s mission was both lofty and paradoxical: a privately supported 
“national” theater for the production of dramatic plays, both classic and contemporary. 
Engrossed in the project, Kahn allied himself with the few founders who truly knew the theater, 
Hyde and Eliot Gregory in particular. Even as they enjoyed a comfortable social standing, Hyde, 
in his self-imposed European exile, and Gregory, a cultural sophisticate but hardly super-rich, 
were outsiders among the mainstream of New York society, among other reasons, because they 
were aesthetes.63 So, too, was Kahn, who was socially marginalized as a Jew. When the New 
Theatre venture opened up to boxholders, the Times reported that for $25,000 a box, members of 
the Metropolitan Opera set like John Jacob Astor IV, August Belmont Jr., E. H. Harriman, J. P. 




What made the New Theatre endeavor noteworthy was that the surviving record 
explicitly details the manner in which Jews were regarded, handled, and excluded. Here Kahn 
walked a fine line. Reporting to Hyde in Paris about how the new board was being assembled, 
Eliot Gregory explained that Clarence Mackay, the (Catholic) president of Commercial Cable 
Company, proposed an incorporation plan that was “all rot,” primarily because of its liberal 
attitude towards Jews.65 “We all want just what he does,” Gregory noted about the project in 
general, “but think our way the only practical one as his way would let all the Jews in town into 
the thing and they would swamp it in no time and work us all out.”66  
 Kahn, however, was on the inside of this equation. He may have been an important 
member of the Conried Metropolitan Opera board, but he still did not sit in his own box, 
evidently because he was Jewish. But in the New Theatre, Kahn was “the soul of the thing,” 
according to Gregory, and calling the shots, determining how many Jews could be included.67 
 Gregory described the “Jew Question” in detail in one of his many letters to Hyde 
regarding the early planning of the theater:  
The Jew question came up point blank the other day at our meeting before Kahn. Cravath 
said “We might as well face this Jew Question now as later.” Kahn said “Gentlemen I 
have not the same predudice [sic] that you have against Jews as I am one, but I agree with 
you that for the success of this enterprise It will be better to have only one or two boxes 
sold to jews [sic].” ! That ended the matter. Schief [sic] and Speyer and Kahn will be the 
three Jews and we will stop there. Firm.68  
 
It was one thing for a devil-may-care insider like Hyde to mix with Jews. It was quite another for 
Kahn to do the same; ultimately, he went so far as to exclude his own former boss, James 
Speyer, whom he hated, and whom Gregory referred to as “that beast.”69  
Located at Central Park West and Sixty-second Street, and built at a cost of $3 million, 
the New Theatre was touted as the most expensive theater ever erected in New York City.70 Its 




the monumental, civic aspirations of the venture, with a grand colonnade and five entrances 
facing Central Park, a large vestibule with two staircases, a smaller theater in addition to its main 
stage, a roof garden, and a restaurant.71 Its name (which Gregory noted “even the difficult Mrs. 
Wharton” liked) expressed its intended purpose as a “new departure in that line.”72 
Although its mission was “for the sake of art only,” the non-profit theater’s larger 
altruistic cultural spirit, as well as the relative novelty of its mixed leadership, were both 
engulfed by its inappropriately large size and the very notion of a prominent horseshoe of boxes, 
which seemed to some to be a regrettable reprise of the social controversies played out at the 
Metropolitan Opera House and the Academy of Music before it.73 In this sense, there was 
nothing new about the New Theatre. Its artistic mission was hardly innovative. And the 
auditorium was not a space created for the intimate style of modern drama and acting. Moreover, 
the conflicting agendas of serious high culture and conspicuous social display here did not 
coalesce at all. The project suffered from a cultural lag that was out of sync with modern times, a 
new theater operating both socially and architecturally under an old protoype.74 
Walter Prichard Eaton, writing in the Atlantic Monthly, had few kind words for the 
project. “In its scheme of highly privileged support, its utterly undemocratic horse-shoe of 
founders’ boxes, around which the auditorium has in reality been built, it is a direct product, 
almost a copy, of conditions pertaining to that fashionable and exotic pastime of the very well-to-
do,—grand opera.”75 The Times concluded, “the construction of the temple itself, with plenty of 
private boxes for the elect and exclusive, is clearly the dominating idea of the promoters.”76 This 
clearly was not what Kahn and his cultured cohort had in mind.  
 They might have been well advised to heed the lessons of the “opera wars.” Exclusivism 




national theater was expected to be democratic, the New Theatre appeared to have lost its way in 
the planning stage. Plus, the site was too far from the theater district to draw any but the most 
avid theatergoers. In an editorial, the Times derided the New Theatre leaders as a group of 
dilettante gentlemen with “few of the required qualifications” to lead the undertaking, “except 
wealth, abundant leisure, observation of theatrical proceedings in Europe, and such knowledge of 
art as may be acquired by contemplation of it.”77  Critics were oblivious to its board’s relatively 
radical ethnic social distinctions. “The founders of the New Theatre are chiefly men financially 
interested in the Metropolitan Opera House and pillars of its social prestige,” Eaton stated.78  
Worse still, after the novelty wore off and the boxes went empty at performances, the founders 
were perceived as having had little interest in theater in the first place.  
*** 
 Was this what Conried had in mind when he proposed the undertaking? By 1906, the 
director, prone to emotional outbursts and obnoxious behavior, was falling out of favor with his 
board and former supporters. On one hand, the New Theatre founders were funding and leading 
the enterprise; on the other, Conried was at least initially the creative force behind it, and placed 
himself “center stage” when speaking to the press.79 According to Gregory, Conried had been 
“getting himself into constant hot water” and had a personality that grated on most people’s 
nerves.80 Oblivious in private to the theater’s populist cultural mission, Gregory wrote that it was 
important to the New Theatre founders that the press understood that they were “founding a 
theatre for ourselves, and not for him [Conried],” although apparently Conried’s initial plan had 
included Morgenthau and some of the people from his original opera “wine list” as supporters.81 
It always fell to the diplomatic Kahn to keep Conried in check, something he did masterfully. 




heel in the most wonderful way.”82 Gregory was under the impression that Kahn was helping 
Conried financially, which softened the blow of his admonishments. Kahn, Gregory, and Hyde 
(behind-the-scenes in Europe) were already discussing getting a director from Paris who could 
take his place the moment Conried “got too fresh.” Kahn informed Conried that “he had better 
not be one of the Directors.—to which C. reluctantly agreed,” Gregory outlined.83 The “sad and 
humbled” “Herr Directeur” was being marginalized by his boards in the gentlest manner by 
Kahn: “Kahn has managed Conried beautifully having stolen his idea, taken his land, chucked 
out his friends, wiped him off the list of Founders, and at the same time kept his [sic] in a good 
humor,” Gregory surmised.84 
 In the end, Conried was too controversial and clearly too busy for the New Theatre. 
While still holding down the Metropolitan Opera directorship as well as the management of the 
Irving Place Theatre, here was yet another theatrical venue, this one with lofty artistic 
aspirations, free of commercialism. But he also knew from his opera experience that money and 
commercialism both were the proper ingredients for success. While the Sun questioned the 
appropriateness of Conried for the New Theatre position and furthered the rumor that he would 
retire from it after its proposed opening in fall 1908, the Times supported him as the “best man in 
sight” to direct its affairs.85 
 In 1906, the Metropolitan Opera Real Estate Company renewed Conried’s contract for 
only three years and not the five he had requested, and issued a reprimand for performances that 
they felt had fallen “far below” the standard.86 Eliot Gregory deemed this “unfair and untrue,” 
and condemned the musical tastes of the Real Estate Company’s leaders. Twombly, Mills, 
Haven, and the unnamed other who passed judgment on Conried were “about as musical as four 




to hate him,” Gregory noted.88 The opera company board didn’t appear to like him much either, 
and, according to Gregory, omitted his name on the new opera lease, calling the organization the 
“Metropolitan Opera Company.”89 It again fell to Otto Kahn to play the diplomat, and meet with 
Haven, after which the Real Estate Company withdrew its complaints about Conried. In fact, his 
management had been excellent and his notices glowing, so much so that Gregory was glad that 
the incident occurred to deflate Conried, who “was getting a head the size of a balloon.”90 
 
“Salome” and the Spirit of the Parvenu 
After his usual summer break in Europe, Heinrich Conried returned to New York in fall 1906, 
refreshed and brimming with enthusiasm for the upcoming season, promising the most 
successful and elaborate performances of grand opera ever presented in the city. He had engaged 
internationally renowned singers and conductors, and was “very sanguine of artistic success.”91 
But his real coup was in obtaining the American rights for Richard Strauss’s new opera, Salome, 
which was causing a sensation in Europe, and which he scheduled to be performed that winter in 
New York. 
 The opera was based on Oscar Wilde’s controversial play taken from the Biblical tale of 
Salome, who, after performing a sensual dance at her stepfather King Herod’s request, asks for 
and receives the head of John the Baptist as compensation. Forbidden from performance by the 
censor in Vienna and condemned by the German emperor, the opera premiered in Dresden in 
December 1905 before an audience of musicians, actors, managers, and critics “from every 
civilized country.”92 It received a twenty-minute ovation, and was deemed a monumental artistic 
and musical achievement, on a level with Richard Wagner’s greatest works.93 Conried had seen 




colleague was overwhelmed by the experience, and “considered it a duty to present it in New 
York.”94 Sembrich herself was less effusive about the modernist score, “a chaos of 103 
instruments playing in different keys at the same time, while the singers sing—beg pardon—
screech—in other keys.”95 She found the work interesting, although far from beautiful. But 
Conried was willing to stake his reputation on the sophistication of New York audiences, to 
whom he owed it, as director of its world-class opera company, to introduce the most important 
and distinguished existing operatic fare. 
 Anticipation of the New York premiere generated the same sort of fanfare Parsifal had 
aroused during Conried’s inaugural season. Expecting frenzied interest in the work, a New York 
publisher issued an analytical guide to Salome months before the event.96 New York Times music 
critic Richard Aldrich foresaw a bold new operatic form that by all accounts would transcend the 
bounds of musical art, “something that twenty years ago, ten years ago even, would not have 
been accepted as music at all.”97  
 In fact, musical aficionados agreed that the first official American performance on 
January 22, 1906, was perhaps one of the most remarkable operatic achievements ever 
accomplished in the United States.98 The singers and orchestra had mastered the “stupendously 
difficult” music, and Strauss’s cerebral, complex score was “dazzling, thrilling, overpowering, 
often beautiful, but at all events, wonderfully expressive of what he aimed to express.”99 It was 
an unprecedented musical experience. “The listener is captured, whirled along, dominated by it. 
The composer imposes himself by sheer intellectual power and the endless resources of his 
technical devices and compels submission.”100  
 Acknowledging the opera’s potential for controversy among boxholders, the Conried 




flocked to buy tickets. Even with higher prices for the performances, the premiere was sold 
out.101 Additional policemen were required to handle the crowds.102 Quite apart from the music, 
the opera’s sensational features—which in addition to the dance also included a long aria in 
which Salome caresses and kisses the severed head—“brought a throng of men and women such 
as no previous opera has drawn to the Metropolitan.” The audience even bought the libretto to 
follow along.103 At the performance’s conclusion, as the audience filed out silently into the night, 
“many faces were white almost as those at the rail of a ship, many women were silent, and men 
spoke as if a bad dream were on them.”104 This was no ordinary opera. 
 Four days later, Conried and his board received this message: 
Dear Sir: The Directors of the Metropolitan Opera and Real Estate Company 
consider that the performance of “Salome” is objectionable and detrimental to the 
best interests of the Metropolitan Opera House. They therefore protest against any 
repetition of this opera.  
By order. FRANK N. DODD, Secretary.105 
 
The censure came as a surprise. Quite apart from the fact that a number of the opera’s reviews 
had been tempered with moral outrage, for the first time since its inception, the Met’s Real Estate 
group was taking issue with the performing entity over something programmatic. Kahn and the 
Conried directorate had given the Metropolitan Opera Real Estate Company ample time for both 
input and protest during the planning stages of the production the previous year. One director 
also had sent copies of Wilde’s play to all of the members of the Real Estate board, so that they 
would be conversant with the libretto before hearing the performance.106 Why protest now? The 
action “by the real backers of opera in this city was hardly expected,” according to the Times.107 
 Apparently, one of J. P. Morgan’s daughters was present at the premiere, and, disturbed 




the Real Estate Company directors went along with Morgan and demanded that any future 
performances of the opera be canceled. 
 There was an uproar as critics pointed out that it was inappropriate to judge music or art 
by moral or religious standards. How would the standoff between the two Metropolitan Opera 
boards be resolved? Salome was the talk of New York, the theme of conversation in the 
restaurants, and along Fifth Avenue and Broadway, and even in church, where two or three 
opposing directors met by accident.109 One operagoer suggested that the opera’s libretto was no 
more controversial than various others. But because of the publicity, many boxholders who had 
never before perused a libretto had read this one. More librettos had been sold for one 
performance of Salome than for four performances of any other premiere. “If the boxholders 
knew what they were seeing on the stage at some presentations of opera they would probably be 
just as squeamish,” the operagoer suggested.110 
 Olive Fremstad, the star of Salome, regarded Strauss as “the creator of a new form of art, 
which was to lead to greater things, and that it would be a step backward to discontinue the 
performance of the opera.”111 Anton Van Rooy, the production’s John the Baptist, chuckled at 
the provincial reaction of some of New York’s leaders. “Europe will never get over laughing at 
America if this work of art is taken off the stage.”112 The musical director agreed. “If the opera is 
not produced again it will not hurt the opera, but it will be a set-back to musical art in America,” 
he said to the Times.113 To the Tribune he admonished, “Certainly the musical taste of the New 
York public is sufficiently advanced for the house to put aside its prejudices and give a thorough 
hearing to a work of art which has been received with enthusiasm in all the continental 




arrogant “spirit of the parvenu” embedded in American cultural naïveté was what was really 
behind the censorship: 
The “Salome” incident would be ridiculous if it were not so sad. While living in 
Germany I fancied, that narrowmindedness [sic] had reached its limit in the Royal 
Prussian Censor, but I am astonished to find that the “old country” is far more up 
to date than this new world of liberty. 
 The intervention of the Metropolitan Real Estate Company Directors is the 
business part of the affair, and consequently paramount to the average American. 
But more important and very significant seems to me to be the lack of feeling for 
art manifested in the attitude of the Metropolitan Directors. 
 I would like to hear an informed and informing authority—The New York 
Times, for example—discuss the real reasons for the non-production of 
“Salome”—whether it is the spirit of the parvenu, the lack of understanding to 
distinguish between works of art and works of sensationalism, whether it is 
simply the craving to attract attention by all means, or whether there are really 
men who honestly think they have a right to protect the morals of their fellow-
citizens.115 
 
 Richard Strauss was “amazed” by New York’s reaction.116 As he noted: “In art there is 
never the moral nor the immoral; such conceptions are incompatible with the conception of art; 
are foreign to it. In art there is only good and bad. Is an artist’s work good art? Is it bad art? 
These are legitimate questions and these the artist must face and answer.”117 
 Recognizing the cultural debate and seizing an opportunity to upstage New York as a 
cultural center, leaders in Boston and Chicago ridiculed the censorship in Manhattan. The 
manager of the Boston Theatre said, “I have never received so many requests for an opera so far 
in advance as I have to-day for ‘Salome’.”118 Mayor Fitzgerald was more circumspect. “If the 
opera is considered unfit by the managers of the Metropolitan Opera House to be performed in 
that playhouse, it will hardly come up to the standard for Boston.”119 However, Milward Adams, 
the manager of Chicago’s Auditorium Theatre, saw no reason “for striking out” objectionable 
material.120 In a slap to New York’s alleged refinement, the Met’s musical director himself 




Philadelphia, and one in Kansas City, St. Louis, Milwaukee, Cincinnati, St. Paul, Minneapolis, 
and Cleveland.”121 
 Immediately upon receiving the Real Estate group’s letter, the executive committee of the 
Conried company, consisting of Kahn, H. R. Winthrop, and Conried, met for almost two hours 
on January 26. Conried’s representatives then issued a formal statement to the press reminding 
the Real Estate Company, as well as the New York public, of the opera’s distinction as perhaps 
the most important work since Wagner. Salome had been produced in the Royal Opera Houses of 
Dresden and Berlin, as well as in Milan and in Turin, Italy, and was currently in preparation for 
productions at the Imperial Opera House in Vienna and the Grand Opera House in Paris.122 Thus 
New York, with aspirations to be America’s cultural capital, was the logical place for the opera’s 
first American venue. 
 Meanwhile, Kahn defended the production to the Metropolitan Opera Real Estate 
Company in a letter offset printed for widespread distribution.123 Written in Kahn’s elegant and 
instructive style but signed “Conried Metropolitan Opera Co.,” it laid out a defense of the opera 
and an argument for its continuation.124 It began: “Strauss’s Salome is recognized by the 
consensus of the most competent critics of modern music as a monumental work, probably the 
greatest which musical genius has produced in this generation,” and restated that it had been 
performed in twenty European cities, including many of the foremost Court Theatres, where a 
strict standard of censorship prevailed.  
 In essence, the letter deigned to explain to the Real Estate directorate the meaning of the 
art form that they had supported for decades.  “It is commonplace to state that the libretto of all 
operas is a subordinate feature, and that what people go to hear is not the text, but the music.” 




and beautiful character” whose death at the behest of Salome is duly punished with her own swift 
execution. Far from defending Oscar Wilde’s play, however, the Conried group implored with 
emphasis, “the opera should be judged as a musical, not as a dramatic work.” 
 Speaking as one group of cultural leaders to another, the Conried board reiterated that the 
enthusiastic reception to the work in Europe, “where its performance everywhere was considered 
a musical event of the first magnitude,” prompted them to bring it to New York. The Real Estate 
board had made no objection during the many months of rehearsals. “It was not until three days 
after the first performance, and two days after the public announcement of the additional 
performances, and when a large sale of tickets had already taken place, that your protest reached 
us,” the letter politely complained. 
 Diplomatically, they broached the subject of the considerable financial loss that the 
suspension would cause, as well as the possible litigation which its withdrawal would involve. 
Of course, the letter commended the Real Estate board for erecting the opera house in the first 
place and “by establishing for it an unparalleled prestige and position, by insisting from the 
beginning upon the highest standard of operatic performances and by making financial sacrifices 
year after year to maintain the opera during the long period when grand opera in New York 
meant loss and disappointment.” Ever so subtly, the comment asserted that grand opera was alive 
and well under Conried’s company leadership, and urged the Real Estate board to allow the three 
additional performances for which tickets had been issued to proceed. 
 On January 30th at the office of the Real Estate Company board president, George G. 
Haven, the two boards met. The interrelationships of both assembled boards were intriguing. 
Haven, a banker, was by his own admission “not of a musical bent” but was a prominent 




existence.125 Also on the Real Estate board, Augustus D. Juilliard, a textile manufacturer, 
investor, and philanthropist, clearly was of a “musical bent,” and upon his death in 1919 willed 
most of his estate to the cause of the advancement of music in New York and the United States. 
William K. Vanderbilt, no longer considered an arriviste interloper, had been a major force in 
building the opera house and was still enormously wealthy. August Belmont was the son of the 
Academy’s August Belmont, with serious opera house management pedigree. And then there 
was J. P. Morgan. A dominant force in corporate finance and industrial consolidation, he was a 
prominent collector, patron, philanthropist, and president of the Metropolitan Museum’s board. 
 Representing the Conried side, Henry Rogers Winthrop, the board president, was a 31-
year-old banker, stockbroker, director of the Equitable Life Assurance Society, and clearly part 
of the Hyde cohort. Rawlins L. Cottenet, a 41-year-old relative by marriage to Mrs. Astor and 
member of “the 400,” had lost the family fortune and become the proprietor only of a society 
flower shop. But he nevertheless remained a part of New York society’s inner circle, and had 
been a guest at the 1900 wedding of Morgan’s eldest daughter Louisa (the same daughter who 
had objected to Salome).126 James Speyer and Otto Kahn had a complicated history, as Kahn had 
worked for Speyer’s family’s banking business early in his career. Recently the two had been 
embroiled over the founders’ list for the New Theatre. Kahn had negotiated behind the scenes to 
keep Speyer out of the New Theatre leadership cadre, and while Speyer was aware of Kahn’s 
influence in that matter, he also was under the impression that it was J. P. Morgan who had 
blackballed him.127 Kahn and Speyer often were singled out as the only Jews involved in such 
high cultural endeavors, and yet they were far from personally allied. Interestingly, the only 




uncle had been of the original founders of the opera house. Yet it was Kahn and Goelet who 
were the designated speakers at this important meeting, with Kahn taking the lead. 
 Consequently, it was a fairly congenial assemblage, with deep connections and 
allegiances between and among the two boards. But Kahn, clearly aware of the possibility of his 
being accused, as a Jew, of religious insensitivity, reiterated that Kaiser Wilhelm, although head 
of the Protestant Church in Germany, had withdrawn his objection to Salome, and that the opera 
was now under production there.128 Kahn implored the directors to “see their way clear to 
permitting the production of at least the three announced performances” as advertised. After 
Goelet “added a few words to the same effect,” the Conried company representatives were 
dismissed.  
 Following a “very full discussion,” the Real Estate board took the narrow road and 
resolved unanimously to cancel Salome.129 There would be no more performances of the opera, 
although the board was willing to consider its part in compensating for the financial loss. 
 When the two groups conferred again a week later, Kahn and Goelet were joined by 
Edmund L. Baylies, a Conried board member and a socially prominent Vanderbilt lawyer.130 
Kahn noted that the cost of preparing and producing Salome came to “at least $30,000,” and 
given the heavy advance sale of tickets for the three announced performances, the gross income 
would have produced no less than $50,000.131 In short, it was a “noteworthy loss,” particularly 
following the destruction of all of the company’s scenery in the 1906 San Francisco earthquake, 
while on tour.132 While defending Salome, the Conried board nevertheless withdrew it from 
performance “not because our views in this respect had undergone any change,” but in deference 




 But then, without warning or any apparent pressure, the Conried faction capitulated 
further, concluding “it would not be consistent with the spirit of our contention, or the dignity of 
our position, to let you assume any part of our loss.”133 One week later, on February 15, the Real 
Estate board met once again, this time at J. P. Morgan’s library on Thirty-sixth Street. The 
meeting proceeded somewhat casually by ratifying actions taken at previous meetings, namely 
the addition of a toilet at the Directors’ Room on the parterre floor of the theater. Afterwards, 
they drafted a short letter of response to Conried’s board, accepting its offer to reject liability for 
any proportion of the expenses incurred for Salome.134 And then the subject was closed. 
 Clearly, the Conried board had taken the moral high ground. Kahn’s faction had the 
money to assume the financial loss, thus protecting their continued contract from risk. In any 
event, Salome’s supporters had the last laugh. Three months later, Salome had its premiere in 
Paris. Unlike the New York dress rehearsal, which stirred controversy partly because it was held 
early on a Sunday, the dress rehearsal in Paris was an event of great magnitude. When the 
performance concluded, the president of France, accompanied by all the Cabinet ministers, 
conferred upon the opera’s composer the Legion of Honor. Kahn and his wife were there, as 
were European royalty, members of the Rothschild family, William K. Vanderbilt, James Hazen 
Hyde, James Stillman, Mme. Alexandre Dumas, Edith Wharton and her husband, “and scores of 
others prominent in literature, finance, art, politics, fashion, sport or bohemianism.”135 The 
composer himself conducted, and “the verdict of Paris is that the work is the masterpiece of 
Richard Strauss, and is an absolute triumph.” Gabriel Fauré, the director of the French 
Conservatory of Music, called Salome “the only musical drama that Germany has produced since 




New York’s social and cultural leaders look like country cousins, not metropolitan sophisticates 
in a world city.  
 
Transformation 
Conried was already showing signs of stress when the Salome storm hit.137 In November 1906, 
his star, Enrico Caruso, was arrested and convicted of pinching the buttocks of a woman in the 
monkey house of the Central Park Zoo. Conried bailed out the weeping tenor and stood by him 
through the press maelstrom, but Caruso suffered an apparent nervous breakdown, or possibly an 
attack of sciatica, that confined him to his bed.  
 In January 1908 Conried finally was forced out. Conried’s threat to rally his supporters 
had come to naught as Kahn implied that resignation was preferable to termination.138 Claiming 
ill health publicly, Conried privately settled his claims against the opera company for $75,000, 
payable in four installments until January 1912.139 With characteristic politesse, the Real Estate 
board commended Conried on his standards for grand opera and complimented his five 
“brilliant” seasons.140 The impresario may have elevated the standard of the opera house to the 
levels to which it had always aspired, but the ultimate significance of the effort was lost on the 
narrow-minded bigots of the Real Estate board. 
 In October 1908, Kahn, now chairman of the Metropolitan Opera Company, recognized 
the twenty-fifth anniversary of the theater with a letter to the Real Estate board. Reprising some 
of the complimentary language from his Salome letter, Kahn commended the board for its 
financial and moral support “in the face of many difficulties during the period when Grand 
Opera in New York meant loss and disappointment.” Obviously, Kahn was allying his own 




world: “It was the personal weight and standing in the community of the founders of the House, 
as well as their wisdom in insisting from the beginning upon the highest standard of operatic 
performance which has been most largely instrumental in establishing for the Metropolitan 
Opera Company its unique prestige and distinction amongst the Opera Houses of the world.”141  
 Now officially independent of Conried in name and in fact, the Metropolitan Opera 
Company engaged a general manager, Giulio Gatti-Casazza, the first to function not as an 
independent impresario, but as an employee under contract to the Opera Company board itself. 
He was of towering artistic merit, and his first action was to hire Arturo Toscanini as his chief 
conductor, who shared the post with Gustav Mahler, who previously had been engaged by 
Conried. Gatti-Casazza would preside over the Metropolitan Opera until 1935, as it grew to 
become one of an undisputed handful of leading opera companies in the world.  
 Both behind the scenes and center stage, Kahn was the central figure in this 
transformation. By 1916, he was a majority shareholder in the Metropolitan Opera Company 
with 706 shares. William K. Vanderbilt was the next most powerful shareholder with 340, 
followed by Clarence Mackay with 300. Whitney now had 100 shares; Winthrop, 48; Robert 
Goelet, 4; and Griswold, 2.142 With grace and tact, Kahn had led a revolution. At least in the 
surviving record, the power shift occurred with little fanfare.143 
 Leadership, however, came at a price. In his over two decades of chairing the board, 
Kahn would be seldom absent from the monthly meetings that often met without a quorum.144 
Nevertheless, Kahn reveled in the task of monitoring and reinventing the Metropolitan Opera 
Company along standards of excellence, guaranteed by Kahn-funded loans. In the first 




the spokesman who outlined ambitious plans to continue “all the best features of previous 
administrations” while instituting important reforms on both sides of the proscenium.  
 Most unusual, however, was a move into the Real Estate Company’s territory with a 
consideration of improvements to the house, including an additional exit, enhanced ventilation, 
and an elevator to the family circle, all to add to the comfort of “the upper galleries.” In 
uncommon recognition of the opera-going “other half,” the management acknowledged that “the 
success of its aim to make the Metropolitan Opera a broad National music institution is in no 
small part dependent upon the support and co-operation of that portion of our music-loving 
population which cannot afford to purchase expensive seats, and every effort will be made to 
secure their good will, not only by the excellence of the performances, but also by giving 
evidence of the management’s earnest desire to extend to them every courtesy and 
consideration.”145 The Metropolitan Opera was becoming less of a social barometer and more of 
a cultural one.  
 The change in leadership was initiating a new way of thinking, framed along more 
populist principles. The opera company announced that all surplus profits from the opera season 
would be devoted to the establishment of an endowment and pension fund to further advance the 
Metropolitan Opera as an art institution.146 No longer merely a rich man’s pastime funded at the 
whim of a few New York families, opera was achieving a significance of a much broader 
context. 
 It still took money, though. According to the Metropolitan Opera’s official history, 
between 1898 and 1929, every season but one was profitable except for 1906-07, when the Met 
was faced with competition from Oscar Hammerstein’s Manhattan Opera Company.147 The 




February 1909 that the company might borrow from Otto Kahn and William Vanderbilt “such 
sums of money as they, or either of them, shall be willing to advance.”148 In May, the board 
authorized the chairman or treasurer to borrow for the corporation significant amounts (totaling 
$140,000) from three different banks, even while the Real Estate Company had agreed to spend 
only up to $20,000 of its own funds for a suitable rehearsal room and stage on the roof of the 
auditorium.149  
 Operation in the black, in fact, depended upon Kahn’s largesse. The Metropolitan Opera 
Company was, in Gregory’s words, “cheerfully losing $10,000 a week” with Kahn unofficially 
covering losses that amounted to  $200,000 in 1908-09 and $250,000 in 1909-10.150 By January 
1910, the Opera Company had a plan to fundraise “for the proper carrying on of business,”151 
and began with the stockholders of the Real Estate Company, to whom they intended to broach 
the question of a larger subsidy for Metropolitan Opera productions.152  
 Contrary to the Real Estate Company’s belief, building the theater was only a small 
portion of the enterprise, and the Opera Company was seeking ways to assure the company’s 
survival as well as supremacy. Meanwhile, the Real Estate Company pragmatically minded its 
own investment in the theater. Writing to Kahn in 1914, its president, George G. Haven, 
privately assessed the relative value of some proposed changes to the theater. He stressed that 
improvements financed by the Real Estate Company would add nothing to the value of the Real 
Estate Company’s property, as the house, “except for the purpose for which it is used, is and will 
be of no value.”153 Where did responsibility lay for renovations, if they benefited only the opera 
company that performed there and not the entity that had built the theater?  
 Sustaining the Metropolitan Opera’s dominance was costly indeed. Oscar Hammerstein’s 




repertory (including a production of Salome), quality stars (including the Met diva Nellie 
Melba), and an independently wealthy impresario (Hammerstein).154 To carry on its primacy, the 
Met formed two companies that performed 361 times in just over seven months in 1909-10.155 
Squelching Hammerstein’s effort successfully required quality performances and sound financial 
management, not to mention serious legal expertise. Even then, Hammerstein did not go away 
quietly.156 In the end, in April 1910, Hammerstein signed a deal with Kahn and his board for 
$1.2 million to cease producing opera in New York, Boston, Philadelphia, and Chicago for a 
decade.157 
 Clearly financial issues were prompting new ways of thinking. While attending to the 
expense of competing with Hammerstein, the Opera Company had absorbed the Salome loss and 
was implementing expensive changes associated with the new post-Conried management 
philosophy. In 1910-11, for example, they restricted the numbers of free tickets given to various 
critics; replaced the grand tier boxes with seats; withdrew from some agencies that offered the 
public subscription tickets; and raised the price of orchestra seats by 20 percent.158 As early as 
1901-03, the Met’s music librarian, Lionel Mapleson, was making live recordings of 
performances on his Edison cylinder machine.159 In January 1910, experimental broadcasts 
transmitted portions of Tosca and Cavalleria Rusticana and Pagliacci from the roof of the opera 
house, reaching a few hundred listeners from as far away as Newark, New Jersey.160 It would be 
decades later before recording contracts and matinee broadcasts would prove lucrative for the 
Met, but this was an innovative start.161  
 In August 1911, returning to New York after a European absence, Otto Kahn told the 
New York Times that the Metropolitan Opera now had no equal anywhere. “In Europe, the 




York, and that some of the best performances are given here.” Every night was a “festival” 
performance. “I say this with all due modesty and with the full belief that it is the public as well 
as the management which has brought about this condition of affairs,” Kahn concluded.162  
 Kahn’s assessment was no mere boastfulness. The years from 1908 until April 1917 were 
important for the American opera company as well as the opera house, which hosted the 
legendary Russian ballerina Anna Pavlova in 1910. That same year, the Opera Company 
premiered Frederick Converse’s one-act The Pipe of Desire, the first American opera and first 
opera in English at the Met; Giacomo Puccini selected the Met for the world premiere of his new 
opera, La Fanciulla del West; and Engelbert Humperdinck, composer of Hänsel und Gretel, 
staged the world premiere of his work Königskinder.163 The year 1913 witnessed even more 
important premieres, with the first American performances of Modest Mussorgsky’s Boris 
Godunov and Richard Strauss’s Der Rosenkavalier.164 
 
Paying Off Debts 
On December 27, 1917, Kahn was the only director present at a special Metropolitan Opera 
Company meeting at his office at 52 William Street, to allow the issue and sale of additional 
shares in the Opera Company, in order to increase its authorized capital stock and permit 
payments of proceeds to relieve its indebtedness.165 Without a quorum, the meeting reconvened 
the following day with only the Metropolitan Opera employees Edward Ziegler and Earle R. 
Lewis present, and the remaining directors represented by proxy. Holding three and two shares 
respectively in the company (donated by Kahn), Ziegler and Lewis were empowered to take 
action to increase the Corporation’s capital from $150,000, or 1500 shares at $100 per share, to 




action to the other directors present.167 Essentially, he was calling for a few directors to step up 
to the plate and settle debts through a new subscription of 3636 additional shares. Of these 
shares, Kahn purchased 1826; William K. Vanderbilt, 1285; Clarence H. Mackay, 275; and 
Harry Payne Whitney, 150.168 Combined with the old shares, however, this left Kahn with a total 
of 2527 shares in the Metropolitan Opera Company and Vanderbilt the next most influential 
stockholder, with 1625. 
 Why did Kahn choose to own half the shares in the company? Perhaps it was not just out 
of his unceasing devotion to the Metropolitan Opera, but because of the Great War. With battles 
raging on the Western front, anti-German sentiment was widespread in the United States, and the 
Metropolitan Opera dropped all of its performances in German and canceled German singers’ 
contracts at the close of the season.169 Kahn may have been a cosmopolitan New York City 
aesthete and a British subject, but he was still German by blood. And he also was Jewish. 
 In the nineteenth century, sophisticated German Jews had been more easily assimilated 
into the social whirl of New York City. But the rising tide of immigration after 1890 swept new 
Russian Jewish stock into the mix in large numbers and with such force that social distinctions 
between German and Russian Jews blurred. A clear stereotype emerged by the 1890s. In 
American popular culture, the Jew was caricatured as a bearded, hook-nosed peddler or 
pawnbroker named “Cohen” or “Jake” or “Abie,” pushing a cart, wearing a black derby hat, and 
dressed in either old, worn clothes or something new and flashy.170 Pushcart peddler or Wall 
Street financier, the Jew’s métier was always money, from which he derived his strength and 
influence. Yet there was a tension between the impressive way in which Jewish citizens seized 
upon the bootstrappish, enterprising American energy of the Gilded Age and the negative 




of American culture, anti-Semitic attitudes were often covert and usually blurred by a lingering 
respect,” explains John Higham, historian of late nineteenth-century American anti-Semitism. 
“Many Americans were both pro- and anti-Jewish at the same time.”171 
By the 1890s, three different groups had emerged as particularly anti-Semitic: certain 
agrarian radicals of the Populist movement; members of the poor Gentile urban underclass; and 
patrician Protestants such as Henry and Brooks Adams, Henry Cabot Lodge, and Henry 
James.172 For this last group, the economic collapse and depression of the 1890s were causing a 
social catastrophe, and the Jew was “both the symbol of a materialistic society and an agent of its 
destruction.”173 In “a society of Jews and brokers,” Henry Adams wrote in 1893, “I have no 
place.”174 Or, in Robert Goelet’s words, “the old order changeth.”175 Goelet’s grandfather, his 
uncle, and father had been founders of the Metropolitan Opera House. But by late 1917, of the 
over five thousand total shares of Metropolitan Opera Company stock, Robert Goelet owned 
only four.  
 Meanwhile, the long-standing practice that no Jew could own a box at the Metropolitan 
Opera continued. J. P. Morgan was a “principal champion” of this unwritten law.176 Thus, Kahn 
had to witness performances from a rented parterre box or from the lowly vantage point of the 
orchestra stalls, where he often purchased several seats for each season, reserving one for his hat 
and coat.177 For Kahn, the invincible financier, urbane sophisticate, mastermind of railroad 
mergers and the New Theatre alike, and enthusiastic philanthropist, no social slight could 
diminish the intensity of his passion for opera. 
 On May 9, 1917, George Henry Warren chaired the first meeting in five months of the 
directors of the Metropolitan Opera and Real Estate Company. Thirteen men were elected as 




Juilliard took over the chair and the meeting continued as the secretary read a letter from Warren 
requesting the transfer of half of his interest in Box 14, or 150 shares, to one William Hall 
Walker, the 71-year-old retired Eastman Kodak executive.179 
 Historically, the transfer of shares or the sale of a box was a pro forma action in which 
the boxholder or boxholder’s estate would request in writing a transfer of interest either to a 
family member or to an appropriate acquaintance, and over the decades the Metropolitan Opera 
Real Estate Company approved such requests uneventfully. Why was this circumstance 
different? Warren was a member of the executive committee, and his family had owned a box at 
the Met from the theater’s very inception. Warren now was hoping to give up half of his interest 
in the box to Walker, who had a home in New York City but mostly lived lavishly on his estate 
in Great Barrington in the Berkshires. There were several members of the “Golden Horseshoe” 
who were at least as prosperous and socially acceptable. 
 Yet Juilliard proposed that Warren’s request vis à vis Walker be laid on the table, 
“because of the lack of acquaintance of the Directors present with the candidate for transfer.”180 
Warren pushed the board to take action on his request in order for him either to close with 
Walker or to seek another purchaser. The transfer request was denied.181  
 The following month, the Real Estate Board met again, and President Juilliard asked the 
Board’s permission to dispose with reading of the minutes of the previous meeting, “which were 
somewhat lengthy.” The meeting progressed with a noteworthy resolution. George Warren now 
proposed Otto Kahn for the box transfer. Warren, reduced to 150 shares, moved to Box 13, 
leaving all 300 shares in Box 14 for Kahn to purchase.182 A historic barrier to Jews holding 




with nary an official mention. In fact, Kahn’s name had come out of nowhere, for there was no 
indication in the minutes of his desire or intention to join the boxholding set. 
 Without a record of the discussion or even a more than passing acknowledgment of the 
event in Kahn’s voluminous archives, one can only speculate about what happened. To the Kahn 
biographer Theresa Collins, the “standard notion” that Kahn decided to “crack” the anti-Semitic 
wall is fraught with contradictions, given his long-standing ambivalence as a Jew.183 Was the 
purchase the Real Estate Company’s choice or Kahn’s? It seems uncharacteristic for Kahn to 
have pushed for it purposefully, yet his growing generosity to sustain the opera was well known. 
Perhaps the box served as a token of appreciation for Kahn’s role in making the Metropolitan 
Opera one of the best in the world. Or perhaps the Real Estate Company recognized an 
embarrassing situation. After all, Jewish or not, Kahn had been on the Metropolitan Opera 
Company board for almost fifteen years, and other members of the Real Estate board had had 
dealings with him professionally on banking, finance, and railroad boards, as well as in other 
cultural ventures.184  
 Possibly Juilliard, acting alone or with a small group, simply seized the opportunity and 
manipulated the discussion and its outcome. The sale of a parterre box had come up only about 
ten times in the long history of the Metropolitan Opera, and Juilliard, the president of the 
Metropolitan Opera Real Estate Company, may have seen fit to extend the privilege to Kahn, the 
president of the Metropolitan Opera Company.185 It is not that Walker, the Kodak executive, was 
an inappropriate choice to be a Met boxholder; it was just that Kahn, the monumental arts patron 
and financier, had been neglected for too long. George F. Baker, who proposed the Kahn 
resolution, was close to Juilliard and was a towering commercial financier.186 Considered the 




respected for wise judgment.187 And although Augustus D. Juilliard’s business was in drygoods 
and textiles, he had amassed an even greater fortune through his investments in the banking, 
railroad, and insurance industries. His passion, however, was for music.188 Presiding over the 
Real Estate Company at last was a man who understood that it was the music more than the 
theater that gave the Metropolitan Opera its greatness. It was time to set aside old prejudices to 
give credit where it was due to Otto Kahn. 
 Maybe it was this act of relative generosity that motivated Kahn to take even firmer 
control of the Opera Company later that year. Evidently it did not make much of a difference, for 
he funded the opera uncomplainingly and received little public credit for it in his lifetime. In any 
case, the social authority of the old Golden Horseshoe was fading with the century that had borne 





The Spirit of the New Humanism 
 
 
As the new century progressed, the founding library, museum, and opera trustees aged and died 
as their institutions coped with social, economic, and political change. Inspired and sometimes 
even galvanized by a new humanistic spirit, a new type of leader steered the programs. As 
president of the library trustees, Lewis Cass Ledyard was the most conservative of the cohort. 
Even so, he supported a plan that recognized the cultural diversity of the city and the library’s 
users, and negotiated the labor demands of the largely female staff. But while he was reticent and 
almost aristocratic about fundraising, his brand of elitism also was incongruously unpretentious. 
Similarly, at the museum, the modern-leaning William Sloane Coffin succeeded the progressive 
Robert de Forest as president, and promoted a populist agenda that conserved money and 
resources even as the museum broke into innovative new territory. And as Otto Kahn advanced 
the idea of building a new opera house, the old guard resisted, unimpressed with his arguments 
either for a state-of-the-art stage or for a more egalitarian box system. After Kahn, the 
pragmatically detached lawyer Paul Cravath, helped by the passionately democratic Eleanor 
Belmont, led the insolvent Metropolitan Opera. But even as a new age beckoned, conservative 
forces still lingered. Much as the opera’s Real Estate Board guarded their archaic turf, the elderly 
George Blumenthal assumed the presidency of the museum after Coffin’s death with great 
financial efficiency but, like Ledyard, with firmly entrenched nineteenth-century tastes and 
attitudes. 
 As had been the case for over a half century, finances had the power to shape institutional 
agendas. But by the 1930s, this no longer meant philanthropists with unlimited funds rising to 




but rather focused on directing their money specifically towards more concentrated projects. But 
as the spirit of the times and the technological revolution of radio offered the masses greater 
access to abstract ideas and high culture as well as popular entertainment, institutions, in turn, 
looked to smaller donations in greater numbers to carry on their programs. A public sort of 
privatism emerged by necessity with the modern era. 
 Part Three ends with the endurance of the three institutions through a precarious time, 






“We can do our little part while we are here”:  
Towards a Modern Library 
 
 
In the early years of the twentieth century, progressive library pioneers like John Shaw Billings, 
Melvil Dewey, and John Cotton Dana were committed to a new kind of democratic service. 
Previously, librarians had kept books safe in the stacks instead of in the hands of readers. The 
new attitude was that books were a stabilizing force in a changing and more fluid society, with 
the library functioning as a kind of people’s university.1 Billings was a follower of this 
movement. As a nineteenth-century gentleman of science and letters with a twentieth-century 
view of librarianship, in just under two decades as the first director of the New York Public 
Library, he carried out many tasks.2 By the time he died in 1913, the Central Building was 
complete; the consolidation of the Astor, Lenox, and Tilden holdings with the circulating 
libraries was thoroughly accomplished; the research collections had more than doubled to over 
one million volumes and the circulating collections had more than quadrupled; the total number 
of readers had tripled; there were forty-four branch libraries plus the Central Circulation and 
Central Children’s rooms; and the library circulated a record high of eight million books.3 
 The library had adopted progressive notions not only in terms of institutional efficiency, 
but also where collecting was concerned. These extended into a modernist diversity of people, 
money, and ideas that for the most part the trustees embraced as the spirit of the times. 
 Billings’s death marked the end of a time focused on the unprecedented blending of 
several corporate entities as well as two sometimes-competing notions: combining a Circulation 
Department geared towards book lending and community service, with a Reference Department 
dedicated to reference and research. Not only were circulating libraries thriving, but the 




with the university libraries at Columbia and Princeton ranking distantly behind.4 To those who 
carried on his legacy, Billings had been an extraordinary influence for librarianship with the 
broadest sense of purpose.  
Billings’s successor was his protégé and assistant, Edwin H. Anderson, who continued 
his mentor’s wide-ranging programs. Harry M. Lydenberg assisted both men, and later himself 
became Director. As a “probationary cataloger” at the Lenox Library while still attending 
Harvard, Lydenberg witnessed how Billings had transformed a private, elite book repository into 
a more pertinent resource that addressed modern trends in History, Science, and Technology. 
While Billings welcomed rare books and manuscripts, he made no significant investment in such 
treasures, preferring instead to follow a maxim of “useful research” that set a benchmark for 
collecting with enormous range.5 Billings and his successors viewed reference works not as 
curiosities, but as precious holdings that recognized new forces and ideas while respecting the 
old.6 
During his tenure as Director, Lydenberg continued to embrace programmatic diversity 
and actively acquired unique special collections.7 The New York Public Library had a Library 
for the Blind from 1903, which stocked and produced Braille items, taught people how to read 
them, and circulated the materials postage-free. It had a picture collection starting in 1915 with 
eighteen thousand images, which quickly expanded to many millions. It enlarged Lenox’s music 
collection with a division created in 1919 with funds from Augustus D. Juilliard’s will.8 The 
library also was an innovator, as one of the first to install a Photostat machine in 1912, and to 
experiment with microfilm.9 For five months in 1923-24 Lydenberg visited postwar Europe to 
acquire materials with Avrahm Yarmolinsky, and spent more than half of the time in Eastern 




from that region at the time, leaving the field open for the New York Public Library’s Slavonic 
Division to become a foremost American resource in the subject area.10  
Consequently, by the 1920s, the New York Public Library was among the few American 
libraries in scale (over one million volumes) and variety. The collections were as diverse as the 
city itself. By 1935, there still were only thirteen such libraries in the United States, with the 
New York Public Library second only to the Library of Congress.  
But this sort of radical and decidedly modern way of thinking could not have proceeded 
without an active board of trustees. The irony was that the broadly conceived endeavor stemmed 
from exclusive nineteenth-century entities that were consolidated into a private, nonprofit 
corporation, in turn governed by a self-perpetuating board. Nevertheless, the leaders had set out 
to create a grand public institution of world stature, and in no way fell short of their ambitions. 
No large personalities, with the exception of Carnegie, pushed a personal agenda that was not 
reflective of a broader purpose. 
Nevertheless, within this gentlemanly context, John L. Cadwalader, George L. Rives, and 
Lewis Cass Ledyard dominated the board in the early decades, each eventually serving as 
President. Perhaps only by coincidence demonstrating the balance of commitment and leadership 
among the institution’s initial board of trustees, each had come from a different arm of the 
library’s consolidated entity: Cadwalader from Astor, Rives from Lenox, and Ledyard from 
Tilden.11 These men were born into the educated, cultivated class during the first half of the 
nineteenth century, and Ledyard’s cousin, Edith Wharton, recalled that along with fellow-trustee 
Stephen Olin, they were part of a cohort of nineteenth-century New Yorkers that possessed “a 
cultivated taste.” The larger group’s only weakness, Wharton lamented, was that most of them 




A few were distinguished lawyers or bankers, with busy professional careers, but 
too many . . . lived in dilettantish leisure. The best class of New Yorkers had 
shaken off the strange apathy following on the Civil War, and began to develop a 
municipal conscience, and . . . were active in administering the new museums, 
libraries and charities of New York; but the idea that gentlemen could stoop to 
meddle with politics had hardly begun to make its way, and none of my friends 
rendered the public services that a more enlightened social system would have 
exacted of them.”12  
 
At the same time, Wharton viewed them as part of a new generation which “had at last stirred the 
stagnant air of New York, and in their particular circle it was full of the dust of new ideas.”13 But 
they firmly ceded local politics to men of a different social class. 
Yet many of the trustees in fact did have greater government and civic commitments. 
Cadwalader, who served as chairman of the library’s executive committee during the central 
building’s construction, was a lawyer who had served as Assistant Secretary of State under 
Ulysses S. Grant. Olin was active in the local anti-machine Citizens Union, which endorsed 
Samuel Greenbaum for the New York State Supreme Court, and who, in turn, served as the only 
Jewish trustee on the Public Library board from 1902-30. Rives, also Olin’s law partner, was 
Grover Cleveland’s Assistant Secretary of State; was corporation counsel during the mayoralty 
of Seth Low (and thus an ideal library board liaison); was president of the commission to revise 
the Charter of the City of New York in 1900; and often was put forward as a candidate for 
mayor, which he always declined.14 Other trustees included the statesman and Nobel laureate 
Elihu Root, who held the offices of U. S. Senator, Secretary of War, and Secretary of State; he 
later became the first president of Andrew Carnegie’s Endowment for International Peace. 
A majority of the trustees had in common the advantages of wealth and social 
prominence, and a commitment to cultural, civic, and eleemosynary activities. Indeed, some of 
the richest and most powerful Americans of the time served on the New York Public Library 




John S. Kennedy, Edward King, Philip Schuyler, Payne Whitney, George F. Baker Jr., Vincent 
Astor, and several others. While no Rockefellers joined the board, the family was a major donor, 
and many trustees had ties to their interests.15  
Paradoxically, the New York Public Library trustees, who had the energy and 
imagination to galvanize the public and private support of Greater New York, were 
unrepresentative of the city’s diverse population. While this did not diminish the institution’s 
larger design, it did not acknowledge the library’s overarching public mission. Lawyers and 
bankers on the board corresponded with New York’s role as the financial capital, but no trustees 
professionally represented the city’s growing cultural influence or its manufacturing interests.16  
The organization’s reluctance to welcome city authorities into its leadership cadre had as 
much to do with social control as with any distaste for corrupt politics. These class issues also 
affected the board in other ways. In spite of the city’s large Jewish and Catholic populations, for 
decades there was only Judge Greenbaum and two Irish Americans, one of whom was the 
Archbishop, to represent them. The old Aguilar, St. Agnes, and Free Circulating libraries had 
done better in this regard, and also had included women in the ranks of trustee leadership, but the 
merger with the New York Public Library addressed funds and function, not broader 
management. It was not until the 1950s that women would join the board, and two decades later, 
the first African Americans.17  
Nevertheless, beginning in 1902, the trustees did include three ex officio members from 
the public sector: the mayor, the comptroller, and the president of the City Council. But the 
association always would be uneasy. In 1906, for example, Rives reprimanded City Comptroller 
Herman Metz for publicly accusing Carnegie for not handing over his money for the libraries 




paid up his money faster,” Rives admonished. “The subject you have touched upon is one that 
interests a great many people in all parts of the City, and I hope you will give it very careful 
consideration,” he warned, adding in a peevish postscript: “You are an ex-officio member of the 
Board of Trustees, and I wish you would attend its meetings—or some of them.”18 In 1909, 
however, the trustees fought a bill requiring all corporations on City land to permit five mayoral 
appointees on the board. It “would be detrimental to the interests” that the trustees represented.19 
In any case, ex-officio public servants rarely came to trustee meetings and never participated in 
decision-making.20  
 Even so, Cadwalader, Ledyard, and Rives were steadfast in assembling the best board to 
realize the institution’s enormous goals. Cadwalader constantly protested about poorly attended 
meetings, which compared unfavorably to the Metropolitan Museum’s board, upon which he 
(and later Ledyard) also sat. He noted that the art museum’s executive committee was always 
well represented, there was always a quorum, and few people were ever absent. In Cadwalader’s 
estimation, the only  “deadwood” on the Metropolitan’s board was Bigelow, the New York 
Public Library’s president.21  
A few days before the grand opening of the building in 1911, Cadwalader was focused on 
infusing the board with new blood.22 He complained to Ledyard that Carnegie and Morgan had 
not been to meetings for years “and really ought not to be on the Board,” and other notable 
trustees, namely the Archbishop, Judge Greenbaum, and even President Bigelow rarely attended. 
As the original rationale behind their election had long since passed away, their importance as 
trustees had “distinctly vanished.”23  
Yet at the opening, John Bigelow received the gold key to the building from Mayor 




affirmation that “mental and moral worth in mankind are things of slow growth.” In tortured 
prose, the politician commented, “We cannot do everything in one generation, much less in one 
day, as some of my good friends seem to think. But we can do our little part while we are here, 
and leave something to be done by those . . . who come after us.”24 Unfortunately, there were 
few committed trustees to pick up the baton. “To get a quorum we must make exertions, and I do 
not think there has been a quorum of that Board together more than twice since last May,” 
Cadwalader asserted in April 1911.25 
 After Cadwalader’s death in 1914, Rives, Olin, and Ledyard expressed concern over the 
choices for second vice president, Cleveland Dodge and Judge Morgan J. O’Brien. Dodge, the 
mining heir and president of the YMCA, was “hardly desirable” because of his impulsive “habit 
of expressing opinions without full knowledge of the facts.” O’Brien, who recently had gained 
acquittal for Stanford White’s assassin and state hospital escapee Harry K. Thaw in his insanity 
trial, was to Rives and Ledyard an inappropriate choice for board leadership because his social 
standing and his “outlook on life” were “not quite what we should like to have or are accustomed 
to.”26 He also happened to be one of the two token Catholics on the board, with close ties to the 
Archbishop. Rives more enthusiastically favored either Payne Whitney or Elihu Root for first 
vice president, the latter in particular because of his connection to the Carnegie corporations. 
And heeding the objections of elite intellectuals like Wharton, Rives also mentioned that “it 
might be desirable in filling vacancies to see if we could get someone who is concerned in 
writing books, as well as reading them.”27 But he could not think of a single author whose 
reputation and standing would either justify election or who would possess the desirable qualities 
they sought. Ironically, perhaps the only American writer of the time who might have fit the 




 Although such elitism was commonplace, membership on the Public Library board 
differed from the criteria for admittance to Mrs. Astor’s nineteenth-century ballroom. On 
balance, the Public Library trustees were men who viewed participation on nonprofit boards as 
an obligation.29 In many other cities, mayors or local officials led the libraries. New York’s 
private, non-profit leadership was more public-spirited. Unlike the clannish, self-appointed 
aristocrats of Wharton’s old New York, they satisfied their civic interests and reformist political 
tendencies by participating in cultural endeavors that benefitted the city as a whole.30 In turn, the 
trustees’ high status and financial independence actually helped give the New York Public 
Library an institutional autonomy that advanced its programs with a minimum of public 
intervention.31 
 
Public Library and Private Forces 
By the 1920s, it was evident to the library trustees that building an enormous physical monument 
was but one small part of a continuing process. Maintenance was a larger endeavor financially 
than they could manage single-handedly. From the moment the building opened, expenses far 
exceeded expectations.32 Without broader support it would falter just as the Astor and Lenox 
libraries had.  
In 1911, Cadwalader outlined the complex public versus private nature of the library 
enterprise. There was an essential difference between the support of the Forty-second Street 
library’s reference department and the forty circulation branches’ operations. The central 
building was constructed by the City and leased to the Public Library, and the entire expense of 
its reference library operations was assumed by the trustees, without any significant yearly 




the circulation arm was constructed at Carnegie’s expense, while the cost of its operations did 
belong to the municipal authority. No other city had created public institutions on this peculiar 
model as successfully.33 
From 1912 to 1922, the Library’s endowment rose nearly 50 percent to $15.5 million, 
and with the approximate U. S. per capita income still under $1,000 in 1920, this would seem an 
enormous sum.34 But inflation and costs exceeded the endowment income: in ten years, the 
number of books consulted annually increased 100 percent, from 1.3 to 2.6 million; and the 
annual number of readers increased 200 percent, from around 400,000 to 1.2 million. 
Correspondingly, from 1911-22 the cost of operations increased 113 percent from $424,000 to 
$906,000, and the salary roll increased by 160 percent from $257,000 to $672,000. Hence, 
annual deficits became a regular occurrence as both use and operations rose through the 1920s.35 
Each year, the trustees and friends of the Library made up the budget shortfall, although the 
outside gifts of cash were relatively small.36 In 1930, the Committee to Raise $50,000 fund 
raised $3000; the following year, it received only $700.37 
Ledyard remained the board president until his death in 1932. As a lawyer he was a 
master at finessing the details of large bequests, but as a gentleman from another century 
regarded purposeful fundraising as improper.38 In fact, as a friend and legal advisor to Morgan, 
Payne Whitney, and George F. Baker, and the counsel for the New York Stock Exchange, 
Ledyard was probably right to be reluctant to use his influence to ask for funds for the Library. 
In his letters of acknowledgment, he often emphasized that any donations had been voluntary. He 
expressed genuine surprise when “out of a clear sky, unsought and unsolicited,” Baker, the 
banker, railroad magnate, and library trustee, sent him a check for $10,000 to help cover the 




I mean never to do so,” Ledyard wrote in appreciation.39 But given their enormous wealth and 
their responsibility as stewards of an ambitious enterprise of their own making, trustees’ seeming 
generosity, even on Baker’s scale, was somewhat tight-fisted. 
Nevertheless, that year, with another deficit looming, in spite of his half-hearted 
fundraising, Ledyard did not discourage the overtures of John D. Rockefeller Jr., who confessed 
that he had never been inside the “new” library building. After looking over the Library’s 
financial records, the emerging philanthropist pledged $50,000, the amount the board anticipated 
needing at the end of the fiscal year.40 When Rockefeller paid it in January 1922, Ledyard 
groveled, “Of all the gifts we received none was more truly spontaneous and unsolicited than 
yours, and I cannot tell you how much it means to us to feel that the work itself has attracted 
such generous support.”41 
Ledyard’s words anticipated the spirit of the Library’s great windfall of that year, when 
the trustees Payne Whitney and Edward S. Harkness joined Rockefeller in pledging a total of $6 
million to the Library’s endowment fund for the reference department.42 Even Fiorello 
LaGuardia, at the time the President of the Board of Aldermen, was impressed. “What wonders 
could be accomplished if we could manage our public affairs with the same degree of 
intelligence, efficiency and economy that private and semi-private institutions are conducted,” he 
wrote to Ledyard.43 As extraordinary as the gift was, however, the Library endowment still 
needed an additional $500,000 a year; while there were calls for the public to take responsibility 
for its library, Ledyard feared both the political interference and the legal entanglements. The 
Reference Department thus hobbled along until 1927, when Whitney died and left an endowment 
of $14 million, followed by Ledyard’s own $2 million bequest five years later.44 Even so, while 




$2.3 billion in donations, over $600 million more than in 1921—the New York Public Library 
still was desperate for funds.45  
Indeed, there is no underestimating the value of the time the trustees spent with Library-
related correspondence and in meetings, which were numerous and mind-numbingly tedious. It 
would stand to reason that governing an enormous library system—with its central 
administration building and dozens of branches—would be a complex undertaking. There were 
issues of building the Carnegie branches—with land purchase, dealing with architects and 
contractors, and weighing in on heating and ventilating, plumbing, plastering, and fixtures, 
among other things. There were visitor statistics for the reading rooms, the exhibition spaces, and 
the galleries to mull over. There were issues of the proper use of the Forty-second Street 
building’s steps as a stage for speakers or events, or the legality of whether a booth or newsstand 
could be erected alongside the front entrance.46 The men’s lavatory also was a lively subject, as it 
was a place “often monopolized by degenerate characters and park habitués,” and the facilities’ 
conditions, Anderson wrote, were “almost beyond belief, and could not be described in a 
letter.”47 The trustees spent the better part of 1924 on the issue of whether “nickel-in-the-slot” 
pay toilets could be installed in a public building to alleviate the problem; even Elihu Root 
received a handwritten complaint from an irritated citizen.  
And then there was the staff. In the years before federal social security, the trustees often 
had to intervene personally in individual cases of employee disability, as when R. Fulton 
Cutting, a trustee of several cultural institutions, who also was the board president of the 
Association for Improving the Condition of the Poor, asked Rives and Billings to look into the 
matter of a staff member who had lost his property in a fire.48 This was the down side to 




employees were the trustees’ concern, and not the City’s. Or were they? The delineations 
between private and public, and authority over reference and circulation buildings and operations 
were astoundingly complex. 
In the nineteenth century, library employees with little or no formal training worked 
within an apprentice system. After 1887, when Melvil Dewey founded the first library school at 
Columbia University, the role of the librarian became professionalized.49 The New York Public 
Library had a large staff of small means, but the board never increased salaries. In 1911 
Cadwalader felt that the trustees had “a sort of obligation” to do something for their moral and 
physical wellbeing. Financially, however, while he recognized the “difficulty of living decently” 
with a low salary in the city, he did not do more than hire a staff doctor to determine the health of 
the employees and potential hires.50 
But even as the branch librarians functioned as veritable social workers lobbying for the 
improved quality of life of their neighborhood clientele, they had their own lives and interests to 
look out for. Because they were poorly paid, some staff members formed a union, the first for a 
library in the United States, while a Staff Association formalized more direct employee relations 
with the trustees. The board listened to pleas for more remunerations and a pension system, but 
the branch libraries were the responsibility of the City, and the trustees did not intervene, 
carefully guarding the library’s autonomy even while not-too-stridently forcing the City to 
recognize its commitment. One faction of the library union backed by the American Federation 
of Labor demanded a civil service contract, denouncing the library administration for its lack of 
accountability and transparency.51  
The Staff Association was more conciliatory, and in 1922 reported to Ledyard on the 




publicly aired the tenuous nature of the Library trustees’ accountability to the public authority, 
and vice versa.52 Even so, the staff was roundly in favor of the substance, if not the style of those 
who argued for salary increases. Soon after, Robert Moses, secretary of the New York State 
Association, contacted the president of the Staff Association, and proposed including the Library 
employees in the State Employees Retirement System without being subject to Civil Service 
requirements.53 Ledyard, ever the lawyer, looked over the bill and demurred. Any member of the 
library staff, to comply with the law, would have to be considered an employee of a county or 
city. “Of course, none of them does come within this definition,” Ledyard concluded.54 The 
salaries of the sizeable Reference Department staff came under the purview of the Library, but 
under the Carnegie contract, the City still remained responsible for funding the circulation 
operations—and thus paid these considerable staff salaries. Yet as per the New York Public 
Library Act of 1901 governing the branch libraries, the Library trustees were charged with 
directing, appointing, and controlling employees. Nevertheless, Ledyard and the trustees 
ultimately came out “heartily in favor” of an amendment that would extend the benefits of the 
City Employees Retirement System to the Public Library staff.55 Unfortunately, the bill did not 
pass.56  
This policy had far-reaching implications. With no provision for retirement, older 
librarians refused to step down. Mayor John F. Hylan, notoriously unsympathetic to wealthy and 
powerful private interests, suggested that the staff might look to its “employers”—namely, the 
Public Library trustees—for a pension.57  
The subject of raises and pensions persisted throughout the 1920s. Under protest, the 
board finally distributed itemized salaries to the city, and after being threatened by utility cutoffs 




Ledyard about the library’s situation, explaining how Brooklyn and Queens representatives were 
even more exercised about city interference potentially hurting the library, because the idea that 
private individuals might give money to be administered by a city-appointed board was still 
inconceivable.59 
The mayor, in turn, could be sharp in his dealings with the board. Anderson recalled 
protectively to Ledyard: “After being present at that hearing before the Board of Estimate when 
that fool Hylan tried to insult you, I have never felt that I wanted you ever again to have anything 
to do directly with City officials.”60 But to run the Library, the board could not avoid cooperating 
with the City.61 Meanwhile, the Staff Association remained understandably confused about 
where authority lay vis à vis a pension fund. Many believed the large Whitney bequest was 
intended to serve the whole library, including the Circulation Department, and thus could easily 
finance a pension fund as well.62 Ledyard reminded staff and potential donors alike that the 
Whitney money was earmarked for an endowment for the Reference Department, and was 
unavailable for the Circulation Department or for any sort of  pension.63  
 
A New Era 
Mary Haugh, one of a succession of female Staff Association presidents, was an outspoken 
advocate for the largely female workforce. Women exclusively staffed the branch libraries from 
the outset; like the volunteers in the settlement houses, they believed in a larger mission to 
nurture and educate the masses.64  The time had long since passed that public libraries were not 
open to the public, and the librarians furthered the belief that the buildings were meant to be 
open and informal, with pleasant surroundings and helpful employees. By embracing the notion 




females to shift their focus from inside the home to the outside world, where they could be a 
guiding force in social reform and professional leadership in social work, education, and 
librarianship.65  
As a boy, Yip Harburg, the librettist, lyricist, and author of the Great Depression anthem 
“Brother, Can You Spare a Dime?” preferred his “study” at the library on Tenth Street opposite 
Tompkins Square Park to his family’s unheated Lower East Side apartment. “It was a fine, 
warm, clean place, and there were lovely librarians, with blond hair and blue eyes and elegant 
accents. The attraction was magnetic,” he recalled. What was equally compelling was the sense 
of belonging and consideration the young boy received there. The librarians’ suggestions, which 
included the stories of O. Henry, became a constant influence on Harburg’s future work.66  
This sensibility was the hallmark of Anne Carroll Moore’s leadership; beginning in 1936 
and for the next thirty-five years she supervised children’s services in all of the branches. Her 
unique vision respected children’s books as integral to the library, where young visitors could do 
homework in a warm, safe environment, while being inspired with a love of reading.67 Moore 
and her staff, akin to social workers, were cultural humanists who appreciated the tension 
between immigrant parents and their children, and incorporated ethnic traditions and folklore 
with storytelling, celebrations, and special events. The library enlivened the young readers’ 
world, and encouraged them to embrace their parents’ backgrounds while learning to read in 
English.68  
Intellectuals like Randolph Bourne had championed the notion that America’s cultural 
unity, derived from a blend of diverse peoples, was a way to liberate creative power and bestow 
a more “spiritual citizenship” upon the nation.69 The Public Library’s collecting and programs 




aesthetic construction. Given the diversity of the metropolis, it would stand to reason that 
multiculturalism would prevail in the branch libraries. Ernestine Rose of the 135th Street branch 
from 1920-42, was another significant figure on the Library staff. Using the resources of the 
Harlem community and the prestige of the Public Library, her branch became a model for service 
to African Americans, and a significant force as a conduit between writers, artists, playwrights, 
performers, and their public. The library’s important book collection became the Schomburg 
Center for Research in Black Culture.70 
In 1920, Congress recognized woman suffrage with the passage of the Nineteenth 
Amendment. That year, women’s clubs throughout the city wrote to the New York Public 
Library’s trustees calling for the election of female members, particularly given the institution’s 
large percentage of female employees.71 (Once the undisputed founders of the nineteenth-century 
circulating library movement, women would not be invited into the consolidated leadership cadre 
of the New York Public Library until well into the twentieth century.) The General Federation of 
Women’s Clubs had long championed library initiatives, and were instrumental in organizing 
traveling libraries throughout the country.72 More locally, the New York League of Women 
Voters pressed the City to raise the standard for trained library workers and establish a set 
entrance salary of $1,200.73 The Association to Promote Proper Housing for Girls wrote to 
Ledyard to raise consciousness about the prohibitive cost of rent (eight to ten dollars a week) 
relative to employee salaries (less than twenty to twenty-five dollars a week). The group thus 
urged the board to adjust its salary line in the budget for the Board of Estimate. “We shall write 
to some of the prominent members of the Board of Estimate whose interest may be secured and 
we shall be very glad to further the effort in any way that you or any member of your Board of 




Lydenberg suspected that the increased interest from such activists might have come as a 
direct result of the exertions of the Staff Association. Feeling underrepresented by the trustees to 
the Board of Estimate, the Staff Association decided to look elsewhere.75 As the modern era 
progressed, the staff felt emboldened to galvanize support from municipal offices and others 
directly, avoiding the paternalistic protocol of the trustees’ or director’s intervention.  
Lewis Cass Ledyard’s death in 1932 marked the end of an era. With Cadwalader and 
Rives, he was the last of the great triumvirate of board presidents, and only the 87-year-old Elihu 
Root remained from the Library’s earliest times.76 The new president, Frank Polk, was a lawyer 
who had served as both acting U. S. Secretary of State and Under Secretary of State, and was 
involved in educational and municipal reform on New York City commissions. The Library 
trustees and director consistently had been engaged in progressive thinking beginning in the era 
of the Library’s consolidation, so its twentieth-century activities would become as much about 
maintaining the ambitious enterprise financially as about sustaining it both intellectually and 
philosophically. 
 During Polk’s presidency, which lasted until 1943, the Library was affected by the 
Depression and the disruption of World War II. But its relations with the City grew more cordial 
during Fiorello LaGuardia’s term, even as tight budgets and pleas for more money prevailed. In 
1937, the staff finally received pension benefits, and as ex officio trustees began to attend more 
meetings, the board loosened its restrictions on appealing to the public for support for the branch 
libraries.77 By 1937, with increased demands came decreases in resources through reduced gifts, 
lower rates of return on investments, defaults in payment of bond interest, and mortgage 
obligations. The Library could no longer draw on tapped-out reserves, and future deficits were 




 In 1936, William Haygood, of the Library School of the University of Chicago, 
conducted a survey of the New York Public Library’s Circulation and Reference Departments.79 
The Public Library covered over the three boroughs spanning 124 square miles, and served 3.25 
million library patrons in all, a little less than half of New York City’s entire population. It was 
“a clientele as numerous as the population of Minnesota or of Lithuania, and racially as 
heterogeneous as Western Europe itself.”80 The largest category of Circulation users was 
students (38 percent), while the Reference users were mostly professionals (59 percent).81 By 
age, 65 percent of the patrons of the Circulation Department were under twenty years old, and 
almost 80 percent were under thirty. In the Reference Department, where overcrowding resulted 
in the exclusion of students from general use beginning in 1931, users were up to age fifty.82 A 
more startling demographic was how men outnumbered women as library customers: 55 percent 
of branch visitors and 80 percent of reference users were male.83  
 Nevertheless, for almost fifty years Billings, Anderson, and Lydenberg had sustained a 
commitment to gathering library collections of extensive range and diversity, in keeping with not 
only their catholic instincts, but the spirit of the times, so it was hardly of passing interest in 1935 
when the feminist activists and scholars Rosika Schwimmer and Mary Beard joined forces to 
create the World Center for Women’s Archives. Lydenberg immediately offered his support to 
Beard, the historian and collaborator with her husband Charles on the influential 1927 work, The 
Rise of American Civilization. The Archives’ credo was “No Documents; No History,” and it 
boasted an illustrious board and the sponsorship of such women as Eleanor Roosevelt, Irene 
Lewisohn, the congresswoman Caroline O’Day, Mrs. Vincent Astor, Pearl S. Buck, Carrie 
Chapman Catt, Ruth Harkness, Anne Morgan, Georgia O’Keeffe, Alice Paul, Frances Perkins, 




about women’s role in the past, and the purpose of the initiative was to encourage recognition of 
females as “co-makers” of history. Beard advocated rewriting history with a more complete 
consultation of established facts. “The impulse behind this movement,” Beard said, “is not a 
desire to ‘gang up’ on men, but to resist and prevent the formation or attempted formation of 
public opinion by historians and essayists who have in fact ‘ganged up’ on women by excluding 
the from the social picture, or presenting a false, because one-sided picture based on insufficient 
facts and inaccurate knowledge.”85 It was a radical departure for its time. 
The World Center for Women’s Archives almost immediately evolved from 
Schwimmer’s idea of a collection focusing on women’s role in world peace, to more broad-based 
material about women’s activities in general and as an archival and educational center for 
women’s studies. Within weeks of the announcement of the project, Lydenberg compiled lists of 
manuscript materials by or about women for Beard and extended the facilities of the New York 
Public Library to the archive until it could find a permanent home.86 The correspondence was 
warm and friendly; Lydenberg delicately broached the subject of the possible deposit of the 
collection, and Beard obsequiously encouraged an association. “It is a truly inspiring relation that 
has developed for me in connection with the Public Library,” she wrote. “The potentialities of a 
definitely creative service there—another creative service I mean of course—perhaps begin to 
outweigh in my mind other proposals.”87 
Yet as Schwimmer and others investigated a collaboration with the New York Public 
Library or the Library of Congress, Beard in fact was opposed to any such plan, which she feared 
would undermine the WCWA’s independence and “again take women off the record.”88 But 
even with the exclusively male board, the library did have a largely female staff and espoused 




In a fundraising brochure, the organization referred to the National American Woman’s 
Suffrage Association papers at the Public Library, whose papers were “crammed in drawers 
crumbling to dust” and “in such condition that readers cannot use them without injuring them.” 
In addition, the records were impossible to find. State institutions were not much better, because 
to Beard, they were subject to male politicians’ control. “Women need to direct the collection, 
preservation, and guidance of readers in women’s materials to correct the balance—until such 
time at least as it acquires stability, through natural cultural discipline,” the Archives asserted, 
adding that it was also more efficient to keep the materials in one place—at the World Center for 
Women’s Archives.89 
 In the end, the Archives gathered an impressive array of papers, but internal issues 
fractured the WCWA, and financial problems guaranteed its demise in 1940.90 In 1936, dispirited 
by the Center’s administration and shifting goals, Schwimmer resigned from the board.91 
Schwimmer ultimately did establish a collection focusing on women’s role in world peace, 
which she donated to the New York Public Library. Beard, who even after her own resignation 
from the board in 1940 was still charged with determining the fate of the collection, chose to 
return some materials to their donors and disperse the rest to women’s college libraries, rather 
than keeping the archive intact by donating it to one repository. Beard feared that the collection 
might get lost in a large library operating under one system, as had been her experience in 
researching women’s role in urban history at the New York Public Library, where she could not 
find any such materials.92 While the demise of the ambitious Women’s Archives project 
coincided with the outbreak of World War II, Beard had a lingering “guilty feeling” about hiding 




 And in spite of the New York Public Library’s constant acquisitions of distinguished 
women’s materials, including the second largest collection of Carrie Chapman Catt’s papers after 
the Library of Congress, Beard may have had a point about the Public Library’s cataloging, if not 
its general attitude towards women. Possibly still seeking the collection in the event that Beard’s 
plans fell through, or at least courting the principals’ goodwill, Lydenberg began a 
correspondence with Eva Hansl, the Archives’ director after Mary Beard, and in 1941 
enthusiastically supported her idea for an exhibition at the Library on the history of the women’s 
movement. But C. F. McCombs, his exhibition director, was reluctant to shift his spring show on 
amateur periodicals and could find only two months in the summer for a small display drawn 
from the Public Library’s collections. He also objected to working with a group of the World 
Center’s leaders to help conceive the exhibition. “With the best of intentions committees of 
enthusiastic ladies may commit us to more than we can perform,” he wrote dismissively to 
Lydenberg.94 
 Attitudes towards the past, of course, could be indicative of a deeper attitude towards the 
evolution of culture itself.95 In spite of their endorsed populist, progressive, and humanist 
approach to programs, the trustees could not go so far as to extend that intellectual multiplicity to 
a gender diversity on the Public Library board. Certainly the men had forgotten the imaginative 
and forthright female founders of the long-since absorbed free circulating libraries. It would be 
not until the 1950s that women would rejoin the leadership cadre of library trustees. While that 
did not significantly affect the broader mission of the institution, it did diminish the board not 







Upon Harry Lydenberg’s retirement as director of the New York Public Library in 1941, 
it was among the largest such institutions in the world, with holdings of great distinction, some 
unique in certain fields. Without the advantages of the Library of Congress or university 
collections, it was noteworthy that an urban repository could achieve such merit. It now ranked 
with the British Museum and the Bibliothèque Nationale, and essentially served as the United 
States’ second national library.96 The fact that the numbers of readers at the New York Public 
Library surpassed both the Library of Congress and the British Museum was a point of pride for 
both the trustees and staff; in 1930, more than two million readers consulted nearly five million 
items in the research libraries alone.97 And in spite of its financial limitations, in 1936 the 
Library had ranked first among national and university libraries in all categories, except budget, 
which was the smallest.98  
Its liberalism was long in place before the library profession’s first official expression of 
intellectual freedom, the anti-censorship statement issued by the American Library Association 
in 1939.99 In fact, in a seminal 1949 publication, Oliver Garceau wrote that the success of the 
“modern library” as a public institution occurred in two “spheres”—in educating the immigrants 
and in developing reading as an activity for children. Both of these initiatives had been part of 
the New York Public Library’s program from beginning of the twentieth century.100  
The decades around the Second World War were considered the Public Library’s “golden 
age,” but so, too, was it a time of ascendance for New York City itself, and the point at which it 
rightfully became the cultural capital of the world. The metropolis was now a sophisticated 
international hub for those in the arts and letters as well as those in business and finance. Artists, 




city with their presence, and their artistic production and the influence it had on home-grown 
talents were both immeasurable.   
New York also remained a city of dreams for immigrants. The multiculturalism that long 
had been the hallmark of the Public Library’s collecting program mirrored and capitalized on the 
dynamism of the metropolis. The Library represented the diversity of democracy itself, “public” 
to the core. Late in his life, the Brooklyn-born intellectual Alfred Kazin recalled his experience 
of contemplating and writing about the modern world in the 1940s while ensconced in the 
nineteenth-century Forty-second Street library building. 
My subject had to do with the “modern” as democracy; with America itself as the 
modern; with the end of the nineteenth century a the great preparation: in lonely 
small towns, prairie villages, isolated cottages, dusty law offices, national 
magazines, and provincial “academies” where no one suspected that the obedient-
looking young reporters, law clerks, librarians, teachers would turn out to be 
Willa Cather, Robert Frost, Sinclair Lewis, Wallace Stevens, Marianne Moore. 
The new literature was being created inside an old century—proud, stormy, yet 
elegant. The elegance was still in those great halls of the Library; up those marble 
stairs; always surrounded by pictures of the mid-century reservoir that had been 
replaced by the Library, the old fire fighters in their red wagons, the traditional 
view from the Battery. These put me right back into the turn of the century that 
saw the building of the Library—and the intellectual insurgence and radical hope 
that bedrocked my book. Even the spacious twin reading rooms, each two blocks 
long, gave me a sense of the powerful amenity that I craved for my own life, a 
world of power in which my own people had moved about as strangers.101   
 
For certain there was a modernist sensibility in the cultural explosion that began between the 
wars in New York City. But in many ways, imagining the city of the future as well as the useful 
purpose of a library had animated the leaders of the New York Public Library from the time of 






“A New Mental Attitude”: The Metropolitan Museum Broadens its Reach 
 
 
At 10 o’clock pm on February 17, 1913, a trumpet sounded, and a hush came over some two 
thousand people gathered at the Sixty-ninth Regiment Armory, on Lexington Avenue between 
Twenty-fifth and Twenty-sixth streets, for an international exhibition of modern art sponsored by 
the Association of American Painters and Sculptors. “American artists—young American artists, 
that is—do not dread, and have no need to dread, the ideas or the culture of Europe,” said the 
collector of avant-garde art and lawyer John Quinn, the honorary vice-president of the event. 
“They believe that in the domain of art only the best should rule. This exhibition will be epoch-
making in the history of American art,” he predicted hyperbolically. “To-night will be a red letter 
night in the history not only of American but of all modern art.”1 
 He was right. The trumpet flourish heralded the advent of modernism in America and the 
growth of the avant-garde in New York. The exhibition consisted of the most representative 
collection of modern art held anywhere in the world. It introduced the United States to the 
French contemporary paintings of Picasso, Braque, Rouault, Dufy, and Léger, as well as 
Cézanne, Van Gogh, and Gauguin; it also caused a stir with Marcel Duchamp’s cubist work 
Nude Descending a Staircase. The artworks represented a new sort of cultural expression that 
deconstructed time and space.2 While the Armory Show was a revolt against the conservative 
National Academy of Design and traditionalist art dealers, the radicalism in art was only echoing 
the current state of rebellion and upheaval in manners, morals, and politics in the 1910s. The 
Armory Show made it clear that a new era was dawning—or at least that one century was 




would encounter this dialectic of progress, peering into the future, only later to retrench into the 
past. 
 As the Morgan era was on the wane at the museum, a new modern spirit was quietly 
taking over American life by 1913. While the museum curatorially would hold out against 
modern art for decades after the Armory Show, administratively, the semi-progressive initiatives 
put in place by Morgan continued to guide the operations of the museum.  
 Morgan’s organization man in that endeavor was Robert W. de Forest. He had been the 
“young turk” on the board during the Sunday opening and Cesnola firing controversies, and even 
though a position on the trustees was his veritable birthright as John Taylor Johnston’s son-in-
law, de Forest approached the task with great seriousness and responsibility. Upon his election in 
February 1889, he wrote to Cesnola: “I accept the position not because it is an honor but because 
I am deeply interested in the prosperity and success of the Museum and stand ready to give it the 
full measure of service which I can consistently with other duties.”4 Under two weeks later, he 
wrote again, asking Cesnola for back numbers of the museum’s reports, to refresh his memory as 
to the growth of the institution; he also asked the director to request similar reports from the 
Boston Museum, something Cesnola would not do. The new trustee clearly was contemplating 
the institution’s past and future, and in his inimitable way trying to quantify them; in the same 
communication he also requested a list of donations that were contingent on the museum’s 
Sunday closing. “I should like to inform myself intelligently as to this side of the ‘Sunday’ 
question,” he wrote.5  
 A descendant of Jesse de Forest, a French Huguenot who arrived in New Amsterdam 
aboard the first ships in 1624, Robert de Forest lived his entire life in Greenwich Village, and 




Johnston announced their engagement in 1870, the year of his graduation from Yale and, as 
legend would have it, on the very day the Metropolitan Museum was founded. The Johnston 
house at Seven Washington Square North, built by Emily’s grandfather, was a wedding present, 
and where they lived for the rest of their lives. In the 1920s, de Forest was asked why he did not 
move to the “millionaire district” east of Central Park. He replied that with the gradual but steady 
migration ever northward of families of means, the new fashionable area just did not feel 
permanent to him, as Washington Square always would. It was a place with continuity and 
history, with “the charm of old associations,” he said. “With all the bustle and unrest of our great 
city it still retains in large degree the quiet of Old New York.”6  
On the Metropolitan board, de Forest had focused on the museum’s legal and financial 
issues. He handled the intricate terms of large bequests, always with an eye towards precedent-
setting policies.7 And when he succeeded Morgan as president of the museum in 1913, de Forest 
infused his work with his inherent love for the past and simultaneous respect for the future, along 
with a healthy recognition of the changing times. Echoing the supposed mandate of the 
Metropolitan’s past, he encouraged the study of the fine arts as it pertained to manufacture and 
practical life. Under these principles, he advocated the museum’s cooperation with New York 
City’s public schools, expanded the educational staff, and encouraged children to visit the 
museum.8 
Immediately upon becoming president of the museum, de Forest launched a public 
campaign for an endowment fund of $5 million. The museum had overdrawn its income by as 
much as $30,000 a year, a deficit usually made up by the trustees. The fund drive was 
discontinued when world war broke out, resuming in 1920. By then, the museum had over $16 




many salaries, which in fact were quite low. Rich as it seemed, the institution needed new 
sources of income to avoid drawing down its principal.  
Furthermore, as new trustees assumed leadership, they codified and adapted the founders’ 
educational mission as it pertained to the times. Even as the museum’s initial purpose was to 
create and improve American taste through its collections, the Metropolitan also had the 
potential to inform a larger civic agenda. In fact, de Forest was considered to the world of public-
spiritedness what J. Pierpont Morgan had been to the realm of finance, and he brought his same 
sensibilities to bear in his participation on either cultural or social welfare boards. “Morgan’s 
name suggests Wall Street, while irresistibly the mention of any philanthropic activity brings 
Robert W. de Forest to mind,” the Times wrote.9 Metropolitan Museum trustees from an earlier 
age might have had charitable, religious inclinations but by and large many failed to understand 
the urban underclass they were seeking to protect. De Forest was of a different mind altogether. 
When de Forest helped form the Charity Organization Society in the 1880s, almshouses 
and orphan asylums were the primary sources of relief for the poor.10 As a young man with a 
growing law practice, de Forest sought to bring “order out of the chaos” in these public and 
private charities by encouraging the use of modern scientific methods and the professionalization 
of the field of social work.11 His charitable philanthropic activities focused on health, education, 
and welfare rather than the more paternalistic, albeit religious benevolences of an older time. 
Nevertheless, while hardly a radical, de Forest had a firm sense of noblesse oblige and parlayed 
his influence and elegance into social justice for the underclass.12 Believing that charity should 
not be “haphazard,” he made the School of Social Work a reality.13 His resolve to organize a 
national relief organization helped the American Red Cross rise to prominence during World 




of the Charity Organization Society, de Forest became active in slum housing issues and was 
appointed chairman of the New York State Tenement House Commission, which drafted the 
pivotal 1901 Tenement House Act, the most important municipal housing legislation of its time. 
Subsequently, Theodore Roosevelt, governor of New York, appointed de Forest chairman of the 
New York State Tenement House Commission. 
Decades later, de Forest found a way to serve the city through the 1929 Regional Plan of 
New York and its Environs, which united development schemes for the city and its suburbs, 
anticipating commercial and passenger traffic.14 Its corollary mandate was directed at advancing 
the region’s quality of life by providing for parks, playgrounds, and other recreational facilities. 
Recalling Andrew Haswell Green’s vision for a New York of the future, the Regional Plan spoke 
to de Forest’s interest in improving the lived experience as well as the built environment, which 
he also guided as president of the Municipal Art Commission.15 
Late in life, de Forest reminisced about a time in the city of his youth when he flew his 
kite in meadows that would become Madison Square, and rode on a “tall, stately bicycle” up the 
empty streets of Broadway.16 This was not mere nostalgia, but an indication of his romantic, 
albeit practical, humanistic spirit as a New Yorker—and different sort of booster—commenting 
upon expansion and change in his hometown. In this way, his focus as president of the 
Metropolitan contrasted with Morgan’s, with its heavy emphasis on building the museum’s 
collections. “The very fact that the word ‘humanism,’ once exclusively associated with classical 
scholarship, has had its definition extended to include the study of man as the proper study of 
mankind, more or less symbolizes the growth of a museum such as the Metropolitan,” Elisabeth 




De Forest’s stamp, for example, was all over the museum’s participation in the 1911 
Child Welfare Exhibit at the 71st Regiment Armory. In its first two weeks alone, over 130,000 
New Yorkers visited it. The goal was to focus each individual exhibitor on the subject of the 
child.18 While there were “many foreign faces” among the visitors, the exhibit reached all 
classes, “regardless of their place in the life of New York.”19 To de Forest, the Metropolitan 
Museum, with its educational mandate, was hardly out of place in this setting. “It illuminates 
history. It inspires patriotism,” he said at the opening.20 
The museum now was being perceived more as a public and professional institution 
rather than a board-driven diversion or private repository. The director Robinson gradually relied 
less and less on the trustees who at one time had been charged with art buying, in favor of 
curators and other professionals. The Metropolitan’s secretary, Henry Kent, who trained under 
Melvil Dewey in library science at Columbia and who applied organizational methodology to 
administration, assisted him. It was Kent who instituted a system for recording and registering 
every work of art in the museum, who supervised the photography of the collections, and who 
assumed the responsibility of producing the new Bulletin to inform the public of the Museum’s 
activities. The “popular instruction” mandate of the museum’s founding mission became his 
singular focus. His programs for schoolteachers and new gallery talks both began to address the 
educational obligations the Museum previously had overlooked.21  
With the advent of radio in the 1920s, de Forest brought his vision of an accessible 
museum to the public through a series of fifteen-minute programs under the American 
Federation of the Arts. “The enjoyment of art,” he said on the air, “is open to everyone—poor 
and rich. That is one of its democratic features.” He continued: 
Some years ago I went through the picture gallery of one of our millionaires with 




as much as the man who has paid for them! All he can do is look at them and 
enjoy them by looking at them—I can do the same.” He was right. Every man, 
woman and child who goes through a private gallery or a public museum for all 
practical purposes owns everything in it. All he lacks is the pride of possession—a 
selfish pride unless possession is shared with others.22  
 
Radio addresses gave de Forest occasion to express his respect for national artistic achievement 
as neither products of a new “age of machinery” nor the crude handiwork of another age, but as a 
uniquely American form. “This discovery is no ‘antique craze’ but a sound and deep-rooted 
trend which has revolutionized many phases of industry and trade,” he said. “Business has been 
‘discovering’ the museum; and to an extent not generally recognized, the museum has served 
business, while the latter—for reasons of self-interest and not in a spirit of altruism—has become 
a teacher of art.”23 
 To that end, de Forest and his wife donated their collection of early American furniture as 
well as approximately $100,000 to build the American Wing in 1920, distinguishing the 
Metropolitan as the first museum to direct a large-scale focus to the field of American decorative 
arts.24 His interests were beyond broad—de Forest believed that every person had a right “to be 
able to see, at least occasionally, good works of art, for the same reason that every dweller in a 
crowded city should sometimes have the opportunity of seeing the green of the country.”25 
 By 1920, the Metropolitan’s half-century mark, the museum was receiving gifts from all 
over the country, and indeed had become a national and no longer merely a local institution. 
Although there were also over twice as many fine arts museums in the United States as there had 
been only fifteen years before, all competing for funds, the Metropolitan Museum under de 
Forest still was a prestige-laden locus of support for New York businessmen.26 George F. Baker 
and John D. Rockefeller gave unrestricted gifts of $1 million each, increasing the endowment 




marble plaque in the great hall. Although a more democratic age was underway, some modicum 
of status still could be had for ambitious plutocrats desirous of being memorialized in a public 
place.27 
Consequently, the Metropolitan Museum had become the largest and richest art museum 
of the Western hemisphere by the 1920s.28 But critics continued to complain that it remained the 
city’s most exclusive club. American artists protested that they were underrepresented. Still 
others attacked the soundness of the museum’s founding educational mission. What was the 
point of a museum? What did “instruction” mean? Under whose authority could “taste” be 
codified? Early in the twentieth century, these questions took on a new context.  
John Cotton Dana of the Newark Free Public Library and the founder of the Newark 
Museum, for example, was uncompromisingly avant-garde compared to the Metropolitan in 
matters of museumship and education. Dana conceived of his museum as a kind of artistic 
lending library, where the public could literally take an object home to study it.29  
The trend in American museums, however, was towards expansion. In a significant 
commentary in the Atlantic Monthly, Frank Jewett Mather Jr. argued that the act of visiting a 
repository like the Metropolitan Museum, with its myriad departments, was simply exhausting. 
“When an American art museum is founded, in order to survive it must literally be all things to 
all men; it must appeal on the broadest and most miscellaneous basis to everybody who may give 
it support,” he explained.30 Mather’s critique hoped to open a dialogue about what American 
“jumboism” meant, and whether the “overgrown art museums” might consider decentralizing in 
the interest of the public’s experience, much as Dana had suggested.31 De Forest conceded that 
the Metropolitan’s collections had become unwieldy and that the objects on display could be 




experience. But he held firm on maintaining the rich departments of the museum; in aggregate, 
they were all necessary for a great museum with an educational purpose.32 
In actuality, the museum’s revived commitment to an education agenda, with its 
accompanying populist overtones, did help win the city’s investment in the institution during the 
Morgan period of physical expansion. Public funding was no longer optional in the face of 
insurmountable costs. De Forest parlayed his involvement on myriad municipal commissions to 
the museum’s advantage in this regard.33 
Scolding “the exclusiveness” of museum enthusiasts, and indeed, some of the more 
conservative forces on his board, de Forest once said, “We are now showing signs of 
understanding that to walk with beauty we need not necessarily limit ourselves to trooping 
through the galleries of our formal collection of art.” The museum, however, was on a path in 
line with a modern spirit, and de Forest had set it on that path. “In its lectures, its classes, its 
exhibitions of current art, it is taking on the aspect of a place that not only invites within but 
propels without. It says to those trooping through its galleries: ‘Why are you here if you cannot 
do something with what you take away?’”34 
 
A New Mental Attitude 
As 1929 came to a close, Robert de Forest consulted with the soon-to-be treasurer of the 
Metropolitan about the financial crisis. He learned that since only 1925 the staff had increased by 
40 percent; that salaries had increased by 60 percent; that a new pension system was drawing 
down resources; that the publications program was increasingly active (and thus costly); and that 
more attendance required more light and heat. In short, the administrative budget was 
unsustainable, and had increased by over $400,000 in four years. On New Year’s Eve 1929, the 




“A new mental attitude is the first requisite,” the new treasurer, William Sloane Coffin 
advised. He proposed that locally supported branch museums in Greater New York at which 
less-important objects might be exhibited could increase exposure and halt the frequent demand 
for new wings. He recommended that the museum levy a “fair fee” for adult instruction in the 
self-supporting art schools. And he thought that a larger membership in the higher classes could 
participate in a united effort with all of the friends of the museum, who could help the public, as 
well as the trustees and staff, to realize that “we actually do need money and we need it badly.”35 
In imagination as well as in spirit, the young trustee was de Forest’s protégé. “I made up 
my mind at the time that you were one of the men whom I should like to associate with me in 
carrying out some of my dreams,” the older man reminisced to his disciple in 1928 about their 
earliest meetings. “And if, in my confidence in you and your judgment, I put too many burdens 
on you in the Museum you must speak out,” he cautioned, and then warned: 
You will have many calls upon your public spirit, just as I have had. My advice to 
myself as well as those who like yourself have so great capacity for usefulness, 
can be given in two words—“Don’t scatter.” Hold fast to the things of greatest 
importance—ignore others. Not that others may not be worth while, but that 
others are not so much worth while and one’s power of accomplishment is 
limited.36 
 
Soon afterwards, de Forest appointed Coffin to a three-member committee empowered 
with representing the board in questions arising from the selection and installation of objects 
under the important Havemeyer bequest.37 But before long Coffin would be tested even further. 
In spring 1931, upon Elihu Root’s resignation, he assumed the position of first vice president 
while continuing to be treasurer. That year, in rapid succession, de Forest died, along with four 
other trustees and Edward Robinson, the museum’s director. Coffin became the acting president 
of the board, and until late 1931 functioned as the museum’s only officer, with the exception of 




Metropolitan’s trustees, putting to an end the months of conjecture during which virtually every 
board member had been mentioned as de Forest’s possible successor.38 
 William Sloane Coffin was Yale educated; a member of the old New York elite; 
Presbyterian, like most of the other Metropolitan Museum and cultural leaders before him; and 
the brother of Henry Sloane Coffin, the president of Union Theological Seminary. 
Professionally, Will Coffin directed his family’s real estate ventures as well as its furniture 
business, W. & J. Sloane. Aesthetically, his orientation was influenced by his opinion of New 
York as “the greatest industrial city” on the continent, and practically, his retail background 
informed his entire way of thinking about the museum experience.39 Fittingly and accordingly, 
his philanthropic activities echoed de Forest’s in their social consciousness, although Coffin, 
thirty years de Forest’s junior, had a more modern manner in carrying out a contemporary social 
agenda.  
Coffin’s civic work began in 1906 with his organization of the Art-in-Trades Club to 
bring together art tradesmen to promote study in the field. His real estate ventures included 
developing the residential community Munsey Park on the North Shore of Long Island; 
modernizing old housing units in the older sections of the city; and as vice president of the City 
Housing Corporation, financing model tenements. As president of the City Mission Society, he 
supervised its work with the Spanish-speaking residents of upper Manhattan. As a leader of the 
Federal Council of Churches in America, he campaigned for the religious education of children. 
And as a humanitarian and aesthete he visited France and Belgium following the First World 
War to appeal for American aid for the restoration of devastated cathedrals.  
 Coffin had strong views of American culture, and of cultural stewardship. “What do we 




“resulting in an abundant life guided by the noblest ideals.” Yet he qualified this abstract 
assessment with a dose of reality. “Individual self-expression is restricted in most cases to the 
pictures, books, and other furnishings we select for our homes. Only rarely do we create anything 
ourselves,” he said. “Marvelous machinery” was easing the pressure on labor to work long hours, 
causing many Americans to have unfamiliar leisure time. “Education for the proper use of leisure 
and individual self-expression is one of the greatest problems of today. This leads one directly 
into theories of progressive education for the training in self-expression of the individual child, 
as well as other interesting and controversial subjects,” he stated.40 Coffin embraced the once-
embarrassing American aesthetic banality and recast it as a perfect expression of contextual 
change. 
 But how did the art museum fit into this vision? Coffin had observed the “average 
citizen” in his professional life, in his philanthropic work, and at the museum, and was convinced 
that the American public was eager for the best in art. Could it be that these people, once the 
great unwashed clamoring to visit the museum on Sunday afternoons, were now, by Coffin’s 
estimation, of the leisure class? For example, he declared that the concerts at the Metropolitan on 
Saturday evenings in January and March were attended by thousands of people, mostly in their 
twenties. Only one-third of the audience could be even seated. Such genuine thirst for classical 
music necessitated a change in the way trustees and professional staffs viewed museum visitors.  
“Art museums as a rule began as rich men’s clubs for the proper display of their treasures 
and those of their friends,” Coffin bluntly stated. “These clubs were directed by hierarchies of 
scholars who satisfied their own professional pride in seeking praise from scholars in Europe, 
and satisfied their patrons by obtaining rarer and more costly objects than were found in other 




equation, Coffin suggested. “This early viewpoint has been largely but not entirely outgrown. 
Both Trustees and Staffs must be taught that at least one of their chief aims should be to give the 
average citizen an appreciative love of the beautiful which will make the study of art a delightful 
pursuit in his leisure hours.”41  
Furthermore, Coffin boldly claimed that “rich men” were becoming a rarity on boards of 
trustees. But museums needed not only money, but trained volunteers “to spread the love and 
knowledge of art among the new leisure classes.” This new class was a potentially large, 
untapped base of support.42 Coffin clearly wanted to continue to promote de Forest’s public 
agenda out of the nineteenth century and further into the twentieth.43 “His program is at once 
progressive and conservative,” the Herald Tribune concluded in an editorial. “In this the trustees 
may be relied upon to back him up, and so may the public.”44  
In the context of the economic depression, the displaced, disenfranchised, and 
unemployed individual played an important part in Coffin’s program. In 1933, this “forgotten 
man,” abandoned by his country after serving it in war, was memorialized in a song popularized 
in the film Gold Diggers of 1933. Coffin also wrote and recited a poem on this subject.45 He 
looked upon this man as the type of individual whose perfect self-expression might be 
manifested in his home, “free from the dictation of architect, interior designer, and artist.” The 
home was an American’s castle, reflective of his creativity and individuality.46 Of course in the 
early years of the Depression, with rising unemployment, “leisure hours” were a grim reality, 
and whether a home was well furnished or not was the least of most citizens’ concerns. As a 
landlord, Coffin, in fact, did not evict tenants who could not pay their rents. Predictably, his real 




 But everyone was feeling the pinch in the 1930s. In New York, financial pressures and 
institutional competition here provoking museums to justify their importance and relevance to 
the public. The Metropolitan, once unique among art institutions in New York, now was being 
challenged by newer museums like the Whitney and the Museum of Modern Art, both 
established by women with decidedly modern aesthetic tastes and perspectives. Furthermore, 
there were other cultural institutions struggling to survive and competing for shrinking funds. 
Coffin comprehended this competition with his tirelessly populist perspective. As he noted, “any 
one presiding over the destinies of that complicated cosmos which is called the Metropolitan 
must be responsive to myriad appeals. The museum is sometimes superficially considered a 
place solely for the embalmment of paintings, statuary and miscellaneous objects of art. As a 
matter of fact it is a hive of activities vitally touching many aspects of the city’s life.”48 Art, 
Coffin contended, was “a perfectly natural self-expression,” and understandable to every man, 
woman, and child. Simply put, art could serve the people, and Coffin broadcast that idea at every 
opportunity, and disabused the public of the notion that such a mission would lower the 
museum’s standards. To him, art was not something remote or esoteric that “should be kept 
safely at the top of the stairs and never brought down to street level.”49 
That meant pulling Emanuel Leutze’s Washington Crossing the Delaware out of storage 
after it had been “banished” because of its questionable artistic value and lack of historical 
authenticity. Coffin justified his decision to exhibit the much-loved work by claiming that there 
would always be a popular sentiment for such pictures, “whatever their artistic defects.”50 It 
meant that as his first presidential act, Coffin would accept the towering $10 million bequest of 
Michael Friedsam—one hundred thirty-five paintings and two hundred other works—as a 




details of Friedsam’s will’s directive to “maintain the collection’s identity as a whole” deter him. 
Immediately, Friedsam’s trustees showed “rare understanding” and agreed to offer the museum 
the paintings with the guarantee that the collection stay together under vaguer terms: “as far as 
humanly possible.”51 The notion of keeping the collection together, a throwback to the earlier 
times of Altman and Morgan, risked making the Metropolitan Museum look like “an art patron’s 
necropolis,”52 an impression thoroughly inconsistent with the new progressive agenda. The 
Friedsam gift held out the promise of being yet one more step in realizing de Forest’s hope: that 
“every child and every man and woman will come to know this museum as ‘their museum.’”53 
Once, the art museum was a place primarily for the wealthy, or the self-styled nobility. Now it 
was for everybody. 
Coffin saw the Metropolitan Museum’s “education” mission on an even broader level 
than de Forest had. In summer 1933, Coffin announced his old idea of establishing branch 
museums in Queens, the Bronx, and “two or three other places.” This program, he stated 
optimistically, would take on new relevance and importance in the face of additional leisure 
hours for the public as mandated by the New Deal and the National Industrial Recovery Act. 
Coffin, halfway through his second year of directing the destinies of the museum, now one of the 
largest art collections in the world, was preoccupied not only with dreams for the future, but also 
with the realities of its harsh financial outlook.54 In September 1933, Governor Herbert H. 
Lehman had to intervene to unblock an impasse between New York City officials and the 
bankers who were unwilling to extend a $72 million credit to the city. All budgets were being 
cut, and museums and cultural institutions were not immune.  The Metropolitan Museum, in fact, 
was lucky that its $397,610 request was cut only to $355,000, although the budget director 




Coffin vacillated about commencing a public appeal for funds, but instead beseeched 
former contributing members to continue to pay $10 dues. “Even with a competent finance 
committee it is difficult to get all we had hoped for from our investments,” he noted sardonically 
to the Herald Tribune. In spite of this anxiety, the museum’s activities survived uncurtailed. 
Indeed, it was inconceivable that Coffin could be thinking of an expanded program in the face of 
financial retraction. His old idea of encouraging more members to join at lower levels for added 
revenue would have to wait. “We are trying to meet our cuts in income by economies in every 
possible channel in order not to impose on the public at a time when the demands for relief are so 
imperative,” he said. But the fact remained that unless the museum received support from the 
public, it would perish.56  
As the museum’s president, Coffin never let go of the idea that art could be ennobling 
and comforting—“a true and happy science of the soul”—and the notion that the Metropolitan 
had a moral obligation to carry its influence as a service to the community.57 His perspective 
recalled the public taste agenda of earlier decades, but devoid of its previous paternalism, and 
proud of American artistic output, no matter how utilitarian. He honestly believed that training 
school children as well as the sales forces in department stores could more universally transform 
art appreciation and taste. Art had “crept into industry,” and retailers needed an understanding of 
what constituted beauty to help impart public refinement. On a no less practical level, Coffin 
pursued a course for the museum that elevated it beyond a “repository of the great art treasures 
bequeathed to it by art lovers.” The museum’s mission was larger: to present to the public 
inspiring and instructive examples of human creativity.58 
At the Convention of the Association of American Museums in Chicago in June 1933, 




diminished resources of their historic outlets of support, the government and the wealthy 
individual. “There must be a radical cut in the cost of government, and to the normal politician it 
is much more natural to reduce contributions to art rather than the salaries of henchmen,” he said. 
“The personal fortunes of the wealthy patrons of art have undergone such a shrinkage that many 
assert that one should no longer count on large bequests from multimillionaires, as the species is 
rapidly becoming extinct.”59 Coffin lauded the fact that the most generous gifts to the museum 
during his presidency had been bequests from “simple folk scarcely known to the community or 
even to the Museum staff.” While annual contributors were personally economizing at the 
expense of philanthropy, Coffin looked to the challenge of regaining that membership and of 
cultivating “new friends” throughout the community. Unfortunately, the situation was dire: the 
total dues collected for annual, sustaining, and fellowship members fell from $108,785 in 1931 
to $69,502 in 1933, and the income from the city fell from $467,914 to $368,635.60 Interestingly, 
a form for bequests began appearing prominently in the annual reports of the 1930s, an attempt 
at a more subtle form of fundraising.61 
The fact was, though, Coffin’s larger creative and populist approach also was cost-
effective. He launched his revolutionary plan for branch museums around the city with a dinner 
at his home for six principals of New York City high schools and four officers of the 
Metropolitan Museum. Heeding the critics of the overgrown, multi-departmental institution, 
Coffin imagined the experiment enabling visitors, most particularly children, to view art in small 
groups “rather than herded through the galleries in droves à la Thomas Cook & Sons.” He had 
realistic expectations about the way young people behaved in museums, but blamed the 
museums and not the children. “It is perfectly impossible to keep a whole procession of children 




be distracted,” he observed. As part of the education plan, the museum also would sponsor a 
series of four slide lectures describing the past using objects in the collections.62 
In November 1933, the first branch exhibition opened on the lower East Side at the 
University Settlement, the oldest settlement house in the United States, on Eldridge Street. The 
trial program focused on Chinese and Japanese art, and the scheme called for exhibitions of 
armor, European art, and ancient Egyptian art to follow at six week-intervals, making the circuit 
of neighborhoods served by the venerable program. The objects were to be of “high artistic 
value” as well as examples of practical material culture, with an added human appeal. In the 
Asian art exhibition, for example, porcelains, armor, and paintings on silk were on view along 
with a “pepper blower,” a Japanese weapon that discharged a blast of ordinary pepper into an 
enemy’s face at close range. The idea of neighborhood exhibitions had existed for years, Herbert 
Winlock, the museum director revealed. But with the support and enthusiasm of the settlement 
houses and their workers, the plan finally could be realized. The exhibitions were conceived 
along both general and diverse lines in consideration of public appeal.63 
 While Coffin’s notions were modern, the museum was slow to accept modernism in art. 
For now, it was enough that the Metropolitan was embracing bold ways of reconceiving its 
program in light of precarious financial times. It was revolutionary, for example, for the museum 
to stand firm about having the freedom to display a bequest as curators saw fit, as opposed to 
isolating a collection around a donor’s name alone. The Metropolitan Museum was rejecting its 
complicity in allowing benefactions to be grand, lasting representations of their benefactor. 
Rather, gifts of art were to be recognized on their own merits as works of art to be displayed for 




 During this time, the Metropolitan also was engaged in a rather different “branch” 
location, the “cloister museum” on Fort Washington Avenue housing a collection of medieval 
works assembled by the sculptor George Grey Barnard, and purchased in 1925 through a gift 
from John D. Rockefeller Jr., a collector of medieval art. Rockefeller had declined election to the 
trustees in 1921, claiming he did not serve on philanthropic boards other than his own.64 But he 
did become deeply involved in the Cloisters project, supplementing it with additional pieces 
from his own collection, donating land and landscaping for a new museum in Fort Tryon Park 
when the neighborhood around the existing one began to change, and ultimately agreeing to 
finance the construction and maintenance of a new building in 1933. 
In contrast, modern art was on the rise, and for the first time the Metropolitan was part of 
the movement. In May 1932 the Museum of Modern Art—spearheaded by Rockefeller’s wife, 
Abby Aldrich, with Lillie P. Bliss and Mary Quinn Sullivan—announced a move to its 
permanent home on Fifty-third Street.65 The election of its trustees Nelson Rockefeller and 
Cornelius N. Bliss to the Metropolitan Museum board signaled to art circles and the public alike 
that collaboration was now a definite possibility.66 “No other institution includes so wide a 
public as the Met and to it should go ultimately the finest works of the foremost modern artists,” 
Alfred H. Barr Jr., the new museum’s director, said. The Metropolitan Museum had lent 
paintings by Daumier and Winslow Homer to the MoMA, which in turn lent a Cezanne still life 
from the Bliss collection to the Met. Barr was quick to add that the new museum would not 
become “merely the feeder” to other museums. “To live, we need the bone and sinew of a 
permanent collection which has strength and vigor, which looks toward the future but retains the 




museum’s founders, Lillie Bliss, Cornelius’s sister, and Abby Aldrich Rockefeller, Nelson’s 
mother.68 
 “Aloofness is dissipated,” the critic Edward Alden Jewell proclaimed, heralding the 
unprecedented transparency and reciprocity now apparent at the Metropolitan Museum. “The 
entente wears all the earmarks of a new museum era,” he added, noting that in former times the 
Bliss and Rockefeller additions to the board might have been looked upon “in somewhat the light 
of hostages.”69 The Metropolitan Museum, in fact, was venturing into the future by daring to 
exhibit pictures by living artists. Coffin cannily suggested to Barr: “When the so-called ‘wild’ 
creations of today are regarded as the conservative standards of tomorrow, is it too much to hope 
that you will permit some of them to come to the Metropolitan Museum of Art, leaving space on 
our walls for the new creations of the new day?”70 
 In fact, Coffin, as no Metropolitan Museum president before, had a fresh and accepting 
view of contemporary art. To those who criticized its quality, he said, “Well, it must be 
remembered that a great deal of the worst art of the past has disappeared, and we are comparing 
all modern art with only the best of the past.” Furthermore, in earlier times, the only people who 
“indulged in artistic expression,” or even collected art objects, were the nobility and the very 
wealthy. “Today every home can afford pictures and even furniture and furnishing inspired by 
the masters of the past,” he happily observed. And classic art no doubt was inspiring the good 
design of the present. “I myself have pointed out color schemes in classical paintings that could 
be put to industrial use,” he said.71  
 But the Museum of Modern Art and the Metropolitan were hardly the only museums 
breaking new ground in Manhattan in May 1932. The Whitney Museum was established in 




building that January. “Who says our depression hasn’t turned the corner?” the critic Jewell 
marveled.72 
 On Saturday, December 16, 1933, his oldest son’s twelfth birthday, Will Coffin went to 
his office at W. & J. Sloane in the morning; had lunch at the Metropolitan Museum; and upon 
leaving, fell on the pavement, as though he had slipped on the ice. He recovered and went home, 
striding past his doorman and his children without comment or his characteristic good cheer. His 
wife found him a short time later, lying on his bed with his hands clasped over his chest. He was 
dead, at age fifty-four, of a heart attack.73  
 Coffin had been one of the most important philanthropists in the city, and had raised 
hundreds of thousands of dollars for the charities he supported. But his family business and real 
estate investments were hit hard by the Depression, and his own income in the early 1930s had 
come from selling his property in Oyster Bay. To pay one overdue bill, his wife parted with her 
favorite fur coat. Catherine Coffin worried about her husband’s “endless problems and pressures 
from people and organizations,” but respected the fact that although people had begged him to 
slow down, “that was not his way.”74  
 A stunned city eulogized Coffin and how “all his brave ideas, all his sane liberalism” had 
changed the Metropolitan Museum from a forbidding to a popular presence in only two short 
years. “From the start he showed that he took the opportunities of his office to be those of a 
warm, humanizing influence. He was not content to preside over an institution. Rather he 
governed an agency for the enkindling of the citizens,” the Herald Tribune wrote in an editorial. 
“He would have nothing pedantic, nothing chilling, and as little as possible ‘official’ about the 
great building in Central Park. He would make it a welcoming and inspiring place, friendly, 




its will to serve.”75 Where the museum founders had sought an edifying existence for their 
museum in a developing nineteenth-century city, Coffin reinterpreted that purpose for the 
modern era.  
 Coffin had endeavored to make the Metropolitan Museum an effective force for culture 
in the city, state, and nation. One of his last public remarks bemoaned the fact that while there 
was plenty of leisure for culture, there was still little culture in leisure.76  
   
A Distinguished Amateur 
The Metropolitan Museum could not afford to lose any time in choosing a new leader. The late 
president’s first year in office had been one of “rigid economy and wise precautions against the 
uncertainties of the future,” and at the time of his death, Coffin had barely completed his second 
year.77 He had been energetic and enthusiastic, proud of the museum’s past accomplishments, 
eager for its continuing advancement, and imaginative about how to do so in light of the 
financial times.78 But by the end of 1933, the museum had lost around ten thousand of its over 
thirteen-thousand dues-paying members—in the higher as well as the lower categories. These 
membership fees usually funded administrative expenses. While attendance was still at a robust 
1,184,665 in 1933, that number represented a falling off of 101,340 visitors from the main 
building, made up by the popularity and accessibility of the Cloisters, aided by a new bus line 
which stopped at its front door. Attendance was noticeably lower on days when admission was 
charged. With the 1933 budget already 13 percent below 1932’s, the museum suspended plans 
for a northward extension and for any new membership campaigns.79 The course struck a 
tentative balance between savings and essential activities without an obvious reduction in the 




began in 1926, with over 1.1 million visitors to the main building, with greater attendance on the 
free admission days. Indeed, only around $7,800 was received in admission fees, representing a 
tiny portion of the $2 million in receipts.80 
 The trustee George Blumenthal received much official and unofficial recognition for the 
institution’s relative solvency. As chairman of the Executive and Finance Committees, the retired 
Wall Street financier had invested cautiously throughout the 1920s; William Sloane Coffin had 
credited him with the excellent condition of the museum’s finances at the close of the volatile 
decade.81 His financial genius was legendary; in 1896, he was one of five managers of a 
syndicate that included J. P. Morgan and Jacob H. Schiff which pledged $50 million to sell 
foreign exchange and prevent a gold export crisis.82 In the months following the 1929 stock 
market crash, Coffin wrote to fellow-trustee William Church Osborn explaining the Finance 
Committee’s actions, reassuring him that “the changes of investments are carefully watched by 
Mr. Blumenthal who carries a list of Museum securities wherever he goes—(both here and 
abroad) and continually checks up the standing of the various securities.”83 A major collector of 
important medieval through Rococo art, Blumenthal became a trustee in 1909; joined the 
executive committee a year later; and rose to chairman in 1932. He also had been a member of 
the finance committee from 1916. In November 1927, he initiated and drafted a significant 
resolution creating one general account out of all of the securities held in the different funds of 
the museum.84 More personally, in 1928, he and his wife Florence gave the museum $1 million, 
with the provision that the interest accumulate until after their deaths, at which point, combined 
with principal, it could be used to buy works of art.  
In addition, the Blumenthals gave generously to other causes, in particular Mount Sinai 




that time.85 Sigismund S. Goldwater, president of the Associated Hospital Service of New York, 
noted that when Blumenthal joined a working group, “his qualities of leadership soon came to 
the surface” without any personal aggressiveness. “Men turned to him instinctively when they 
saw how quickly he grasped a situation, how just was his attitude, how sound his judgment, how 
inexhaustible his energy, how successful he was in getting things done.”86 
 In manner, Blumenthal was decidedly Old World. He and his wife lived in an austere 
Italian Renaissance house on Seventieth Street and Park Avenue that they built in 1920 to 
showcase their art; its centerpiece was a two-story courtyard that had been part of a sixteenth-
century Spanish castle. The interior, illuminated by hundreds of candles, was at once “eerie and 
intimate,” and seemingly “far from the material bustle of New York,” wrote the art dealer 
Germain Seligman. “It was a dreamlike oasis of beauty, complete with melodious sound from the 
running water of the patio fountain, often the only sound of greeting.” Beyond the works of art 
and objets that, as part of the décor, were there to be touched, every detail of the house was 
flawless.87 In the evenings, the stylish Mrs. Blumenthal often wore dark velvet Renaissance-style 
gowns as she presided over her home in a relaxed way. Her husband, less comfortable in the 
space, “had a disconcerting habit of ushering guests into the elevator on the ground floor and 
then dashing up the stairs to let them out when they reached the drawing room level.”88 After his 
retirement from business in 1925, Blumenthal spent half of the year at his homes in France, 
where he engaged in extensive art collecting and received the order of the Legion of Honor 
twice: in 1925 for his aid in stabilizing the franc, and again in 1929, with his wife, for their many 





Although devoted to the Metropolitan Museum, Blumenthal was not a maverick like 
William Sloane Coffin; he instead was a reversion in style and substance back to J. P. Morgan, 
older and more Old World than the younger advocates of modernism. Just the same, the trustees 
quickly selected the 75-year-old to succeed Coffin. A draft announcement of his election written 
by H. W. Kent described Blumenthal as a “distinguished connoisseur, notable as a collector of 
judgment and as one foremost in the encouragement and promotion of the arts”; the final version, 
signed by the museum’s first vice president (and chairman of the board of U. S. Steel), Myron C. 
Taylor, replaced the word “connoisseur” with “amateur.”90 In fact, Blumenthal had begun 
collecting as a young man, and had an unusual, tactile sensibility that he used to understand the 
works he assembled. “Where the scholar labors to know about objects, the connoisseur trains 
himself through all his senses to know objects,” the curator W. M. Ivins wrote of his aesthetic 
awareness.91 Accepting the presidency with the promise that the museum would “continue to 
expand in usefulness,” Blumenthal claimed not to be planning “any new departures,” and 
acknowledged the museum’s progress in its growing availability to the public.92 In all respects, 
he was one of the most appropriate men to become the seventh president of the Metropolitan 
Museum. Except that George Blumenthal was Jewish. 
Blumenthal was the first Jewish trustee of the museum, and at the time of his 
appointment as president was still the only one. “About a quarter of the people of the city are 
Jews and a large proportion of the art treasures of the city are in Jewish hands,” Osborn had 
observed to de Forest in 1928.93 Both men were sensitive to the museum’s need to recognize the 
significant Hebrew presence in cultural affairs, and Blumenthal’s election to the board in 1909 
was largely due to de Forest’s efforts in this regard, with Morgan’s approval. Yet the trustees’ 




pedigree were in lockstep with the previous Metropolitan Museum presidents, and whose three-
decades’-long involvement as the board president of the Children’s Aid Society recalled Coffin’s 
philanthropic outlook. But in 1934, Osborn was too preoccupied with political and civic affairs 
to consider taking on the museum’s presidency, and he probably influenced the decision to offer 
the presidency to Blumenthal.94 The new president accepted the office with “a considerable 
degree of reluctance,” as he was said to generally prefer to withdraw from the forefront. And yet 
the often-“irksome” position was suited to his insight and administrative skill.95 
Blumenthal was born in 1858 in Frankfurt am Main, where he became a banker for 
Nazard-Speyer-Ellissen. In 1882, he arrived in New York, where he worked for Speyer & Co. 
until 1893, when he began a successful career at Lazard Frères.96 Following his retirement from 
the investment firm as senior partner in 1925, he devoted the rest of his life to philanthropic work 
and art collecting, an activity he took up with his wife as a distraction following their only 
child’s death.  
Blumenthal had an incisive mind and “an ebullient yet durable energy, an indomitable 
will, an unassailable integrity, great personal charm,” and a “warm heart,” according to his 
hospital colleague Goldwater, yet he also “was one of the most puzzled and in a sense one of the 
humblest of men.”97 Well into the twentieth century, letters among even the closest of friends 
rarely began with a first-name salutation; however, when Blumenthal corresponded with Herbert 
Winlock, the Metropolitan’s new director, it was always “George” to “Herbert.”98  
But to Katharine Graham, Florence Blumenthal’s niece and the future publisher of the 
Washington Post, he was “a difficult man, with a big ego and a quick temper,” whom her father, 
who worked under him briefly at Lazard, never liked.99 When Winlock retired as the 




which a New Yorker writer cryptically commented: “Mr. Blumenthal is sometimes a difficult 
man to advise and this title is to a certain extent honorary.”100 Even Seligman, who from 
childhood had enjoyed a warm relationship with Blumenthal, recognized that as a “man of daring 
in business,” he was “difficult to argue with, and had little inclination to waste time listening to 
all sorts of stories.”101 The towering financier in fact was physically small, “delicately built,” and 
“froggy,” and together with a thick German-Jewish accent, his temperament and person was 
inconsistent with his reputation as a man of cool elegance and genteel refinement.102 And yet, 
unlike the trustees who for decades had spoken of the Metropolitan as “our museum,” and the 
staff as “their” employees, Blumenthal recognized the appropriate boundaries between the 
trustees and the personnel, even if by ceding authority to the curators, the board might allow its 
influence to slowly erode.103 But this possibly was Blumenthal’s only serious nod to the 
progressive agenda Coffin had set in motion. 
Blumenthal’s artistic taste reflected his conservative approach in manner of all things, 
and his collection bore his mark as a connoisseur. It was “not a group of individual masterpieces 
purchased here and there with accidental prodigality, but the slow accumulation of years of 
patient and discriminating judgment,” wrote Francis Henry Taylor, the museum’s curator during 
Blumenthal’s tenure. “All the violent likes and dislikes of the man of taste have entered into its 
making,” he surmised. To Taylor, Blumenthal bore a similarity to his contemporary, Boston’s 
Isabella Stewart Gardner, who likewise was steeped in the European tradition of collecting, 
“fascinated by its glamour, by the romance and fury of the chase.”104 Blumenthal’s long 
progression of gifts to the museum of medieval and Old Master works began in 1905 and 
continued until his death.105 “Nowhere in this country, except at the Cloisters and in our own 




of early mediaeval ivories and enamels,” Taylor declared.106 So much of the important art 
collecting of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries was focused on European works 
dating prior to the eighteenth century, and depicting Christian religious themes. As the works 
were appreciated as art as opposed to religious iconography, it was hardly unusual, even while 
ironic, for Jewish dealers and collectors to favor them. 
During his extended stays in France, Blumenthal reported back to the museum about the 
art market with an all-consuming zeal. He rarely haggled, but simply passed up objects with 
prices he felt were unjustifiably high.107 In a July 1933 letter from Paris, he wrote to Winlock 
that there was “nothing of interest to report,” apart from a few bargains, but “no real 
improvement perceptible yet so I believe that a good many more things will come out there [in 
the] next 12 months from quarters not yet heard from.” He eagerly anticipated that it was “quite 
possible that many German museums belonging to the smaller principalities will try to part with 
good things just because their government need [sic] the cash,” and reported seeing a fine gold 
enamel cup selling for one-fifth of the 1928 price.108 Blumenthal neglected to mention a more 
serious international situation: on July 14, 1933, the German cabinet declared the National 
Socialist German Workers Party to be by law the only political party in Germany. On the same 
day, the Nazis also passed another law stripping Jewish immigrants from Poland of their German 
citizenship, and yet another for the “prevention of progeny with hereditary diseases,” mandating 
forced sterilization of Germans with genetic defects.  
Undeniably, it was customary for important art collectors with an interest in the museum 
eventually to be asked to join the board, with the notable exception of those who were Jewish, so 
Blumenthal’s reluctance to draw attention to his background was understandable. He even sent 




“unavoidable absence.”109 Blumenthal had become a trustee under Morgan’s term along with 
men like George F. Baker and Henry Clay Frick, and in that company was classified as a wealthy 
financier and collector more than anything else. Yet in the same period, in 1913, the German-
born merchant Benjamin Altman bequeathed a magnificent collection of old master paintings 
and objets d’art to the museum valued at $15 million. Exceptional highlights from the 
approximately eight-thousand-piece donation were on exhibit at the museum for several decades 
after the donation. Michael Friedsam, Altman’s closest associate, followed suit in 1931 with a 
bequest of 135 important Dutch, French, German, and Italian paintings and 200 other works 
valued at $10 million.110 Neither Altman nor Friedsam—both Jewish—were ever considered for 
Metropolitan Museum board membership. 
Like many of Gotham’s important philanthropists, Friedsam had an abiding interest in 
New York City’s civic progress, as well as in state educational matters. He often had said that 
because he did not like the way the Metropolitan Museum was run that he “never would give it a 
nickel,” and indeed spread his generosity as far afield as the Louvre, to which he gave a rare 
Italian primitive painting, and to Monticello, Thomas Jefferson’s home in Virginia, to which 
Friedsam was the first New Yorker to pledge to the campaign to save it.111 Towards the end of 
Friedsam’s life, however, it became “stronger and stronger in his mind” that the Metropolitan 
Museum indeed might be the best place for the public to view his art collection, which he 
believed to be far superior to Altman’s and quite possibly the best in the world. Displayed 
together, he felt the works could help convey the history of art, and advance public 
knowledge.112 Coffin’s endorsement of a bonafide educational agenda for the museum no doubt 
convinced Friedsam’s executors of the museum’s earnestness in that pursuit, enabling them to 




Apart from collecting, Friedsam, who had taken over the leadership of the B. Altman 
store after its founder’s death, was deeply involved in Jewish philanthropic endeavors, and he led 
the successful campaign in November 1925 to raise $4 million in four days for the Federation of 
the Support of Jewish Philanthropic Societies, pledging $25,000, the highest individual amount, 
himself.114 As chairman of the State Commission on School Finances and Administration 
appointed by Governor Al Smith in the 1920s, Friedsam recommended a municipal tax to 
subsidize public school costs, to be levied through increased taxes on either personal income, 
inheritance, corporations, or a gasoline tax; it was considered the most important educational 
measure enacted by the Legislature in many years.115 He was a director of the American Red 
Cross; a liberal supporter of Catholic Charities, the United Hospitals, the Boy Scouts, and the 
Playground and Recreation Association; a leader of the movement to complete the Cathedral of 
St. John the Divine on Morningside Heights; and as president of the Fifth Avenue Association of 
merchants, pushed for the City Administration to establish a bridge and tunnel authority and a 
city planning commission. His prescient suggestions in the realm of city planning raised 
consciousness about traffic, the condition and upkeep of the streets, and the removal of the Sixth 
Avenue elevated train; in addition, he promoted the construction of a midtown tunnel.116 When 
Friedsam died in 1931, Governor Franklin D. Roosevelt remembered his friend as “one of the 
most unselfish and useful citizens of his city and State.”117  
Friedsam, indeed, was close in spirit to the civic-minded de Forest, and even more similar 
to Coffin, both men being merchants dedicated to religious charities and to public education and 
welfare. Yet Friedsam always was associated with Jewish causes; even his $10 million bequest 
to the Metropolitan Museum headlined the Times article trumpeting “$56,200,870 Given By 




Meanwhile, both William Church Osborn and his brother Henry Fairfield Osborn, the 
American Museum of Natural History’s president, had taken note of the growing importance of 
Jewish philanthropic leaders. The Metropolitan Museum trustee Osborn encouraged placing “at 
least one young Jew” on its board.119 Similarly, his sibling wrote to fellow natural history 
museum trustee Percy R. Pyne in January 1910: “It is very important I believe to select [as a 
trustee] the name of an agreeable Hebrew, because the Zoo, the Metrop., the Public Lib. have all 
done so, and our atti[tude] is becoming conspicuous.”120  
Blumenthal, however, remained circumspect about being Jewish. When Edward 
Robinson, the Metropolitan Museum director, died in 1931, Blumenthal was among the 
illustrious pallbearers at St. Bartholomew’s Church, who included both Osborns, Coffin, John D. 
Rockefeller Jr., the architect Chester Aldrich, the art connoisseur Grenville Winthrop, and only 
one other Jew, James Speyer, as the representative of the Museum of the City of New York.121 
The New York City “power broker” Robert Moses, another assimilated German Jew, noted that 
the New York Zoological Society’s board chairman, Madison Grant, was a downright anti-
Semite, and Osborn’s wish for an “agreeable Hebrew” on the Museum of Natural History’s 
board was only heeding “the course of geological evolution.” The considerable debate over 
whether that man should be Felix Warburg or Isaac Newton Seligman, another banker, was 
“reminiscent of club stuff.” Yet “even geologically, this was not as remarkable a feat as George 
Blumenthal’s swimming up Niagara to the presidency of the Met,” Moses wrote.122  
Moses did not mince words about his opinion of “our wealthiest and most powerful 
institution,” the Metropolitan Museum, of which he was an ex officio board member as the city’s 
Parks Commissioner. In spite of the museum’s advances under Coffin, to Moses it was “still a 




modern trends, relatively unimpressed by public opinion, removed from local pride and pressure, 
but beginning to realize that even a matchless collection and a $45 million endowment require 
political backing, larger appropriations from the public treasury, and therefore a broader base and 
closer contacts with the lowest common denominator, otherwise known as Joe Doakes, the voter, 
man in the street, citizen, and taxpayer.”123  
Moses reserved his more blatant hostility for Blumenthal, who had insisted that an ex 
officio trustee could not be a member of the museum’s executive committee. Moses explained 
that he had wanted the park commissioner to be a member of the board group that acted upon the 
most important business “not because of the social distinction involved, since I did not have the 
time to attend personally, but because it was the only way in which the commissioner could be 
helpful in explaining the museum’s program to the Mayor and city financial authorities.” When 
the museum’s legal advisers finally agreed to “this sacrilege,” Blumenthal’s polite reception of 
Moses failed to impress. “Mr. Blumenthal invited me to his mansion to give me caviar and 
brandy with the glad tidings that a representative of the Park Department would be admitted to 
the holy of holies, in the hope that it would not be profaned by his presence,” Moses wrote.124 
To Moses, museum trusteeship was about power, not social acceptance. To Blumenthal, 
who had a surfeit of both—on Wall Street and in the European and American social elite 
worlds—the museum, its leadership, and its holdings represented the last bastion of a cherished 
other time. Two weeks after Blumenthal’s election in January 1934, certain members and friends 
received an engraved invitation to meet the new museum president at a 4 pm reception in the 
restaurant.125 Recalling the days when Morgan stood at the head of the stairs shaking members’ 
hands at functions, Blumenthal embraced the ceremonial aspects of his new position with his 




Taylor, Blumenthal would receive guests in the middle of the museum’s great hall. “The sight of 
them—Blumenthal short and wiry, Osborn tall and patrician, and Taylor looking like a cross 
between François I and the actor Sidney Greenstreet—made an arresting tableau,” Calvin 
Tomkins wrote.126 Moses was contemptuous of the old moneyed founders, whom he found 
arrogant and conceited. “They really felt they were the lords of creation and that nobody had the 
right even to question what they did,” Moses said.127 
 Blumenthal’s conservatism was also professional and financial. The autocratic Lazard 
partner ran the board with a businesslike efficiency, and continuing as chair of the finance 
committee even after becoming president, guarded the museum’s finances with great secrecy, 
and made a majority of the cautious investments himself.128 He “brooked no laxity in fellow-
members of the boards he directed, unequivocally reminding latecomers that it was a business 
meeting and not a social gathering,” Seligman wrote.129 Moses was not the only official to run 
into problems with transparency in the board administration. Blumenthal even refused to allow 
his finance committee to do an audit of the endowment.130 “He would bring a single copy of the 
annual financial report to the board meeting, and announce that his colleagues were welcome to 
examine it if they so desired; the general impression was that he would be much happier if they 
did not,” Tomkins wrote. Of the “rather disturbed” trustees, Ogden Mills threatened to resign 
unless Blumenthal agreed to distribute copies of the statement to the board; the president 
reluctantly complied.131  
As a “sound money” advocate, Blumenthal opposed the New Deal and submitted an open 
letter, via Henry Morgenthau Jr., Acting Secretary of the Treasury, to President Roosevelt in 
November 1933. “I know you do not wish to put your country into bankruptcy,” he began, “but if 




to for several months. By calling immediate halt in present policies and announcing intention 
reverting to sound money and accepting the working of the law of demand and supply, chaos and 
ruin can probably still be avoided.” He predicted that Roosevelt’s “faulty measures” would bring 
“untold misfortune” to the United States.132 Blumenthal’s message was picked up by the national 
press, and in some circles was roundly criticized. (The Pittsfield, Massachusetts Eagle even 
joked that the financier was an advocate of sound money, but apparently not sound grammar.) 
But Blumenthal’s fiscal caution, along with curtailed operating expenses and limited 
purchasing as mandated by de Forest, kept the museum afloat during the Depression. Although 
some great art treasures went to other repositories during this period, in 1934 the museum also 
began building the Cloisters in Fort Tryon Park, funded by Rockefeller.133  
The Cloisters project was thoroughly compatible with Blumenthal’s aesthetic orientation, 
and he chaired its special committee with passion. Indeed, Moses cheekily complained that 
Blumenthal’s “dictum” that “nothing significant had been painted, molded, or wrought since 
1900” persisted and grew in authority even as the world moved well into the twentieth 
century.134 Modern art simply was too far a departure from his taste. He barely could tolerate 
being in the same room with Gertrude Stein, the American expatriate intellectual and storied 
modern art collector, who adapted Cubist philosophy to the written word. When Blumenthal 
heard her lecture at the Colony Club, James Rorimer, the young assistant curator of decorative 
arts, eventual curator of medieval art, and future Metropolitan Museum director, warned the 
museum president that he would make history if he left in the presence of so many distinguished 
guests. But he departed anyway, and Rorimer followed up with a telegram saying, “By leaving 




nine times.” Rorimer fondly remembered decades later that although Blumenthal refused to 
acknowledge receipt of the telegram, for months he “kept telling the story all over town.”135  
Even so, in 1934-35, Blumenthal did appoint a joint committee to consider “some form of 
relation” between the Metropolitan and the new Museum of Modern Art. Recognizing a broad 
common objective, the boards addressed the Modern Museum’s ability to “act more 
experimentally” while the Metropolitan acknowledged the limits of its obligation to purchase the 
work of living artists as mandated by the bequest of James A. Hearn. “It was felt that on such 
matters as these, mutual consideration and cooperation would be of great value,” a memo from 
the first meeting in November 1934 described. Although cooperation was animated by the 
formation of the committee and the proposed election of three trustees shared by both boards, 
ultimately nothing of programmatic substance immediately occurred to further a modernist 
agenda for the Metropolitan Museum under Blumenthal.136 
The selection process for a new director to replace the ailing Herbert Winlock tested 
Blumenthal’s conservatism, anti-modernism, and his Semitic ambivalence. Blumenthal may have 
feared exposure to criticism about bringing Jews to the Metropolitan Museum leadership or 
professional circle; even so, there was a definite divide between the notion of Jewish trustees and 
the reality of Jewish curators. In the professional sphere, particularly in the arts, the growing 
Jewish presence did not raise eyebrows in the way it did in the social arena of cultural boards or 
clubs. Two vital staff members were Jewish—Rorimer, who helped develop the Cloisters, and 
Harry Wehle, the curator of paintings and nephew of Justice Brandeis.137  
In June 1939, William Church Osborn, charged with the search for a director, surveyed 
some of the leading American art historians for ideas. Charles Rufus Morey, the head of the 




position among art museums, the scholarship of the curators and the director should be 
paramount, and he was hardly alone in this assessment. The time had long passed for the 
museum to rest as a “mere collection of fine objects.” The best man for the directorship, he 
suggested, was Paul Sachs of Harvard, who stood out as a scholar, a collector, and an 
administrator. Morey told Osborn that Sachs’s relations with public officials as well as with the 
general public “was certain to be good,” and added that in the past, Sachs had expressed an 
interest in the museum directorship.138 Osborn immediately cabled Blumenthal at the Ritz in 
Paris for permission to make inquiries and schedule an interview.  
At the time, Paul Sachs was in the midst of a long and illustrious career at Harvard as a 
professor of Art History, chairman of the Department of Fine Arts (Art History), and associate 
director of the Fogg Art Museum. Functioning with considerable skill and imagination without a 
board of trustees, the Fogg’s director, Edward Waldo Forbes, together with Sachs, extended the 
museum’s influence far beyond New England.139 Sachs, however, was best known as the 
professor of a graduate seminar on museum history, philosophy, and methods, the first of its kind 
in the United States, and consequently the most important training ground for future museum 
curators and professionals. Through his course, Sachs mentored two generations of museum 
professionals, including future directors of the Metropolitan Museum, the Museum of Modern 
Art, the National Gallery of Art, the Boston Museum of Fine Arts, and the Art Institute of 
Chicago.140 He counted among his protégés James Rorimer and other Metropolitan Museum 
curators, although his most famous was Alfred H. Barr Jr., the Museum of Modern Art’s first 
director, hand-picked by Sachs at Abby Aldrich Rockefeller’s behest. But in his position at 





Osborn was taken aback when Blumenthal cabled back from Paris that he was 
unimpressed with his choice of Sachs: “CONSIDER SACHS HIGH CLASS CHARACTER 
AND VERY SCHOLARLY VERY GENTLEMANLY BUT UNATTRACTIVE 
PERSONALITY STOP UNDER PRESENT CONDITIONS AFRAID WOULD BE GREAT 
MISTAKE GIVING HIM POSITION AS WOULD SURELY BE VERY UNPOPULAR AND 
OPEN TO MUCH UNJUSTIFIED CRITICISM ADVISE ABSTAINING PRESENTLY 
PERSONAL INTERVIEW WILL WRITE      BLUMENTHAL.”142 Morey and Osborn 
communicated again, and the Princeton professor only pressed Sachs’s case further: “The more I 
think of the Metropolitan directorship, the more it seems to me a job considerably beyond the 
capacities of the museum directors that I know. . . . The place seems to me to be exactly 
comparable to that of the presidency of one of our most important universities, and the qualities 
to be sought seem to me to be those we seek in filling a university presidency.” Morey was ever 
more convinced that Paul Sachs was the man for the job. Furthermore, heeding Blumenthal’s 
apparent hesitation more explicitly, Morey added that Sachs “would be the least affected by 
prejudice as to his race of all the prominent Jews in the country, having for one thing the solid 
backing of the Harvard interests and of Princeton as well, so far as our department is 
concerned.”143 He also was known to every member of the Metropolitan Museum’s staff, and 
Winlock and Osborn both anticipated that if chosen, Sachs would be favorably accepted by the 
public.144 
Sachs’s exposure to art did not come from Harvard alone. As the eldest son of Samuel 
Sachs and the nephew of Marcus Goldman, the investment bankers who founded Goldman, 
Sachs & Company, Paul Sachs was born to privilege. After studying at Harvard, where his 




York, where he frequented the museums and galleries, and came to know prominent art dealers 
and collectors, many of them family friends like Altman and Friedsam.145 He returned to Harvard 
and to art history, however, at age thirty-seven. At Shady Hill, his Cambridge home, Sachs led a 
lively salon that drew on not only Harvard’s luminaries and students, but also included national 
and international museum directors and art collectors.146 Professionally, Sachs was a trustee of 
Boston’s Museum of Fine Arts, the Institute of Contemporary Art, and the Cincinnati Art 
Museum; he also was a trustee of Radcliffe, Smith, and Wellesley, and received honorary 
degrees from Colby College, Princeton, Yale, as well as Harvard. New Yorker Grenville 
Winthrop donated his important four-thousand-piece art collection to the Fogg because of Sachs, 
transforming the museum from “a good study collection” to an “institution of global stature.”147 
Finally, Sachs was one of seven founding trustees of the Museum of Modern Art, to which he 
gave works that initiated its department of graphic arts. 
Sachs had wide-ranging charitable interests that included work for the Red Cross, board 
membership with the Urban League, and, during World War II, he helped rescue scholars, as 
well as works of art, from the Nazis. Like Blumenthal, he had little interest in Judaism, however, 
and identified even less with Jewish causes. Although proud of his family name, he felt that 
distinguishing himself intellectually and aesthetically counteracted any bigotry about his 
inherited ethnicity.148 But Sachs also was an elitist who valued cultivation and looked to the 
scholarly role of the art museum. His conviction was that “a museum worker must first and 
foremost be a broad, well-trained scholar, a linguist, and then in due course, a specialist, a 
scholar with wide bibliographical knowledge, a scholar with broad human sympathies including 
a belief in popular education, a curator and administrator taught to understand that in the 




educational institution, and last, but no means least, that he should be a competent speaker and 
writer, as well as a man of the world with bowing acquaintance with other fields.”149 In other 
words, the archetypal “museum worker” was Paul Sachs himself. 
Osborn wrote back to Blumenthal suggesting that on an eastward trip he might stop at the 
Fogg to see, but not interview Sachs, and added that none of the people he had already 
interviewed, Francis Henry Taylor of the Worcester Art Museum, Horace H. F. Jayne of the 
University of Pennsylvania Museum, or William Milliken of the Cleveland Museum, were up to 
the demands of the job.150 
In a letter following his telegram, Blumenthal more specifically voiced his concerns, 
acknowledging again that Sachs was a “high-class man.” But Blumenthal also felt that the 
towering figure in the field of art history did not measure up. “His personality is anything but 
attractive + he has not sufficient courage to defend his opinions but rather bows down to that of 
persons considered ‘authorities,’ who are also apt to make mistakes,” Blumenthal somewhat 
outrageously stated. Then he acknowledged in couched terms that he was Jewish, and this was a 
problem. “If everything else was satisfactory it might still be unwise to consider Sachs on 
account of the positions held in the Museum by me, Wehle + Rorimer. This point, however, need 
not be considered because of the other shortcomings, one of which is that he is about 58 years 
old,” Blumenthal concluded.151 
As far as Blumenthal was concerned, under no circumstances would Paul Sachs ever get 
the job. 
Blumenthal was not averse to considering even Morey himself, even though he was older 
and less distinguished than Sachs. Taylor and Jayne ultimately were the finalists, and a less-than-




Taylor who was Blumenthal’s first choice.152 In the end, Taylor became the new director, and 
Jayne, his close friend and associate, the vice-director. Together, they would lead the museum to 
mid-century with a commitment to change that would not be met approvingly by everyone.  
Nevertheless, the election of the irreverent, un-stuffy, thirty-seven-year-old Taylor was 
seen as a coup for younger trustees seeking a more progressive approach to the museum 
management. His art experience notwithstanding, the New Yorker described Taylor as “a 
nonconformist member of an old Philadelphia fox-hunting family” who weighed over two 
hundred pounds, and had “a passion for good cheeses.”153 
It is interesting to speculate about the direction the Metropolitan Museum might have 
taken had Sachs become its director in 1940. The period included discussions in the direction of 
an unprecedented artistic modernism: a proposed consolidation with the Whitney Museum in 
1943-47, and a potential contract with the Museum of Modern Art to purchase its pioneering 
works no longer considered “modern.” Neither plan came to fruition. The decade also witnessed 
the launch of a large seventy-fifth anniversary fundraising and membership campaign; new 
public relations initiatives; and continual pressure from Robert Moses regarding the museum’s 
finances, the city’s responsibility for erecting additional buildings, and his persistent criticisms 
about the absence of women on its board. During the Sachs controversy, Winlock and Osborn 
commiserated about the unfortunate circumstances between the famed art historian and 
Blumenthal. “I am not sure that he is entirely persona grata with G.B.,” Winlock wrote. “They 
are of the same race, perhaps that is the trouble,” he concluded.154 
When Blumenthal died in 1941, he bequeathed to the museum all of his works of art 
dating before 1720 as well as his house itself. While he had considered leaving the building 




special fund for the museum.155 The celebrated Spanish Renaissance patio from the Vélez Blanco 
palace, where Blumenthal lay in state and where his nondenominational funeral took place, was 
then reinstalled in the museum.156 He was remembered as a man whose keen business sense was 
matched only by his connoisseur’s taste, which was evidenced not only in his collection, but also 
in the museum’s purchases during his term of office.157 
Adjacent to Blumenthal’s obituary in the museum Bulletin was a harbinger of the 
changing times: an announcement of the museum’s television initiative, a new arm of the 
institution’s educational activities. “The only reason that I can discover for the quality which I 
describe as a new life, when pictures are transmitted by television, is that the picture is repainted 
by millions of electronic particles,” Gilbert Seldes, the Director of Television Programs for CBS, 
wrote. Through modern technology, works of art now could be brought into thousands of homes 
simultaneously.158 This was in ironic juxtaposition to the publication’s remembrance of the late 
president, whose only visible commitment to modernity was a push-button device in his bedroom 





Brother, Can You Spare a Dime? The Opera Goes Begging 
 
During the 1920s, consistent with the progressive impulses of the day, and like the library and 
the museum, the Metropolitan Opera Company embraced technological advances and created 
new professional standards, both of which presented fresh opportunities for additional revenue. 
The Company signed recording contracts with the Victor Talking Machine Company and with 
Brunswick-Balke Collender,1 and enforced the clause in contracts prohibiting artists from 
performing on any other American stage.2 No longer a scattershot assemblage of stars and 
musicians contracted from season to season, the Metropolitan Opera Company had become a 
renowned institution with a consistently high standard of artistic quality, consistency, and 
professionalism.  
 This evolution occurred independently of the theater in which the Company performed. 
In 1922, Kahn approached the Metropolitan Opera Real Estate board with a proposal from the 
city for the opera house to move to a planned City Art Centre, located at the blocks from Forty-
eighth or Forty-ninth Street to Fifty-first or Fifty-second Street, running through from Seventh to 
Sixth Avenues. As an inducement, the City was offering title to the site upon which the Real 
Estate Company would erect the theater. The Metropolitan Opera Company would rent the new 
house, the two board entities and their relationship would remain the same, and the Real Estate 
Company would have the same right to determine box owners.3  
 Even as many of the opera leaders joined Kahn in embracing the future, equally powerful 
others were retrenching into the past if only to hold onto their social status and authority, and not 
cede it to presumptuous newcomers. The tension tested the leadership group even while it 




 Essentially, Kahn’s proposal called for an up-to-date theater to be erected in an 
increasingly modern city, even while retaining the antiquated social standard that was the 
foundation of the initial enterprise. But clearly, new economic and social realities nevertheless 
were marginalizing the Metropolitan Opera Real Estate Company and its house. Even in the act 
of proposing the change, the city approached Kahn and the opera company, not the real estate 
board. With the boxes now controlled by the descendants of the original founders, the great 
funds and funders that built the opera house were now becoming a thing of the past. Significantly 
increased taxes and mounting expenses to maintain the building were considerable concerns of 
the Real Estate Company, which hoped to pass the costs on to the Opera Company in a 
renegotiated lease. World War I had reconfigured international society, depleting the ranks of 
real royalty in Europe and changing the quality of its ersatz counterparts in the United States. 
Individually, the Real Estate contingent still possessed significant inherited fortunes, but the 
group lacked initiative if not the disposable funds to build a new house. Furthermore, it was the 
old Metropolitan Opera House itself that was partly responsible for these men’s enduring, albeit 
waning, social power. Not surprisingly, J. P. Morgan Jr. moved that the City Art Centre proposal 
be rejected.4  
 Kahn was not so easily dissuaded, and again approached the Real Estate Company in late 
1925 with another proposal, this time initiated by the Metropolitan Opera Company itself.5 
While Kahn had discussed the matter privately over the years with George H. Haven, the late 
president of the Real Estate group who had agreed about the growing inadequacy of the old 
theater, he and Kahn both were deferential to the Real Estate board. But now the situation was 
becoming more urgent, and Haven was gone. Kahn acknowledged as always the “high standing 




the success and prestige of Grand Opera.”6 Even though Kahn represented a board and company 
whose commitment to opera was more of an artistic rather than a social nature, he wished for the 
opera house’s traditions to endure in a new space. 
 Kahn himself, not the Real Estate Company, was making the necessary arrangements to 
finance a new house. In fact, to secure the desirable site at Fifty-seventh to Fifty-sixth Streets 
between Eighth and Ninth Avenues, Kahn purchased it at his own risk for $3 million, prior to 
obtaining the views of the Real Estate Company.7 The old Metropolitan Opera House and the 
board that managed it had become irrelevant. Yet Kahn graciously held out the hope that “the 
same group of gentlemen who control the present Opera House should take the lead in the 
erection and control of a new Opera House, acting either through their present organization or in 
their individual capacities.”8 
 Meanwhile, Kahn held that the “overwhelming preponderance of opinion” was that the 
old Met physically no longer met “present conditions and requirements.” Everything behind the 
curtain—the narrow wings; the shallow stage; the facilities for scene storage, wardrobe, and 
stage effects; the dressing rooms; the ventilation—were all “sadly inadequate.”9 The traffic near 
the theater also had become an insoluble problem. And for the productions themselves, “the cost 
of giving opera in the style befitting the Metropolitan” was mounting even as “the limit of 
income which can be obtained within the capacity of the present House” had been reached.10  
 Kahn’s main argument for improvement, however, was that the Real Estate Company had 
never considered the notion of bringing opera to the masses in addition to boxholders. The 
Metropolitan Opera Company’s operating board was “in constant touch” with the public and was 
unanimous in its conviction that a new building had become “an urgent necessity” for the 




in the world.” Furthermore, it was unjust to take money from the poor for unsatisfactory lower-
priced seats. To Kahn, it was a “compelling obligation” for the company, “standing as it does in 
a kind of trust relationship to the opera-loving public of New York, to provide amply and 
generously for those of its patrons who are of small or modest means and in whose case the price 
of a ticket often means close economy and self-denial.”11  
 The most radical departure in Kahn’s proposal concerned the box arrangement. 
Traditionally, box owners attended the operas they chose and then rented or gave their boxes 
away for any remaining performances, a system Kahn deemed “inconvenient, troublesome and 
expensive to the owners, and detrimental to the value of the boxes.” Therefore, he suggested that 
in a new scheme there be no owners and only lessees. With five subscription performances each 
week, and assuming thirty boxes, he suggested that one hundred fifty persons be invited to 
become box holders for one performance each week (or more than one evening if so desired by 
any of those so invited). The cost of renting such a box would be approximately $3,500.—or 
about $145. for each performance.”12 
 Furthermore, Kahn envisioned the “new Metropolitan” architecturally to be “plain and 
dignified, on good but simple lines, seeking its distinction in being perfectly adapted to its 
purpose, both on the stage and in the accommodation to the public, rather than in outward 
impressiveness.”13 In keeping with current trends, the building did not need to be monumental, 
ornamental, or rival European theaters physically. Kahn was anticipating a Metropolitan Opera 
House cut along more egalitarian and modernist lines—a place that, unlike the old Met, was not 
an architectural manifestation of the grand, aristocratic aspirations of the plutocrats who had built 
it. Although Kahn had ascended to the boxholding privilege, it was clear that it was the opera 




certain of what drew them to the opera house. A new way of thinking was sidelining old elites. 
The financial and creative vitality of the Met now relied on new money and fresh habits of mind 
to assure its preeminence in the twentieth century. 
 Opera, of course, never had been a moneymaking endeavor. Kahn saw fit to remind the 
Real Estate Board that the stockholders of the Opera Company—primarily Kahn himself—“have 
never received or claimed any interest or dividends whatever on the capital which for 17 years 
they have furnished and kept invested in producing Grand Opera in a manner befitting the 
traditions, the dignity and the standards of the art enterprise which was called into being by the 
founders of the Metropolitan Opera House and which has come to rank, by universal assent, as 
the world’s foremost operatic institution.”14 
 The Real Estate Board, no longer a small, powerful, purposeful entity with limitless 
means, answered by abdicating the question of a new theater to the individual stockholders. A 
passive tone of resignation permeated their public response. “The sentiment was expressed, that 
if the new Opera House project goes successfully forward in the hands of the Metropolitan Opera 
Company, this Company would doubtless retire from the field and leave the conduct of opera for 
the future wholly in the hands of the newer organization, under whose care and zeal great artistic 
success have been achieved.”15 It was up to the boxholders to either accept or reject the plan, for 
the board was removing itself from the debate. Board president R. Fulton Cutting replied to 
Kahn’s letter: “[I]t was decided that the Company would not undertake the erection of a new 
building for the production of opera. Moreover, it has no intention of continuing to produce 
opera if a new building such as your Committee proposes should be provided for that purpose.”16  
 The Times stated it more plainly: “The present opera house holding company, controlling 




the opera house,” and the directors were hesitating to assume the responsibility for a new site for 
“the leading musical structure in America.”17 The new endeavor would require youthful energy 
in addition to money to direct it, and the newspaper questioned whether once that leadership was 
in place if Kahn would transfer to the new organization the site he had provisionally acquired.18 
Kahn and his land purchase forced an uncomfortable issue, and the social protocol of a different 
time no longer determined who would take the lead in creating a new performance space. All 
that it seemed would be necessary for such a monumental move was money and initiative, and 
Kahn possessed both. 
 Nevertheless, Kahn proceeded in the two years of discussions that followed with utmost 
regard for the old governing board. The Real Estate group did not fade into irrelevance partly 
because of its ties to the old social order that both the board and the theater represented, and 
partly because the board still held some social power. With discussions for a new theater on the 
table, nominally entered into cooperatively by both Real Estate and Opera Company boards but 
actually spearheaded by one man, Kahn, it might have been logical to think about consolidating 
interests into one central group of directors. But the Real Estate Company was not going to 
capitulate so quickly. 
 In the days that followed the discussions in early January 1926, the battle lines that would 
endure until late 1928 were already clear. R. Fulton Cutting, the president of the Real Estate 
Company, was of the opinion, shared by many on his board, that the old opera house was 
sufficient, and he and Cornelius N. Bliss corresponded frequently about their distrust of Kahn, 
who clearly favored a move. Less than a week after the announcement, public opinion emerged 
strongly in favor of a new home, in spite of the reservations of some who held a sentimental 




news item had taken, which insinuated that plans for the new house were not the result of a 
mutual agreement by the two boards.20 The thirty-five boxholders, as shareholders of the 
Metropolitan Opera House, were for the most part also in favor of replacing the theater.21 (Even 
Cornelius Bliss had to relent, because his older sister Lillie, with whom he shared a box, wished 
to sign up for the new plan.22) But the greater power of the boxholders’ control was social rather 
than financial. “It is conceded that it would not be difficult to raise the money required, but that it 
is essential that the project should have behind it the names and the prestige of the present 
boxholders,” wrote the Times, which observed that the Met served another function as “the only 
centralizing factor in New York society,” now broken into small groups and driven by disparate 
influences. “The Golden Horseshoe represents New York society’s last stand as a unit,” the 
newspaper stated.23  
 What would a new Metropolitan House look like, and how would it represent twentieth-
century New York City? In a January 1926 editorial, the Times warned that Kahn’s plot of land 
was within “audible distance” of the elevated railroad, and on the less-desirable Upper West 
Side. But it also was affordable, convenient, on wide Fifty-seventh Street, and accessible on all 
four sides of the building. A new building also had the potential to be one of architectural 
integrity, with an opera house at its core and studios and offices “piled up in ‘cloud-capt [sic] 
towers,’” a contemporary skyscraper style considered by some to be “the finest contribution of 
America to architecture, in dignity and impressiveness.”24 The theater could be large enough to 
hold 500 to 1,000 more of the “opera-going masses,” opening up the “beneficent prospect of 
giving the pleasure and profit of hearing opera to a greater public” while increasing the 
company’s receipts. Modern acoustical engineering, no longer a “gamble” but a matter of 




assumed that, this time, New York’s opera house will be built by an architect who has seen the 
inside of a theatre and knows all the intricate requirements of a modern stage.”25 
 For those who would mourn the passing of a hallowed arena, these remained practical 
issues. Moreover, unlike the government-subsidized opera houses of Paris or London, in New 
York no structure was off limits to the wrecker’s ball, its opera house included. “The wide plazas 
that make monuments of foreign opera house and give them permanency do not exist here, where 
land is so precious and business so progressive,” stated Paul Morris in the Times.26 Similarly, the 
foundations of the upper class social order were beginning to feel equally impermanent in New 
York City. 
 A new Metropolitan Opera House seemed inevitable, and it gave some New Yorkers with 
long enough memories pause to contemplate the “opera wars” of the 1880s. It would be 
dangerous to reduce the numbers of boxes of the new theater to thirty from thirty-five, as was 
suggested, even as it would be rash to pass judgment on what the Times called “the needs and 
rightful claims of New York society in opera boxes.”27 The Academy of Music lost the “opera 
war” to the Met in part because it was too small physically and too exclusive socially. The Met, 
in turn, was now expanding its physical and social boundaries further.  
 New Yorker George Hillard Benjamin, a prominent 74-year-old scientist, lawyer, and 
patent expert, reminisced about the Academy of Music, and what “The Opera” meant to New 
Yorkers in the nineteenth century. The building, he wrote, was essentially a social center—a 
place “where public and private balls, receptions, and the like could be given and which would 
be adequate for the proper presentation of opera.” There was a definite pecking order to the 
arrangement of the seats, which reflected New York’s developing class structure: the parquet 




socially unimportant “would-bes,” otherwise known as “the legion of the lost ones, the cohort of 
the damned.”28 Now, ownership of a box at the Metropolitan Opera held no social significance 
whatsoever, in his opinion. Box sublets were prevalent, and box owners were socially unknown, 
not because they were unworthy, but because organized society in New York had ceased to exist. 
There were no longer four hundred qualifying elites—there were thousands. Benjamin believed, 
and others concurred, that the old Met boxholders had lacked their own initiative for building a 
new opera house because the opera was “no longer a social necessity,” and the estates which 
held the boxes were no longer inclined to invest money in what would be “a purely business 
enterprise.” He thus suggested that a new opera house should be built and controlled by the 
people of the City of New York, and controlled by a board of governors, much as the 
Metropolitan Museum was.29 But that was an idea whose time had not yet come. 
 Other observers were wont to find the similarities between 1880 and 1926, although in 
fact the impulses that led to the building of the Met in the 1880s were social rather than artistic, 
and in the 1920s the priorities were artistic rather than social. Where the Met was concerned, 
Otto Kahn, too, recognized the limitations of the antique theatre not only technologically, but 
also socially. There were “opera going masses” to please in addition to thirty-five boxholders. 
Kahn simply loved the opera, and desired for it to be as well presented as it could be for the 
benefit of as many people as possible.  
 The Metropolitan Opera House had become a venue of world stature, of which New 
Yorkers of all classes had every reason to be proud. It was one of the first places that 
distinguished foreign visitors would visit upon arriving in New York, and it managed to maintain 




opera in this country no one theatre has been able to hold the fashionable world so long as has 
the Metropolitan.”30 But was it the opera or the house that held their attention? 
 In a poignant coincidence, amidst all the discussions in early 1926 about the “new” Met, 
a short article announced the closing of the Academy of Music with a performance hosted by the 
building’s new owner, the Consolidated Gas Company of New York. “An unusual demonstration 
of sentiment will be witnessed this afternoon,” the Times anticipated, to which several musicians 
who had played at the Academy years before had been invited, along with only two descendants 
of families who had held seats there. The announcement neglected to mention what was to be 
performed, an appropriately fitting end for a theater which began less for art than for a now-
outdated aristocratic ideal.31 The Academy of Music was demolished soon afterwards, and an 
office building was erected in its place. 
*** 
 The 1926 Metropolitan Opera season began in the fall with a few notable changes in the 
boxes. August Belmont’s estate relinquished Box 4, which Belmont had purchased in 1895.32 
Anticipating the impending move, William K. Vanderbilt II and Harold S. Vanderbilt, sons of 
Alva and William K. Vanderbilt, the largest initial stockholder in the Metropolitan Opera House, 
relinquished Box 6. Vincent Astor, grandson of nineteenth-century society’s queen Caroline, 
now shared Box 7 with several others. In fact, all boxes but the J. P. Morgan family’s were 
shared.33 In the modern “café society” of the Roaring Twenties, opera was but one entertainment 
among many, and it stood to reason that an opera box might not be constantly occupied. Box 
subletting also could prove lucrative: Georgine Iselin, who held three hundred shares of stock in 
the Met as represented by her box, leased it from the Metropolitan Opera Real Estate Company 




a case that went to the Supreme Court in 1926, she and similar stockholders were found to be 
exempt from a 50 percent tax imposed on comparable sales by scalpers.34 
 The opening night in October 1926 was filled with sentimental anticipation, as people 
crowded into the soon-to-be-extinct old auditorium. The house that once dominated Broadway, 
the Times wrote, “now is lost among twenty surrounding skyscrapers.”35 Subscriptions for the 
season’s four thousand seats were “near saturation,” and the wider public looked to get on the list 
for future consideration in the event of a move. The opera, indeed, now was going to be open to 
everyone. Opening night remained a social event, with “the delay of seeking out the old familiar 
quarters and exchanging a new season’s greetings with the neighbors of other years.” The house 
was “filled to its last chair or foot of standing room.” But the audience was a different one from 
the previous century’s, and represented, possibly as no other audience, the New York of the 
present.36 
 News accounts of who-was-who in the boxes were no longer limited to the parterre 
“golden horseshoe” of the first ring. The public now knew who would be in the Grand Tier and 
who would be in the Stall Boxes each season. These subscribers ranged from “lesser” society 
people, to John J. Raskob, the financial executive and builder of the Empire State Building, to 
Samuel Minskoff, the Jewish New York real estate developer. Exclusive preparatory and 
finishing schools and colleges also sat in certain boxes for the season.37 The “omnibus” box at 
the left side of the grand tier was filled, as it had been since 1893, with members of the 
Metropolitan Opera Club, a broadly mixed organization of approximately one hundred business 
and artistic men not of the social caliber of the house’s golden horseshoe elect, but whose 
standing in the professional world was of some note.38 By the 1920s, along with much less 




several Jewish bankers, art collectors, and philanthropists like Jules S. Bache and Ludwig 
Vogelstein.39 
 Indeed, New York operagoers had grown extraordinarily diverse by the 1920s, ranging 
from the elites in the boxes, to the standees, to the immigrant couple who would share one ticket 
in the upper balcony by alternating acts with waiting on the sidewalk.40 Homosexuals found the 
opera to be artistically congenial and socially convivial. Gay activity in the early twentieth 
century was strongly policed, and the State Liquor Authority prohibited lesbians and gay men 
not only from working in most restaurants, bars, and other businesses that served liquor, but also 
from openly gathering in such establishments.41 Homosexual men thus met discreetly at places 
like the Astor and Plaza Hotel bars, showed up for performances of gay iconic entertainers, and 
enjoyed the opera and ballet. The Metropolitan Opera became a meeting place, since police 
never raided cultural events. George Chauncey’s study of gay New York quoted a man who 
recalled that at the opera, “all stops were pulled out as far as costume and grooming.” The opera 
house encompassed multiple audiences and cultural meanings, and to Chauncey, this subtlety 
was largely obscure to the leadership class.42  
 Indicative of the tone of the new Metropolitan Opera House undertaking, the two board 
factions also were blending. Harry Payne Whitney had been on both boards for years, and there 
was one of two Robert Goelets—the first cousins Robert W. and Robert—on each board. 
Strongly in favor of the new opera house, William K. Vanderbilt II, along with Vincent Astor, 
joined the Metropolitan Opera Company board in 1926.43 His father, also William K., had been a 
leading force on both the Real Estate Company and the Conried Company boards from their 
earliest days, and, ironically, had brought up the subject of a new opera house to the Opera 




Company board, R. Fulton Cutting Jr., the son of the conservative president of the Real Estate 
board, also joined the opposing board. The extended Vanderbilt family that had founded the 
opera house was splintering and exhibiting divergent levels of interest; following the lead of their 
nephews William K. and Harold, the daughters of William H. Vanderbilt, Mrs. Henry White and 
Mrs. H. McK. Twombly, sold their family box in 1927.45  
 “New Opera House Uptown Assured,” proclaimed a New York Times headline in early 
1927.46 All uncertainty was now ended with Kahn’s announcement that the directors of the 
Metropolitan Opera and Real Estate Company, upon whose decision the move rested, had 
unanimously voted in favor of a new house. Now, after a year, the project was ready to proceed 
to the next stage, with plans for a new theater seating 5,000 (up from the current capacity of 
3,600); a tower for studios and apartments atop the structure; and thirty-two instead of thirty-five 
parterre boxes to be leased instead of owned. Each purchaser was to pay $145,000 to acquire a 
1/32 share in the real estate, opera house, and apartment house, as well as the use of a particular 
box on Mondays and a choice of Thursdays or Saturday matinees. For all other performances the 
boxes would be available for rent by application to the Real Estate Company, which now would 
profit from sublets.47 Every seat, however, was promised to have a full and unobstructed view of 
the stage (unlike at the old Met), and the increased capacity was planned “mainly for the purpose 
of providing more low-priced and medium-priced seats,” another deficiency of the old space.48 
 The reduction of the number of boxes in the new theater appeared to be driven less by 
design or necessity than by the fact that a few of the estates that still held boxes at the old Met 
had expressed a desire to dispose of them. While Kahn claimed that the choice of fewer boxes 
was governed “largely by architectural considerations,” in fact, no architect had yet been 




leading up to the stock market crash in 1929; both Vanderbilt boxes were sold for a reported 
$200,000 each.50 Even so, the boxes were the last stronghold of the Met’s ancient social control, 
and were not so easily purchased, even in the altered context of a new, twentieth-century 
auditorium. 
 By spring 1927, Cutting, the chair of the Real Estate Company, was now speaking 
encouragingly about the venture to the press, even though he clearly had reservations about both 
the scheme and Kahn himself. All but three or four boxholders had deposited their stock with the 
committee in charge of the erection of the new opera house, and three or four unnamed others 
wished to “retire and liquidate for various reasons.”51 At a meeting attended by twenty-eight 
boxholders, attorneys, and committee members, no action was necessary, as the committee 
already was in possession of a majority of the boxholders’ stock.52 Cutting also stated plainly 
that regardless of any lingering regret over the loss of the old theater, “the principal disability of 
the house is its incapacity to earn sufficient income to meet the greatly increased cost of 
operation and its heavily mounting taxes.”53 Combined with the unanimous vote of the Real 
Estate Company board, the move to Fifty-seventh Street now appeared certain, and construction 
was anticipated to begin after Kahn’s return from Europe. 
 However, hints of some deviations from the plan were already beginning to surface. The 
Metropolitan Opera House directors wanted to wait for definite estimates of the cost of the 
building, which would be ready by the fall. Kahn’s preliminary estimate, which he sent much 
sooner in May, was a prohibitive $4.2 million. Cutting was enraged, and was suggesting 
privately to other board members that they reject the proposition. His venom was directed at 
Kahn. “This shows that we cannot evidently depend at all upon any of his statements,” Cutting 




improbable that we can continue any negotiations with him,” he declared, adding that the Real 
Estate Company should make an announcement “in the near future” about withdrawing the old 
opera house from sale.54  
 Issues with the architects, Benjamin Wistar Morris and his associate, Joseph Urban, also 
were of concern.55 Nevertheless, Morris and Urban’s selection was delicately in keeping with the 
interests of the two governing entities: Morris had designed the Morgan Library, and thus was in 
Morgan and the Real Estate Company’s camp, while Urban, a well-known architect and designer 
of over forty Met productions, reflected the Opera Company’s interests.56 
 It seemed fair enough for the boxholders, who were largely funding the project, to 
question costs. As the old Met now was commonly perceived to be “the embodiment of the 
conservative forces of the town as nothing else is—not even the churches,” the move uptown 
was going to be not merely a local, but a national event. “It represents all over the country the 
stronghold of the social prestige that still clings to the metropolitan city of the New World,” 
wrote H. I. Brock of the Times.57 The social element still mattered to the structure’s funders. As 
an institution, the Metropolitan Opera remained a private as opposed to a state concern, “an 
alliance between wealth with a modicum of taste . . . and the public that is interested in the 
music-drama.”58 As a place, though, the Met, while historic, had become old, shabby, and 
inadequate, left behind in the northward march of the city’s development. To take its amorphous 
prestige along with it in a move uptown to modern quarters would be “a task of delicate 
diplomacy.”59 Kahn was once again playing the ambassador-negotiator. But now the 
circumstances were more complicated than they were years before with the New Theatre 
venture, in which Kahn’s role was to appease a temperamental director while leading an 




with the remnants of nineteenth-century social New York, indeed, a group that in the past had 
politely resisted him in every possible way. 
 In spite of the apparent public unanimity of the Real Estate Company action, reports 
leaked from late May through the summer that some stockholders were not comfortable with the 
Fifty-seventh Street site, and favored a more “conspicuous” location. Where the additional 
millions to obtain such a site would come from, nobody could say.60 Fifth Avenue and 110th 
Street, facing Central Park, emerged as a new possibility, although many were taken aback that a 
site so far uptown could be seriously entertained.61 But what the leaders Bliss and Cutting really 
were most uncomfortable about was Kahn. The Opera Company president responded with 
diplomatic practicality, appearing to be flexible about alternative sites while forthright about the 
appropriateness of his original choice, which was near the theater district and accessible to both 
the east and west sides.62  
 Kahn’s response also betrayed his impatience with the financial obliviousness of the Real 
Estate group through a not-so-subtle reminder of his personal largesse in sustaining the 
enterprise: “The Metropolitan, in the fact of steadily mounting costs, is dependent on its own 
resources, aided—when needed—by a very few financial backers.”63 The Company managed to 
pay rent and taxes without non-profit immunities, any subsidy fund, or municipal help. While the 
topic of “revenue-producing features” in the new venture was still under debate, a low structure, 
Kahn reasoned, was “simply an invitation for skyscrapers to be built on either side in order to 
take advantage of the light.”64 Kahn was realistic about the aesthetic and commercial priorities of 
the twentieth-century city, in stark contrast to the nineteenth-century notions of some of the 
boxholding holdouts, who eschewed commercialism. Perhaps the Real Estate Company was just 




which helped keep ticket costs down. “The dignity of the new Metropolitan Opera House will 
depend upon its architectural aspect, (to which a tower need not be a detriment),” Kahn added, 
reassuring that the commercial uses of the space would not sully its venerable social and cultural 
aspects.  
 Throwing down the gauntlet, he concluded, “if a way can be found, consistent with the 
budgetary requirements of the Metropolitan Opera, to confine its new home to operatic uses 
only, and if such be the preference of the stockholders of the Real Estate Company, I shall 
support that conclusion.”65 Still considering financial alternatives later that summer, Kahn 
proposed reselling the boxes for a reduced subscription price on the one day, as per the original 
scheme, that the boxholders opted not to use their boxes.66 This, of course, was a presumptuous 
suggestion. Given Kahn’s financial commitment to the Metropolitan Opera, he had behaved 
appropriately; given his lowly social position relative to the Real Estate Company old guard, he 
had completely overstepped his bounds by taking the lead inside the Real Estate group’s 
territory. 
 In October 1927, prior to the promised estimate presentation, Joseph Urban’s tentative 
plans for the new theater appeared in the magazine Musical America. At a casual meeting in 
Urban’s studio, the magazine’s editor, Deems Taylor, saw the unofficial designs and could not 
resist a “scoop,” which the local press immediately picked up. Urban’s sketch did not reference 
the nineteenth-century theaters of Europe, with their focus on the design and hierarchy of the 
boxes.67 Instead, the proposed theater was inventively utilitarian, an architectural expression of 
the atmosphere of the times. It was fan-shaped and without a horseshoe (although thirty-five 
boxes); a large stage consisting of two side stages extending from but relating to the proscenium; 




facilitate traffic. There would be three separate structures, as opposed to one tower, consisting of 
the stage and office building at one side; the lower auditorium in the center; and an apartment 
house tower at the other end. The overall effect was cathedral-like in shape while modernist in 
aesthetic, and nothing short of radical.68 
 “The building as a whole is unmistakably the conception of a man who is not only an 
architectural designer of talent approaching genius, but an extraordinarily resourceful and 
experienced man of the theatre,” Taylor wrote. “If his plans are carried out, New York will have 
an opera house unsurpassed anywhere in the world, not only for beauty, but for completeness, 
modernity and ingenuity of equipment and design.”69 Although the plans were exhilarating, their 
early and inadvertent revelation in the press conflicted with the diplomatic and measured 
approach Kahn had employed for almost two years. The plan creatively took into consideration 
the Real Estate group’s preference that the opera house building be low, although Benjamin 
Wistar Morris, their architect, did not appear to be directing the design process.70 
 The Real Estate group reacted without delay, and the months and months of prevarication 
and polite capitulation ended with an eruption of questions about the suitability of the Kahn-
selected site. Once a fait accompli, the erection of the new theater at Fifty-seventh Street was 
now publicly cast into doubt.  
 Behind the scenes, however, there always had been fissures in the negotiations. For one 
thing, while the Real Estate group’s opponents of the new opera house claimed in 1926 to be 
“wholly passive in their opposition” and without any intention of “starting an agitation,” this was 
never entirely the case.71 In fact, the “three or four” objecting boxholders, William Fahnestock, 
Robert Walton Goelet, his aunt, Mrs. Ogden Goelet, and Mrs. Goelet’s younger sister, Mrs. 




the April 1927 Real Estate stockholders meeting, Robert W. Goelet spoke out against leaving the 
old Met and went so far as to suggest that the Real Estate Company go back to the old system of 
leasing the space to another opera company, “rather than building a new opera house for a lessee 
with whom perhaps relations might not be permanent.”72 This was the first hint that the Real 
Estate group might consider severing relations with the Opera Company that had built the Met’s 
unrivaled international reputation. Goelet questioned the necessity of the additional stories 
allotted for studios and apartments, specifications that had been determined by the current 
“lessee,” Kahn’s Metropolitan Opera Company, and not initiated by the Metropolitan Opera Real 
Estate Company itself.73  
 Grace Vanderbilt, who by 1915 had inherited the mantle of “head of society” from a long 
line of formidable women beginning with Mrs. Astor, objected to the new opera plan with both a 
letter and a telegram for dissemination at the April 1927 meeting.74 And throughout 1927, the 
daunting grande dame was a vocal, vociferous, and omnipresent opponent to the plans to move 
the Metropolitan Opera House.75  
 But in fact, Cutting, Bliss, and DeLancey Kountze of the Real Estate dominant inner 
circle, also were privately opposed both to the plan and to Kahn. While they constantly shared 
correspondence to each other voicing their resistance and distrust, throughout the process they 
were publicly circumspect.76 
 Otto Kahn and the Metropolitan Opera Company had not been entirely forthcoming, 
either. In January 1926, soon after the Real Estate board met and discussed Kahn’s proposal, the 
Opera Company board increased its ranks from fifteen to twenty-five directors, and met to 
appoint a committee to make the necessary preliminary studies for a new Metropolitan Opera 




and a Committee of Boxholders—clearly anticipating a shift in Met leadership where the house 
and boxholding were concerned.77  
 Consequently, these were no loose sketches that the Musical America editor encountered 
at Joseph Urban’s studio in October 1927. In fact, by then the architect already had prepared nine 
elaborate schemes for the new Metropolitan Opera House at Kahn’s proposed 57th Street 
location, beginning almost immediately after the initial announcement, on February 22, 1926. By 
1927, the designs were particularly far along.78 Urban, as a theatrical designer, was well aware of 
the restrictions that the old Met’s limited size was placing on new productions of new operas.  
 “The present opera houses were built for the four act grand opera,” reads an unsigned 
document in the Urban archive, noting that contemporary operas were proving more difficult to 
stage.79 This fourteen-page-long description of the parameters of the new theater also included a 
philosophical justification for a fresh architectural direction. Quoting from the June 1927 issue of 
the magazine Singing, the document pointedly questioned: 
Do they clearly understand that there must be a definite break with the past, 
especially the European past, when dynasties instead of democracies made up the 
only important part of the audience of an opera house? 
 
Do they realize that the opera box was invented in the seventeenth century, in 
order to shield the feudal lords and ladies of that time from contact with the 
vulgar populace? 
 
Do they not consider the twentieth century has outlived these ideas of segregation, 
and should not the private seclusion of any part of a public audience be made 
impossible in the opera house, as it has long been in all other theatres?80 
 
 The Metropolitan Opera Real Estate Company now was wavering, and for the 
Vanderbilt-Goelet camp, the answer to these questions was a resolute “no.”  For them, the 
perfect solution would have been to find a site on otherwise residential Fifth Avenue, which had 




if Fifth Avenue real estate was not prohibitively expensive, a theater would have been 
unwelcome there.81 The Real Estate Company’s biggest fear, it seemed, was of appearing 
“commercial.” A theater-cum-skyscraper on Fifty-seventh Street with rental units and shops, 
located between Eighth and Ninth Avenues, definitely smacked of commercialism. Urban 
protested that on the contrary, his skyscraper would be “a unit of architectural beauty” and that 
the opera house itself would be “a separate edifice of appropriate and fitting type for a great lyric 
theater.”82 As per an upper-class order that never was truly the case for most rich Americans, 
elites were not supposed to be “in trade.” It would stand to reason that Mrs. Vanderbilt could not 
possibly be a cofounder of such an enterprise, with its profit-making necessity so visibly 
betrayed in its architecture and location. To be a real estate investor in a club-like opera house, as 
per the old Met, might be fine; but to be a part-landlord as well would be downright improper. 
 Through the second half of 1927, the press mentioned several alternative locations for the 
new opera house.83 The site committee even contemplated taking over the Century Theatre, 
formerly known as the New Theatre, and the site of Kahn’s misadventure from two decades 
before. The grand playhouse would be razed—an incredible thought, since its primary fault was 
in its design, conceived more as an opera house than an intimate theatrical space.84 
 Publicly, the Real Estate Company was exercising control which only months before it 
had all but abdicated. Before final action could be taken, it awaited the return from Europe of  
J. P. Morgan, who was one Real Estate committee member in favor of a new opera house.85 
“Nothing has been decided in any way,” Kountze told the New York Times, adding that since his 
group was considering the public’s view on the matter, that “suggestions regarding a new site 
from the outside as well as from our stockholders” were welcomed.86 In actuality, Kahn’s site 




near Central Park, and adjacent to Columbus Circle, a hub poised to be “the civic centre of New 
York.”87 It was accessible by public transit, including new proposed IND subway extensions on 
Manhattan’s west side. Theater development also was inching northward and westward from 
Times Square, and a new Metropolitan Opera House would only anchor that progression.88 But 
the location also was surrounded by commercial buildings. 
 The freeze, it seemed, was directed at Otto Kahn. Now an even greater majority 
shareholder of the Metropolitan Opera Company after procuring all of William K. Vanderbilt’s 
stock in 1924, Kahn was a unique financier with an emotional and near-evangelistic connection 
to the arts. After a tour of the American West in the 1920s, for example, he was buoyed by what 
he perceived to be the artistic awakening of the citizens he observed there. “Municipal 
auditoriums are being built, museums and symphony orchestras established, traveling exhibitions 
of pictures arranged, concerts and lectures, frequently of great excellence, are taking place and—
an especially significant sign of the times—community theatres are springing up in many cities, 
small and large,” he reported in 1927.89  
 As the debate over the new opera house was brewing, Kahn was speaking out for national 
support of the arts. He publicly challenged Senator Reed Smoot, the Chairman of the Senate 
Finance Committee, to repeal taxes instituted during wartime on drama and music, whose greater 
social and cultural value had barely been recognized. In the United States, support of the arts was 
left up to the initiative and “liberality of private persons,” and the institutions themselves were 
burdened by a tax. By contrast, European nations historically had received large sums from 
public revenues to support the performing and fine arts.90 From a banker’s point of view, art also 
was a good investment for European cities.91 Moreover, Kahn felt it was the duty of the wealthy 




address to the Municipal Art Society in January 1928; the affluent were obliged to pay back 
some of that wealth to the public. “The contributions of rich men to art will no doubt be pleasing 
to St. Peter and enable them to get by with greater ease,” he said.92 Quoting Oscar Wilde, Kahn 
added, “God shows what he thinks of wealth by the people on whom he bestows it,” prompting 
laughter with his reference to “the chosen ones concerning whom ‘it is not for me to speak.’”93 It 
is probably a coincidence that Kahn invoked Salome author Oscar Wilde, for at least outwardly 
there was no lingering resentment over that past debacle, or that the Times’s suggestion of “the 
chosen ones” subtly alluded to Kahn’s Jewishness while invoking St. Peter.  
 The next month, on the eve of his sixty-first birthday, an exhausted Kahn announced that 
he was putting his property on Fifty-seventh Street between Eighth and Ninth Avenues on the 
market. There was no alternative site on the table for a new Metropolitan Opera House, nor, 
ultimately, would there be a new house at all until 1966. Denying any controversy among the 
governing boards, Kahn tactfully cast blame on neither party, claiming instead that “the scheme 
as submitted and approved was considerably more costly than we had been led to believe on the 
basis of informal estimates, and was not feasible from the financial point of view without 
material modifications.”94 Kahn reiterated that in the “friendliest spirit of collaboration,” it was 
not the Metropolitan Opera Company’s purpose or function to undertake the erection of a new 
opera house itself, advocating the “continuance of the time-honored relationship, under which 
the stockholders of the real estate company own the house and lease it to an operating 
company.”95   
 Cutting, Bliss, and Kountze finally had won, and their only regret was how the incident 
would play out in the press. In fact, they had rejected Kahn’s last proposal of February 1928, and 




the letter you write should be written having in mind the possible publication of it, as 
undoubtedly when this present plan is thrown down Mr. Kahn will probably try to put the entire 
blame on our shoulders,” Kountze pessimistically (and inaccurately) anticipated.96  
 A day after his announcement, Kahn left for Florida and a trip across the United States.97 
“Pulling teeth is a delectable diversion as compared to getting anything out of these people,” 
wrote Kahn to his lawyer and fellow Met board member, Paul D. Cravath, when the episode was 
behind them.98  
 When Kahn returned, however, things were decidedly different with the Metropolitan 
Opera Company board. For one thing, no minutes, if any were recorded, survive from October 
1927 until October 1929, when the group met without a quorum and thus passed no resolutions. 
There was no stockholders’ meeting in the spring of 1929 because of Kahn’s absence in Europe 
and Cravath’s assertion that meetings were not necessary every year unless there were changes to 
be made.99 Kahn, after all, controlled 4,202 shares out of a total 5,136 in Metropolitan Opera 
Company stock. One terse sentence in the October 16, 1929 minutes indicated that the topic of a 
new opera house was still in play: “The subject of discussion was chiefly the latest development 
in the matter of the new opera house.”100  
 In fact, in 1929 the Metropolitan Opera Real Estate group was negotiating for the 
erection of the opera house at what would become Rockefeller Center. Ironically, that 
development from the outset was decidedly commercial, described by its construction engineer, 
John R. Todd, as a “high-class retail section” for stores and offices.101 A bidder for the 
Metropolitan Opera House lease, a Seventh Avenue dress manufacturer and midtown skyscraper 
builder named Louis Adler, already was eyeing the property in order to erect a tower upon it.102 




engaging in a commercial endeavor where Kahn’s proposal had been concerned, or even any 
sentimentality about preserving the old opera house, there were no objections now. 
 The old guard’s slap at Kahn for his presumptuousness, if debatable during the 
negotiations of 1926-28, now was obvious. For the remainder of his tenure on the Metropolitan 
Opera Company board, a humbled Kahn would remain uncharacteristically subdued. 
 It was not yet clear how times were changing. The Met’s forty-fifth season opened in 
1929 paying tribute to general manager Gatti-Casazza’s twenty-second year with the company, 
exactly half of all of the Met’s seasons. “The same excited, upholstered and distracted crowd 
congested entrances as the hour of performance drew near, and stuffed the aisles with opera hats, 
ermines and noises obstructive alike to eye and ear. No one cared,” Olin Downes of the Times 
declared.  
The box holders came late, as they should. They waited confidently for the 
turning up of the lights after the first act, knowing well that the eyes of the many-
headed would be turned toward them at the first opportunity and not to the stage, 
where the artists bowed, smirked and flattered each other to the accompaniment 
of plaudits and floral tributes. Those of the Third Estate in the upper part of the 
house came early, in inverse ratio. They waited long and desperately to get in.103 
 
It could have been an opening at the Academy of Music in Edith Wharton’s time. But it was 
Black Tuesday, October 29, 1929, the evening of the fourth and final day of the catastrophic 
stock market crash that precipitated the Great Depression, and it had passed at the Metropolitan 
Opera House without mention.  
 
“The Metropolitan Opera Company has never asked for outside help” 
By early 1930, however, financial troubles loomed large. As the Metropolitan Opera Company 
faced its first deficit in twenty years, the Real Estate Company reminded Kahn that the 




Estate board’s attempts to pressure him financially, adroitly cautioning that the Metropolitan 
Opera Company “would be glad to do what it can to facilitate the task of whoever may be its 
successor.”105 Kahn hadn’t really given up, however, and in a creative plan to keep the opera 
company in the black, proposed a private syndicate to support it: 
In every city where Grand Opera has a permanent home, it is subsidized by the 
State or Municipality. The only exception is New York. The Metropolitan Opera 
Company has never asked for outside help. The fact is, however, that there are 
only three stock owners in the Metropolitan Opera Company, apart from a few 
merely nominal holdings, namely Mr. Kahn, Mr. Clarence H. Mackay, and the 
Estate of Harry Payne Whitney. Mr. Kahn owns 83% of the total stock. That is, 
manifestly, an undesirable situation. An organization like the Metropolitan Opera 
Company ought not to depend to any such extent upon one individual. … It is 
respectfully suggested and urged, if a contractual relationship is to continue 
between the Real Estate Company and the Metropolitan Opera Company … that it 
be sought to be a joint action to create an underwriting syndicate aggregating, say, 
$250,000 annually, … the direction of the organization to be in the hands of the 
underwriters.106 
 
Evidently, in harder economic times, Kahn now was seemingly unwilling to continue to single-
handedly fund the opera company he had nurtured and cultivated for almost two decades. 
Despite his forewarning, it came as a shock when, at a special meeting of the Metropolitan Opera 
Company board on October 26, 1931, Kahn resigned as its President and Chairman. 
 “In justice to my business, my associates, my family and my health, I have had to reach 
the decision to divest myself of outside activities as far as possible,” stated Kahn.107 Publicly, 
that was the explanation. Privately, however, he told the Times critic Olin Downes a different 
story. The Real Estate Company happily had allowed Kahn to unburden them of the 
responsibility for the practical operations and affairs of the Opera Company; indeed, it was well 
known that it was Kahn’s business sense as well as his own pocketbook that kept the Met 
financially sound. So long as Kahn maintained the status quo, everything was fine; when he 




Downes, Kahn plainly confirmed the unmentionable: no matter how effectively he sustained the 
opera, the Real Estate Company board was “not wholly favorable” to having a Jew as the 
chairman of the opera company. There it was. Thus, in spite of his boundless enthusiasm and 
polite cooperation, Kahn had felt isolated and marginalized, working almost entirely alone and 
with little support from “any but one or two” of the Real Estate Company members, and always 
feeling reluctant to experiment with innovative repertory or staging. The course he had the 
company pursue, then, while hardly original, was not altogether a bad one: the Met offered high-
quality artists and productions, which guaranteed popular support and consequently a balanced 
budget.108 
 Yet Kahn’s publicly stated reasons for his resignation also were genuine. Neither he nor 
his firm had turned a profit in 1930, and things only grew worse when in May 1931 the 
Rothschild-funded Austrian bank, the powerful Creditanstalt, failed, causing a run on all of the 
Central European currencies.109 Kuhn, Loeb & Co. suffered an even harder blow a few weeks 
later with the sudden death of its senior partner, Mortimer L. Schiff, on June 4, his fifty-fourth 
birthday.110 With what looked to be financial liquidation confronting the world, Schiff had 
written to Kahn in May that “the bears are having things their own way,” and the following 
month Kahn would have to face this fact and its repercussions alone.111 For the remainder of the 
year, Kahn worked in his office without interruption every business day, and the stress weighed 
on him both emotionally and physically.112 
 The year 1931 then, already had started out chaotically for Kahn. By fall, his professional 
role as a banker moved to the forefront, as he commented frequently in the press about strategies 
for ending the economic slump while defending the capitalistic system and criticizing anti-trust 




“unavoidable distress,” he encouraged “a psychological obligation” to keep a “stiff upper lip.”113 
In September, Kahn was hit with a $500,000 lawsuit for his alleged failure to give $160,000 to 
an opera singer, Lydia Lindgren, in exchange for her dropping a slander action against another 
singer. The suit was thrown out of court.114  
 In November, Kahn also remained a visible presence in New York cultural news. Citing 
the same reasons for his Metropolitan Opera withdrawal, he resigned from the board of the 
Philharmonic-Symphony Society, on which he had sat as vice president for a decade. On the 
17th he spoke at the opening of the Whitney Museum, along with former Governor Alfred E. 
Smith and Representative Robert L. Bacon from New York, who read a letter from President 
Hoover in a ceremony broadcast nationally on the radio. The museum, the first of its kind 
devoted to American art, was founded by Gertrude Vanderbilt Whitney, the wife of late 
Metropolitan Opera Company board member Harry Payne Whitney and an artistic maverick in 
her own right. Placing the arts and the financial times in a lofty and spiritual context, Kahn said: 
the severe and grievously prolonged depression which has come upon our country 
has shown all too vividly the hazards and fluctuations to which material 
possessions are subject. By the same token and by contrast, it has demonstrated 
the permanency and inviolability of spiritual possessions that which we have 
within us in faith, in appreciation and love of art and books and nature, in cultural 
interests and understanding, no man and no event can take away from us, no 
income tax can reduce and no stock exchange collapse can diminish.115 
 
 Divested of the Met chairmanship, Kahn still sat on the Opera Company board as well as 
in his box at the opera, and Prince and Princess Vasili of the former Russian empire 
accompanied him and Mrs. Kahn to the November 2 opening.116 And showing his humor, 
humanity, and philanthropic spirit, he addressed a Metropolitan Opera audience at a late 
November performance of La Bohème, in an appeal for the Unemployment Emergency Relief 




Times reported playfully, “that perhaps the Metropolitan had asked him to speak because he was, 
as far as it was concerned, among the unemployed.”117 
 The 1931-32 opera season had begun with $2 million in subscriptions, “no sign of 
depression,” and with good reason for the Met to be optimistic about the future.118 The 
Metropolitan Opera Company board had lost not only Kahn, but two older board members, 
George Eastman, chairman of the Eastman Kodak Company, and Edward S. Harkness, the 
capitalist and philanthropist. Their replacements were stellar: Paul D. Cravath took over from 
Kahn as chairman, and Clarence Dillon of the banking firm Dillon, Read & Co. and 
Representative Robert L. Bacon filled the other two seats.  
 Cravath, the prestigious lawyer, was a pioneer in corporate financial reorganization, and 
his professional expertise was essential to the Opera Company. A member of the Philharmonic 
board and elected to the Met board in 1910, Cravath admitted that while he was not the musician 
Kahn was, he was more than familiar with the Met’s practical problems. “I judge opera as I 
judge other music, much more by its effect upon my emotions than by technical details of which 
I am largely ignorant,” he said. “The opera that is a great opera for me is the one which sends 
chills down my spine.”119 Lacking Kahn’s sense of poetry about the arts in general and opera in 
particular, Cravath nevertheless had some reasonable opinions. To him, grand opera was 
“perhaps the last of our Victorian expressions,” meaning that the best examples had been created 
in the past. “But I am certain that opera is going to take a new lease of life when the form is 
brought more closely in touch with the thought and the currents of the times,” he said, noting that 
masterpieces often emerged after periods of “operatic sterility.”120 A tension between the old and 
the new, and of sterile ideas and radical ones, were on his mind. Cravath may have lacked 




organizational strategies, and Cravath was the man to implement them. Furthermore, all 
contentiousness with the Metropolitan Opera Real Estate Company ceased with the start of 
Cravath’s tenure. Perhaps this was because of the spirit of the times, perhaps this was because of 
Cravath himself, the sharp (Gentile) organization man, or perhaps it was a combination of both. 
 “The resignation of Mr. Kahn, whatever may have been the actual reasons behind it and 
whatever the attempts to minimize its significance, has created a new situation,” Downes 
surmised in the Times. Stating explicitly what had only been implied, Kahn’s resignation meant 
that he was relinquishing not only his leadership, but “a large measure of responsibility, financial 
and otherwise.”121 In his column, Downes gave Kahn the valedictory that Kahn himself 
preempted with his cursory resignation. “With Mr. Kahn’s incumbency a cycle of Metropolitan 
history began and ended,” Downes wrote. When Kahn took over, the disorganized theater began 
to experience a new efficiency and financial solvency. Some of the Met’s safer artistic choices 
Downes attributed not to the antiquated ideas of the Real Estate Company, but rather to an 
enormous and undiscriminating public.122 “Suppose a repertory that included every novelty of 
importance heard in Europe, as well as other works honored by time, had been offered, to the 
glory of the company and the loss of the box office. . . . Who would have furnished those 
handsome additional guarantees in the name of art—Mr. Kahn, playing a lone hand, or Mr. Kahn 
with the generous cooperation of his stanch opponents in the organization?”123  
 Of course, Kahn had unsuccessfully attempted, personally funded, and dramatically 
failed at just such innovations—with Salome, with the New Theatre, and with the idea for the 
new Met. Who would pick up his banner? “Among those who stood against Mr. Kahn there 
should now be individuals willing to put their hands in their pockets and fight, and substitute 




fact that everyone’s resources were dwindling, and Kahn-like initiative and enthusiasm were rare 
in any economic climate. The Metropolitan Opera would never see the likes of the old Otto Kahn 
again. 
 Immediately upon Kahn’s retirement, the Opera Company’s executive committee was 
increased from three to five members, enlarging the power base and clearly indicating the level 
of authority Kahn previously had commanded.125 At Cravath’s first meeting as chairman, the 
company’s, and indeed, the country’s financial outlook was the topic of discussion for the first 
time ever. The Company had a cash fund of about $750,000 to start the season, and needed 
additional money to conclude it.126 
 To that end, the board proposed that Gatti-Casazza, the manager of the Company, be 
authorized to seek “the cooperation of all artists, musicians and other employees of the Company 
who might volunteer to accept reductions in their respective salaries” to assure the completion of 
the season. Cravath’s pragmatic hand was already at work. Kahn, now merely a board member, 
was present at the meeting, and made only one suggestion: that the minutes also include a vote of 
appreciation of the Company and of the results achieved by the manager and his assistant, 
Edward Ziegler.127 
 Four months later, at the March annual meeting of the Opera Company, another major 
proposal followed. Because of declining patronage, a new membership organization to be called 
the Metropolitan Opera Association was to take over production of the opera at less cost. 
Because the Association was being organized as a corporation for educational purposes, it also 
would not be subject to prohibitive federal taxes, and the Metropolitan Opera Company was 
poised to transfer several contracts and the ownership of scenery, costumes, and property in 




production of grand opera as provided in the April 1908 lease by the Metropolitan Opera and 
Real Estate Company.128 The Metropolitan Opera Company for the time being would remain the 
stock corporation, while the Metropolitan Opera Association would become the operating 
company, with both entities governed by the same board of directors. The bold and brilliant 
fiscal move was heralded for its “democratization of the governing powers of the opera 
company.”129 It was no longer necessary to buy stock to become a member of the Metropolitan 
Opera Company. Anybody could contribute to the endowment or operating fund, and, at least in 
a small way, have a part in sustaining a grand cultural institution. 
 A few weeks later, however, as Cravath had anticipated, the situation grew even worse. 
Because of reduced receipts and in spite of the salary reductions, the season’s losses would wipe 
out the Metropolitan Opera Company’s $550,000.00 capital and most of its reserve. There would 
be insufficient funds to assure another season. “Manifestly a serious question is presented as to 
the future of the Metropolitan Opera,” the Company declared to the press. The board pledged to 
make an earnest effort to reduce expenses in order to continue the following winter.130 But they 
weren’t promising that they could succeed. 
 New radio broadcasts had done much to popularize the opera, though, and there was 
growing patronage from the general public.131 Thus, the notion of “saving” the opera by and for 
its fans had gained real traction. In a much larger sense, however, the national scene in 1932 was 
desperate, and money was tight. While Jack Benny was debuting on the radio, Amelia Earhart 
was flying solo for the first time, Lake Placid was hosting the Olympics, and Babe Ruth and Lou 
Gehrig were leading the New York Yankees to victory, the country also was in turmoil. There 
were deadly riots at the Ford factory in Dearborn, Michigan. A “Bonus Army” of five thousand 




ordered the army to remove them. Aviation hero Charles Lindbergh’s baby was kidnapped and 
killed. A Federal gas tax was enacted. In July, the Dow Jones Industrial Average hit a 
Depression low of 41.22. Franklin Delano Roosevelt was elected to his first term as president 
that November. And fascism was on the rise in Italy and Germany. 
 For the time being, the Metropolitan Opera Association could only trust that a shortened 
season, a simpler operating organization, and a tighter budget might tide the company over. 
Cravath’s election as president of the new Association indicated an honest intention to carry on 
for at least another season.132 The public also had turned out to be an increasingly important 
aspect of the Metropolitan Opera’s financial equation. No longer a rich man’s hobby, the opera 
was returning to its nineteenth-century form as a more popular pastime. It would have been an 
absurd notion only four years earlier, but small donations collected in large numbers might 
actually stave off the Metropolitan Opera’s demise. In the post-Kahn, Depression-era climate, 
individual patronage from the so-called masses now was becoming the institution’s best hope for 
long-term survival. 
 Without solicitation, the public response was “warmer and more spontaneous” than 
expected, as no subscribers canceled for the next season, some desired to increase the number of 
performances they would attend, and sales for individual performances remained strong. The 
opera, therefore, had retained its attraction for the casual visitor. The broadcasting that had begun 
that season also had helped popularize the art, and new patronage accounted for the strong 
individual seat sales.133 
 By November, the opera was set to open its fiftieth season with a sold-out house. 
Standing room seats were at pre-war rates, which, along with a shorter season of four instead of 




Eckstein, the Chicago magazine publisher, confectioner, real estate owner, and operator of a 
chain of drug stores, joined the Metropolitan Opera Association board. At first blush hardly of a 
pedigree worthy of Metropolitan board membership, Eckstein nevertheless had functioned at 
Chicago’s Ravinia Grand Opera Company much as Kahn had at the Met, paying off around $1 
million in deficits over twenty years and running the company almost single-handedly.135 The 
Met needed funds, not family background. 
 In spite of its financial desperation, the Met also was looking to the future while dealing 
with the deficiencies of the past, namely, the unsuitability of the old opera house. With the recent 
and growing popularity of opera, a move to a larger theater at Rockefeller Center was beginning 
to look favorable. In April, the plans for the new $4,500,000 auditorium that the Rockefeller 
group submitted to the Manhattan Bureau of Buildings indicated that the house was being 
designed to seat over 4,000—or 600-700 more than at the Met—with fewer boxes, more family 
circle seats, and the patronage of the more general public clearly in mind.136 It bore a 
resemblance to Kahn’s plan and Joseph Urban’s design for a new Met from five years earlier, 
except that the Metropolitan Opera Real Estate Company was silent in the new negotiations, as a 
theater was going to be built with or without the Met’s participation.  
 Although Cravath was willing to admit that the Metropolitan Opera was cooperating with 
the Rockefeller’s architects in the planning of the auditorium, no contract had been signed. If 
there was any division of opinion among the directors of the Metropolitan, Cravath was unable to 
say, abruptly telling the Times that not only had the board had taken no action, but “he was 
unable to read the minds of others.”137  
 But the theater at Rockefeller Center was not going to be exclusively for the Metropolitan 




Philharmonic was mentioned in the plans, as was a connected “sound motion-picture theatre” 
outfitted with the most modern equipment.138 S. L. Rothafel, also known as “Roxy,” was the 
impresario in charge of the movie palace, and declared that it would not interfere with the 
Metropolitan presentations. Nevertheless, he had the audacity to advise the Metropolitan Opera 
to make some changes in order to be successful, by examining “modern stage investiture and the 
temper of our times in regard to action.” His recommendation to stage operas more 
dramatically—for example with the tenor singing to the soprano as opposed to the audience—
was geared towards mass appeal. “He was firmly convinced that not one note in any of the great 
operatic scores should be removed or tampered with, but he saw no reason why changes could 
not be made in other ways to make the operas more accessible to the modern audience’s 
understanding and background,” reported the Times. “Wagner and most of the other composers 
were showmen, Wagner the greatest of them all,” Roxy declared, “and were they writing today 
they would take into consideration the point of view of the present public.”139 Opera now was 
hardly the exclusive pastime of aristocrats and social aspirants. 
 In fact, San Francisco broke the historical tendency for opera houses to be privately 
funded and held when it opened the first municipally owned and maintained opera theater in 
American history in October 1932.140 The short length of the San Francisco opera season as well 
as the inexpensive seats underestimated the public demand for the opera, which proved to be 
strong. Indeed, opera and symphonic broadcasts, which reached, in Cravath’s words, “every 
nook and cranny of the country,” were creating more widespread appreciation for classical 
music.141 The Metropolitan Opera chairman hoped that small companies might follow suit 
throughout the United States. Other cities were already primed to welcome the Metropolitan 




line, and Richmond, Atlanta, Pittsburgh, Cincinnati, and Detroit also were bidding for a visit. 
Boston made the “first emphatic call for the stars,” the Times reported, partly because of its 
“considerable, faithful and eager public,” and partly because of the excitement and approval of 
the “august” Boston matrons “in whose hands rest social destinies.”142 If there was still a social 
composition to the opera, at least in the Met’s case, that aura now was imbedded in the company, 
and not in the theater or its governing group. In fact, the Metropolitan was the only American 
opera company from the past that had endured. 
 Nevertheless, by February 1933, the Met’s condition was deteriorating further, with an 
estimated deficit of about $350,000 for the season that was underway. “That the situation is 
grave for the future of grand opera in New York, its last citadel in the United States, none of its 
patrons would deny . . . but that it was hopeless few would concede,” pondered the Times.143 At a 
dinner for a few of the box owners, three proposals emerged: to further reduce salaries and the 
season length; to seek financial support in Chicago in a joint effort; or to eliminate the 
Metropolitan Opera Association altogether in favor of a smaller American-focused company.144  
 Without a company of the Met’s stature to perform in the auditorium, the Real Estate 
board would lose the leverage it had once enjoyed, and any deferential attitude towards the group 
now was not only outdated but unnecessary. The public finally was growing curious about what 
the Real Estate Company’s function really was. Still acting as president of the board, Cutting 
defended the group’s actions by pointing out that the building had been built in 1882 at a cost of 
$1,750,000 and then rebuilt after the fire a decade later. He reiterated that the Opera Company 
leased the building rent free, and that essentially the parterre box owners’ investment subsidized 
the rest of the auditorium. The various assessments Cutting estimated at $4,522,000 in aggregate 




Real Estate Company’s (non-profit) contribution to the venture.145 Yet in fact the Metropolitan 
Opera Company had paid a fair share of maintenance costs for the building, a detail Cutting 
failed to express. 
 It hardly mattered any more which board was more responsible for the Metropolitan 
Opera, or which one was more to blame for its current woes. With the $350,000 deficit looming, 
both factions were in accord about one thing: the future looked gloomy. The Opera Company’s 
assets included subscriptions and revenues from income and the spring tour. While reduced 
overhead expenses and a shortened season cut the $2,880,000 budget in half, it still was not 
enough. And the city was noticeably mute on the subject of aid. Under the circumstances, a 
move to Rockefeller Center from a rent-free auditorium was impossible.  
 
A Last Resort 
The front-page headline of the New York Times on February 10, 1933 stated it plainly: “Opera 
Asks Public for $300,000 Fund as a Last Resort.” The larger significance of the request was 
articulated in the story’s lede: “The ‘old guard’ that had built its social season around the 
Metropolitan Opera for half a century announced last night that it was looking to the public to 
help New York’s greatest musical institution weather the depression.”146 Times had changed, and 
the social prejudices of another time now seemed almost quaint in a new populist age facing 
economic catastrophe. Cravath was steadfast about saving the opera, and both his board and the 
Real Estate Company were in accord that this was no time to stand on ceremony. Social 
openness would have to prevail.  
 R. Fulton Cutting of the Metropolitan Opera and Real Estate Company made the 




whether or not the Opera Company intended to renew its lease. At that time, Cravath had 
revealed that the renewal would be impossible without the assurance of an additional $300,000 
guarantee. With hard-nosed realism, the lawyer and chair of the Opera Association had made it 
clear that while his board was prepared to cooperate in “bringing a new era in American opera to 
successful reality,” he already had done his “full duty” to the Metropolitan.147 While Cravath was 
not as emotionally invested in the opera as Kahn had been, neither would duty call him to be as 
financially invested either. His letter to Cutting was accordingly devoid of reverence or romance: 
Frankly, as we will by May 31 have completed the period of our lease and 
provided New York with opera for twenty-five years, with our entire cash 
resources gone, we ourselves do not feel called upon to undertake the task of 
raising the necessary guarantee fund for next season. I may add that when I 
accepted the presidency of the Metropolitan Opera Company I only undertook to 
carry opera through the current season and until the end of our lease. That having 
been accomplished, I feel that my personal responsibility will have been 
discharged.148 
 
Nobody from any of the opera companies that had leased the Metropolitan Opera House had ever 
addressed the Real Estate Company with such bluntness. The lease had always been a significant 
source of the Real Estate Company’s power; now, faced with the prospect of an empty house, the 
tables were turned.  
Even as the directors of the Metropolitan Opera Association felt that interrupting the 
Metropolitan Opera would be “a national misfortune,” the responsibility was no longer theirs (or 
Kahn’s) alone. “We assure you of our willingness to cooperate in every reasonable way with 
your company in an effort to meet the situation,” Cravath wrote to the Real Estate board, 
expressing a clear expectation of mutual accountability, and a few proposals emerged. The 
prospect of a national operatic organization divided between San Francisco, Chicago, and New 
York did not gain support for a lack of financial response. A penny tax for operatic broadcast 




for the two boards together to form a Committee to Save Metropolitan Opera, to ask the 
legendary Spanish diva Lucrezia Bori to chair it, and to go to the people for their financial 
support. 
 One month later, between the third and fourth acts of La Bohème, the season’s last 
subscription performance, the Met’s gold curtains parted and Bori introduced Mrs. August 
Belmont Jr., clad all in white. “I’ve often asked audiences to do something for someone else,” 
Mrs. Belmont began. “Tonight I’m asking you to do something for yourselves. We must have 
music and poetry, and we cannot think of a future without their inspiration.”149 Before her 
marriage, she was known as Eleanor Robson, the renowned actress for whom George Bernhard 
Shaw had written Major Barbara. As such, she was thoroughly comfortable on the formidable 
Metropolitan stage; as Mrs. Belmont she also was entirely welcome upon it. Not since the 
happier days of Otto Kahn’s involvement on the Met board were such stirring words uttered in 
defense of the arts, and they were what people most needed to hear now. Invoking history, she 
explained to the audience that her other reason in pleading for the Metropolitan was because long 
ago, her husband’s father had been an early founder of opera in New York and leader of the old 
Academy of Music.150 By the time she finished her speech, Eleanor Belmont had raised over 
$4000: $1000 each from Mrs. Cornelius Vanderbilt, Mrs. Charles B. Alexander, Mrs. Robert 
Goelet, and an unnamed donor, plus more money from individual collection boxes. Together 
with other similar pleas, in one month, Lucrezia Bori’s group gathered $140,000, or almost half 
of the goal, including over 2,000 letters of support from all parts of the United States and 
Canada, each containing contributions of $1 to $5 in response to her radio appeals.  
Bori’s committee was a huge and unprecedented joint effort, consisting of the often-




School, and Chicago and Brooklyn opera board members.151 But with Bori and Belmont at the 
forefront making the pitch to the public, women were doing the serious fundraising. Where were 
the paternalistic nineteenth-century elites with their deep pockets now? A new culture of social 
openness was positioned to save the opera. 
“Grand opera at the Metropolitan can no longer rely, as heretofore, upon a small group of 
rich men,” Paul Cravath declared on the radio. “We must now rely upon the support not only of 
the audience at the opera house, but also on the vast radio audience that listens to opera through 
the National Broadcasting Company.” Bori added that “opera has found a home in every 
American family, and opera in this country can progress only by preserving the Metropolitan. It 
is not a problem for the few in a big way, but a problem for the many in a moderate way.”152 By 
mid-March, donations large and small were pouring in. Along with a commitment of $50,000 
from the Juilliard foundation, $10,000 each from Louis Eckstein and Pierre du Pont of the du 
Pont Corporation and General Motors, and $5,000 from an emotionally removed Otto Kahn, a 
post-season benefit performance of Manon raised $13,000, presented for free by about half of the 
Metropolitan personnel of 770 artists and staff members, including Bori herself in the title role.  
Smaller donations came from others, including the opera star Geraldine Farrar’s father, 
who sent $3 (one dollar from himself and each of his two dogs), as well as from an upstate New 
York farmer, who sent a crate of thirty dozen eggs to the opera house to be sold for 25 cents 
each. Backstage, quarters rained down on Bori in payment for the eggs. “So you see,” said the 
soprano to the audience, “even the dogs and the hens are contributing. And if any of you want to 
help us out right now, I am ready for business.” Almost a joyful atmosphere permeated the 
common endeavor, with many factions coming together to save the opera. There also was a 




belittled Otto Kahn because he was a Jew promoting a more democratic house, accepting eggs 
from an upstate farmer. Nevertheless, the campaign was unusual and effective, raising $213,000 
by March 18.153  
In her role as expert fundraiser, Bori praised the radio audience for its support, and 
declared that in only two seasons the weekly broadcasts had transformed New York’s opera 
“from a local social enterprise into an artistic institution of national interest and concern.”154 Not 
to be overlooked, however, the “old guard” made plans to help out also, by banking on the very 
social traditions that not only created the Met, but that ironically had ceased to sustain it. The 
“aristocratic auditorium,” Bori announced, was set to be the scene of the first Opera Ball on 
Friday, April 28, 1933, the proceeds of which would go to the fund. The type of zeal evinced 
over preparations for the event by members of society and the musical world alike approached 
the fervor of another time.155 The Met stage was to be transformed into a gala pageant 
representing a ball given for the Empress Eugénie at the Grand Opera in Paris in 1860. While the 
accounts of the anticipated costume extravaganza recalled the decadence of the Vanderbilt or 
Hazen Hyde balls of decades earlier, behind the proceedings was a far more self-conscious focus 
on the Metropolitan Opera’s desperate situation rather than on frivolous depictions of an 
unusable past. 
For sure, the participants were aping European royalty much as Mrs. Astor’s 
Knickerbocker aristocracy had done. But unlike Mrs. Astor’s or even the less inbred Vanderbilt 
or Hyde balls, New York’s first Opera Ball enlisted many stars of the Metropolitan Opera, three 
ballet companies, guest stars of the concert hall and the stage, in addition to prominent members 
of society. By 1933, at the highest rungs were those with nineteenth-century social ancestry, 




Gentile, new money and old, entertainers and socialites now banded together to save the Met 
while attending a ball that was being touted as “one of the outstanding entertainments in the 
history of the city.”156 The Met now belonged to everyone. Boxes were not reserved exclusively 
for the Real Estate Company elite, but were available for sale upon application to a Mrs. Chester 
Burden at the New York Junior League Bureau of Entertainments located at the Saks Fifth 
Avenue department store. The price was hardly prohibitive: boxes sold for $50 and stall boxes 
for $30, not including the cost of admission, which was $10, including supper.157  
 Historical accuracy and artistic authenticity were still important for the ball’s organizers, 
who thus engaged the team from the Society of Beaux Arts Architects responsible for their 
organization’s elegant and successful parties.158 Even so, the Opera Ball was acknowledged to be 
pure fantasy: a “fancifully conceived historical pageant” recalling the “glamour and romance” of 
Paris during Louis Napoleon’s reign, while temporarily suspending the grim reality of New York 
during what would come to be known as the Great Depression.  Performers and socialites alike 
were set to impersonate nineteenth-century figures. Napoleon’s Zouaves (portrayed by a 
detachment from the Seventh Regiment) began the program with a drill, followed by 
performances by prominent artists playing historical roles.159 
But so long as historical accuracy was on the agenda, what the organizers failed to 
understand, much less to articulate, was the fact that New York in the Academy of Music era 
was socially and culturally a provincial place. The Metropolitan Opera, in a sense, was a reaction 
to the socially closed and artistically challenged Academy. In time, the Met, too, closed ranks 
around an old guard. The Save the Met costume ball of 1933 was thus the apotheosis of the ebb 





 Articles in the press recorded every aspect of the event, including its casting of around 
five hundred members of society as the actual European royalty of Empress Eugénie’s day. In 
the roles of members of the French, Austrian, British, and Russian aristocracy were 
representatives from New York wealth, society, business, and the arts—a group as diverse 
socially as ever could be imagined leading such a spectacle at the Metropolitan Opera House.160 
Leading the pageant, as the Empress Eugénie, was Eleanor Belmont herself, escorted by her 
Napoleon, the flamboyant French fashion arbiter Boutet de Monvel.161  
 Three thousand people came. Reprising the upper-class custom of the past, several 
society hostesses gave dinners beforehand. In fact, the attendees were conspicuously female, and 
most married women listed in the press accounts were present without their husbands, unlike the 
costume balls of Alva Vanderbilt’s time, at which men of leisure were as enthusiastic guests as 
were their wives. The pageant began at 11:30 pm, and upon its conclusion the orchestra floor 
was removed to provide space for dancing.162 It all must have seemed a bit ridiculous to the 
members of the true “old guard” who attended. In the end, though, the ball netted $25,000 for the 
Save the Opera fund, which put the $300,000 goal over the top, and thus truly saved the opera 
for another season. For now, Mrs. Cornelius Vanderbilt, Mrs. Cornelius N. Bliss, Mrs. W. 
Bayard Cutting, Mrs. Harry Harkness Flagler, Paul Cravath, and even Otto Kahn, sitting in their 
boxes, could only silently witness how a younger, more diverse group was making an effort to 
guarantee the continued existence of their old Metropolitan Opera House. 
 A few weeks later, Earle Lewis, the Metropolitan box office treasurer, announced a 20-
to-30 percent increase in the number of subscribers for the next season. Many of those who had 




newcomers. All of the subscribers expressed their satisfaction with the proposed program, and 
some of the subscription price reductions also functioned as a good purchase incentive.163 
There was no underestimating the impact of the new technology of radio on the rising 
popularity of opera. The National Broadcasting Company had not only borne the expense of the 
radio broadcasts, but had promoted the Metropolitan Opera financially—through direct 
contributions as well as by helping increase opera listenership. In the middle of a special opera 
program celebrating the opening of NBC’s new studios in Rockefeller Center, Cravath praised 
the inaugural radio broadcasts of the opera two years before as being of “great importance to the 
musical world.”164 Opening up the Metropolitan Opera to a larger audience not only saved it, but 
made it better, as radio listeners appreciated the quality of their world-class company while 
taking literal and figurative ownership of it. During the summer of 1933, Cravath had toured the 
operatic festivals of Europe, including Baireuth and Salzburg, and had returned convinced that 
“we have, all things considered, the best opera in the world, and we believe it will be better than 
ever this coming winter.”165 New York’s Metropolitan Opera Company had become the 
American opera company. It took over six decades, but August Belmont’s plea for New York 
City’s cultural preeminence via the opera was now a reality. 
 
“If you want a thing done—go. If not—send.”  
Eleanor Robson first experienced grand opera from the standing room. “It had never been 
possible to hear a Metropolitan performance because of my own theatrical engagements,” she 
explained in her memoirs.166 The fact was, however, that even though she was a famous actress, 
she had led a fairly humble existence prior to her marriage to the widower August Belmont Jr. in 




small house on West Seventy-seventh Street, to that of Mrs. August Belmont, the lady of several 
mansions in New York, Newport, Saratoga, Long Island, Kentucky, and South Carolina.  
 Of the third generation of a theatrical family, Eleanor Robson was born in 1879 in 
Wigan, Lancashire, where her grandmother had been performing. Upon the death of her father, 
her mother, a well-known actress named Madge Carr Cook, moved to the United States with her 
seven-year-old daughter, whom she deposited at a Staten Island convent school. Upon 
graduating, the girl joined her mother, who was performing with a theatrical stock company, and 
also began acting in a few small roles. Reminiscent of a Victorian drama itself, Eleanor’s life 
took an extraordinary turn when the company’s ingénue fell ill and the bright blue-eyed teenager 
was catapulted to stardom as the replacement, eventually emerging as a top Broadway star. 
August Belmont became a persistent suitor, and although the actress seriously contemplated the 
benefits of a career over marriage, she accepted his proposal in 1910 and retired from the stage. 
The bride was 30, and her husband was 57.167 
Not exactly to the manner born, Eleanor Robson nevertheless played the role of Mrs. 
August Belmont with aplomb. In her life story and in her interests, she was the perfect composite 
of what a socially relevant twentieth-century elite might be: she had an unpretentious style, 
personal presence, and intelligence; she was cultured, yet from a humble, although not 
unsophisticated background; she had worked, so thus had an understanding of the working class; 
and she was raised in a convent school, which instilled in her a sensitivity and sense of 
commitment to the less fortunate. And as Mrs. Belmont, she had not only the personal gravitas, 
but the social connections and financial resources to support and draw attention to the causes that 
concerned her. While imposing in manner and appearance (but in fact she wore little or no 




had known in her youth, for example, kept writing to her as Mrs. Belmont much as they did 
when she was Miss Robson; Eleanor, in turn, replied with kind and sympathetic letters.168 The 
life of a superficial social butterfly was clearly too insubstantial for her, and she stayed true to 
herself throughout her century-long life. 
 While the Belmont marriage appeared to be quite formal, there was an element of deep 
admiration and respect between the couple. “I was trained by my husband,” she said in her later 
years. “He said, ‘If you want a thing done—go. If not—send.’ I belong to that group of people 
who move the piano themselves.”169 Indeed, almost immediately after her marriage, Eleanor 
Belmont became consumed with public, cultural, and social activities, and had an obvious 
aptitude for leadership well beyond the role that would have been automatically accorded her 
simply for being Mrs. Belmont. She was an important fundraiser for the Red Cross during World 
War I, making forty-five speeches in thirty-eight cities in ten states from February to May 1917. 
When she sailed for France to report on her Red Cross field activities, she carried with her a 
letter of introduction to General John J. Pershing from Theodore Roosevelt. “Mrs. Belmont is 
one of the few really able people who are also gifted with the power of expression,” he wrote. 
“She has a man’s understanding, a woman’s sympathy, and a sense of honor and gift of 
expression such as are possessed by very, very few either among men or women.”170 
 “I never go on a committee unless I really follow though,” she said. “To give your 
name—and then have nothing to do with the project—is wrong.”171 Indeed, Belmont had an 
activist’s zeal for the endeavors she chose. She was a leading member of the Woman’s 
Organization for National Prohibition Reform. For several years in the 1930s she was on the 
board of Survey Associates, a cooperative publishing society that advanced the cause of social 




building the Stratford Theatre in England, helping to open it officially in the summer of 1932 
with the Prince of Wales, later King Edward VII. In 1933, she created and headed a campaign for 
the Adopt-a-Family Committee, which provided $300 per “adopted” family in emergency wages 
for five months, giving not only money to the unemployed, but apprising the benefactors of the 
specific medical and clothing needs for families; she addressed the Federation of Jewish 
Philanthropic Societies; and she planned an important luncheon to raise consciousness for 
unemployment insurance, and leaned on some important contacts, ranging from Sidney Hillman 
of the Amalgamated Clothing Workers, to John Elliott, Adler’s successor in the Ethical Culture 
Society, to Marshall Field, to John Schiff, to Frances Perkins, to attend.172  
In 1934, as the President and National Chairman of the Motion Picture Research Council, 
she spoke out against gangster films, asserting that men had the right to make money but “no 
right to rob moral fibre,” offering instead that theaters be granted the right to book films 
individually instead of in blocks.173 That year, with Alfred E. Smith and Felix M. Warburg, she 
became an honorary chairman of the Citizens Family Welfare Committee, in a campaign to raise 
$2 million for New York City family welfare activities.174 And she was honored with a gold 
medal from the National Institute of Social Sciences for her services for “the benefit of 
mankind.” 
In her charity work, Mrs. August Belmont was a new kind of lady bountiful. For sure, she 
understood the power of money—not only her own, but more importantly, the small 
contributions of others. It was not enough to find a few wealthy benefactors to fund a 
philanthropic undertaking, as had been the accepted pattern. One had to gather the large and 




sense of shared purpose could contribute. It was from this plain instinct that she derived her 
power. 
August Belmont’s estate had sold his interest in Box 4 at the Metropolitan Opera upon 
his death in 1924, and while his wife’s cultural involvements were wide-ranging, she never 
ceased going to the opera. So when Eleanor Belmont took the stage with Lucrezia Bori in March 
1933 and pleaded for money for the opera company, or donned a costume the following month to 
portray the Empress Eugénie at the Save the Opera ball, her participation was not unusual. As a 
Belmont, she had a keen sense of her place in history, and was willing to bank on it to preserve 
not only the Metropolitan Opera, but the opera itself in New York City, which her father-in-law, 
the proud New Yorker, Wall Street financier, and Jew who had become an Episcopalian, had for 
his own reasons sought to strengthen. 
 But Eleanor Belmont also was about to make history in a different way. On May 18, 
1933, at the annual meeting of the Metropolitan Opera Company, she was named to the board of 
directors, making front-page headlines the following day. The story prominently mentioned that 
Belmont was “the first woman so honored.” It also listed the illustrious group of men she was 
joining: among others, there was Vincent Astor, Cornelius Vanderbilt Whitney, Frank Gray 
Griswold, E. Roland Harriman, Frederic A. Juilliard, and Henry Rogers Winthrop from old guard 
families; Cravath, Marshall Field, Louis Eckstein, and Ivy Lee from the new professional class; 
and Otto Kahn and Rawlins Cottenet from the founding era of Conried’s Opera Company. But 
the unprecedented action of a woman’s election to such a board did not bear any further 





Even though women like Frances Perkins now were holding important public offices, 
Belmont’s election was out of the ordinary. “My first meeting in May, 1933,” she wrote, “was 
almost as difficult as an opening night in the theatre. It is not possible to say who was more 
perturbed, I or these formal gentlemen, several of whom were friends or had been cordial dinner 
partners. But mixed company on boards was far from a familiar sight at that time, and when I 
slipped into a chair, several of the directors looked solemnly uncomfortable. Missouri might 
have been their home state. As for me, I felt like misplaced matter.”175 The New York World 
Telegram praised the forward-thinking opera company for recognizing the “generalissima of the 
women’s forces” in unemployment relief. “Women have long predominated in the ‘Golden 
Horseshoe’ by virtue of the splendor of their gowns and jewels and the awe of their names,” the 
editorial noted. “A woman now takes her place with those who dominate the financial structure 
which makes the opera possible.”176 
 While Cornelius Bliss was less than open about embracing Otto Kahn, he was impressed 
with Eleanor Belmont. He had known of her work with the emergency unemployment initiative, 
and as one of the rare members of both Metropolitan Opera board factions, suggested bringing 
her into the conservative opera circle. When Belmont accepted his invitation to join the board, 
however, it was more out of an impulse to help avert unemployment, with which she was “all too 
familiar,” rather than serve “any lofty idea of preserving an art.” The Metropolitan Opera 
Company, after all, was employer to over six hundred people, and Belmont recognized that in 
times of financial crisis, artists were usually the first affected. “At such times, like jewelry and 
furs, the arts are listed as luxuries and are not considered essential.”177 Thus it was not for the 
preservation of an outmoded social club, nor for the traditions of the past, nor for her own 




institution that Belmont was moved to join the fray. It was for the employees of the Opera 
Company.  
 Yet the triumph of the Committee to Save Metropolitan Opera was unequivocally 
Lucrezia Bori’s. She had not only allowed the group to use her name, but also took command of 
the situation. Cravath publicly presented her with a set of “engrossed resolutions” [sic] when the 
$300,000 goal was met. “And now that the campaign is a success and that the people of New 
York and of this whole country are to be assured of opera next winter, the result can be largely 
attributed to the genius of this extraordinary woman,” he said.178 In San Francisco later in 1933, 
five thousand opera lovers, listening for free via an “elaborate remote-control electric 
reproduction,” crowded into a municipal auditorium to hear Bori in a live performance of La 
Bohème at the War Memorial Opera House a few blocks away, where she was performing for 
3,000 others. At the end of the third act, Bori left the opera house to greet those at the 
auditorium, joined by the city’s mayor, Angelo Rossi, who presented her with a bouquet and read 
testimonials from her colleagues Gatti Casazza and Paul Cravath in New York.179 The honors 
bestowed upon her were for her art, but more particularly for her work in saving New York’s 
opera company for the rest of the country. Bori, who at age 46, was still drawing crowds to hear 
her sing, had the passion for opera and for the Metropolitan Opera Company that Belmont had 
for its employees. While Bori hung up her fundraising hat until called upon the following year 
for a repeat performance, it was left to Belmont to generate the same sort of enthusiasm and 
creativity for sustaining the opera in a more long-term way from inside the boardroom. 
 In December 1933, the Metropolitan Opera Association board appointed an executive 
committee to steer efforts to safeguard against future uncertainty, as had been the case for the 




there had always been talk of the Opera Company being self-supporting, or of a “reserve fund” 
that had been depleted with the onset of the depression, in reality it was always Kahn who had 
personally subsidized the endeavor, keeping it in the black. By now, Kahn was becoming 
increasingly resentful of the direction the Met was taking. He needed to remind the newcomers 
of all he had done, submitting to Cravath the terse suggestion, “would like committee and 
perhaps suitable others to know that my connection with the Metropolitan cost me three 
millions.”180 Although others may have been on the committee with him, for several years, Kahn 
was the executive committee, as the majority shareholder of the Opera Company.  
Bliss and Kahn’s mutual dislike for one another persisted following the thwarted plans 
for the new opera house in the 1920s. Cravath, however, recognized that Bliss and the Real 
Estate Company that he represented could be important to the survival of the Opera Company, 
and made him a director of the new Metropolitan Opera Association in May 1933, followed by 
his election as chairman of the executive committee later that year. Bliss consolidated his power 
by appointing to the committee anyone he wished. Kahn was not on his list.181  
Thus, on November 17, 1933, Kahn resigned from the board in anger, but Cravath 
intervened before the press and the Juilliard Foundation could get wind of it. Praised by Cravath 
as the “guiding genius of the Metropolitan Opera House for so many years,” Kahn withdrew his 
resignation.182 Thus, Kahn and Bliss took their places on the executive committee alongside 
Cravath, Robert S. Brewster, Frederic Potts Moore, Myron C. Taylor, Allen Wardwell, and, 
notably, Eleanor Belmont. Little did the press know of the behind-the-scenes drama. The Times 
considered it significant that the committee included those long connected with active direction 
of the Metropolitan, as well as “persons of more recent affiliation.”183 The lawyer Wardwell in 




on which he served as a trustee. In Otto Kahn’s day, the Met felt no need to draw on the goodwill 
and available funds of the foundation established by the old Real Estate Company chairman, and 
in fact had refused an offer of aid in 1924.184 Now it was begging. 
 The board also had to rely on creative strategies for survival. No suggestion was rejected 
as inappropriate, and a mix of ideas was as significant to success as was the mix of people that 
were making it happen. Buoyed by the triumph of the Eugénie ball, society ladies such as Mrs. 
Bliss, Mrs. Adrian Iselin, Mrs. Herbert Satterlee (J. P. Morgan’s Salome-objecting daughter), as 
well as Mrs. Frank Damrosch and Bori herself hosted a series of “opera teas” at the Waldorf-
Astoria Hotel.185 In December 1933, the Metropolitan Opera Association and NBC negotiated 
with the American Tobacco Company to underwrite the radio season. The cigarette manufacturer 
was not new to radio broadcasts, having sponsored a program featuring a dance orchestra 
conducted by Jack Pearl, known on the air as “Baron Munchausen.”186 That month, with the 
cooperation of the management and board of the Metropolitan Opera Association, Mrs. Belmont 
announced that she was forming a Woman’s Metropolitan Opera Club, primarily for female 
music lovers. Limited to only one hundred members, the Club nevertheless was not as socially 
exclusive as it might have sounded. It was for those who could not afford the regular 
subscription but did not wish to attend alone.187 
 The Christmas premiere of the Metropolitan Opera in 1933 opened with another 
testimonial to Lucrezia Bori, “the opera’s Joan of Arc,” who had saved the company from “the 
big, bad wolf of depression.”188 Among the four thousand present was Mayor-elect Fiorello 
LaGuardia. “In a music-hungry town the magic circle of great names was complete once more, 
with society at its gayest in mid-season holidays,” reported the Times music critic William B. 




Fifty years of supremacy, social, artistic, financial, never yet successfully nor 
often even seriously challenged hitherto, had shed the glow of confidence over a 
future faced with unknown elements of change. Would increasing radio tie-ups 
finally carry away the Temple of Song from Thirty-ninth Street and Broadway to 
the new direction of Forty-ninth Street and Fifth Avenue? Or would this 
overwhelming influence, joined with “new blood” in the crimson and gold 
parterre and with the unforeseen loyalty of popular sentiment for a lyric theatre of 
unmatched memories, continue clinging to the old site and to traditional ways? A 
permanent, hereditary audience asked these things and wondered.189 
 
 Indeed, what of the new blood? In January, the executive committee elected yet another 
person “of more recent affiliation,” David Sarnoff, the broadcasting pioneer and president of the 
Radio Corporation of America, to the board of the Metropolitan Opera Association. Sarnoff, a 
Russian Jew who had immigrated to New York as a young child, began an illustrious career in 
the media by selling newspapers to support his family. As a young teenager, he worked as an 
office boy at the Commercial Cable Company and later at the Marconi Wireless Telegraph 
Company, where he learned about the new technology of communications, and rose to the role of 
company commercial manager. When General Electric purchased the Marconi Company and 
turned it into RCA, Sarnoff was well positioned to eventually become president of the company.  
Sarnoff’s election appeared to align the Metropolitan with Rockefeller Center, and the 
possibility of a move there had not been discarded.190 “If the new appointment does not mean 
that the Metropolitan is considering moving to Rockefeller Center,” the Times speculated, “it is 
regarded as indicating a desire on the part of the directorate to bring into the executive committee 
representatives of all groups interested in the Metropolitan.” The committee now included 
members of the Real Estate Company, stockholders in the operating company, a trustee of the 
Juilliard foundation (Wardwell), and a representative of the Radio Corporation (Sarnoff).191 Also 
on the board since the 1920s was Ivy Lee, one of the founders of the field of public relations and 




always consisted of a more vibrant mix of types, that mix no longer was just about Jew and 
Gentile, youth and maturity, or new money and old. It now had professionals and even a woman. 
But the upcoming 1934-35 season still was in doubt, a fear somewhat dispelled by the 
news in late February that the Juilliard Foundation was to continue its support.193 While the 
Philharmonic was following the Met’s lead with a public campaign for $500,000, the Met 
announced that although it would need a guarantee fund, the opera company would make the 
appeal privately to patrons and not to the public.194 Cornelius Bliss once again asked Lucrezia 
Bori to head a committee to solicit the friends of the Metropolitan Opera, assisted by an even 
larger committee, consisting of Metropolitan Opera employees and singers; representatives from 
the Real Estate Company, including Bliss and Cutting; and Eleanor Belmont, Cravath, Kahn, Ivy 
Lee, and David Sarnoff, among others, from the Association.195  
 
The Final Act? 
While there were still those who had managed to maintain a share of their wealth in the face of a 
declining market, for the Metropolitan Opera, the time of $200,000 boxes and cavalier offers of 
financial bailouts had long passed. That time also had passed for Otto Kahn, whose finances had 
plummeted for over three years along with his failing health. After his $10,000 pledge to the Met 
in 1932—the only five-figure donation from a board member—Kahn’s contributions to his usual 
causes remained few and only in the hundreds of dollars.196 Although his net worth was still in 
the several millions, it was time to protect his legacy for his family and not for cultural 
posterity.197  
Wednesday, March 29, 1934 began as a typical day for Kahn: he reported to his office at 




around 1:45 pm, while sipping coffee at the end of the meal, he suddenly slumped over the table.  
Stricken with a heart attack, Kahn was dead. He was 67 years old.198 
Where the Metropolitan Opera was concerned, however, Otto Kahn already in effect had 
passed away, the minutes of meetings in the early 1930s indicating his presence but not his 
voluble participation in the considerable actions facing the company. In death, though, Otto 
Kahn’s real contributions to the company could be publicly revealed. “Nowadays, the mere 
ownership of wealth no longer confers honour,” he wrote in 1913, and for two decades 
afterwards, Kahn’s financial relationship with the Metropolitan Opera proved that point. At the 
time of his death, he still owned 84 percent of the stock in the Metropolitan Opera Company, 
now essentially worthless. He had financed the Met’s losses of around $350,000 from 1908-10, 
and bought out Hammerstein for $1,200,000 to assure the Met’s dominance. He risked his own 
funds on the new Metropolitan Opera House venture. He had subsidized the New Theatre 
debacle and spent $400,000 on the Russian ballet. He did all of this in what he must have 
perceived as a kind of service to his community, and he did so without exceptional recognition, 
publicly behaving as one of several board members instead of as the major contributor.199 The 
Metropolitan Opera might now be blaming the severe economic depression for its financial 
woes, but its leaders also never really understood or openly acknowledged that without Otto 
Kahn’s support, disaster could have struck a decade or more sooner. 
Two days after Kahn’s death, at the Good Friday performance of Parsifal, Mayor 
LaGuardia appeared before the curtain to honor the memory of the former president and 
chairman of the company. The audience rose in silent tribute. “Now, my friends,” LaGuardia 
said, “in his memory, for all that he did many years single-handed [sic], for all that he gave to us, 




closed next year.”200 The condition of the fund for the next season, Gatti-Casazza had quipped, 
was about as good as the City Treasury, and while that made the mayor “feel quite at home,” it 
also gave his appeal a special urgency. “Do you realize, my friends, that only 10 percent of our 
grandparents were privileged to hear good music? And good music and good opera and art 
belong to all the people and not to a privileged few.” How times had changed. “Opera must be 
maintained by the music lovers in New York,” LaGuardia asserted, entreating the audience to 
take ownership of a community endeavor. “I appeal to you to send your contribution, no matter 
how small it is. And you, my friends, in the parterre, send your contribution, no matter how big it 
is.”201 
The next month, Bori announced that the 1934-35 opera season would proceed, for the 
necessary funds had been raised.202 In fact, with guaranteed funds from Juilliard and other 
foundations, from broadcasting rights, and from individuals, the drama of the previous effort did 
not need to be reprised.203 With the new season now assured, the intractable Real Estate 
Company quietly announced plans for the immediate modernization of the theater. The directors 
authorized $325,000 for improvements including exterior work and new lighting to begin at 
once; a total of $600,000 over two years, financed by mortgaging the building.204 Cravath, as 
president of the Opera Association, felt compelled to note that none of the money for the 
improvements would be taken from the funds raised to save the opera company. Over a half-
century after the Met’s opening, there remained confusion as to whom the governing boards 
represented. And over that time, the only effort at the theater’s modernization had come not from 
the Real Estate board, the Met’s ostensible founders and the building’s owners, but from Otto 
Kahn and the performing company, whose efforts were scuttled and deemed inappropriate by a 




the building instead of getting out their checkbooks. It certainly never would have gone to the 
public to beg for help to finance the necessary improvements. 
The Met’s current situation now seemed not only regrettable, but unimaginable—with a 
diva, Bori, having to make pleas on the radio for funds, or with even more serious talks 
underway with the Philharmonic, to discuss a merger of the two financially strapped musical 
institutions. As with the Met, the Philharmonic was facing a suffocating deficit. Olin Downes of 
the Times surmised that “in earlier days there were individuals who were able and willing to put 
their hands in their pockets and pay the difference between the income and expenses of 
orchestral concerts—which never have paid for themselves”: now there were very few who were 
able or willing to do so.205 In the end, the proposed merger was impractical, and the directors of 
both the Met and the Philharmonic heeded Arturo Toscanini’s advice that the combined 
companies would not be artistically advantageous to either organization.206  
The Met’s 1934-35 season started in December with an announcement that it would be 
Gatti Casazza’s twenty-seventh and last. Kahn was gone from the Golden Horseshoe, as was  
R. Fulton Cutting, his Real Estate Company counterpart and sometime nemesis, who died that 
September, as well as Ivy Lee, who died in November. The headlines asserted that older patrons 
dominated the opening, and the parterre was filled with aging representatives from already the 
third generation of the original founders. “The new opera season draws an impressive contrast to 
the bygone years, when comparatively few persons saw the opera in the effulgence it now 
projects upon the social season of New York,” reminisced the Times. In fact, some seven 
thousand names now were on the Metropolitan’s mailing list, “a compendium that reaches about 
20,000 persons and results in an attendance of approximately 50,000 persons at the Opera House 




estimated size of the Metropolitan Opera radio audience: fifty million.208 It helped that in the 
financial capital of the United States, money would sustain and the latest technology would 
promote the city’s opera company in ways that bolstered its national preeminence—an advantage 
simply unavailable to Boston, or Philadelphia, or even Chicago. New York’s unique position 
thus helped the Metropolitan Opera in its quest for survival. 
And yet, with deficits for over five seasons, the threats persisted.  
After a meeting of the executive committee of the Metropolitan Opera Association on 
February 13, 1935, Cravath announced that it would not be realistic to count on presenting opera 
the next season. As a last-ditch effort, the eight-member committee, which now included Robert 
S. Brewster, the new president of the Real Estate Company, resolved to look into a way of 
reducing costs and increasing public support through subscriptions. Extensive cuts were 
unrealistic to contemplate if the quality of the opera was to be maintained; an anticipated 
increase in subscriptions was not feasible either, if the current high rates were to prevail. The 
only solution would be to cut salaries further, which would mean that European stars probably 
would not return. As for another public drive, the board was unenthusiastic, as were private 
guarantors, who were not forthcoming. “The opera cannot go along on its present basis without a 
subsidy,” the Times noted.209 But it also was clear that nothing could go forward vis à vis radio 
contracts or subscriptions until it was clear whether or not there would be an opera season at all. 
At the same time, Bliss, Brewster, and Wardwell, directors of the Metropolitan Opera 
Association, met with Mayor LaGuardia about his proposal that the Metropolitan Opera House 
become the hub of a projected municipal art center for the performing arts under municipal 
direction. The Met hoped that in exchange for its cooperation, the city might waive the $150,000 




president of the Real Estate group, Brewster indicated that his board regarded itself as the 
“trustees for the benefit of the people of the city and nation,” although the grandiose notion that 
the opera house building itself held such intrinsic value was tempered with his acknowledgment 
that the first desire of the board was the “perpetuation of the Metropolitan Opera.”211 
 Ultimately, the deus ex machina for the 1935-36 season came in the form of the Juilliard 
Foundation, which agreed to contribute $150,000 if the Met’s board of directors could raise 
$100,000 more. As part of the terms, the Met would adopt the Foundation’s proposal for a 
standard grand opera season followed by a popular-priced one featuring works in English and 
young American performers. The “supplementary” popular season, running through early spring 
and summer, was to fulfill an anticipated public demand.212 The action, to be a one-season 
experiment, was in accord with the spirit of Augustus Juilliard’s bequest.213 As a proviso for its 
support, the Juilliard camp also recommended Herbert Witherspoon for the job of general 
director of the company, replacing Gatti Casazza upon his planned retirement at the end of the 
current 1934-35 season.  
 “The director of an opera house has to keep one eye on the prompter’s box and the other 
on the box office,” Witherspoon believed. “He must know exactly what is taking place on both 
sides of the curtain, and he must see to it that what is taking place on one side will attract people 
to the other.”214 Witherspoon, a Yale graduate, physically resembled a successful businessman or 
lawyer, but as a professional opera singer (who sang at the Met for eight years), former director 
of the defunct (and populist) Chicago Civic Opera Company, head of the Cincinnati 
Conservatory of Music, and chairman of music at the “Century of Progress” exposition, he was 





“Democratization of the opera had begun!”  
Still, uncertainty prevailed. To Mrs. Belmont, “the opera situation was more than serious; it was 
grim.” As she had learned from experience, it was important to cast a wide net of responsibility 
for the future. She also looked for a way “to share in some measure privileges that had hitherto 
belonged to a small group of directors and stockholders.” In hard times, what would be the small 
donor’s incentive for continued support? Belmont thought that closer association with glamorous 
opera singers, attendance at selected rehearsals, and a ticket-buying connection might be a good 
start, along with the larger aim of supporting the Opera Company. In early 1935, she put together 
“piece by piece, a mosaic of various ingredients” and presented a proposal to Bliss and the 
executive committee. Her plan called for a membership organization with “specified privileges 
and services,” in exchange for dues ranging from $10 to $100. A portion of each membership 
would go toward maintaining the opera.216 “Cathedrals are built with pennies of the faithful,” 
Eleanor Belmont wrote. “A great opera house also is a spiritual center, a temple of sorts, where 
many gather together for recreation, education, and inspiration—a blessed trinity worthy of 
public support.” From this belief, her new project took form.217 
 Mrs. Belmont’s group was to be called the Metropolitan Opera Guild. “My spine was 
stiff with fright when in April the executive committee approved this plan for an opera guild, and 
authorized me to take such steps as might be necessary to put it into operation,” she wrote. 
“Democratization of the opera had begun!” she declared. The reality of the very possible demise 
of the opera demanded “speed and faith.”218  
Predictably, Robert Brewster, chairman of the Real Estate Board, inquired skeptically 
about how she anticipated getting members. Bliss came to her rescue: “Probably Mrs. Belmont 




in the Red Cross and in unemployment relief, Bliss knew the attempt might fail, but, in 
Belmont’s words, “not for lack of effort by the newly appointed chairman of a Guild in embryo,” 
armed with “a plan on a few sheets of paper, no more.”219 The Guild would offer privileges 
worth more in cash value than the cost of membership. While dues money, increased 
subscriptions, and gift money to the Metropolitan were part of the objective, so too was putting 
forward the sense that opera was for everyone. “To create general public interest came first,” 
Belmont wrote, “then to get people into the opera house was our aim.”220 Thus involved, the 
public would become, in a very different and modern way, bona fide patrons of great art.221 
 Mrs. Belmont was thinking big. This was to be a national endeavor befitting America’s 
greatest (and now, only) opera company.  It was important to obtain increased notice “not from 
just a few people in a few cities, but for a national art produced by a great national company.”222 
Even Adolf Hitler demanded “music for all” in Germany in 1933, and thought that three opera 
houses in Berlin by 1942 were not enough.223 Radio listeners would receive the opportunity, 
through membership in the Guild, “to share in support of the opera on a wider and more popular 
basis.”224 Indeed, Eleanor Belmont was part operatic evangelist, like Kahn, and part activist, 
befitting the times. The New York Times understood her view implicitly, and wrote about the 
significance of the organization in an editorial that fall: 
The Metropolitan Opera Guild, in its effort to secure a sustaining membership 
similar to that enjoyed by other great art and cultural institutions, started from the 
conviction that if grand opera is to survive, the many must become interested in 
its conduct and development rather than merely the few. The appeal is made to 
three groups: first, those who themselves appreciate the opera and wish to have a 
part in assuring its permanency; second, those who, belonging to this group, wish 
also to preserve it for their children; and third, those who, even if they are not 
operagoers, wish to maintain opera as a means of culture for this city and for the 




This was to be a national citizens’ organization to promote opera in general, and the 
Metropolitan in particular.226 Every broadcast listener was a potential Guild member, offered a 
stake in the Metropolitan Opera. 
 The Association agreed to finance the initial undertaking with an appropriation of $5000. 
Belmont invited a founding group of national sponsors to signal the Met’s broad importance, 
before presenting the plan to the public. On her list were no ordinary citizens: at the top was 
President and Mrs. Roosevelt, along with governors from nine states, Mayor LaGuardia, Senator 
Robert F. Wagner, and two hundred distinguished citizens, taken from society and business, as 
well as the Metropolitan Opera “old guard” and their descendants. As never before, the names 
Speyer, Cutting, Frick, Iselin, Juilliard, Lewisohn, Morgenthau, Steinway, Vanderbilt, Warburg, 
Mackay, Cravath, and Bliss were united in the same Metropolitan Opera cause.227 
 The Guild implemented Belmont’s strategy immediately. There was a flurry of activity, 
including several “at home” receptions for members with performers; luncheons with opera stars 
as guest speakers; an exhibition of costumes worn by opera stars; a dress rehearsal of Fidelio 
open only to members; and a special event at the theater that December, at which members 
mingled with the company and staff over an informal program and buffet supper. Within four 
months the Guild was 2,200 members strong, and the spring “subsidiary season” of opera was 
guaranteed. Edward Johnson, who replaced Witherspoon as general manager after his sudden 
death within weeks of his appointment, addressed the Guild with a call to arms: he was counting 
on the group “to give us the new element so necessary to the continuance of what is probably the 





The enthusiasm was warm, and the invitation welcoming, with 1,200 acceptances for the 
December reception at the theater. Paper festoons and balloons decorated the Met’s grand 
staircase for that occasion, and seventeen girls in costume from the Guild’s junior committee 
assisted the organizers. Lucrezia Bori took the stage with all of the heads of the technical staffs 
and sang a jingle in support of the Guild and Belmont: 
I want you all to join us as we go to work and build 
A bigger and better Metropolitan Opera Guild 
And when you see what we will do I know you’ll all be thrilled. 
The guild goes marching on. 
Greater glory to the opera. 
Brava, brava Mrs. Belmont, 
The guild goes marching on . . . .229 
 
Mrs. Belmont championed the “new and young faces” that were now seen at the opera, and 
appealed to members of the committee to interest glee clubs, musical societies, and university 
clubs in the opera.230 Indeed, Belmont, at Felix M. Warburg’s suggestion, had begun a separate 
campaign to provide reduced-rate opera tickets to “impecunious music students and others” 
thereby assuring the permanency of opera by filling every seat for every performance.231 The 
idea soon was followed by Guild-sponsored student performance days for students from all over 
the city and surrounding suburbs; the Guild was broadening the Met’s support base further by 
educating future audiences.232 Here, in fact, was the perfect realization of the Metropolitan 
Association’s act of incorporation: it was founded as a corporation for educational purposes—in 
reality a legal construction of Cravath’s not really to advance culture, but to avoid prohibitive 
taxes. 
 Belmont’s imagination for fundraising was surpassed only by her zeal for consciousness 
raising. The Guild enlisted representatives from department stores and specialty shops, urging 




supported the effort further, by mandating the Merchants Association to advance the cause of the 
Metropolitan Opera, and by extension, that of culture as a whole in New York. Mrs. Belmont 
addressed the merchants at a luncheon at which LaGuardia’s words were read: “We should join 
together, it seems to me, in making our city the greatest civic centre of music—or art in any 
form—rather than to permit leadership in this respect to be claimed by the cities of Europe. 
Could [sic] the merchants of New York join in sponsoring this movement it would be of 
outstanding assistance to the city and I should be glad to give you my support in every practical 
manner in order that it might result in benefit to the general good of our citizens.”234 
 By the close of 1935, Earle R. Lewis, the Met’s box office treasurer, announced that the 
efforts were paying off. The upcoming season had 28 percent more new subscriptions than the 
highest total ever recorded since 1919.235 In addition, it was an all-time record for a single year’s 
sales.236 The Metropolitan Opera Association was overcome: “Not only are the greatly improved 
financial results of the season directly traceable to the efforts of the Opera Guild, but the 
increased interest of the public resulting from their efforts has been a great inspiration to the 
management and the artists.”237 It was a tribute to Eleanor Belmont. 
 Threatened with extinction only a few months earlier, the Metropolitan Opera opened its 
1935-36 season in December with newfound energy and purpose. It had a new, young director in 
Edward Johnson, a Canadian by birth but wholly American in manner. “The worlds of art and 
society, business and politics,” wrote H. Howard Taubman of the Times, had rallied around the 
new leadership, as had the company, energized with a new youthful spirit.238 One of the first 
orders of the new management was the banishment of the “claque,” a centuries-old practice of 
professional applauders. Historically, the “horny-handed gentlemen” prolonged an evening at the 




thereafter moved along more smoothly.239 The Real Estate Company’s renovation project was 
complete, and a refurbished auditorium included new chairs and carpets, a new lighting system, 
freshly painted corridors, and an air conditioning system that would enable seasons during the 
warm months. Johnson hoped to build on the American public’s enthusiasm for the opera by 
reaching out to a wider audience during the summer season; he also hoped to establish the Met’s 
leadership in influencing musical and operatic trends throughout the nation. In sum, the success 
of the 1935-36 season would be crucial for the new management’s long-term goals and 
aspirations. “If it could consolidate its position, establish its prestige, it would be ready to carry 
forward to a memorable period in American operatic history,” the Times wrote. Indeed, a new 
era in the history of the Metropolitan Opera House was just beginning.240 
 Five years later, the Guild was still growing steadily, while in contrast, the Real Estate 
Company’s leadership was eroding. Whatever power or influence once associated with 
ownership of the opera house had long since evaporated, and it now hardly was worth keeping 
up the effort. Thus, in January 1940, the Real Estate Company gave the Metropolitan Opera 
Association the option to purchase the old theater at Broadway and Thirty-ninth Street for 
$1,970,000, the total of the existing mortgage ($470,000), second-mortgage bonds ($1,000,000), 
and $500,000 in cash.241 It was, as a Times editorial pronounced, “A New Day for Opera.” 
Established as a business enterprise while enduring as a social one, the Metropolitan Opera, with 
the help of the radio, now had a greater following than ever before, in spite of its historic 
exclusivity. To serve the broad public interest, the Association was set to mount an appeal for 
public support to buy the building. It would have to raise $1,000,000 by May 31: $500,000 as a 




 The appeals began immediately over the radio and at performances, and continued at a 
frenzied pace leading up to the May 31 deadline. With the impending dissolution of the 
Metropolitan Real Estate Company, it was up to the Association to “take up the option before the 
building is bought and torn down or converted to other uses before our very noses,” Johnson 
explained. The interruption or cessation of the theaterless Metropolitan would mean the end of 
weekly broadcasts, the end of educating audiences about the opera, the end of nurturing 
American talent, and the end of opportunities for musical students. “It would mean that 
Americans had fallen down on the job of preserving in this country those opportunities and 
values which abroad have been disturbed or extinguished because of war.”243 If the effort 
succeeded, however, it would mean that in the place of a broken-down elite, a populist, 
democratic group was rising, and it was strengthening the quality of the entire enterprise. 
 Over the ensuing four months, contributions at all levels were proudly announced to the 
press. On the first day came a $1,000 check from the diva Bidu Sayao, and a letter enclosed with 
a gift of $1 each from five young men who sold librettos at the Met. Many other Metropolitan 
Opera performers and employees—from its stars, to its chorus, to its ballet dancers, its 
stagehands, the truck drivers who handled the scenery, and its administrative staff—all followed 
suit with large collection drives. Professional groups, society women, even schoolchildren, 
organized other drives. Plus, there were an estimated 10 million radio listeners to be tapped. 
Lucrezia Bori once again seized the radio waves: “The operas have come to you for nine 
seasons—but tales of financial needs have not. The opera now faces a crisis that is by far the 
most serious in its entire history. It has come to the crossroads, and it is for its friends to say 




 In two days alone, popular response produced ten thousand letters with contributions 
ranging from $1 to much more. There were $1,000 checks from individuals in Colorado and 
Pennsylvania, another for $5,000 from Allen Wardwell, and one for $10,000 from Marshall 
Field. It was not hyperbolic to suggest that opera had become a “definite cultural force”—and an 
American one at that.245 The drive to buy New York’s opera house became a national public 
undertaking. In the first week of February, the fund received donations from a blind boy from 
North Carolina; from the grandson and great-grandchildren of the Metropolitan Opera House’s 
builder; and from four oil workers in Oklahoma, who wrote about listening to the opera on the 
radio at the drilling rig. “We heard a woman singing, which was something we know little about, 
but we got interested and took in the show and wondered at the beautiful music. . . .  We are poor 
boys trying to find some oil. Getting along O.K. and think the show is worth something so we 
are sending you 25 cents each.”246 In two weeks, the drive had netted $216,000, including 
$70,000 from the Juilliard Musical Foundation.247 By the month’s end, the American Guild of 
Musical Artists, which included leading Met singers, voted to raise $100,000 towards the goal.248 
 Affluent New York City patrons, who organized an “uptown committee” which met with 
team captains, all exclusively female, unanimously decided to raise $100,000 as well. Other local 
committees emerged in Gotham suburbs. So, too, did more groups across the nation, as 
committees sprung up in Boston, Philadelphia, Chicago, Cleveland, Toledo, Washington, San 
Francisco, and other cities. “The opera is meat and drink to us in the Middle West,” wrote a 
contributor from Hiawatha, Kansas.249 The Guild was galvanized, sponsoring local and national 
committees.250  In early March, a national Industrial Committee was formed, including among its 
ranks the chairmen of Coca Cola, Procter & Gamble, the Motion Picture Producers and 




Days later, the fund passed its halfway mark, with 80,000 radio audience gifts already in hand, 
and thousands more coming in. The Retailers from Greater New York organized a group of their 
own.  Even youngsters, whom the Met had not solicited, joined the effort. More than 10,000 
schoolchildren from across the country had made contributions to the fund, sending in pennies 
and conducting campaigns in their classrooms.252  
 Believing that discontinuing New York’s Metropolitan Opera would be would be “an 
irreparable loss to the people of the nation,” New York’s Governor Herbert H. Lehman sent 
$500.253 He was joined by governors of nine other states, and 175 prominent men and women 
involved in civic, educational, and musical activities from twenty states and the District of 
Columbia, served on a sponsors’ committee.254 George A. Sloan, the fund campaign manager, 
told a group of corporate leaders that “to deprive this country of the best in grand opera would be 
to endanger the strength of our cultural life and thus weaken our community life and make 
business—as difficult as it may have seemed at times of late—even more difficult.”255 The group 
contributed $130,000 to the fund. Even Herbert Hoover made a modest contribution, with the 
statement, “The opera is no longer the exclusive privilege of a few. The millions of radio 
listeners of the country have made it a national institution, and all of us owe to it support that it 
may survive and grow.”256 With culture blackened out in Europe, it was an American obligation 
to preserve it for the world, the former president reasoned. 
 In April, with more than a month to go before the purchase deadline, the fund was within 
$160,000 of its $1 million goal. Philanthropic foundations had given $83,457; the American 
Society of Composers, Authors and Publishers (ASCAP), $2,500; the Metropolitan Opera Club, 
$4,593; and the Guild, $385,871.257 With a gift of $50,000 from the Carnegie Corporation of 




$1,300,000, including $327,000 from 152,000 radio listeners from all over the country, Canada, 
and South America. Of the donors, 74 percent from outside the New York City metropolitan area 
contributed 38 percent of the total money raised.259 Governor Lehman said that “one of the most 
heartening evidences of the triumph of democracy” was the cultural and artistic enterprises that 
existed on a broader scale in 1940 than ever before.260 The Times critic Olin Downes concurred, 
with a reflection on the changing economic order: 
The whole transaction affords extremely significant comment upon the 
development of musical taste in this nation in the last quarter century, 
coincidentally with the profound social and economic changes which are going 
forward, peacefully or catastrophically, through the nation and through all modern 
society. The new opera deal was necessitated by the changing economic order. 
The rich, in plain words, could not or would not attempt, in view of decreasing 
incomes and greatly increased taxation, to carry the financial burden of one of the 
greatest opera houses of the world. In a rapidly shifting scheme of values the 
opera box had in any event lost a considerable measure of its social prestige and 
glamour.261 
 
If the Metropolitan Opera was to continue, it could do so only with the public’s support. 
 On June 28, 1940, the Metropolitan Opera Association, the successor entity to the 
Metropolitan Opera Company, took title to the opera house and became the owner of the 
building, which was still as antiquated as it was the day Otto Kahn first proposed building a new 
one. But it had a history. The seats in the parterre boxes, formerly a vantage point of social 
power but now but a quaint vestige from the past, now would be sold to the public at box office 
prices. Former owners of the thirty-five parterre boxes, of course, would be permitted to sit there 
under the same arrangement as was available to all other subscribers.262 
  Lucrezia Bori and her appeals had ushered in a new way of funding the opera, and 
Eleanor Belmont capitalized on her name to make such money-grubbing for a cause socially 
acceptable. When Edward Ziegler, the Met’s assistant manager, arranged for the sale of the old 




fundraising opportunity, snatched the “ten-ton antique” from his hands. The Guild cleaned it, cut 
it up, and sold it piecemeal as souvenirs, netting $11,000 and funding the launch of a discount 
ticket service for students and schoolteachers. “The following season,” recalled Belmont, “as the 
freshly made successor to the famous old curtain gracefully parted, a new era dawned for our 
Metropolitan Opera.”263 The original $5,000 board underwriting for the proposed Metropolitan 
Opera Guild in 1935 had remained untouched, and by the time Belmont wrote her memoirs 
almost two decades later, the Guild had raised around $2 million for the Metropolitan Opera, and 
had spearheaded the beginning of an endowment to avoid an ongoing hand-to-mouth 
existence.264  
 Over the course of almost a century, what had opera, once the aristocratic pastime of rich 
plutocrats, come to symbolize? The new manager Johnson surmised in 1935, “With the change 
of times there is a new perspective of what opera means to every one and what every one means 
to the opera. The Metropolitan remains unique in our national life.”265 With the advent of radio, 
and an entirely new way of thinking about the entitlements of class, the opera belonged to 
anyone who embraced it. Even pennies could purchase it. During the campaign in 1940, the great 
American baritone Lawrence Tibbett concluded, “If America has come of age in music, I say it is 




Navigating a Negotiation 
 
 
Selection as one of Caroline Astor’s four hundred party guests was an indication of social status 
in “old New York,” but it also presumed that one was not a member of the city’s intellectual or 
cultural elite. By 1905, the year of Mrs. Astor’s last big gathering, antiquated notions of 
exclusivity were on their way out. Knickerbocker manners and mores were becoming archaic, 
and Greenwich Village socialists, downtown union organizers, and the press itself were all citing 
the social elite as a prime example of “all that was parasitical and undemocratic in the American 
system.”1 Certainly, few from the old society circles were among those who had made a lasting 
contribution to the larger cultural life of the city by the end of Theodore Roosevelt’s first term. 
By the 1920s, New York’s once-inbred aristocracy had become, like the city itself, more 
cosmopolitan. As British expatriate novelist and critic Ford Madox Ford surmised, “New York 
will achieve its position—it has achieved the position it has—rather by in- than by ex-
clusiveness, and it is good that there should be a place where all sort [sic] of foreignness—all 
sorts—should be united as it were in a common frame.”2 What Ford found particularly 
invigorating about New York was its openness to not only non-natives, but to artists and 
intellectuals, whose work could be both appreciated as well as financed there. Whatever 
provincial attitudes other American cities might have harbored about difference, to Ford, New 
York was redeeming the country “far more by the cordiality it displays to cosmopolitan artists 
and thinkers than by the fact that it is the financial center of the Western Hemisphere.”3 New 
York was the place to make a mark socially, financially, and culturally. 
Moreover, the city’s cultural institutions for the public had grown out of private funds 




privatized economy and culture was un-American.4 Yet early institution builders also had the 
freedom to experiment with creating cultural organizations for their cities, even as they tested the 
limits of their social control and leadership. All it took was money. In this sense, for better or for 
worse, New York’s library, museum, and opera constituted a uniquely American and democratic 
form.  
 The dominance of new habits of mind by the 1920s and 1930s continued to challenge the 
old social order in sweeping ways that were intensified by economic circumstances. While 
nineteenth-century elites determined the city’s aesthetic agenda simply on the basis of their 
wealth, their counterparts by the 1920s had to negotiate a different societal context. The 
development of a formal, public cultural infrastructure for New York City may have been the 
outcome of old-school privatism, but trustees could no longer retreat to their restricted 
boardrooms to confidentially consider their next moves. Rather, they had to be attentive to how 
institutional programs appeared in public forums, and the New York Public Library, the 
Metropolitan Museum, and the Metropolitan Opera all invited public relations professionals to 
join their boards. With limited funds and fewer rich funders, institutions were forced to add 
persuasive and imaginative fundraising approaches to an already-onerous list of board 
responsibilities in order to ensure institutional survival. 
In 1940, around twelve thousand charitable, tax-exempt, non-religious corporations 
existed in the United States and, most typically, were guarded by old-line community leaders. 
Eventually, three factors would change this condition: the inclusion of ethnic minorities in 
economic leadership roles; the rise of a welfare state that funded private sector programs; and 
new regulations demanding accountability of private tax-exempt entities to government-set 




formerly the exclusive territory of old Protestant elites, opened up to broader leadership and 
diffusion of power, and with it different expectations, values, and professional abilities, in 
addition to essential new wealth.6 But New York already had been navigating this negotiation for 
years, and learning and benefiting from it. 
Furthermore, the former private-public demarcations broke down in the context of 
growing government intervention in the 1930s and 1940s. The Metropolitan Museum trustees 
were stunned when Parks Commissioner Robert Moses argued with them in 1943-45 about his 
authority over the museum expansion plan, and whether or not the city would fund it. Taking a 
proactive role as an ex-officio board member, Moses also weighed in on ways to galvanize and 
modernize the staid board, pushing for the inclusion of women, Jews, and businessmen.7 Old 
assumptions and nineteenth-century obsequiousness no longer held.  
In fact, no city cultural institution was immune from Moses’s blunt prescription for 
continued change. As forward thinking as New York’s cultural institutions had been, Robert 
Moses had always remained vigilant about the boards’ elitist tendencies. In 1941, he pronounced 
the venerable old Historical Society, once New York’s only museum, as “musty,” “sacred,” and 
in a word, “dead”—because of the self-perpetuating board’s lack of vision. In response, 
Alexander Wall, the institution’s secretary, countered that it was privately endowed and received 
no support from the city treasury, and did not charge admission. In that sense, it was none of 
Moses’s business. Moreover, between 5,000 and 10,000 people visited yearly—“surely 
indicating” to Wall that the Historical Society was not dead—although in reality such numbers 
were closer to the daily attendance of the Metropolitan Museum on free admission days.8 
 The American Museum of Natural History, the city’s progenitor of the private-public 




reconstruction,” yet the jointly prepared plans, according to Moses, were subject to “endless 
argument and revision,” and progress was at an impasse. “The waste of funds in preparing 
detailed specifications and then abandoning them hardly needs emphasis,” the Parks 
Commissioner grumbled. “When the officers, trustees and curators of an institution of this kind 
completely change their minds on such basic matters, city officials lose interest and patience and 
it becomes more difficult to persuade them to appropriate public funds and give time and serious 
thought to new inspirations,” he wrote.9 Reliance on substantial private resources was no longer 
a foregone conclusion as an easy alternative . 
Moses was a bit more generous towards the New York Public Library, albeit even with 
its own “self-perpetuating” board, which included city officials. While its endowment was 
“reasonably adequate,” it, too, required a large-scale renovation for additional stacks. “A very 
considerable question arises as to how fast city and library funds can be made available for this 
reconstruction,” he wrote. The prevailing financial division called for a contribution of one-third 
by the city, and two-thirds by the trustees.10  
But the issue was larger than simply one of financing. It had become one of leadership. 
Reviewing the case of the Metropolitan Opera in the late 1940s, Moses invoked Otto Kahn’s 
earlier failed attempts at cultural populism, while conveniently ignoring Eleanor Belmont’s 
current success in this regard, to make a larger point. “The aristocratic tradition dies hard,” he 
wrote, “and until the Metropolitan group abandons it entirely, concedes that the era of the 
Diamond Horseshoe is over, that patrons now come from the rank and file of people of average 
and small incomes, and that the location must be based upon mass transportation and proximity 
to subways and buses, there is little likelihood that the Metropolitan problem will be solved.” 




exploitation of these relationships by our museums will provide constant stimulus to them, and 
recognition of their practical value will result in financial contributions from business as well as 
philanthropy and government,” Moses surmised.11 
Ideally, Moses hoped that the election of future trustees should be so based on such 
connections uniting the past with the present, thus leveling the barrier between the curator and 
the outside world. “Such changes,” Moses wrote in 1949, “together with a more representative 
composition of the boards of directors and the aid from the city administration to the institutions 
in their present difficulties … can go far toward curing the troubles that at present beset the 
museums,” he predicted.12 
Ironically, Mrs. Astor’s grandson was among the more forward-thinking cultural board 
trustees who understood the spirit of the times. Earlier family munificence to the Public Library 
notwithstanding, Vincent Astor was known as “a hitherto unknown phenomenon in America: an 
Astor with a highly developed social conscience.”13 He was committed to giving away his vast 
inherited fortune for the public good. After his death in 1959, his wife Brooke parlayed Astor 
wealth and her social skill into a new kind of leadership in the philanthropic world. Serving on 
the boards of the Metropolitan Museum, the Central Park Conservancy, and the New York 
Public Library, she had substantial influence over institutional programs, directives, and 
directors. Over the next five decades, she oversaw a changing social order “defined more by 
balance sheets than bloodline.”14 By the late twentieth century, New York society had long since 
welcomed entrepreneurs, celebrities, and Wall Street tycoons who had bought entrée with so 
many millions of dollars that Mrs. Astor regarded herself as “nouveau pauvre.”15 But unlike her 
ancient namesake, this Mrs. Astor recognized that it was broadness of purpose, not a culture of 




Beginning in the 1960s, this new reality was apparent to anyone who bothered to look. 
Corporate interests now were seizing upon the old notion of leadership through cultural 
philanthropy. In the case of Lincoln Center for the Performing Arts, established from 1955 to 
1970, the private and public collaboration—of individuals, corporations, nonprofit cultural 
organizations, and city, state, and federal governments—was participating in an ambitious urban 
renewal and redevelopment project encompassing “slum clearance,” the consolidation of cultural 
interests, and the regeneration of New York itself. The program’s lofty commitment to high 
culture overshadowed the displacement of poor and middle-class people from the west side 
neighborhood, all to the greater benefit of developers and politicians. Nevertheless, with Lincoln 
Center, what had been surmised for decades was now taken as fact: New York City was the 
cultural capital of the world. The perception was not really about the superiority of the 
Metropolitan Opera, the New York Philharmonic, or the New York City Ballet, all of which 
were getting new homes on a sprawling campus; rather, it was quantified by a series of large 
financial pledges that set an unmatched new standard for cultural philanthropy.16 President 
Eisenhower hailed Lincoln Center not merely as a remarkable local initiative, but as something 
of greater national importance: “a mighty influence for peace.” In the end, beyond a political, 
educational, or even aesthetic agenda, it opened up opportunities for thousands of performing 
artists and millions of patrons.17 
The leadership cycles of New York’s premier institutions have continuously reflected the 
influence of local wealth in defining the city’s and the nation’s cultural landscape. Amid the 
diversity of ideas, opinions, and people, inevitably the most successful institutions, often at 
critical moments, have recognized the advantages of breaking down old social barriers to 




trustees, whether they have liked it or not, have been inevitably open to and experienced with 
this sort of pragmatism. 
Yet by the mid-twentieth century, even the Metropolitan Museum of Art faced the 
hovering specter of institutional irrelevance and board entrenchment. In October 1966, its board 
of trustees summoned Thomas Hoving, the then-current New York City Parks Commissioner, to 
the Union Club to discuss the museum. An art historian and former curator, Hoving less-than-
reticently observed, “The place is moribund. Gray. It’s dying. . . . The attitude of the Met is a 
problem—people think it’s inhospitable, elitist, and inactive.” The once-progressive board had 
allowed the renowned institution to come to a “standstill,” and it lacked a “crusading spirit,” 
something “all but mandated by the times.” Hoving felt that the Met needed to change 
“spiritually as well as financially,” in order to return to a position of leadership.18 An inclusive 
and forward-thinking museum with a modern mission might begin “to communicate the grandeur 
of the fifty centuries of art the Met possessed,” something it was currently failing to do. When he 
was offered the director’s job two days later, Thomas Hoving subsequently presided over a new 
and controversial era of curatorial redirection and trustee reorganization, in which structural 
expansion and “blockbuster” exhibitions became dominant programmatic undertakings. 
It was not that simple for the New-York Historical Society. Because of its long-standing 
privatist autonomy and lack of wider trustee accountability, by the 1980s, it had lost its way. In 
1988, as it faced bankruptcy because of board mismanagement that had eroded the institution’s 
endowment, the 184-year-old museum announced that it would auction off some of its holdings 
in order to avoid total collapse. Its president through this unsettling period was Robert Goelet, 
descended from a line of philanthropists all bearing the same familiar name. The patrician New 




deficit, or to launch a fundraising campaign, or even to support the idea of a gala party.19 “Sadly, 
the Historical Society’s former trustees, for whom a seat on the board was as much a given as an 
old name and old money, didn’t love it enough,” the New York Times accused. “They failed to 
insure its endowment or proclaim its treasures to the mass of New Yorkers—who might then 
have made keeping the institution alive a priority,” the editorial concluded.20 The lesson of the 
Metropolitan Opera’s institutional crisis and impending demise—saved in the 1930s by the 
“pennies of the faithful”—was lost on a board cut along aristocratic lines. It was not that the 
Historical Society’s leaders did not love their institution—it was that they were functioning 
under obsolete, nineteenth-century notions of etiquette and cultural leadership.  
It took more than the desperate measure of deaccessioning parts of its collection; or the 
appointment of a new board in addition to an advisory committee of influential businessmen, arts 
administrators, and educators; or a media outcry; or even the naming in 1993 of an energetic new 
director, Betsy Gotbaum—yet another New York City Parks Commissioner—to turn things 
around for the New-York Historical Society.21 It took money, and an unflinching view of how to 
raise it. First, Gotbaum set the mandate to open up the museum and to popularize it.22 Then city, 
state, as well as private financial intervention helped shore up the budget: the institution could no 
longer afford to turn away public support, and would have to open its books as well as its 
program to public scrutiny and opinion. A decade later, Richard Gilder, the New York financier, 
collector, and philanthropist, emerged as a board power broker committed to contributing funds 
and seeking the support of like-minded trustees of both sexes who also could afford six- and 
seven-figure donations.23 He also recognized the value of trustee diversity, and opened the 
Historical Society board to other important scholarly, professional, political, and cultural types 




gulf between Goelet and Gilder could not have been greater. Thus, a more relevant programmatic 
directive, coupled with a decidedly aggressive fundraising approach, saved the institution. 
It was a similar story across the street at the American Museum of Natural History when 
in 1993, the lawyer and former president of Barnard College, Ellen Futter, became the 
institution’s president. Her charge to curators and trustees alike was to think “strategically” about 
relevant exhibitions geared to a wider audience, as well as to ponder the city’s present and future, 
and what the museum’s role might be in that context. Antiquated notions of “dowdy 
respectability” and a steadfast adherence to tradition no longer could sustain any institution. 
Futter herself broke the mold of the Natural History leader, a position that historically had been 
shared by two men: a scientist and a gentleman. The New Yorker cheekily suggested that in an 
age of growing interest in biodiversity and extinction, the institution was wise to consider its 
relationship to the WASPs with whom it had aligned its fiscal destiny. Those Protestant trustees 
of an earlier time had financed expeditions, collections, and deficits, and made the museum a 
“formidable redoubt of ruling-class values.”24 But the world was now different. Arthur Gelb, the 
New York Times Company Foundation’s president, likened Ellen Futter to Vartan Gregorian, the 
New York Public Library’s visionary (Iranian-American) president through the 1980s, also an 
academic, and an iconoclastic and atypical cultural leader. Like Gregorian, Futter was poised to 
get “major figures in all classes of cultural life and business life” interested in her agenda. “I can 
see the Museum of Natural History on a Sunday having the same kind of crowd that the Met 
has,” Gelb presciently anticipated.25 In the end, Futter succeeded in looking meaningfully and 





Admittedly, all cultural institutions at the turn of the twenty-first century were riding a 
wave of financial prosperity, making institutional development and advancement less difficult 
than it had been in decades past. A new generation of philanthropists in a new Gilded Age, like 
the Carnegies and Rockefellers before them, were becoming exposed to the power of money, if 
no longer to create institutions, then to revive existing ones. Even so, and even in the early 
2000s, money could not automatically buy programmatic change. “If you’re going to get 
involved with a large, well-established organization, unless you want to go along in the way 
they’re going, forget it,” cautioned Gilder, himself known for shaking up his pet philanthropic 
causes. “If you think you can change Yale or Columbia or the Metropolitan Museum because 
you have a few million bucks, you’re kidding yourself,” he said.26  
Perhaps not. As some fortunes grew ever larger, what would it take, paraphrasing New 
York’s Mayor Michael R. Bloomberg, to help ensure that New York remained a cultural and 
intellectual capital of the world? In 2007-08, this tall order was aligned with the destiny of the 
New York Public Library’s $1 billion expansion project, and the question was posed to Wall 
Street financier Stephen A. Schwarzman. “We’d like you to be the lead gift and give us $100 
million and we’d like to rename the main branch after you,” Schwarzman recalled 
representatives of the library saying. “That sounds pretty good,” he nonchalantly replied.27 
Although the gift came without conditions, the library trustees proposed adding the Schwarzman 
name to those of Astor, Lenox, and Tilden on the Carrère and Hastings Forty-second Street 
building façade. The New York Landmarks Preservation Commission agreed unanimously with 
the plan.28 In all probability, with continued progress in the balance, the library’s early twentieth-




Over time, other institutions and other cities were inclined to incorporate the example and 
lessons of New York City’s museums, library, and performing arts venues into their own trustee 
initiatives in order to survive. Money, followed closely by trustee diversity and an eye for public 
interests, trumps all else, especially the pretentions of a social pyramid. And in spite of the 
changing global order at the beginning of the twenty-first century, the New York Public Library, 
the Metropolitan Museum, and the Metropolitan Opera remain titanic in the world—and standard 
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